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In

contemporary theoretical discourse the concept of responsibility

is

often found in the

intersection of attempts to rethink ethics of difference, enlightened
notions of

human

agency, as well as questions of accountability. This dissertation complicates the terms
of
these discussions

politically.

by exploring

In doing so,

this

the

meaning and implications of theorizing

responsibility

study disentangles the question of responsibility from

formulations that privilege accountability and from those associated with deconstructive

and ontological paradigms. Accordingly,

I

that without ceasing to

critical

be material and

formulate a

critical

theory of responsibility

and without erasing the “subject,”

responsive to claims of Identity/Difference, otherness, and suffering captures the

dimension of these questions. Responsibility
politically

is

is

political

thus partly redefined as the need to

respond to a certain predicament both as an individual as a member of

different collectivities, face the burdens of acting collectively, and

involved as a collected collectivity that
generates, as well as of

its

is

assume the obligations

vigilant in relation to the forms of

power

it

uses. Stated differently, rather than to approach responsibility

only from an ontological, or “analytical” outlook,

viii

I

propose

to

look

at

political

responsibility

from the perspective of

critical

theory by considering the historical

experience of genocide in the aftermath of Auschwitz.
In

major

its

conceptual aspect, this dissertation combines careful
interpretative work on

political thinkers in the twentieth-century
with a critical

works of anthropologists,

historians, literary critics,

critical theory, the

Great

the political theory of catastrophe, on the dialectic
of enlightenment and

entanglement with
civilization,

the

late

modem

critical

the

and philosophers. Chapters on the

Hegelian-Marxist tradition, Adorno’s dialectical-constellational

War and

engagement with

its

despotism and the historical coupling of violence and

import

of

historicism

for

a

ethico-political

historical

consciousness, and universal history, frame the bulk of the dissertation. These
chapters

aim

at

constituting

what Theodor W. Adorno, following Walter Benjamin,

called a

“constellation” of concepts and narratives that seek to illustrate the complexities of

theorizing responsibility politically, without aiming

IX

at

exhausting the question.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The

interpretation

of

given

and

reality

its

abolition are connected to each other, not, of
course, in the sense that reality is negated in the

concept, but that out of the construction of a
configuration of reality the demand for its real

change always follows promptly.

Theodor W. Adorno

Our predicament we

are

nowadays

told

is

one of

loss: the loss

of the idea of reason as a

privileged transcendent standpoint; the loss of an alternative system to capitalism;
the
loss

of the

socialist

socialist countries

dream, as

it

became a catastrophe embodied

of the former Soviet bloc; the loss of

genocidal wars and atomic weapons; for American
during the sixties and again with the recent loss of

1

And

yet

lives at the

liberals, the loss

human

sense of security and invulnerability in the aftermath of

of the idea of linear historical progress.

human

in the so-called real

1 1

life,

of innocence,

September 2001; and the

some cases

1

lost object

one can lose what one never had. But others losses are

real.

due

to

human

For a recent statement, see

catastrophes,

Wendy Brown,

,

especially while facing

such as terrorism

Politics

2001). Cf. Sheldon S. Wolin, “Political Theory:

Theory ed. Jason Frank and John

-

Tambomino

Out of History

From Vocation

(Statist

human

as

was

And

these lead to a condition of grief and eventual working through - which

are also told are “resourcefs] for politics”

largely

loss

most of these losses are not such -

2

still

first

along with a loss of a

Freud in his essay “Mourning and Melancholia” suggested, sometimes the
never there, and

hand of

in

we

losses that are

and non-Statist) and

(Princeton: Princeton University Press,

to Invocation,” in

Vocations of Political

(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2000),

The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient History (London: Blackwell, 1992), the
Judaism and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and especially Mourning Becomes
the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5ff.

Also

cf.

Gillian Rose,

essays collected

in

Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, Volume 14, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001).
2

1

genocide. (And in instances like these one
often has to mourn a loss without
bodies,

hence

the

irrespective of

striking

is

of memorial

centrality

that for the

and

monuments

which ones of the aforementioned
most

valiant efforts

-

let

“unknown”

are losses and

which

nuanced understanding of the

to a

political configurations that

in the twentieth century

to

soldiers.)

are not,

But

what

is

part this predicament of “loss” has not led
to a critical

reckoning with recent history, nor
cultural,

and

have led

to the passing

socio-historical,

of emancipatory ideals

alone to cast the experience of loss politically.

have been made

To be

sure,

in this direction, but often falling into an
ahistorical

ontological path that, even while ostensibly meant to be political,
ends up positing what
after the

Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas has been called a “new ethics”

that stands as

a contrast to the indictment against reason, or “the metaphysical Western
tradition,” for
its

role in the concretization of

little

tolerance for equivocations

some of

when

it

these

comes

human-made
to “reason.”

losses.

An

These

efforts

have

ironic stand for those that

are thrilled in highlighting the fragility, contingency, and non-sovereign character
of

human agency
without reason

but wind up in a paradoxical predicament of “despairing rationalism
3
.

This

is

a predicament of antinomies and theoretical stalemates that

is

sometimes confused with aporetic thinking.

When

facing loss,

I

shall argue,

to recast itself in self-reflective

it

becomes more imperative

ways. Loss need not lead

to the

for critical thinking

abandonment of

critical

thinking, or reason, and of the utopian aspirations that arguably miscarried. Instead,

3

Archetypical here

is

the recent

work of

Judith Butler on “Ethical Violence.” See her essays, “Global

Violence, Sexual Politics” in Queer Ideas: The David R. Kessler Lectures in Lesbian and Gays Studies,
for Lesbian and Gay Studies, CUNY (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of
York, 2003), and its expanded version “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” in Studies in Gender and
Sexuality 4 (January 2003): 9-37. For Rose’s characterization, see Mourning Becomes the Law, 1-14. See

The Center

New

also Rose,

Judaism and Modernity,

1-32, 37-51.

2

critical

thinking needs

to

reassess

articulations, in their institutional

critique: to

embodiments,

which

both freedom and unfreedom. This

and lack of identity of the

embody

that claim to

articulations

ground of

it

in

took, form and

immanence, and

simultaneous implication

other

words,

only

in

is

it

its

critical

theory.

As

emancipatory. In Adorno’s

comprehension of the

such,

critical

it

is

theory,

dialectical

it

is

institutional mediations

of

criticize these for their lack

also “relational,

concrete

its

ideal, as

the

would

I

historical

in turn,

might

moment of thinking.
situated.

Along

his powerful critique of both Heideggerian neologisms

like to suggest equally applies to

abstractions

also the

well as to immanently

Concepts, as Adorno suggested more than once, are historically

critique that

is

reason that precisely allows for a

to as the transcendence

Adorno formulated

historical

and equivocal, and yet also

of identity with the ideal they portend. This,

what Adorno referred

these lines

institutions

reason exclusionary, instrumental, and monotheistic. But reason

is

of positivism

and

in

rendered as discerning the

ambiguous, but

is

concrete

one of the tasks of

ideal, in its

its

their

of freedom and emancipation with the

these ideals. Reason

In

of

light

in order to fulfill

last task is dialectically

ideal

and reconstructive .” 4

responsive,

yield to

ideals

re-cogmze the mutual mediation of the utopian

the concrete-historical juncture in

identity

these utopian

its

-

a

modern-day Heideggerians - and
contemporary

surrogates.

Both

progressive and regressive tendencies dialectically coexist in tension in distinct historical

formulations of a concept. Adorno demonstrated this as early as the essay “The Idea of
Natural History,” where the dialectic between nature and history

the dialectic in

4

which history

is to

is initially

formulated as

be comprehended and criticized as nature, while nature

Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 4-5.

3

IS

to

be apprehended as

historical,

again

later

enlightenment in the Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

in

the

and

entwinement of myth and

still

later in his reflections

on

progress and on “subject and object .” 5 The
concept “reason” does not constitutes an

exception to this dialectic. Or as
relation to the utopian

utopia in

its

critical theorist

Susan Buck-Morss has recently put

it

in

hopes animating the twentieth century “dreamworld”
of mass

different eastern

and western variants: “There

is

no reason

to believe that

those utopian hopes caused history to go wrong, and
every reason, based on the evidence

of the abuses of power that propelled history forward,

to believe the opposite .”

6
It

is

rescuing the utopian ideal animating this experience that one
can critically discern

by

how

freedom entered into complicity with unfreedom, equality with inequality,
emancipation
with domination. But to retrieve this utopian
critical

theory

that

moment

requires a critical epistemology: a

immanently discerns the moment of transcendence from

perspective of the historical concreteness of

its

objects,

where

the

losses are pondered as

mediated. Buck-Morss captures this element in Dreamworld and Catastrophe when she
argues for the juxtaposition of images and concrete fragments of the past and interprets
these as

“dream images”

that

embody

past experiences and aspirations that could lead to

the rescuing of the utopian ideal that animated past experience in order to redeem

5

Theodor W. Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History,” Telos 60 (Summer 1984): 111-24;

Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. G.
Stanford

University

Interventions

Press,

2002);

and Catchwords,

“Progress”

S.

Noerr and

trans.

Edmund

and “On Subject and Object,”

in

Critical

Henry Pickford (New York: Columbia University
some length throughout this dissertation.

6

Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 68.

4

Dialectic of

Jephcott (Palo Alto,

trans.

interpret these dialectical notions at

it.

in

Press,

CA:

Models:
1998).

I

East and West

Loss can only be

worked through,

critically

rather than acted out,

“inaugurated rather than aberrated mourning.” 7
Gillian Rose puts
as a question of

learning,

the

new

nsking

to

it

“know, misknow, and yet grow”;

growth and knowledge as

fallible

well

that

Rose

calls] ‘activity

the description, and to distinguish

it

beyond

activity’, to

it

to re-cognize

is,

to

cover the ethical nature of

from the Levinasian ‘passivity beyond

crucial to formulate a critical theory of responsibility that
that avoids abstract

action for

its

openness

to “the other”

concrete realization. That

is,

thinks about

is

its

is at

either enacted

An

passivity’, the

account that

once ethical and

that seeks to centrality

of

One

is

political.

of

political

this question politically involves

that not only acts collectively but

predicament from the perspective of a collective

to this question at the

and compromised by the actions done

identity,

in its

name.

and

I

how

that

shall return

end of this introduction.

In contrast, in the

contemporary theoretical scene there

thinking, or the amelioration of

especially

and

to think

reclaiming the category of the democratic citizen.

how

she sees

and precarious but risk-able.” In contrast

8
idea of ethics as the ego-less substitution of one for
‘the other’.”

identity

when

ethics of passivity, this involves the “constant
risk of positing and failing and

positing again [which

One

by means of an

coming from

its

is

goals and scope. Perhaps

the precincts of what in the

USA

a lessening of critical

more

significantly

passes as “critical theory”

-

is

the terms of discussion are increasingly confined to the discursive field of liberalism.

From such

diverse figures as Jurgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, and William Connolly,

7

See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, chap. 12, and Mourning Becomes the Law, chaps. 3, 5. Cf. Dominick
La Capra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), and
History and Memory After Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
8

See Rose, The Broken Middle, 308-10 and Mourning Becomes the Law, 13-14, 121-23. See also Rose’s
Love 's Work: A Reckoning with Life (New York: Schocken, 1995).

5

liberal-democratic ideology constraints the
horizons of thinking. (If one where to
judge

by academic publishers,
cntical in

man y

“critical

theory”

is

a rather vibrant field, even if the status
of the

of these works more than begs the question.)
At the verge of the new

century (periodizations are equivocal) 9 what
Rose accurately stated in the period

immediately following “the velvet revolutions” found
the antinomies of

all

modem

state

little

resonance: “All the debates,

and society addressed since Hobbes, Smith, and

Rousseau, have been re-opened as well as the opportunity

to

resume examination of

the

connection between liberalism and Fascism from which
post-war state-Socialism has

proved such a dangerous distraction.” 10 Yet, as with her important
contributions
dialectical

and

critical

to

theory in particular, and to political theorizing in general, these

questions have been mostly neglected in contemporary theoretical discourse.
Rose’s
invocation, however, not only suggests an alert vigilance to what
fascist

Adomo

elements of liberal democracy, but also an invocation for a series of reflections on

the antinomies of the

modem

age, antinomies that pervade the predicament

and tortuously navigate. Some of these are nowhere more evident than
1 1

of exception equivalent

fascist

moment of

liberal

to the

inhabit

in the aftermath

of

to the utopian

See Eric Hobsbawm’s interview with Antonio

New

suffering that led to the emergence of

dreams, have changed in their configurations,

Polito,

Press, 2000).

See Rose, The Broken Middle,

as questions of sovereignty, reason of

and freedom, reemerge.

The conditions of domination and human

movements of contestation,

a

zones of war outside, thus conflating the two, as the

democracy unfolds, and

state, collective responsibility,

10

we

September 2001: nowadays, repression of dissent inside has increasingly constituted

state

9

once called the

xi.

6

On

the

Edge of the New Century (New York: The

but have hardly disappeared. Indeed, in
light of the complexities of our
current political
condition, the

way

loss

adequately respond to
political

is

it.

pondered and reflected on foreshadows the
Accordingly,

import of the ways that loss

critical

How

come

into play:

in their universal

comprehensively apprehends the new forms of global

command

it

albeit

great deal of critical import in Fredric Jameson’s dictum:

mourning

“sensibility of decadence, nostalgia,

is

historicized,

and loss”

is

“Always

11

deeply mediated?

differently, there

historicize!”

that,

12

after

is

a

Once
all,

a

not necessarily a historical novelty: these

and mentalities, and these are frequently permeated by

fin

de siecle proclamations,

this sensibility. Yet, in its previous

most recent European ancestor, the aftermath of

the Victorian era in the European nineteenth century, this sensibility

an “upsurge of renewal and rejuvenation.” In open contrast to
intellectual culture is

in a narrative that

one realizes

elements have been historically brought up under the spell of

historical incarnations, especially in the

In

attention to the often neglected, albeit

always presupposed, historical dimension of critical thinking. Stated

the present predicament of

the

and the ostensibly

capital,

emergent global public sphere, one whose forces are immanent,
that

is

and particular, local and

does one confront loss and render

These are pressing questions

What

pondered by the discourse of “mourning”?

is

which narrative does one render them, both
global, manifestations?

questions

possibilities to

one of despair. Writing

in the

its

was accompanied by

predecessor, our present

aftermath of the genocidal twentieth

11

See Susan Buck-Morss’s “A Global Public Sphere?” Radical Philosophy 1 1 1 (January/ February 2002).
See also Buck-Morss, Thinking Past Terror (London: Verso, 2003). Like Buck-Morss, on this last question
I
am also in critical dialogue with Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt Empire (Cambridge: Harvard
I spell out some of my disagreements with their
End of History,” Polity XXXIV (Summer 2002).

University Press, 2000). For a critique of Empire in which
,

argument, see

my review-essay “Recasting the

Left at the

12

See Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). See also
recent reflections in A Singular Modernity (London and New York: Verso, 2002).

7

his

century

it

perhaps impossible for

is

these catastrophes vicariously

13
.

Or

it

to

be otherwise, even

we

so

if

most of us only know of

are often told. In the

cultural critic, for instance, the short
twentieth century

words of a prominent

“was simultaneously

a century of

mdescnptible catastrophes and of ferocious hopes,
and often times the utopian ideals
animating the hopes ended up legitimizing some
dictatorship of the future (the pure
the classless society, the pacified

and

mass

destruction,

consumer

voracious

race,

paradise), turning a blind eye to persecution

exploitation

of resources

and

the

environment,

migrations and dislocations of whole populations to an
extent the world had never

witnessed before .”

and unfreedom
analyses like

done,

because the

And once

again, a critical analysis of the entwinement of freedom

in these concrete historical

this,

some of

14

which invoke history

experiences

is

everything but present in

abstractly. In contrast,

once such a reckoning

is

the oppositions are cast in a different light: perhaps socialism failed
not

socialist idea

was deeply flawed and

totalitarianism

was present

form; perhaps instead, as Susan Buck-Morss has recently argued,

mimicked capitalism too much

15
.

Even

so, the abstract conflation

it

in

failed

embryonic
because

it

of these processes with

the ideals of freedom involved in them, has led to an increasingly chastened conception

of both theory and politics that seeks refuge within the confines of

liberal

democratic

discourse while positing a purified ontology of politics. Hence, the increasing popularity

13

On

this point see

James

E.

Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust

in

Contemporary

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). See also Young, The Texture of Memory
Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Cf. Barbie Zelizer,
Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through The Camera Eye (Chicago: The University of

Art and Architecture

Chicago Press, 1998).
14

See the reflections found

(New York and London:
15

in

Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Making Time

Routledge, 1995).

See Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe.

8

in

a Culture of Amnesia

Of discourses

of mourning

understanding of the past.

paradoxes of

modem

twentieth-century

yet,

is

life

far

and

And

remembrance

yet, after the

are far

firmly

anchored

As

it

is

by means of the language of ontology,

it

is

The

history of the

narratives allow.

new

the call for a

is

And

ethics

difference, and identity.

probably evident by now, one of goals of

within the context of our current condition

settled.

commonplace

these

what comes from the precincts of contemporary theory

that is articulated

apolitical

end of such a century the antinomies and

from being resolved, or

more complex than

an

in

this dissertation is to

argue that

crucial to theorize, politically, the need to

recast critical theory in

its

universal and particular dimensions and thus retrieve

epistemological

in

order

import

comprehensive and
aspiration

liberalism.

particular,

vein,

it

a

critical

and thus bring together

of democracy, the
In this

formulate

to

latter

divorced from

theory

its critical

its

is

import with the

that

may

and

formidable adversaries, such as capitalism, which

particularity; a

is

the

that are often

predicament

that there

most universal ideology

economic, the cultural and the

in

is

such a thing as neoliberalism, which

world history.”

political are

16
)

in

which

most powerful moving force

globe has thus far witnessed, readily figures. (Judging from Anglo-American

“the

political

allow thinking,

and contestation, while facing a predicament of suffering and losses

one would not guess

once

formulates a conception of critical theory that seeks to

articulated within the coordinates of difference

theory,

at

contemporary coupling with

comprehensively devise patterns of commonality and solidarity
action,

that

its

Ours

is

is

the

political

arguably

a predicament in which the

deeply entwined - and to discern their mutual

16

Perry Anderson stands out as offering sobering reflections on this regard. See, for instance, Anderson,
“Confronting Defeat,” London Review of Books 17 October 2002, 15; “Renewals” New Left Review 1
(Jan/Feb 2000), 1 Iff; “Force and Consent,” New Left Review (September/October 2002) 9ff. See also, The
,

Origins of Postmodernity (London and

New York:

Verso, 1998).

9

mediations,

I

shall argue, a

comprehensive

questions of responsibility and politics remains
the last

liberal

two coalesce too

not

indispensable, otherwise

an abstract and ahistorical

to the intersection

our current planetary quandary there
Liberal

at

is

level.

And

easily with the abstract tendencies of a
colonizing discourse of

democracy. For in relation

nowadays,

theory

critical

is

much

of the economic and the

political in

sense in Perry Anderson’s observation:

democracy has spread by force of economic example, or pressure

by moral upheaval or

tended to dwindle, both in

social mobilization;

its

homelands and

participation and

mounting popular apathy

configurations of

power

and as

its

new

set in .”

has done so,

it

its

substance has

territories, as falling rates

17

that are intrinsic to capitalism

Furthermore, given

and

its

how

of voter

new

the

imperatives are consonant

with difference, locality, and fragmentation, as well as with post-modem
liberalisms,
critical

politics

theory needs to reclaim

comprehensive dimension and

of democratic contestation

rendering that

liberal takes

the

its

is

from liberalism, or

that is disentangled

not as one-sided as contemporary liberal democracy

precedence and the democratic

universality

articulate the

of the problems

is

afflicting

is

need
at

for a

least a

- where

the

an expendable coda. Also, as the sense of
the

present

becomes more and more

discemable, one has to wonder about the effectiveness of relying solely on the politics of
fragmentation and particularity, while dogmatically rejecting their global, and therefore,
in the present context, universal dimensions.

Yet the higher stakes of thinking about these questions
invoking a sense of commonality, which once again

is

discourses of difference, particularity, and otherness, but

l7

See Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity,
14 (Mar/Apr 2002), 22.

1

14.

is

politically reside in

often presupposed

seldom

if

ever acknowledged.

Also see Anderson, “Internationalism:

New Left Review

10

by zealous

A

Breviary,’’

Sheldon

Wolin compelling^

S.

multiculturahsm and difference

problems

at

hand

spells out this

problem

at the national level in a

here. “This impasse

is

one

to

terms of the politics of

in

rendering that resonates with the

which the

politics

of difference and the

ideology of multiculturahsm have contributed by
rendering suspect the language and
possibilities

difference

of

is

commonality:

collectivity,

compelled

common

action,

appeal,

to

and shared purpose.

either tacitly or explicitly,

And

yet the politics of

to

presupposition of

judges that will equitably enforce the laws; to teachers

who

will

sympathetically portray cultures other than their own; to social
workers

who

will

to

continue to assist the poor, the people of color, the addicted, and
the abused; and to

who

politicians

still

some

presuppose

work

culture

reform deep-seated, structural

to

of commonality, democratic

injustices.

in

its

Those appeals

practice,

capable

respecting differences and responding to their grievances and needs, and, above

notion of membership that
the

language of the

is

in

political,

struggles

for

anachronistically re-emplotted

18

Sheldon

19

Cf.
20

S.

Brown,

between

education in power by sharing

participation,

in

advance without any consideration

power and

a

equality

it,

and

to their historical

19
.

Instead,

these

are

frequently

20
.

Accordingly, in the chapters of
intersection

all,

centered without monopolizing loyalties .” 18 In the meantime

commonality are often ruled out
significance

of

ethics and politics

dissertation

this

by means of

argue

I

for

restaging the

a reformulation of the concept of

Wolin, “Democracy, Difference, and Re-cognition,” Political Theory’ 21(August 1993): 480.
Politics

Out of History, chap. 2

See for instances, Hardt and Negri, Empire, especially

E. Connolly’s accounts of the “politics of

becoming”

in

their formulations

Why

I

am Not

of the multitude, and William

a Secularist (Minneapolis: The

University of Minnesota Press, 1999) and Neuropolitics (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press,
2002).

11

responsibility. In this vein, the

order to

mend

argument seizes the aforementioned antinomies,
not

them, or freeze them within the context of
current invocations of an ethics

of cultivation or command; instead, these antinomies
need
contrariness,

rather

than

reconciled,

or

to

be rendered in

their aporetic

by neologisms, or neo-Kantian

displaced

deconstructions that leave the liberal status quo in place,
although refashioned by a

language, by

in

new metaphors

responsibility politically.

new

21

Instead, this dissertation seeks to recast the concept
of

.

In doing so,

complexities by apprehending

it

it

seeks to do justice to

in its different manifestations.

its

ambiguities and

This by means of offering

a constellation of concepts that offer “snapshots” of the stakes
of thinking responsibility
politically

- here understood

as responding to the suffering of

naked human

of the despotism and violence that has accompanied what

modernity

in its historical formations

For

critical

critique that can

theory to

do justice

to

fulfill

both

its

its

vocation

dialectical

from a reading of Adorno’s writings

it

I

thus offer an interpretation of his

and

its

call

that a formulation

is

and

import of his conception of critical theory.

Adorno

that

“Kafka’s popularity,” Adorno once wrote,

of

lines,

have sought

is

of

critical

critical

theory calls

theory that

is

responsive to these questions,

work along these

many

recent invocations of

speculative moments, and do so

that the tradition

the grain of

political

to

needs to articulate a conception of

definitely anchored in the dialectical tradition, and that

emerges.

we have come

from the Renaissance on.

from the perspective of critique and democracy
for. It is

life in light

due

to

one

that runs against

to reclaim the ethical

“that

comfort in the

uncomfortable which has made of him an information bureau of the human condition, be

21

Archetypical here are the works of Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty. For a defense of the political
liberal, see Simon Critchley, Ethics -Politics - Subjectivity (London and

import of Derrida’s work as a

New York:

Verso, 1999), 84ff.

12

it

modem, and which knowingly

eternal or

is built.

dispenses with the scandal on which his
work

Adorno’s view, Kafka’s work

In

thought while

little

attention

is

“is assimilated into

an established trend of

paid to those aspects of his work which
resist such

assimilation, and which, precisely for this
reason, require interpretation.” 22

without irony that Adorno’s work has suffered a
similar
praised

-

fate.

Even

if his

work

not

often

is

especially his aesthetic theory and the ethical import
of his critique of Idealism

and identitanan thinking - and has increasingly gained
some currency
political theory in the last decades, his popularity often
resides

his

is

It

more

in

contemporary

in assimilations of

thought to contemporary philosophical or theoretical trends
than

in

a

careful

reckoning with his complex body of work. In these assimilations the
scandal of his
critical theory, its roots in the tradition

incidentally,

supposedly

what

is

found expendable are those aspects

critical credentials,

thought that seek to claim
counteract in

of Hegelian-Marxism,

and

Adomo.

political implications,

It

is

is

dispensed with. Not

that radically question the

of the very same currents of

precisely these assimilations that

the scandal of Adorno’s

Marxism

is

for instance

another turn taken by contemporary theory: this time an ethical one. But

is

22

self-identity;

in

it

in yet

this turn to

displays an almost apologetic reluctance about

other words, the turn to

Theodor W. Adomo, Prisms,

1981 ), 245

found

not as widespread as the so-called linguistic turn in the humanities in the 1990s.

Indeed, in contrast with previous turns,

its

set out to

my reading of Adomo.

The disgarding of

ethics

I

trans.

ethics

is

plagued by uneasiness and

Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge: The MIT

.

13

Press,

ambiguity

23

And

.

yet,

within contexts such as this one

it

has become usual to invoke the

strong ethical impulse infusing Adorno’s
negative dialectics. But these invocations
have

frequently led to an obliteration of what
could be seen as the most scandalous
aspect of
his

thought:

tradition

his

unique theoretical-political engagement with
the Hegelian-Marxist

- deeply

influenced by Nietzsche, Weber, and the
dissonance of Arnold

Shoenberg’s musicology - along with his
conception of

reason even while doing so from the perspective
of a non-

critical

ldentitanan negative dialectics. (Kierkegaard

Adorno’s

deep was his influence on Adorno

day makes a

real declaration

that Sigfried

impulse of his work share in

work, as

ethical

a

if

it

is

was

thread:

’" 4

at all.

common

is

the

)

is

Danish thinker - so

to read the

whole of

Indeed, what most accounts of the ethical

a silence in relation to this important aspect of

an easily expendable

Adorno

book on

if

Kracauer once declared: “If Teddie one

To be

attribute.

impulse informing Adorno’s work vary, even

common

a

of his love ... the young lady will have

Kierkegaard ... to understand [him]

his

an often neglected influence, even

is

original contribution to philosophy

first

of a universal and emancipatory

retrieval

sure, the descriptions

if neglect

of the

of the scandal constitutes

said to be the proponent of an “ethical modernism,” an

ethical stance that should be seen as an non-threatening contribution to the predominant

analytical approach to ethics; or to be the bearer of an ethical

forerunner

or

precursor

of deconstruction;

or

as

a

message

thinker

that is seen as a

of Neo-Nietzschean

“generosity” that seeks to radicalize the ethos of liberal democracy (without however
23

See the discussion found

Turn,” Radical Philosophy

24

Quoted

in

Robert

in Peter

1 1 1

Dews, “Uncategorical Imperatives: Adorno, Badiou and

the Ethical

(January/February 2002): 33-37.

Hullot-Kentor’s

“Forward:

Critique

of the

Organic,”

in

Kierkegaard:

The

Construction of the Aesthetic trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota
Press, 1989), xii. See the discussion of Stefan Miiller-Doohm, En Tierra de Nadie: Theodor W. Adorno,
Una Biografia Intelectual, trans. Roberto H. Bemet and Raul Gabas (Barcelona: Herder, 2003), 178-195.
,

14

posing the question of their

own

complicity with the lack of generosity
of current

formulations of liberal politics ). 25 Efforts such
as

very un-Adomian position, one that does

little

J.

M.

Bernstein’s, for instance, lead to a

justice to the political and theoretical

impulses animating Adorno’s philosophical
reflections. According to Bernstein,
“while
the institutional forms of liberal

democracy and

secured what they apparently promised, there

them, nor

is

[...]

possible alternative, there

is

deficiencies as best as

of sync with Adorno

I

now no

economy have

we

s.

in the

Even

for not adhering to them,

One cannot

if at points

In other

Adorno’s work

to the

ameliorating their

think of a political temperament

more out

indebted to the aforementioned approaches to

pursue a different reading that seeks

ethical thought politically

is intrinsic

absence of a rationally plausible and practically

no reason

can.

thus far not

viable or available alternative to

there a sufficient reason to believe that
present failure

character of those forms.

Adorno,

is

a market

to capture the critical

import of Adorno’s

27
.

words, despite efforts
in the intersection

obliterated the strong political

in

contemporary discourse

of ethics and

component of

to secure a place for

politics, these attempts

his

ethical

have thus

far

message. Adorno’s ethical

"5

See J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2001); Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York and London: Routledge, 1992); and
Romand Coles, Rethinking Generosity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), respectively. For a
rebuttal of this tendency to present

Adorno

as a forerunner of deconstruction in particular

and post-

structuralism in general, one that does justice to the similarities and differences of both traditions, see the
collection of lucid essays by Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment (London and New York: Verso,
1995).
~b

Bernstein, Adorno, 4

27

Efforts in

Germany

to reconstruct the “ethics” that

Adorno never wrote

are found in the following works:

Robert Schurz, Ethik nach Adorno (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 1985); Gerhard Schweppenhauser, Ethik nach
Auschwitz: Adornos negative Moralphilosophie (Hamburg: Argument, 1993); Mirko Wischke, Kritik der
Ethik de Gehorsams: Zunn Moraproblem

bei Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993); and
Impuls und Negativitat: Ethik un Asthetik bei Adorno, ed. Gerhard Schweppenhauser and Mirko Wischke
(Hamburg: Argument, 1995). For a discussion of these works, and an important contribution of her own,
see Marta Tafalla, Theodor W. Adorno:

Una

Filosofia de la

15

Memoria (Barcelona: Herder,

2003), 44-66.

message,

I

shall argue, cannot

his reflections took shape

-

be taken in isolation from the
Hegelian-Marxism

albeit inflected

of identity and the kind of perspectivism

constellations, albeit

Fleshing out the
his

one

does not renounce

that

truth,

elements need not be done

latter

Magnus opus was

that

entitled Negative Dialectics

even

and

built-in

if

in

the notion of

considered as historical).

expense of the former. After

at the

,

is

in relation to his

its

most important

criticism,

total

all,

axial concepts

not only Hegelian-Marxist, but also politically
and socially infused:

are

which

with strong and important Nietzschean
and

modernists motifs. (Especially evident are
the Nietzschean motifs
critique

in

“cultural

“constellations,” “reification,” “mediation,”
“exchange-process,” and “the

social process,” etc.; notions inflecting an ethical,
political, and even juridical

message, but concepts that are part of Adorno’s constellational thinking,
and thus mediate
its

ethical

8

dimension ." This

he expounds
concerns.

it

And

in

is

especially evident in Adorno’s “morality of thinking,” as

Minima Moralia,

a concept utterly infused with dialectical and political

these are elements of Adorno’s version of critical theory that

I

will argue

are inseparable from the strong ethical motifs of his work.

But the rejection of universalism, reason, and
converges on one figure: G. W.

F. Hegel. In fact, in

theory, especially in currents influenced

by French

dialectical

thinking repeatedly

contemporary Anglo-American

post-structuralism, these discussions

have almost always become synonymous with Hegel, and, accordingly, unreflectively

"8

See Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to Theodor W. Adorno (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979). See also the discussion of some of these concepts in Francis Mulhern,
“Beyond Meta-Culture,” New Left Review 16 (July/August 2002). Reification, for instance, is a crucial
notion in the western Marxist tradition, even if its status as a “concept” is often disputed, and its usages by
Lukacs and Adorno is complex. The classic albeit hardly unequivocal treatment of it is found in Georg
Lukacs’

History of Class

Consciousness.

In

addition to

Unconscious. For a very stimulating formulation of the

different renderings within the western Marxist tradition, see

of Late Capitalism (London and

New

York: Verso, 2002)
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Rose’s book, see Jameson,

critical

The Political

import of “reification” that traces

Timothy Bewes,

Reification, or

its

The Anxiety

dismissed.

29

Even

so, there is

an anxiety running through these rejections,
one

of the master thinkers of poststructuralism
acknowledge, even
brush

it

aside.

And

this anxiety is

that

if the disciples

some

tend to

perhaps nowhere better formulated than in
Michel

Foucault’s very eloquent rendering of the
battles his generation had with the
Hegelian
legacy.

As

part of his inaugural lecture at the College
de France

- he was taking over

chair of his teacher and mentor, the Hegel
scholar Jean Hyppolite
credit, offered a series

May

'68

was

readier than ever before to

the rejection

it,

of cautionary statements for a generation

it

to

make

Hegelian

gauge

to us,

in that

how much

from

But as Foucault puts

elsewhere.

also the stakes of

clear:

It

perhaps insidiously.

which allows us

presupposes knowledge of
It

at

the end of

how

close

presupposes a knowledge of what

to think against

Hegel and an

our resources against him are perhaps

using against us, and

which he

;

still

a ruse

is

ability to

which he

is

waiting for us, immobile and

is

31

See, for instance, Robert Young’s founding text within Anglo post-colonial studies, White Mythologies

where Hegel’s thought
30

30

of

a real escape from Hegel presupposes an exact appreciation of
what

Hegel has come

29

far

costs to detach ourselves from him.

still

Hegel.

Foucault, to his

that after the events

was perhaps not only thoughtless and premature, but

moving away from Hegel were
But

move away from

-

the

is

For the most thorough treatment of

Hegelianism,

see

,

misread consistently.
this tradition

and

Vincent Descombes, Modern French

its

anxiety-driven relationship to Hegel and

Thought

,

trans.,

L.

Scott-Fox (Cambridge:

changed much in the last fifty years or
so. Already in the fifties and sixties scholars such as the Jewish philosopher Emil L. Fackenheim and
Gustav E. Muller were arguing against such misreadings that have proven to be very hard to dispel. See
Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) and Muller, “The

Cambridge University

Press, 1981). Ironically, Hegel’s fate has not

Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis,”’ Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (June 1958): 41114.

31

See Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,”

p. 134.
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Emphasis added.

Foucault’s awareness of the stakes in
moving

away from Hegel

is

entirely absent from

recent condemnations of Hegel’s
philosophy. These are certainly hard
times not only for

Hegelianism but also for universalism and

dialectical thinking. In

referred to as “late modernity”
political theorizing has

what

is

frequently

become weary of what

perceived as narratives positing teleological
understandings of nature and history

-

center

to the extent that

theories pose

comprehensiveness

abstractions,

imperatives/commands

is

are

at their

often the price paid for this neglect, as

such as the multitude, neo-Kantian abstract
and futunst

on behalf of the

Other,

or

the

“plurivocity

32

of being .”

Abstractions that often brush aside complex structural
dynamics that mediate political

movements

as well as the nature of late

modem

capitalism in

its

also very

coupling with liberal democracy. The only problem with these
readings,

complex

in the best cases,

these constitute rather partial, and sometimes bad, readings
of Hegel; yet, in the

is that

worst cases, such rejections not only lack a textual basis in Hegel’s
writings but also
attest to a total

ignorance of

this

complex body of work -

tradition that sprung out of his reflections.

And

the

let

alone the rich dialectical

same could be

said about the

treatment of Marx and the Marxist tradition in these discussions.

But some of the questions
hold:

What

is still

that Foucault

Hegelian that allows us

posed more than

to think against

thirty years

ago

still

Hegel? What are the stakes

in

undertaking such reckoning? What are the prospects of thinking universal history from a
non-identitarian perspective that situates itself between the dialectic and the speculative?

Can

32

ideas such as “Universal History” be rendered critically?

Here

I

have

in

mind

thinkers as diverse as Jacques Derrida,

Rose

constitute the

tradition, in the last

two most

fruitful

critical

theory need to

Emmanuel

Levinas, Gilles Deleuze, Antonio

On

the other hand, Slavoj Zizek and

Negri, and scholars of political theory such as William E. Connolly.
Gillian

Does

and original engagements with Hegel, and the

twenty years.

18

dialectical

abandon

historical

its

dimensions? Or does

it

need to rethink

its

traditional categories in

order to devise a notion of universal
history leading to retrieval of a

and

critical

responsible historical political consciousness?
In

light

dissertation

I

of Adorno’s constant engagement with
Hegel’s philosophy,

in

this

take Hegel’s philosophy very seriously
and immanently read his theoretical

positions on the possibility of comprehensive
knowledge and universal history

reading of Hegel that
his assessments

is

admittedly mediated by Adorno’s, even

of Hegel.

do so mostly

I

in the first

if

I

a

do not always follow

two chapters, where

Adorno’s negative dialectics provides a mode of thinking

-

I

argue that

that enacts possibilities for

responsible critical thinking and acting in order to
redress the perpetuation of the
suffering of

naked human

dialectical thinking

life.

and of

For not only does Adorno provide original conceptions of

critical theory,

he also poses the important question of the

responsibility of dialectical thinking in the aftermath of Auschwitz.
In this dissertation

centrality

and

I

thus offer a reading of

of his reworked understanding of the

centrality for

any

ethical

flesh out the ethical

and

political import

its

posing the possibility of a

By way

critical

Adorno

dialectic for his version

message derivable from
of

that seeks to capture the

this

his work.

mode of

of

Out of

thinking and

critical

this

its

theory

reading

centrality in

theory of responsibility.

of concluding these introductory remarks,

contours of the understanding of responsibility that informs

I

would

this

like to outline the

work. In doing so

I

only offering the reader a formal definition despoiled of concrete historical content.
other words,

at this

stage

I

I

ask for the indulgence of the reader as

I

offer a

elusive and schematic formulation of the conception of responsibility that

19

am
In

somewhat
I

seek to

defend. If the constellation of concepts
that the chapters of this dissertation
offer captures

some of

the material complexities of the
understanding of responsibility here put
forth,

the dissertation

would have

fulfilled its purpose,

and the reader

is

advised to eventually

reread what follows in light of the
understanding that emerges out of this work.
In the

found

in

Western

tradition, discussions about the

Greek tragedies such

meaning of

responsibility can be

as Sophocles’ Antigone Aeschylus’s
trilogy The Oresteia,
,

as well as in Aristotle’s

Nicomachean Ethics - which

is,

arguably, the

first

systematic-

philosophical account of the question of responsibility
understood as accountability. The

problem of responsibility

is

accordingly a multifaceted one: Aristotle, for example,

focuses on accountability and the importance of practical
Christian Augustinian tradition

with

God

good. Yet

s

is

not only concerned with

wisdom (phronesis ), while

human

the

accountability but also

accountability and the problem of evil, the latter understood as
an absence of

it is

within a neo-Kantian approach that current discussions of responsibility

are increasingly framed. This neo-Kantianism emerges either

freedom /necessity, which

phenomena, or

in the

in

Kant correlates

to the

two

by means of

distinct realms

form of abstract and formal imperatives. Indeed,

the binary

of noumena and

in important

ways

both analytical philosophy and deconstruction operate under the rubric of Kantianism -

which

is

sometimes a way

to sidestep

Hegel and the Hegelian

tradition.

the context of analytical philosophy, the question of responsibility

is

When

framed

in

presented in terms

of the debates on the possibility of freedom of will, the relationship between freedom and
necessity, the nature of choice and accountability

33

In this camp, the

work of Bernard Williams emerges

33
.

as offering the

most

insightful reflection, largely

and Hellenic periods. See his Shame and Necessity
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1993). There are many other thinkers

due

in part to his

working

grounding

in this tradition.

in the pre-Hellenic

See the collection of essays, Responsibility
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,

ed.

Ellen Frankel Paul, et

al.

From

the perspective of deconstruction
the problems take a different
form:

deconstruction

is

a tradition that on one hand rehearses
the Kantian themes of antinomies

and imperatives, but on the other hand
poses the question of responsibility

in

terms of the

death of the subject and the rejection of
reason, dialectics, and any other remnant
of the

Hegelian tradition. This approach

to the question places the

emphasis on the need

to

have

an unconditioned acceptance and openness
to the “Other” that sometimes takes
the form

of a commandment or imperative. In some
formulations the need
responsibility to the “Other”

is

proclaimed on behalf of the idea of hospitality and
an

abstract and underdeveloped conception of
cosmopolitanism in

the political aspects of these questions

these two otherwise mutually isolated

(Cambridge:

for an unconditional

is

entirely absent

camps -

there

is

no

34
.

which an elucidation of

A common

real

engagement between them

Cambridge University

Responsibility (Oxford and

Press, 1999). See also Jamie Mayerfeld, Suffering and
Moral
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Also located in this tradition
but
Marion Smiley’s Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries
of Community

New

combined with pragmatism is
(Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 1992).

Here the work of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas (and sometimes Heidegger,
lenses of these two) provide the primary theoretical referent.

Friendship

,

denominator of

trans.

Willis (Chicago:

albeit through the

From

Derrida’s corpus see Politics of
York: Verso, 1997); The Gift of Death, trans. David

George Collins (London and New
The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Specters of Marx,

York and London: Routledge, 1994); The Other

trans.

Peggy Kamuf (New

Pleading, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1992); with John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A
Conversation with
Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997). From Levinas’ see Otherwise Than Being
or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1998); Basic
Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996); Ethics
1997)
and
Infinity: A Conversation with Philippe Nemo, trans. R. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1985). Other proponents of deconstruction such as Geoffrey Bennington, Thomas Keenan, Simon
Critchley, and Rudolph Gasche have attempted to present what they claim are the radical political and
ethical repercussions

1998)

by

of deconstructive thought through the question of responsibility. Also largely inspired

body of work, John Caputo, Robert Gibbs, and Edith Wyschogrod have provided reflections on
that combine insights from some of the aforementioned traditions and from other figures such as

this

ethics

Soren

Kierkegaard,

Franz
The Politics

Rosenweig,

Walter Benjamin, and Michel Foucault. See, respectively,
of Deconstruction (London and New York: Verso, 1994); Fables of
Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,
nd
The Ethics of Deconstruction, 2 edition (Ashland: Purdue University Press, 1999) and Ethics Politics - Subjectivity, Inventions of Difference (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Against
Legislations:

;

Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993);

Princeton University Press, 2000);

An

Why

Ethics? Signs of Responsibility (Princeton:

Ethics of Remembering (Chicago:

.
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The University of Chicago

Press,

IS

the abstract treatment of the
subject at hand. Another

politics that almost

The

always springs from these

is

the liberal

is

a group of thinkers that have

contributions to the question of responsibility
from a dialectical or

existential perspective.

The

different branches of continental philosophy
developed at the

beginning of the 20 th century and that flourished

War

thread

efforts.

great absence within this discursive
matrix

made important

common

in the aftermath

addressed issues of ambiguity, responsibility, and
freedom

of the Second World

at a theoretical level,

are not present in these discussions. For
instance, thinkers such as

Simone de Beauvoir, Jean Paul

Sartre, and, arguably,

but

Theodor Adorno,

Hannah Arendt,

are neglected,

quickly dismissed, or absent, even though each of these
thinkers reflected and grappled

with the question of responsibility in innovative ways,
posing - and in some cases
anticipating

positions.

35

sometimes

- some of

now

the questions that are

Meanwhile, the only version of the
taken

seriously

abandonment of critical theory

today

is

considered to be “cutting edge”

tradition

of

critical

Habermasian paradigm.

the

as formulated

by

the

first

theory that

Yet

is

Habermas’

generation of thinkers associated

with the Frankfurt School, his neo-Kantianism, and the intriguing resemblance of
his

concerns and terms of discussion with the concerns and problems of the Anglo-American
liberal tradition that

target

35

An

for

one finds

deconstructionists

in his recent “political” writings,

and

a

bearable

important exception in relation to Arendt

is

the

ally

for

make him both an

analytical

easy

philosophers.

work of Larry May. See Sharing

36

Responsibility

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
36

For a survey of Habermas’ political and theoretical trajectory, see Martin Beck Matustik, Jurgen
Habermas: A Philosophical-Political Profile (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). For a critical
assessment, see Gopal Balakrishnan, “Overcoming Emancipation,” New Left Review 19 (January-February
2003): 115-128. Another important contributor to the “discourse ethics” that emerges from Habermas’

work

is

Albrecht Wellmer. See The Persistence of Modernity, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge: The
and Endgames, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).

Press, 1992)
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MIT

Unfortunately,

synonym

Habermasianism, among other currents
of thought, has become a

for critical theory.

The account of

responsibility that

I

set

forth

resembles the deconstructive

tradition insofar as responsibility is
understood as entailing a response, a
response to

others.

It

also resists the philosophy of origins
associated with the Idealist tradition, and

seeks to transcend the drive to identity in
these formulations. Here responsibility

is

not

understood in terms of accountability but rather
as “responding to .” 37 But the similarities

end

there.

Following Adorno, difference as non-identity

respected. This, as

I

its

emancipatory ideal of freedom

abandon and deconstruct reason,

work

is

to

identity;

dialectic,

it.

challenge the view that the

exhausted and therefore

is

we must

unreflectively

and subjectivity when thinking

ethics

and

thus resists erasing the subject. Like identity, subjectivity can
be criticized

from within the subject. Along these

name of

once retrieved and

point of departure and does not renounce to

Also, one of the main contentions of this

It

at

argue in chapters two and three, by immanently
criticizing

namely, the critique takes identity as

politics.

is

the ideal that

is

lines,

sabotaged in

responsibility of reason resides

its

reason

its

is criticized, in its

equivocations, in the

instrumental realization. At the core of the

self-critique.

apprehended from within concepts - indeed,

In this vein,

the non-conceptual

is

in their non-identity with the experience

they seek to capture, concepts open up space for critique of the status quo. These are
political questions, not metaphysical. Furthermore, the tenor

coming from

the deconstructive tradition seeks to extrapolate a politics from ontology. In

contrast, in this dissertation responsibility

37

of some of the interventions

For a discussion of the different aspects of

Pellauer (Chicago:

The University of Chicago

is

primarily an epistemological and a political

this concept, see

Press, 2000),
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1

1-35.

Paul Ricoeur’s The Just

,

trans.

David

question.

And

unlike both the analytical and
the deconstructive perspectives,
which

denve a conception of ethics and

politics

from either ontology or by thinking
analytically

about politics, a cntical theory of
responsibility thinks politically about
these questions,

and not the other way around
political cntical task, not

38
.

Hence

the aporetic status of these reflections

an apriori assumption. This requires that

this

is

part of

its

conception of

responsibility needs to be disentangled from
other conceptions that in their conflation
of

responsibility with accountability treat
questions of responsibility as questions of
guilt:
the former

a political question while the latter

is

individuals not collectivities

responsibility

is

39
.

mainly

is

legalistic

and pertains

to

Indeed, Kant’s categorical imperative notwithstanding,

a “structurally intersubjective” concept 40
.

Another instance where the
strangled

that

is in its

seeks

to

critical

import of the concept of responsibility

current usage in conservative rhetoric, as a
privatize

the

concept.

“Beyond

synonym with

question,”

Manuel

is

accountability

Cruz

writes,

conservative sectors are using the notion of individual responsibility
with the thinly
disguised aim of draining

all

content from the notion of collective responsibility

—

a

See Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment, chaps. 1, 4. At a meeting of the American Political
Science
Association, in San Francisco in 2001, Sheldon S. Wolin made a comment that ran something
like this: the
difference between political philosophy and political theory is that the former thinks about
politics

philosophically while the latter thinks about theory politically. Needless to say, this study operates under
that distinction.
39

On this point my formulation is indebted to Hannah Arendt’s reflections on responsibility. See
“Collective Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954, ed. Jerome Kohn
(New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1994) and the essays collected in Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome
Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), especially pp. 17-48, 147-59. Also relevant are the formulations of
Spanish philosopher Manuel Cruz. See Hacerse Cargo: Sobre Responsabilidad e Identidad Personal
“On Pain, the Suffering of Wrong, and Other Grievances: Responsibility,” in
Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Maria Pia Lara (Los Angeles and Berkley: The University
(Barcelona: Paidos, 1999) and

of California Press, 2001), 198-209. However, contra Arendt, the social cannot be bracketed. Indeed, most
of the suffering through which the humanity of human beings is violated takes place in “the sphere of the
social.”
40

See Cruz, “On Pain,” 202.
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notion which makes them uncomfortable,
as

disadvantaged

sectors

of society.

it

means

a costly

commitment

These sectors prefer not

to

speak

responsibility to the unemployed, the
sick, refugees, and, in general,

marginalized;

unemployed

rather,

they

to obtain a job,

provide for their

own

But what

is

propose making

it

of the sick to take

the

individual

their medicine,

all

to the

most

of society’s
those

responsibility

who

are

of the

of the active workforce

to

pensions, and so on .”41

the exact

meaning of thinking

responsibility from the epistemological

perspective of cntical theory? In Adorno’s
critical theory the question of responsibility

emerges

in

his

account of subjectivity from the perspective
of non-identity and

difference. In his reflections

on the subject emerges an injunction, a

imperative to respect difference, as

I

shall suggest in chapters

with the commitment to responding to suffering; or to put
a sense in

which Adorno’s philosophy

is

materialist,

it

three. This, along

slightly differently, if there

it

is

two and

different kind of

in relation to the

is

primacy of

suffering in his reflections. Indeed, Adorno’s critical theory takes
corporeal experience
seriously; the suffering of concrete

constitutes

is

its

human

material point of departure.

strongly aesthetic

-

the original

bodies, and the

It is

- and bodies

this suffering,

precisely in that sense that his philosophy

meaning of

aesthetics being a concern with the

concrete experience of bodily perceptions and sensations
objects

memory of

42
.

It

is

from the materiality of

- and from

the

reflection precedes.

As

are objects in both a physical and cultural sense

suffering that emerges in situations of unfreedom, that

all critical

such, this conception of responsibility has a concern for the centrality of a notion of

41

4

“

Cruz,

On

“On

Pain,” 199.

this point see the excellent discussion

found

(London: Blackwell, 1990), 13-30, 341-366.
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in

Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic

collectivity.

Yet Adorno’s cntique of identity
thinking

the kind of individualism that

coupled with the demands for
sohpsistic

Adorno emerges

reading, and in relation to
that

suspicious of

43
.

Without denying

full

the person

I

collective endeavor, and once this

it

that there

is

is

of a quasi-

textual foundation for this

might be a plausible one,

I

rather suggest

implications of Adorno’s concern for
responsibility - and

these might easily transcend the praxis
that

Indeed,

all

normally taken as suggesting

critical distance in intellectual
cntique, a picture

Adorno

does not capture the

it

is

is

shall argue that to conceive

Adorno

of responsibility

rejected, or negatively embraced.

politically

one cannot not think

in

terms that evoke individuals acting together as a
collectivity and sharing political power.
In other words, to think

of responsibility politically entails thinking about

collective action and collective identity. This, along
with the

the suffering of

naked human

question of democracy as
turn requires sharing in

it.

it

life ,

I

commitment

situations in

entails using political

In other words,

assumed because
44

political

power .”

of

question

this

this point: “I think

which responsibility

in

terms of

to redressing

believe, places the question of responsibility as a

power

to redress a condition,

one can only think of responsibility

from the perspective of democracy. Although with a different context
Arendt articulated

it

we

shall

for the world,

political responsibility

Bearing these caveats

have

to

which

mind

from the perspective of

I

in

politically

mind, Hannah

admit that there exist extreme
is

primarily political, cannot be

always presupposes

in

in

which

at

least

a

minimum of

proceed to articulate the complexities

critical

theory by means of reading

43

its

These charges against Adorno are often presented with varying degrees of vulgarization. For two
lines, see Tafalla, Theodor W.
Adorno 97-107 and Sheldon S. Wolin, “Reason in Exile: Critical Theory and Technological Society,” in
Technology in the Western Political Tradition ed. Arthur M. Melzer, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University
otherwise sophisticated readings of Adorno that nevertheless run along these
,

,

Press, 1993).
44

Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 45.
,
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significance in relation to
Hegelian-Marx.st tradition, Adorno’s
dialectical-constellational
thinking,

the

enlightenment

Great

in its

War and

the

entanglement with

of violence and civilization, the
historical consciousness,

after

Auschwitz

is

political

late

critical

and universal

theory of catastrophe,

modem

the

dialectic

of

despotism and the historical coupling

import of historicism for a
ethico-political

history.

the guiding concern through

27

The question of

all

recasting responsibility

these excursuses.

CHAPTER II

ADORNO

MARXISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND CRITIQUE AFTER

S

AUSCHWITZ
An

adequate philosophical thinking

is

critical ot the status

quo and

consciousness but

equally critical of

is

its

not only

reified replica in
itself.

Theodor W. Adorno

A

well-known tension within the Marxist

Hegelian philosophy.

Starting

tradition

from Marx’s own

relationship with the legacy of

is its

critical

interaction with the

Young

Hegelians, major twentieth century thinkers of this tradition,
such as Georg Lukacs,

Herbert Marcuse, Georges Lefebvre, and Louis Althusser, have tried
to elucidate this
2

Perhaps the main source of controversy has been the extent of Marx’s

relationship.

relationship to Hegelian philosophy, and whether or not

it

ceased, or

even transformed, as he increasingly turned to the study of

became mitigated

political

mature writings. This controversy has led to endless discussions on

Marx’s

intellectual

economy

how

or

in his

to periodize

development. Indeed, one of the attributes of Western Marxism, here

1

On

Marx and Engels theoretical and political formation see the
by Stathis Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx, trans. G. M.
Goshgarian (London and New York: Verso, 2003). One of the many virtues of this study is that it
the intellectual currents informing

excellent study

demonstrates the centrality of the French Revolution, along with restoring the importance of often
neglected figures like Heinrich Heine and Moses Hess, as well as Engels’ contributions, to the initial

On

the Young Hegelians and Marx see Warren Breckman, Marx, the Young
of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001). Still helpful is the scholarly work of Sholmo Avinieri, The Social and Political
Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

formulation of Marxism.

Hegelians,

and

the Origins

2

The

Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics,
Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971); Herbert Marcuse, “The Foundations of

classic texts here are:

trans.

Historical Materialism,” in Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston:

Dialectical Materialism, trans. John Sturrock (London:
trans.

Norbert Guterman

(New York: Columbia

Ben Brewster (London and
Press,

Press, 1973);

Henri Lefebvre,

University Press, 1982); Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans.

is Lucio Colleti, From Rousseau to
John Merrington and Judith White (New York: Monthly
Hegel and Marxism, trans. Lawrence Gamer (London: New Left Books,

New

1972) and his

Beacon

Editions, 1974) and The Sociology of Marx,

York: Verso, 1996). Also important

Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society,

Review

Cape

trans.

1973).
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understood as a tradition, has been
the appeal

Marx. Radically disparate thinkers
such

to

one or another

as Niccolo

intellectual ancestor

of

Machiavelli, Benedict Spinoza,

Charles de Secondat Montesquieu,
Jean- Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel
Kant, have
filled this slot,

beyond

even

dispute.

becomes

to

if

But

in relation to these

what extent and

intellectual formation.

so,

only the centrality of Ludwig Feuerbach
and G.

how much

is

That

until

is,

Hegelian

in

to

two

in Critical Theory.

important tensions associated with the legacy of
Hegel

Marxism, especially
present in

Marx and

for

for

is

Georg Lukacs and

is

a Hegelian, and if

For one of the most

the tenability of the distinction

radical “method.”

the

Hegel

influence played a major factor in Marx’s

what extent can Marx be considered

Marxism and

became increasingly important

F.

thinkers, especially Hegel, the question
then

when such an

between a conservative philosophy and a

W.

And

this is a distinction that

development of some currents of Western
the Frankfurt School, although

Engels’ respective formulations.

As

is

it

was already

well known, in the intellectual

milieu of the young Marx, Hegelianism was the predominant
philosophical point of
reference on the

German

modes of thinking

that later

on Marx and Engels would

Ideology. But the answer to “the Hegel question”

effort to elucidate the political import

“The Hegel question”

is

is

criticize in

an intrinsic aspect of any

of the Hegelian legacy for

critical theory.

usually formulated in relation to the opposition between a

conservative system and a radical method: a philosophical system that
contraposition to a

method

commentator suggested,

in

The

that is considered to

is

be utterly dynamic. As one

Hegel’s dialectical method there

is

“an

static

influential

infinite principle

development, an endless negativity into the future” while his system

is

in

anchored

of

in the

3

See Perry Anderson’s classic treatment of these questions in Considerations on Western Marxism
(London: Verso, 1979), chap. 3. See also Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept
from Lukacs to Habermas (Los Angeles and Berkley: The University of California Press, 1984).

29

idea of an

immanent

totality that is

seemingly more

hence the perceived need

static;

4
conceptualize the latter on a different
basis. This opposition runs

Young

all

way

the

Hegelians, Marx, Engels, Georg Lukacs,
and even up to Theodor

to

through the

W. Adorno’s

negative dialectics. In each of their
different formulations this
opposition has been

ambiguous and

relentlessly

the

to

torturous. Indeed,

safe to say, or at least

development of critical theory within Western
Marxism has been

Hegel’s philosophy as

Marx one

In

much

as

Marx

s

finds an initial

political texts

Marx’s

the early

engagement with Hegel not only

from 1842-1844

a figure that

is at

in his early reading

attest;

an engagement that not only proved crucial

the heart of Marx’s account of theory and praxis.

Even

in

be disentangled from the

to

5

it

often took in his system.

put the relation between his

in the following terms:

“My

In the preface to the

dialectical

Marx goes on

second edition of Capital

account of capitalism and Hegel’s philosophy

critical

method

from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite
opposition,

intrinsically related

in relation to the latter’s political theory,
as

Marx’s estimation, Hegel’s philosophy needed

mythical form

Marx

shall argue, that

intellectual trajectory but set the stage for his
“discovery,” or invention, of the

-

proletariat

I

Marx’s was.

of the Phenomenology of Spirit but also

for

is

it

to

is,

it.”

to affirm a closer link

in

its

foundations, not only different

But despite

between

initial

assertion of

his dialectical

method and

this

Hegel’s. “The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means

prevents

him from being

the

first

present

to

its

general

forms

in

motion

in

a

4

See Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel

,

trans.

John O’Neill (New York, NY: Harper

&

Row,

1973), 20n.
5

For a thorough reading of Marx’s works of
chap.

this period, see

5.
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Kouvelakis,

From Philosophy

to Revolution,

comprehensive and conscious manner ” 6
To be
central

Marx’s

for

of classical

critique

capitalism as a system of power, but

sure,

comprehensiveness

economy, and

political

for

his

is

not only

analysis of

7

it

is

the element of his thinking that
allows for the

re-cognition of the implications of
particular economic and political
dynamics as part of a
larger socio-economic system of
power. Indeed,

Marxists have cherished, not merely because

because

the

acknowledges

critical

import

of the

that the critical import

philosophy in the

way

characterized Kantianism.

that

It is

it

theory

is

it

is this

comprehensiveness

crucial for an analysis

cannot

do

of comprehensiveness

he sought

to

without

is

it .

that

many

of capitalism but

Marx

readily

already present in Hegel’s

transcend the oppositional thinking that

also present in Hegel’s critique of the refusal
to think the

relatedness of the concepts with which

we

approach the world and the world

is

thus rightly credited for having presented the dialectical

if

he did so within the confines of an

Marxism’s self-conscious

itself.

Hegel

method comprehensively, even

idealist system.

relation to

Hegel found more

explicit formulation in

Engels’ well-known description: “the whole dogmatic content of the
Hegelian system

declared absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method which
dissolves
,

is

all

g

dogmatism.” The method

method

is

is

thus explicitly contrasted with the system: in Hegel a radical

supposedly entangled with a conservative system. Indeed,

in their respective

6

Karl Marx, Capital:

A

Critique of Political Economy, Volume

/,

trans.

Ben Fowkes (Harmonds worth,

Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1990), 102-03.
7

Relatively recent statements along these lines are found in the works of historical anthropologists and

Two fine examples are found in Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Los
Angeles and Berkley: The University of California Press, 1982); and David Harvey, The Limits to Capital
(London and New York: Verso, 1999).
geographers.

8

Engels as cited by Gillian Rose. See The Melancholy Science:
W. Adorno

(New York: Columbia

University Press, 1978), 57.
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An

Introduction to the Thought of Theodor

appreciations of Hegel, both

Marx and Engels suggest

philosophy could presumably be disentangled:
(dialectics) could

will eventually

that

that these

two aspects of Hegel’s

a radical and dynamic method

is,

be turned against the system. This amounts
to an immanent critique

undo Hegel’s pretension

to devise a system. In other words,
the

that

method

could be retrieved while the aspirations to
a system of philosophy, as Hegel
expounded
in his writings,

critical

could be

And once

behind.

the system

rendered disposable, a

is

theory of society might spring from the dialectical
method.

Even

and despite the

so,

volume of Capital
the idea of the

somewhat
object.

left

it

the structure of the

statements of

work

Marx

differently, the dialectical

contradictions that

of the

to

method

in the preface to the first

itself dispenses, in

method being an independent foundation from

According

contrast

,

critical

is

the thing

the thing in itself and

Marx, “the movement of capitalist society

Marx

dialectically

universal

and

expounds by means of a

particular

Hegelian fashion, with

within

it

is

is full

not external to

its

of contradictions,”

dialectical

capitalist

analyzes. Stated

and speculative

society,

and

does

so

9

comprehensively.
capitalism via the

dynamics

this dialectical

commodity

rendering that allows

as

dialectical

a

social

Marx

to start his analysis

structure of the system, and thus explore

as an economic, as well as social-cultural,

comprehensive
capitalism

It is

approach
process.

comprehensively expounded, and the

is

what makes

Thus

mode of life and
it

possible for

understood,

structural relations

between the

intrinsic

production. Such a

Marx

different

its

of

to

understand

relations

political

can

be

economy

9

Marx, Capital, 103. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York, NY: Humanities
I have found Gillian Rose’s treatment of this question particularly helpful, especially in
her Hegel Contra Sociology (London: The Anthlone Press, 1981). See also Rose’s essay “From Speculative
Press, 1969), 54.

to Dialectical Thinking,” in

Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,

1993).

32

and the sphere of the juridical and
the
complexity. Marx’s analysis of capitalism
In

Marx,

dialectical thinking

the contradictions of material

capitalism as a social process

political

is

can be dialectically rendered

thus thoroughly dialectical .'

in their

0

emerges as the most comprehensive way

to depict

experience in thought, while cognitively
expounding

whose

basis

found

is

in its contradictions.

One

specific

instance of the entwinement between
dialectical thinking and capitalism as
a social

process based on contradictions that further illustrates
this point

known

analysis of

commodity

fetishism. For

is

found

in

Marx’s well-

Marx, the commodity- form

is

“the most

general and the most undeveloped form of bourgeois
production,” one that antecedes
capitalism but

is,

nonetheless, intrinsic to

it.

After penetrating

goes on to disclose what he considers to be a simple
often obscured within capitalism:

to the

social aspect.

market and perform exchanges

carried

is

its

on by individuals.

By

able to discern not only the

in their

own

fact

its

“fetish character,”

of the commodity- form

Marx

that is

“Commodities cannot themselves go
right,”

Marx

writes; this

is

a process

broaching the social aspect of the commodity-form, Marx

way

in

which the commodity-form

is

constitutive of the

abstract exchange process that takes place within capitalism, but can link this analysis to
the liberal “juridical relation” that also constitutes the exchange process.

Marx, individuals become part of the exchange process, and

According

to

are, in turn, abstract “bearers

of these economic relations” of commodities, which correlates with the identity principle

i°

On
(

the dialectical structure of Capital, as well as

Forshung ) and

his

mode of

presentation

on

the difference

between Marx’s mode of inquiry

( Darstellung ) see Alfred Schmidt, History and Structure: An

Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History, trans. Jeffrey Herf (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1981), especially pp. 29-67. See also The Concept of Nature in Marx, trans. Ben Fowkes (London:
New Left Books, 1971). My reading of Marx’s Capital is indebted to Schmidt’s texts.
n

Marx, Capital, 178.
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that

informs the equally abstract

to criticism in his essay

“On

liberal discourse

of rights that he vehemently subjected

the Jewish Question.” All these relations,
and structural

determinations, take place “through the agency of
the social process”; a process that these
2

relations also mediate,

(total

social

and further constitute .'

process)

and

the

By

particular

dialectically positing the universal

commodity-form),

(the

Marx

can

comprehensively discern the structural relations mediating both
of them, and can
speculatively render capitalism as a social process.
his point

of departure, Marx not only

form, but also casts

it

in terms

spells out

its

And by taking

the

origins and

evolution to

its

of the social process of which

it

is

commodity-form

its

political

read against the experience these constitute and unfulfilled

promises of emancipation can be

critically discerned.

Yet another instance of the profound significance of
critique of political

present

a part, thus critically

illuminating both. In doing so, the abstractness of both liberal ideology
and

economy can be immanently

its

as

economy

is

dialectics in

Marx’s mature

found in his important analysis of the relationship

between production and consumption within capitalism
the Grundisse. In contrast with the classic economists,

in

one of the

Marx

drafts

of Capital

resists separating these

,

two

realms. Rather, he proceeds to dialectically, and speculatively, present the opposition

between these two concepts

in order to

show

their

mutual mediation as part of the social

12

Marx, Capital, 180.

On

the questions of rights, the locus classicus

is

the aforementioned essay

“On

the Jewish Question.” For

of Marx’s analysis in
contemporary liberal discourse of rights, see Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and
Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). For an incisive critique of
the limits of Marx’s treatment of the question of emancipation and recognition in this essay, see Patchen
a provocative reading of this essay that attests to the critical

and

political import

relation to the

Marked, Bound By Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University

34

Press, 2003), 127-38.

process.

Marx’s

dialectical rendering

constitutive substratum of the other

-

of the two “oppositions” need not posit
one as a

there

is

no primacy conferred

instead, renders explicit the mutual mediation
of

one process

to either term.

in relation to the other; a

mediation that takes place within a social process,
and further constitutes
process, as such, can only be discerned speculatively,

Once rendered

this

moments of one
reach

is

Marx,

it.

This social

by means of the notion of totality.

way, both production and consumption “appear

any case

in

as

5

Thus both

process.”

are apprehended differently:

“The conclusion we

not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption
are identical, but

that they all

form the members of a

Marx’s protestation

totality, distinctions

to the contrary, as

I

argue in the next chapter, this

the Hegelian concept of totality, one that not only expounds
also strives to

comprehend these speculatively

^

within unity

its

is

basically

parts dialectically, but that

as part of the totality that capitalism

is,

as

17

a process.

Still, it is

important to bear in mind that Marx’s conception of

posited metaphysically or from the Hegelian perspective of Spirit

(

totality is not

Geistf rather,

it

is

a

sociological, politically infused, rendering of capitalism that seeks to comprehensively

apprehend

it,

and thus offer a

Grundisse, “Capital

is

critical

theory of

the all-dominating

its

workings. Or, as he states

economic power of bourgeois

society.

it

in the

It

must

form the starting-point as well as the finishing-point, and must be dealt with before

Karl Marx, Grundisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy

(London, UK: Penguin Books, 1993), 91.
15

Marx, Grundisse 94.
,

16

Marx, Grundrisse., 99.

The

best discussion of this point

is

found in Schmidt’s History and Structure.
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,

trans.

Martin Nicolaus

landed property. After both
[capital and landed property]
have been examined
particular, their interrelation

must be examined.”

But as already mentioned,

in contrast

with subsequent engagements with
Hegel’s

philosophy, in particular with that of Adorno,
theory.

When combined

Revolution and

its

with his

Marx took very

seriously Hegel’s political

engagement with the legacy of

critical

emancipatory promise,

is

it

easily discemable

with an overly conceptual formulation of the
proletariat

in

the French

how Marx ended up

the Critique of Hegel’s

Philosophy of Right: Introduction (1844). Thus, the
question of Marx’s complex

Hegel cannot be reduced

to

distinction

to

so-called

epistemological breaks,

Right, and did so

Marx
.

proletariat sprung

to his critique

if the

Germany,

of Hegel’s Philosophy of

in a philosophical discourse” (this in sharp contrast with

from his

political

rich,

conception of the working

class),

and philosophical engagement with Hegel’s

19

.

Thus Marx put forward a conception of agency and revolutionary

political theory.

action

enveloped

contemporaneous, yet sociologically

s

alone to the

to posit the proletariat as a revolutionary subject,
in

towards the end of his classic “Introduction”

Engels

let

relation

between an early humanist and an older mature economist.
Rather,

young Marx proceeded

in

embedded

in the

imaginary inaugurated

as his unfinished Capital, does not

seem

awesome forms of power of capitalism.

in

in 1789,

one

that later on, in writings such

sync with the rapid transformation and new

20

Hence

the centrality of the legacy of the French

18

Marx, Grundisse 107.
,

19

See Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 330.
years of Marx’s formation in the next paragraphs

is

On

Engels, see chap. 4.

indebted to

My discussion of these crucial

this study.

20

Sathis Kouvelakis offers a different rendering of Marx’s invocation of the proletariat and
the

French Revolution.

He

writes:

“To name

the ‘proletariat’, rather than describe

36

its

its

relation to

‘condition’, and to

Revolution, which along with Marx’s critique
of Hegel’s discussion of the relationship

between the

means of

state

and

civil society,

his theorization

political theory,

of the

informed his conception of
proletariat,

Marx

political praxis. Still,

by

clearly broke

away from Hegel’s

something that was prefigured by Marx’s concern,

in his articles for the

journal Rheinische Zeitung, with the transition
from civil society to state; again, not
incidentally, a Hegelian question. Also,

even when Marx provided a more sociological

conception of the proletariat, he could not escape the
imaginary of popular struggle
inaugurated in 1789:

not only does the figure of the proletariat evokes images
of the

sans-coulottes and the Third Estate, but as

Marx

increasingly

moved away from

political

concerns — the question of publicity and democracy figures largely

analysis

-

his early

in his early

the proletariat eventually disappeared, almost suggesting that
once

Marx

apprehended the magnitude of capitalism as a system of power, he could not conceive
of
a revolutionary subject to

from Hegel.

On

Marx’s

concern with

identify

later

it

match

its

power.

Yet

hardly represented a

this

the contrary, even if Hegel’s political theory

political

economy

is

move away

mercilessly criticized, and

represents a displacement of these questions,

with the negativity of a non class which reveals the antagonism inherent in bourgeois society,
it as a massive empirical fact destined to be absorbed by the ideal figure of human

rather than treating

plenitude

- what does

this

come down

to, if

practice that has yet to be constructed and,

and Revolution 350. And
,

of action

it

not calling, in the performative mode, for a type of political

more importantly,

yet, for all its performativity,

involves, he had in

to

be thought?” See Koulevakis, Philosophy

when Marx

mind what Koulevakis elsewhere

refers to the proletariat,

and

to the ideal

refers to as “the discursive matrix of the

sans-culottes" (340). For a discussion of these issues in Marx, and the subsequent pessimism on the
S. Wolin, “On Reading Marx Politically,”
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University

prospects for revolutionary action in his later years, see Sheldon
in

Marxism: Nomos XXVI,

ed.

J.

Press, 1983).
21

See Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 236; Wolin, “On Reading Marx
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Politically,” 96ff.

as

I

argued above, the investigations of capitalism
were informed by an engagement with

Hegel -

albeit the

Even

Hegel of theoretical philosophy, the Hegel of
the Science of Logic

so, the question

of the

political practice that should

go along with the

of capitalism has been a subject of contention
within Marxism ever

critique

22

since. In the

twentieth century, with the reemergence of what
Perry Anderson has called the “classical
tradition

-

out

-

figures such as Vladimir

I.

Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Leon Trotsky stand

these questions were once again posed, as the unity
of theory and practice

central concern in light

As

part

on

his theory,

of

of the revolutionary process

this tradition, analyses

were put forward

and imperialism

that

were

a
2'

that at the time

of capitalism, anchored

in order to

was

account for the

intrinsic to the capitalist

in

seemed imminent.

Marx and seeking

to

expand

new dynamics of accumulation

mode of

production in the then

nascent century, important works such as Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation
of

Capital and Paul Sweezy’s The Theory of Capitalist Development

from

this tradition.

seemed

Meanwhile,

in the writings

,

among

of Lenin “a Marxist

others, sprung

political theory”

24

to

appear for the

“Whereas the economic

first

In

Anderson’s sympathetic representation,

studies of the period could build directly

foundations of Capital neither
,

of concepts for the

time.

on the imposing

Marx nor Engels had bequeathed any comparable corpus
25

political strategies

and

tactics

of the proletarian revolution.”

See the discussion in Schmidt, History and Structure, 61-66.

See Anderson, Considerations, 1-23.

Anderson, Considerations,

8.

Anderson, Considerations,

12.
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Yet the “political” of

emphasis on “strategies and
revolutionary subject.

was subsumed

political

that,

And

not without irony,

the proletanat

this

political

is

hardly self-evident. Also, the

tactics” takes for granted the
existence

of the

proletariat as a

as the case of Len.n suggests,
in these theorizations the

into the discourse

was

theory

of organization (“Fordism,” among
others)

also an intrinsic part of capitalist
ideology.

were thus reduced

to

The workings of

an organizational activity carried on by a
vanguard

26

party.

Luxemburg’s wntings on

paradoxical exception

the Russian Revolution are a partial
and

- even while defending

somewhat

the decentralized political practice of

associations and councils, she sometimes reverted to
organizational imperatives as her

argument

for the centralization

of agricultural policy suggests.

existence of the proletariat as a political being

In other words, the

was assumed, thus

limiting the realm of

the political to questions of organization and, once the
revolution took place, managing
the

political.

The increasingly

ossified

centralization

and bureaucracy were hardly

accidents of the regime that sprung from the revolution. Both could
be found

embryonic form
to

in the conception

of politics animating

its

architects.

And

Anderson - whose own sophisticated version of “political Marxism”

is,

yet,

in

according

once again not

without irony, “divorced” from political practice as understood by the classical tradition -

with the advent of western Marxism came what he
political practice, thus leading to

statutorily debarred

calls a “structural divorce”

from

western Marxism, a tradition “whose philosophers were

from the revolutionary unity of theory and practice demanded by

the

26

On

of Lenin’s thought, see Sheldon

S. Wolin, Politics and Vision Continuity and Innovation
Brown, and Co., 1960), chaps. 9-10; and Susan Buck-Morss,
Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Utopia in East and West (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
2000 ).
in

this aspect

Western Political Thought (Boston:

:

Little,

27

This tension

is

revealingly found in Rosa Luxemburg’s The Russian Revolution.
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8
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach ”' Ironically,
Anderson has fiercely defended the political

credentials of Fredric

even

if this is

a

Jameson - regarded by some

body of work

that following the path that

thinkers of the western Marxist tradition.

For

most important

as the

all

Anderson has

criticized in the

sophistication

and insightful

its

representations of the intersection between the
political
artistic

representations,

reflection

serious

on the

economy with

Jameson’s account of postmodernism

political as such.

engagement with

More

Marxist -

US

cultural

and

any sustained

lacks

significantly, this account is so despoiled

of any

concept that in Postmodernism and the Cultural Logic
of

this

Late Capitalism Jameson makes the unfortunate remark
that the absence of

“political

reflection” within the Western Marxist tradition (pace
Gramsci) constitutes a “strength”
29

rather than a weakness.

An

observation that leads him to establish a parallel between

neoliberalism and socialism along these lines: both are equally
subjugated to the

imperatives of the economic.

When Anderson
the

same unwarranted

chastises western Marxists, and

on the

political credentials

embraced. More importantly, once one looks

at

the

Adorno

in particular,

he places

proletariat that the classical thinkers

way Marx

conceived of the proletariat

the limitations of his accounts are particularly evident, especially if one considers the fact
that the proletariat eventually disappeared

And

from

his later formulations

as the conception of class found in The Eighteenth

which many Marxists have found wanting

for

its

found

in Capital.

Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte -

very revealing ambiguities - suggests,

28

Anderson, Considerations, 29, 60.
29

Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism of the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham:
,

Press, 1990), 265. Cf. Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (London and
1998), 124-37.
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Duke

New

University

York: Verso,

actual political practice hardly
corresponded with the conceptual
formulation of the
proletariat

like

once held by Marx. Then, the question

Adorno choose

to

theory consists in

economic, cultural, and

much

that western Marxists

how

politics altogether”;

of theory was reconceptualized.

to politically

Now

the realm of representation

-

a realm in

actor in the contemporary world

young Marx

-

is

from the realm of “strategies and

in its

of success,

tactics” to

which Anderson himself has become

a crucial

consonant with the kind of democratic

political

As

intimated.

I

shall argue

below, Adorno’s failure

theorize the political, or to deal with political questions,

temperament rather than being

the task of

apprehend and represent capitalism

political manifestations. Thus, with varying
degrees

shifting theory s concern with the political

practice that the

not so

“abandon any enrollment and discourse within

instead, in this tradition the political role
critical

is

intrinsic to

is

to

a matter of theoretical

western Marxism as a

tradition, or to critical

theory.

* * *

Some of the aforementioned

tensions found expression in what could be considered the

founding text of the western Marxist

tradition:

Georg Lukacs’ History and Class

Consciousness. In Lukacs’ text one witnesses both a retrieval of dialectical thinking and

an attempt to cling to the unity of theory and practice that was perceived as imperative by
the classical tradition. In other words, these tensions are retrieved

capitalism,

and further extended

proletariat in the

to

his

argument on the

second decade of the twentieth century,

by Lukacs

historical

analysis of

mission of the

in the aftermath

of the Russian

Revolution. In what probably constitutes the most suggestive elaboration of the category

of

totality within the

Marxist tradition, Lukacs’ emphasis on

41

totality retrieves dialectical

,

thinking in order to comprehensively
render the structure of capitalism,
particularly
relationship with bourgeois culture,
while at the

of change - one
and domination
offering

that could

match

same time seeking

in its

a revolutionary agent

power and magnitude of the new forms of
power

the

that capitalism has brought into
being.

Lukacs thus follows Marx

a dialectically infused analysis and
exposition of “capitalism

as

a

in

social

30

structure.

Bearing the stamp of Marx’s ambivalent relation
History’

and Class Consciousness Lukacs
,

and Marx:

Marx

is

Hegel’s position today

precisely to take his

that they

form a coherent

is

method and

to Hegel, in the preface to

situates his reflections in relation to both

the reverse of

Marx’s own. The problem with

system as we find them and

his

unity that must be preserved .”

Or

to

demonstrate

stated differently,

seeks to render Marx’s critique of capitalism speculatively in order
to expose

of the

totality

of the social process. Accordingly, the problem with Hegel

of the one Lukacs finds

in

complex web of ideas with

Marx: “The task he imposes

its

These reflections need
intellectual

milieu,

phenomenology. In

one

is

all

to

be

considered

dominated

Lukacs

in

by neo-Kantianism
to

analysis

the opposite

from the

'

present .”

historically,

compelled

felt

Lukacs

the seminal elements
3

vital intellectual force for the

primarily

this context,

is

its

to separate out

sometimes glaring contradictions

of his thought and rescue them as a

Hegel

light

and

of Lukacs’
Husserlian

once again posit the question

of the relationship between Hegel’s dialectic and his philosophical system. For “we must
3°

See Rose, “From Dialectical

to Speculative

Thinking,” 57. For another arresting articulation of the

theoretical import of the concept of totality, see Henri Lefebvre’s reflections in Critique

especially in the second volume. See Critique of Everyday Life: Vol.

Everyday,

trans.

John Moore (London and

New York:

II,

of Everyday Life
Foundations for a Sociology of the

Verso, 2002), 180-93.
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Lukacs. History, xlv.
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demolish the ‘dead’ architecture of the
system
extremely relevant and

modem

sides of his thought and help

a vital and effective force in the present.”
Like

disentangle

the

radical

in its historical

method from

the

form and release the

them once again

Marx before him, Lukacs

also sought to

- even

conservative system

become

to

if

from the

perspective of Hegel himself such a
separation violates an important principle
of
dialectical thinking, an

argument

Negative dialectics. Even

method of

radical

many

the

so,

that later

on Adorno would confirm and elaborate

Lukacs did not

restrict the critical

Phenomenology of Spirit,

for

him

import of Hegel

this is just

in

to the

one instance of the

contradictions in Hegel. In order to discern the
stakes of doing “justice to the

concrete, historical dialectic” requires a consideration
of Hegel,

Lukacs came

to see

anyone wishing

it

3

its

founder.

'

Or

as

retrospectively, and without modesty, forty-five years later,
“For

to return to the revolutionary traditions

of Marxism the revival of the

Hegelian traditions was obligatory. History and Class Consciousness represents
what was
perhaps the most radical attempt to restore the revolutionary nature of Marx’s theories
by
renovating and extending Hegel’s dialectics and method .”

But the

critical

33

import of Hegel ultimately transcends the dichotomy between

system and method. Building on his “extension” of Hegel’s philosophy, and out of
reading of Capital, Lukacs

is

able to proceed speculatively and suggestively read the

Hegelian category of an expressive
process.

to the

By means

his

totality in

Marx’s analysis of capitalism

as a social

of this analysis Lukacs further extends his own analysis of reification

sphere of social relations, while taking into consideration the illusory nature of the

32

Lukacs, History,

xliii.

33

Lukacs, History, xxi.
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totality itself.

moment.

It is,

indeed, this aspect of his exposition
that constitutes

In his subtle rendering

of the process through which

the expressive totality of the
capitalist process, and

Lukacs shows an acute

Marx’s own

analysis,

sensibility to

and the way

this

is in

speculative

its

reification is constitutive

turn further constituted

the profound Hegelian-speculative

method cannot be disentangled from

of

by

it,

moment

in

the object

it

seeks to comprehend:

Marx’s account pushes the
limits,

capitalist nature

of all economic forms

he creates an intellectual milieu where they
can

by positing a

society ‘corresponding to the theory’,

to their furthest

exist in their purest

i.e.

capitalist

form

through and

through, consisting of none but capitalists and
proletariats. But conversely, no

sooner does

seem
mere

to

this strategy

produce

results,

no sooner does

be on the point of crystallizing out

this

world of phenomena

into theory than

it

dissolves into a

illusion, a distorted situation appears as in a
distorting mirror

which

is.

however, ‘only the conscious expression of an imaginary movement ’. 35
Thus, as in Hegel’s account of philosophy’s
world, theory, even in Marx,

tries to

late arrival to explain the affairs

of the

concretize and apprehend an ever-changing reality in

which, as the well-known phrase from the Communist Manifesto suggests, “everything
that is solid melts into air.

Moreover,

like

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit Marx’s
,

Capital can be read as a rendering of the non-identity, or the different phases of misrecognition, between the parts and the whole.

It

is this

speculative

mode of

proceeding

34

For a suggestive discussion of Lukacs’ concept of
Anxiety of Late Capitalism (London and

New

35

Lukacs, History,

reification, see

York: Verso, 2002).

8.
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Timothy Bewes, Reification or

the

that allows for

comprehensive knowledge of the

totality constituted

by

the interrelated

social-pohtical-economic-juridical processes that
are mutually determinative,
even

such a dynamic totality proves to be an
elusive one. Or as Lukacs puts
context which sees the isolated facts of
social

them

integrates

reality.”

And

in a totality,

this is a

life

as aspects

can knowledge of the

way of proceeding

facts

that “starts

of the

hope

to

» 36

reality.”

Here Lukacs

the western tradition of

is

effectively

totality,

moving

to the

to the

realm that would

.

.

infused reflections on the

reality that

it

[and] progresses

it

later

on characterize

artistic or

conceptual.

strategy that shaped the classic tradition of

from Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, and Gramsci, yields
artistic, historiographic,

to a

and

conceptual reproduction of

Marxism: the realm of representation, be

Thus questions of organization and

in this

become knowledge of

from the simple

i.e.

“Only

historical process

.

...to the knowledge of the concrete

it:

if

Marxism

Marxism

that offers politically

and conceptual representations of the

seeks to efface.

But Lukacs

may be worth

move

to this terrain is

looking more closely

at his

ambiguous. Yet, before one considers

notion of

totality,

and his contribution

it,

it

to the

formulation of this notion. Echoing Hegel’s reflections on the question of totality, Lukacs
affirms that this “category of totality does not reduce
undifferentiated uniformity, to identity.

its

various elements to an

The apparent independence and autonomy which

they possess in the capitalist system of production

is

an illusion only insofar as they are

involved in a dynamic dialectical relationship with one another and can be thought of as
37

the

dynamic

dialectical aspects

Lukacs, History,

of an equally dynamic and

8.

Lukacs, History, 12-13.
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dialectical

whole.”

(And

this,

along with Marx’s analysis of the
exchange process,
Hegel’s concept of particularity and

its

next chapter.) Moreover, for Lukacs

it

can enable us

is

relation to the particular, as

is

Adorno’s critique of
I

shall suggest in the

only “the dialectical conception of
totality

understand reality as a social process.”

to

crucial for

not only for apprehending social reality in

all its

And

this turns out to

[that]

be crucial

complexity, and as part of a larger

process, but for Lukacs a Hegelian-infused
dynamic concept of totality “enables us to see
[the fetishistic

for

forms of capitalism] as mere illusions”; illusions

being seen to be necessary .”

conception of

forms of social and
perspective

For any

totality.

that

political

seeks

to

that are

“no

less illusory

38

Hence, the

critical

critical

import of a comprehensive

account that seeks to break with the hegemonic

consciousness cannot dispense with a comprehensive

apprehend the interrelations among different modes of

subjection and domination. In other words, to critically ponder the
intersection
instance, race/gender/class relations of inequality and subordination,
one

comprehensive approach

dynamics

in their often

that tries to think these particular

complex

of the

way

Lukacs

that finds expression in

social

its

name. This has

Adorno’s writings.

in the “Introduction” to the Grundisse, offers a critical historicist reading

the categories of classical political

sought

a

intersections without sacrificing the particular elements

been one central task of critical theory, one

Marx,

must invoke

and differentiated

pertaining to each one of them; at least not for a critical theory worth

If

of, for

to

historicize

the

economy

formalism

are de-historicized, and reified,

of liberal-bourgeois

thinking

in

its

philosophical, economic, and juridical formalism, in order to reinstall a comprehensive

perspective that will allow theory to discern the totality of the process. For Lukacs,

38

Lukacs, History 13.
,
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this

time echoing Marx’s analysis in

On

the Jewish Question

,

the abstract

mode of thinking

exemplified by classic political economy
and liberal thought posits a unified
system of
general “laws” in which “[the] true structure
of society appears rather in the independent
rationalized and formal partial laws

formal

(i.e.

whose

their formal interdependence

links with each other are

of necessity purely

can be formally systematized), while as

far as

39
concrete realities are concerned they can only
establish fortuitous connections .”
Formal

thought, consequently, does not allow for
comprehensive knowledge in which the
abstract character of the formal laws of the system,
and the emancipatory promise these

portend, cannot be speculatively rendered in face of
the concrete relations that take place
in

them.

shown, a

And

as feminist and other twentieth-century forms of
critical theorizing have

critical analysis

of the structural social relations of race,

class,

and gender can

only be seen in their complex mutual mediation and intersection, from
the perspective of
a comprehensive account of the social process

- even

temporally bounded and

if a

contingent one. Hence the difficulty of discerning the non-identity between the
fonnal

laws of the system and the concrete reality

problem of

reification

-

in

which these unfold. Hence,

too, the

these formal laws are reified, and further provide a reified

account of subjectivity and personhood: “Thus the subject of exchange

is

just as abstract,

40

formal, and reified as

in terms

its

object.”

of their concepts of

concept of

totality,

Despite the differences between

reification,

and

Adomo

and Lukacs

their respective relations to the Hegelian

Lukacs’ understanding of the relationship between the exchange

principle and the reification of

autonomy and

39

Lukacs, History, 101.
40

Lukacs, History 105.
,
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subjectivity, as

I

shall suggest in the next

chapter,

finds

resonance in Adorno's analysis of

identitarian concept

late

capitalism

and

in

his

non-

of totality.

Both Lukacs and Marx vividly show and

attest to the

problematic of the Hegelian

legacy with which the tradition of
Hegelian-Marxism has been dealing ever since
Marx:

on the one hand, the cntical potential of the
on the other hand,
system, while the

it

is

dialectic is explicitly or implicitly
articulated;

often pitted against what

moment of speculation

in the

is

perceived as a conservative and

Hegelian dialectic

is

relegated to the

static

later.

This accounts for the uneasiness of Marxism in relation
to the Hegelian dialectic and for

some unresolved

questions:

if the

critical

impulse of the method, dialectic

immanently undoes the claims of the system, how
Hegel?

And

possibilities for critical theory in relation to

break with Hegel?

What

has no social import

if,

as Gillian

move from

actually

Hegel? What does

it

content,

mean

to

forcefully suggested, “Hegel’s philosophy

absolute cannot be thought”?

'

Is

that constitutes the

and one

weakest link
that

is

the absolute a disposable

system?

another aspect of Hegel’s philosophy that both

is

social process,

Rose has

its

4

if the

to the dialectic in Hegel’s

There

one

away do we

given Hegel’s critique of the dichotomization of a method and

what are the

addendum

far

logic,

Marx and Lukacs

in their respective theorizations

intrinsically related to the social

and

shared,

of capitalism as a
political

import of

Hegel’s dialectic: the quest for a revolutionary agent to bring about the overthrow of
capitalism. If

Marx deduced

the centrality of the proletariat out of a reading of Hegel’s

Philosophy of Right, Lukacs posits the proletariat as subject-object of history

in

ways

that

resonate with Hegel’s Geist. Indeed, as part of his engagement with Hegel, Lukacs
41

This argument

is

vigorously

made

in Gillian

Rose’s Hegel Contra Sociology, see especially pp. 42-47,

92 ff.

48

recognizes the importance of the “we”
in Hegel’s philosophy

Hegel’s rendering of this “we” in terms of
World

Spirit,

question “deep affinities” between Hegel and

theory as the self-knowledge of reality ,” even
differences matter as

much

rejects

and his treatment of the “we”

class.

Marx

if the

as the similarities. For

Lukacs certainly

4

echoes Marx’s statement of the proletariat as
a universal
this

42
.

'

Yet Lukacs

identifies in

insofar as “both conceive of
relation

is

complex and

Marx presumably reclaimed

the

“the

progressive part of the Hegelian method, namely the
dialectic,” in order to historicize
social relations. In Lukacs’ reading,

Hegel

s

Marx immanently

criticized

Hegel and “measured

philosophy by the yardstick he had himself discovered and
systematically

elaborated, and found

wanting.” Hence,

it

company. Hegel was unable

“It is at reality itself that

Hegel and Marx part
44

to penetrate the real driving forces

of history .”

But here

Lukacs might have overestimated the power of “the method” he creatively appropriated
from Marx. For him the

dialectical

method destroys

“and clears the way

reification

to a

45

knowledge of
between

method

reality.”

reality

and

reification

for acquiring

knowledge of such

Inadvertently perhaps, Lukacs here hypostatizes the dichotomy

and places undue

knowledge of

reality

power of

faith in the

that reality,

even

if

by

his

own

the dialectical

admission the

remains elusive. More importantly, here Lukacs re-introduces

identitarian thinking into his speculative rendering of capitalism, and with

it,

a remnant of

42

See Lukacs, History, 146. For scholarly discussions of the “we”
the essays collected in The

Stewart (Albany:

Phenomenology of Spirit Reader:

SUNY Press,

1997).

43

Lukacs, History, 149.
44

Lukacs, History, 6-17.
45

Lukacs, History, 14.
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in Hegel’s

Critical

and

Phenomenology of Spirit,

see

Interpretative Essays, ed. Jon

Hegel’s idealism. These tendencies are
nowhere better discerned than
positing the proletariat as a subject-object
of history.

knowledge of reality,” then man has

the capacity to

If,

know

in his insistence

for Lukacs, “theory

this reality,

is

on

the self-

“man must become

conscious of himself as a social being, as
simultaneously the subject and object of
the
socio-histoncal process.” But this

human

activity, or a call for a

guarantees.

of the

democratic share

“From

knowledge of the whole so

its

from being a mitigated
in political

call for

transformatory

power, one that

is

without

Infused by vanguardist tendencies, Lukacs
posits the proletariat as the

subject/object of history:

object of

is far

totality brings

own

point of view self-knowledge coincides with

that the proletariat is at

own knowledge.”

total process,”

its

Thus

one and the same time the subject and

the proletariat

an interest that resides in

its

is

not only the bearer of “the interest

emancipation, but

its

knowledge of the

about the universal emancipation that Marx’s proletariat promised.

Out of Lukacs

reflections

emerge two

distinctive strands of theory that coexist in

tension: an epistemological critical theory and a social ontology. Lukacs’
quest for the

ontological basis for a revolutionary agent
retrieved the former.

insightful analysis

Still, this

is

part of the latter, while Critical

Theory has

quest for an agent need not discredit and overshadow his

of capitalism as a social process. Indeed, similarly

to

Marx, such

derivation of the proletariat seems to suggest that a change of consciousness will be

revolutionary per

se,

thus suggesting a voluntarist party-politics that

is

hardly inherent to

the comprehensive analysis of capitalism as a culture and as a social process, even if

46

Lukacs, History, 20.

50

Lukacs sought
is this

it

to derive

such a politics from his analysis.

4

As

Gillian

Rose has observed,

umversalist model of the proletariat as the
subject-object of history, that

weakest element of Lukacs’ analysis

and Class Consciousness and

in History

,

ultimately discredited the

work

in the eyes

of contemporary figures

like Ernst

is

is

the

what

Bloch and

48

Adorno.

The

latter, especially, resisted

Lukacs’ concept of the

But as an apt

totality.

reader of Hegel,

Adorno could not dispense of the comprehensiveness of this
conception,

and reclaimed

by means of his understanding of constellational

it

thinking: one located at

the intersection between the dialectical and the speculative.

It

against this background of Hegelian-Marxist attempts to
comprehensively

is

think the social, the cultural, and the political within capitalism
that Adorno’s thought

is

best understood. Adorno, indeed, developed a critical theory out of
a deep engagement

with Hegel

s

theoretical philosophy, as

opposed

to his political theory,

one whose basis

resides in a reworked, open-ended understanding of dialectical thinking, but one that
also

at

once sociological and

between the

tension

is

dialectical

political.

and the speculative

Adorno’s singularity resides

in

that takes place in his thinking

is

the tension

and how

that

preserved in his reworking of Walter Benjamin’s notion of “constellations,”

47

Lukacs evidently saw a necessary relation between the two. Right away in his defense and restatement of
main thesis of his earlier book he writes that its purpose was “to demonstrate methodologically that the
organizations and tactics of Bolshevism are the only possible consequence of Marxism.” See Georg
the

Lukacs, A Defense of History and Class Consciousness
Verso, 2000), 47. For an exemplification of

,

trans, Esther Leslie

(London and

New

York:

this strategy see his theoretically sophisticated reading

of

Lenin’s political practice. In his reading of Lenin, Lukacs sought, from the perspective of Hegelian

Marxism,

to conceptually

He

organization.
proletariat”

A Study

by

in the

account for Lenin’s theory of political practice as ruled by the imperatives of

also sought to conceptually derive

“The objective basis of

the leading role of the

virtue of “its position within the capitalist process of production”. See

Georg Lukacs, Lenin:

Unity of His Thought (London: Verso, 1997).

48

See Rose, “From Speculative

to Dialectical Thinking,” 59.

49

For an explication of
Negative Dialectics

this

concept

(New York: The

in

Benjamin’s thought, see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins oj

Free Press, 1977).

51

thus retrieving the critical import of
epistemological critique within the
Hegelian-Marxist
tradition.

* * *

Scholars and commentators have amply documented
the remarkable consistency

in the

concerns that guide Adorno’s philosophical trajectory
from the early 1930s

to

5

untimely death in 1969.
puts forward

°

For instance, the

was already

import of the

critical

his

new philosophy Adorno

present in 1931, in his essay “The Actuality of
Philosophy”:

“Philosophy which presents

reality as

such only veils reality and eternalizes

its

present

51

condition.”

In this essay,

of constellational thinking

Adorno assigns
is

to

philosophy an interpretative task: the notion

already present in the early essay, as well as an embryonic

formulation of Adorno’s critique of the philosophy of origins in both

Heideggerian versions. “Just as riddle solving,” Adorno writes,

its

Husserlian and

“is constituted, in that the

singular and dispersed elements of the question are brought into various groupings
long

enough

for

them

to close together in a figure out

of which the solution springs

while the question disappears - so philosophy has to bring

from the sciences [science as Wissenschaft ],

into

its

elements, which

changing constellations,

it

forth,

receives

or, to

say

with a less astrological and scientifically more current expression, into changing
combinations, until they

fall

into a figure

which can be read

it

trial

as an answer, while at the

52

same time

the question disappears.”

Hence, what Adorno sees as philosophy’s power of

50

See Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics. See also Max Pensky, “Introduction,” The Actuality
ed. Max Pensky (Albany: The State University of New York, 1996).

of Adorno,

Theodor W. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,”
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 24.

Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 32.
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in

The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor

"illumination” The continuity between the
early and the

concern for epistemology, even

if in the early

full-fledged critical theory. Adorno's
in

England

same

at the

beginning of World

period, as well as the

Even

so,

what

impulse that would

is

later

II

a

resides in his

book he was working on while

before migrating to the

works on Kierkegaard

his version

USA,

belongs to

3

is

the ethical and political

of critical theory. In other words, Adorno’s

thinking took a slightly different orientation in light of the
catastrophes that World

brought with
texts for

it:

genocide as embodied

Adorno’s turn

dialectical thinking is

to

this

.'

not present in those early reflections

on infuse

works

essay this concern did not translate into
a

book on Husserl,

War

later

II

megaton bomb and Auschwitz. The key

in the

an ethico-politically infused conception of

Minima Moralia and

War

his joint effort with

critical

theory and

Max Horkheimer

in

Dialectic of Enlightenment. That combination of Hegelian-Marxist motifs
with dialectical
thinking, infused

by

ethical-political concerns,

can be better comprehended

in relation to

the question of Auschwitz; a question that served as the axis for his thinking from

Minima Moralia
thinking

way

it

I

would

on. Thus, to determine the ethical and political import of Adorno’s
like to look at the centrality

of Auschwitz

in his writings, along with the

informs his conception of responsible dialectical thinking and

critical theory,

and

the account of subjectivity that emerges from these reflections. In so doing, crucial

questions about the political import of Adorno’s

critical

Adorno’s reflections are most often presented
Marxist tradition that betrays

its

political

theory will be addressed.

as an

anomaly within

commitment, especially due

with questions of theoretical philosophy rather than with the

Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard:

Construction

53

to his concerns

political. In contrast,

I

have

of the Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor
“On Kerkegaard Doctrine of Love,” Studies in

(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1989);

Philosophy and Social Science 8 (1939-1940): 413-429.

the Hegelian-

suggested that the most enduring contribution
coming from

of representation. Adorno’s engagement with

this question

this tradition is in the

realm

provides the basis to retrieve

the ethical and political import of his engagement
with meta-theoretical philosophy.
latter is the subject

of the next chapter.

But what provides the
source? After

all,

ethical

Adorno claims

to

and

political motifs

informing his work? What

be some kind of materialist, so what

is

that

Adorno made

question of metaphysics:

in

one of his lecture courses

is its

the “material”

experience that provokes his thinking? The answer to this question
perhaps

comment

The

lies in

a

in Frankfurt in relation to the
4

“It is the

question whether one can live after Auschwitz.”

Adorno, Auschwitz became the overwhelming concrete experience

For

that signified the

catastrophe of genocide in the twentieth century. Rather than using a particular Jewish

term

like

Shoah, or a religious one such as holocaust, or even a more general one

like

genocide, Adorno always referred to this catastrophe by the concrete location of one of

most infamous

its

to

Marxism by

political

Although Adorno was already sympathetic

the time the Third Reich took over

power

in

Germany,

the strong ethico-

impulse in his theoretical reflections became more prominent

(In contrast to

II.

killing centers, Auschwitz.

some of

his contemporaries, like

after

Benjamin and Bloch,

World War

Adomo was

never attracted to Jewish thinkers like Rozenweig or Buber. Indeed and he never showed
55

any major
for

interest in this tradition.)

Adomo

it

.

Auschwitz became the referent

embodied the collapse of Western

civilization.

But

for his reflections;

it

was not

just an

54

Theodor W. Adomo, Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader,
Rodney Livingstone, et al. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 435.
See Miiller-Doohm, En Tierra de Nadie,

85ff.
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ed.

Rolf Tiedemann,

trans.

anomaly

in

an otherwise straight path of progress. As his
subsequent reflections showed,

Auschwitz could be historicized without losing

Tiedemann puts

it,

sight

of

its

particularity.

As Rolf

“Philosophical theory cannot simply accept that the
death camps are

prefigured in an existing social structure or are
the products of this or that historical
cause.

Theory

finds itself compelled to reinterpret history

beginnings.”

Adorno and Horkheimer pursued

by going back

this

path

in

the

to its archaic

Dialectic

of

Enlightenment. Indeed, the imperative of thinking Auschwitz comes from
the need for
theory to

fulfill its critical,

to the difficulty

material, task.

Adorno’s

little

understood dictums

of poetry and metaphysics “after Auschwitz” needs

this light, regardless

In his post

of their general

world war

II

to

in relation

be understood

in

validity.

writings,

Adorno grappled with

mostly as a question of representation.

Among

the topics he reflected

impossibility of metaphysics as traditionally understood,
significance of Auschwitz in the

way memory,

and democracy are understood

in its aftermath.

the question of Auschwitz

art,

on

are the

education, as well as the

collective identity, individual autonomy,
57

Auschwitz” he

states the rather

modest though

For instance,

crucial

- conditions

is

Rolf Tiedemann, “Not the

“Education After

aim of reconceived education

the catastrophe. “Since the possibility of changing the objective

political

in

- namely

societal

after

and

extremely limited today, attempts to work against the repetition

First

Philosophy but a Last One”: Notes on Adorno’s Thought,

in

Can One

Live After Auschwitz ? xx.
,

For a sample of these see the essays collected in Can One Live After Auschwitz? For an account of
Adorno’s political activity see Russell Berman, “Adorno’s Politics,” in Adorno: A Critical Reader ed.
,

Nigel Gibson and

Andrew Rubin (London:

Blackwell, 2002).
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,

of Auschwitz are necessarily restricted
there

is

without a doubt a

58

to the subjective

moment of resignation

dimension .”

that resonates with the

brought against Adorno of always finding refuge in
a realm outside of
the aesthetic.

Yet such a reading would lose sight of the

individual education; what he also refers
for

autonomy,

In this statement

to, in this

common

politics,

centrality that

charge

normally

Adorno gives

to

essay and elsewhere, as an education

for critique, that seeks to break with the
indifference towards

human

59

suffering.

any case, the sense of powerlessness

In

that

one

may

identify in

some of his

formulations responds to an awareness to the role of market
imperatives in constraining
individual

still

autonomy

possible,

in a liberal-capitalist society.

and Auschwitz constitutes

instruction finally should be centered

again.” In a similar vein,

he rightly sees

Yet a

concept of autonomy

is

its

historical-material cornerstone. “All political

upon

the idea that Auschwitz should never happen

Adorno proceeds

to criticize the doctrine

of “reason of state” as
60

in that political logic “the horror

.

.

.

emerges from these statements

is

this cultivation

of critique

Adorno

on democracy he does so

is

potentially already posited .”

a critical conception of

individuals to have a critical attitude towards

reflects

critical

autonomy

What

that seeks to educate
6

power and

its

leveling tendencies.

'

And

linked to democracy. In one of those rare instances where

in reference to critique: “Critique is essential to

58

Theodor W. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords,
Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 192.

trans.
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Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 195, 201. See also the essay “Critique,”
88

in Critical Models, 281-

.

60

Adorno, “Critique,” 203.

In “Reflections

on Class Theory” Adorno wrote: “The leveling of mass society

lamented by conservatives and

is

so bitterly

henchmen is in truth nothing but the desperate
masses.” See Can One Live After Auschwitz? 96.

elimination

their sociological

of difference from the identity of the

56

that

all

democracy. Not only does democracy require
the freedom

impulses.

Democracy

is

to criticize

nothing less than defined by critique.

[...]

and need

critical

Critique and the

62
prerequisite for democracy, political maturity,
belong together .”

Unfortunately reflections like these never amounted
to a sustained reflection on
the political. But they

thinker

who

offers

do show the one-sidedness of the presentation of
Adorno

Beckett and Schoenberg as the solution to world
starvation and

threatened nuclear destruction.”

Instead, for

Adorno

the aesthetic provided a realm

where the somatic aspect of re-cognizing suffering could be apprehended

4
.*

Auschwitz

thus yields to one of Adorno’s most well-known formulations,
the need for a
categorical imperative: “a

mankind:

as a

new

categorical imperative

to arrange their thoughts

imposed by

Hitler

and actions so Auschwitz will not repeat

new

upon unfree
itself,

so that

65

nothing similar will happen .”

Accordingly, instead of positing Auschwitz as the “limit-concept” of historical

knowledge, or of modernity,

in

Adorno’s writings

providing lessons pertaining to humanity

it

at large.

emerges as a catastrophic experience
Yet Adorno

is

able to do so without

62

Adomo, “Critique,” 281. I thus disagree with Marta Taffalla’s description of Adorno as a defender of a
form of “negative freedom.” See Theodor W. Adorno: Una Filosofia de la Metnoria (Barcelona: Herder,
2003), 97-96.
63

Terry Eagleton has criticized
oeuvre that lends credence to

this

view, though as he acknowledges, there are passages in Adorno’s

this reading.

Perhaps as he notes, there are

Eagleton rightly suggests, the second one consists of “a theorist for

whom

at least

“two Adornos.” For

as

the aesthetic offers a paradigm

rather than a displacement of emancipatory political thought.” See Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the

Aesthetic (London: Blackwell, 1990), 360.
64

Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic 341-48.
,

65

Theodor W. Adomo, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 365. For
two stimulating readings of this “imperative” see J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 371-96; Taffalla, Theodor W. Adorno, especially 49-66.
Taffa offers an arresting reading of the “materialism” of this

57

new

imperative.

.

redeeming

for the sake

it

Auschwitz, our feelings
as

of a larger process, or as a moment
of

resist

any claim of the

wronging the victims; they balk

of the victims’

at

positivity. “After

positivity of existence as sanctimonious,

squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached,
out

But rather than the impossibility, or lack of

fate.”

ethical import in

representing Auschwitz, this passage suggests a
critique of the redemptive
associated

with

Hegel’s

dialectical

thinking,

and

not

an

to

dictum

ethical

representation as such. Auschwitz, precisely because of the
imperative

it

associated with the principle of identity.

And

materialist philosophy not only has to represent this catastrophe in

ways

may become
importantly,

parallel

is

for

dialectics.

Adorno, a

that individuals

responsible to the forms of suffering that might correlate

it

against

imposes, needs

be comprehended from the perspective of non-identity, from
negative

Indeed, destruction

moment

but

it,

more

leads to a rethinking of the traditional philosophical categories, hence the

with the Lisbon earthquake. In contrast to Lisbon, Auschwitz was a human-made

catastrophe, and in

its

concentration camps the “administration” of murder despoiled

humans beings of their humanity.
Adorno understood
to articulate

any form of

representation,

where

his

mode of theorizing

as a

form of practice, hence

political action as necessary

and his refuge

his refusal

in the

realm of

his critical theory has a pedagogical function, but education for a

66

Adomo, Negative Dialectics,

361.

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 361-62, 380-81. See also Adomo, “Trying to Understand Endgame," in
to Literature: Volume One, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1991), 266-67

Notes

58

critical

conception of autonomy that

long as

it

aspect,

is

vigilant of

power

His guiding conviction

.

is

the

not the intellectual reproduction of what
already exists anyway.

As

relentlessness of critique.

Thinking

68

is

An

activity that

demanded from him

critical distance:

doesn’t break off, thinking has a secure hold on
possibility.

insatiable

aversion to being quickly and easily satisfied,
refuses the foolish

its

wisdom of
this too a

Its

resignation.

The utopian moment

form of relapse — objectifies

Open

realization.

of praxis,

it

is

itself into a utopia

thinking points beyond

more akin

in thinking is stronger the less

itself.

For

its

it

and hence sabotages

-

its

part a comportment, a fomi

to transformative praxis than a

comportment

that is

69

compliant for the sake of praxis.

Democracy

at

of autonomy

once demands such distance and

to

be concrete, the

rejects

it.

dialectical relationship

But

for a democratic conception

of theory and praxis needs

to

be

70

preserved in their “distanced nearness .”
alert vigilance

and

Responsibility after Auschwitz thus entails an

power.

critical attitude in relation to

to the different instances

It

involves responding politically

of human suffering. In Adorno’s

critical theory,

given his

temperamental preference for the meta-theoretical, the most probing reflections emerge
in his

account of subjectivity and of the “morality of thinking.”

k k k

For Adorno’s reflections on theory as a praxis, see “Marginalia

to

Theory and Praxis,”

in Critical

Models 259-78.
,

69

Theodor W. Adorno, “Resignation,”

Cf.

Wendy Brown,

Politics

in Critical

Out of History

Models 292-93.
,

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap.
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6.

In

Adorno’s morality of thinking,

as he

expounds

it

in

Minima Moralia,

are found

reflections that enact possibilities for
responsible critical thinking and acting in
order to

redress the perpetuation of the suffering
of naked
dedication,

Adorno immediately

science,” a statement that, as

human

life.

Right away, in his

affirms that his reflections spring from a
“melancholy

many commentators have

contrast with Nietzsche’s Joyful Science

,

even

rightly suggested, stands in

if stylistically

Adorno’s reflections more

than resonate with Nietzsche’s. Even so, and despite
the abundance of Nietzschean
motifs, the theoretical impulses animating this text are at
odds with the playfulness

associated with Nietzsche. Indeed, and not without significance,
even though

Moralia

is stylistically

stark contrast with

Adorno’s most Nietzschean

some of

vitalism that calls for a bold

infused

by

text, the reflections in

new philosophy of “dangerous

perhaps,” (one that

Adorno

is

surely

posits the need

be responsible, not from the perspective of a new philosophy, or

philosophy of the future, but from the old idea of “teaching the good
for the idea

present a

it

the basic tenets of Nietzsche’s philosophy: rather than a

a strong sense of responsibility after the death of god),

for thought to

Minima

of the good

life is

life.”

done from the perspective of damaged

But

life,

a

this call

the only

perspective that seems to be possible in the immediate aftermath of Auschwitz. After

Auschwitz, “the whole
life”

is

intriguing.

is

the false.”

is

more, Adorno’s invocation of the “good

In contrast to other German-.! ewish intellectual emigres, such as

Hannah Arendt and Leo

Strauss, with the exception of the essay

Dialectic of Enlightenment
Plato or Aristotle,

What

who

,

on the Odyssey

Adorno never had any sustained engagement with

in

either

are usually the figures associated with these sorts of invocations.

Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged
and New York: Verso, 1990), 50.

60

Life trans.
,

Edmund

Jephcott (London

,

Adorno hardly ever engages any

In fact,

thinker

whose work

is

situated before the

eighteenth century, or on political thinkers, for
that matter.
In

Minima Moralia Adorno
,

presents the subjective experience of critical
theory

from the perspective of his concern with “damaged
reflection

a subjective and tentative

done out of what he considered a forced contemplation:
“The violence

me

expelled

life”;

me

denied

knowledge of

foil

experience of exile and

its

in

Here Adorno

Minima Moralia

the Dialectic of Enlightenment-.

Moralia the attempt
,

is

claiming his personal

cognitive import for critical reflection.

relates the subjective reflections offered in

Horkheimer

” ?2
it

to present aspects

“The

that

Adomo

explicitly

to his joint authorship with

specific

approach of Minima

of our shared philosophy from the standpoint of

subjective experience, necessitates that the parts do not altogether satisfy the demands
of
the philosophy of

which they

are nevertheless a part.

The disconnected and non-binding

character of the form, the renunciation of explicit theoretical cohesion,

is

meant

as

one

73

Adomo

expression of this.”

thus presents the relation between the content of the

philosophy he expounds and the form

would take pride of
.

its

.

exposition.

in

which he does

it:

way of thinking

a

his anti-systemic and fragmentary content, one firmly

that later

on

embedded

in

74

The

of Enlightenment

is

relation

between these more subjective

reflections with the Dialectic

the concern that both texts share for the fate of individual experience,

and of difference, in the age of totalitarianism and the administered

Adomo, Minima Moralia

society.

But

this

18.

Adomo, Minima Moralia 18. Cf. Adorno’s “The Essay
Weber Nicholsen (New York, NY: Columbia
,

trans. Shierry

See Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 18-22, 52-53, 162-64.
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as

Form,”

in

Notes

to Literature:

University Press, 1991), 3-23.

Volume One,

concern does not lead Adorno to posit individual
experience as immediate, or

on

it,

as previous critics of

Hegel have done: individual experience

is

to repose

mediated, through

and through, by the objective dynamics of contemporary
society; namely, by the
social process

of which both capitalism and fascism were a

part.

total

Thus, to apprehend the

individual, the standpoint of the totality cannot be
entirely rejected, and the individual

cannot be posited in abstraction from
its

immediacy must

individual even in

scrutinize

its

its

this:

“He who wishes

know

the truth about

life in

estranged form, the objective powers that determine the

most hidden recesses ”

75

Rather than positing either the individual or

the totality as a vantage point for thinking difference,
their

to

mutual mediation, as both constitute,

Adorno seeks

to

apprehend both

albeit not equally, individual

in

and collective

experiences. But Adorno’s insistence on subjective experience does not proceed
to take
the subject, as given in the philosophical tradition, as the point of departure
for his
inquiry.

The

historical

conditions do not allow thought to do

overwhelming objectivity of historical movement
in

for-itself,

Adorno

subject,

Two

now

new

historically

far

only

one, individual

condemned, which

important assertions are illustrated in

this

posits the centrality of comprehensively expounding the historical

that has dissolved subjectivity; thus the present state

of politically by casting
that

on the old

but no longer in-itself.”

passage. First,

movement

itself

“For since the

phase consists so

the dissolution of the subject, without yet giving rise to a

experience necessarily bases

is

in its present

so:

its

present fate in a historicized way. Second,

even though subjective experience tends

75

Adorno, Minima Moralia,

of subjectivity

15.

76

Adorno, Minima Moralia 15-16.
,

62

to

be annihilated

is

thought

Adorno suggests

in the present,

what

actually takes place, theoretically,

subject

is still

“for

it-self,

is

not

its

erasure, but a dislocation: the

but no longer in itself.”

And

condemned old

both are equally important

in

understanding the political and ethical significance
of Adorno’s position.

Adorno thus
and

in spite

links the possibility of subjective experience
to a situation of despair,

of theonzing a melancholy science, or perhaps
because of

it,

the lament that

has taken over subjective reflection needs to be
resisted, and redirected. “Subjective
reflection,”

Adorno

further states, “even if critically alerted to itself,
has something

sentimental and anachronistic about

it:

world, a lament to be rejected not for
threatens to

become

world’s course.”

arrested in

Moreover,

it

something of a lament over the course of the

its

good

faith,

but because the lamenting subject

its

condition and so to

is

in individual experience

fulfill in its

turn the law of the

where the seed

for critical

78

thinking resides

.

Along these

lines,

Adorno formulates

a “morality of thinking” strongly infused

with dialectical and political concerns. As part of

this

morality of thinking he formulates

a reworked understanding of subjectivity, a task he grapples with and carries on until the
late

essay

relation

“On

Subject and Object.” Adorno immanently reads Hegel’s account of the

between these two, and reformulates

this relationship

from the perspective of the

problem of immediacy and mediation. Like Hegel, Adorno

posits the centrality of

mediation, but unlike Hegel he does not see the relationship between subject-object as
leading to a higher unity.

Still,

Adorno’s contrasting formulation

is

done

in

terms of

comprehensively rendering the relationship between oppositions positing the general

Adorno, Minima Moralia,

16.

Adorno, Minima Moralia

18.

78
,

63

1

1

against the particular, or the individual
against society. In so doing

Adorno introduces

his

conception of dialectical thinking as one bearing
the weight of responsible thinking:
It is

just this passing-on

of the general over the

and being unable
particular,

to linger, this tacit assent to the

which

constitutes not only the deception of

idealism in hypostasizing concepts but also

grasped the particular than

it

reduces

it

primacy

its

inhumanity, that has no sooner

to a through-station,

and

finally

comes

all

too quick to terms with suffering and death for
the sake of a reconciliation

occurring merely in reflection

—

in the last analysis, the

bourgeois coldness that

is

only too willing to underwrite the inevitable. Knowledge can only
widen horizons

by abiding so

insistently with the particular that

its

isolation

is

dispelled. This

admittedly presupposes a relation to the general, though not one of subsumption
but rather almost the reverse. Dialectical mediation

is

not a recourse to the more
9

abstract, but a process

By

taking the

concrete

as

of resolution of the concrete
his

point

in itself.

of departure, Adorno reverses the Hegelian

formulation and seeks to render the intersection between the universal and the particular

from the perspective of the concrete, thus anticipating

his later

argument on behalf of the

80

primacy of the

object.

After presenting this formulation, Adorno approvingly quotes a

passage from Nietzsche’s Gay Science

in relation to the latter’s critique

of the way
8

identitarian thinking obliterates differences,

and the uniqueness of the

particular.

The

79

Adorno, Minima Moralia, 74. In Negative Dialectics he
concrete things;

we

writes:

“We

are not to philosophize about

are to philosophize, rather, out of these things.” See p. 33.

80

Adomo, Negative

Dialectics, 183-86.

8

one of the aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that
the relationship between Nietzsche’s critique of the philosophy of origins,

This, along with the critique of the philosophy of origins,

Adomo

values the most.

On

64

is

passage from Nietzsche reads: “He

who

seeks to mediate between two bold
thinkers

stamps himself as mediocre: he has not
the eyes
resemblances everywhere, making everything

to

see

uniqueness:

alike, is a sign

to

perceive

of weak eyesight .”

82

In

Nietzsche’s awareness of this tendency of thought
to identity, Adorno sees a crucial

element for the ethical sensibility he infuses

of

this

in his

conception of dialectical thinking. Out

concern he presents the import of his morality of thought.
The passage merits

lengthy quotation:

The morality of thought

lies

in

a procedure that

neither entrenched nor

is

detached, neither blind nor empty, neither atomistic nor
consequential. The

double-edged method that has earned Hegel’s Phenomenology the reputation

among

reasonable people of unfathomable difficulty, that

demands
and yet

phenomena be allowed

that

to

speak as such

—

simultaneous

its

is,

in a ‘pure

looking-on’—

that their relation to consciousness as the subject, reflection, be at every

moment

maintained, expresses this morality most directly in

contradiction. But

morality

now

that

how much more
it

is

difficult

no longer possible

to

has

become

it

to

all

its

depth of

conform

to

convince oneself of the identity of

subject and object, the ultimate assumption of which

still

enabled Hegel

conceal the antagonistic demands of observation and interpretation. Nothing

is

such

asked of the thinker today than that he should be

at

every

moment both

to

less

within

83

things and outside them.

Adomo, and

post-structuralism, see Peter

(London and

New York:

Dews’ stimulating treatment

Verso, 1995), 79-89.

82

Nietzsche as quoted in

Adomo, Minima Moralia,

74.

83

Adomo, Minima Moralia,

74.

65

in

The Limits of Disenchantment

Here one finds the

initial

formulation of what later on Adorno
presented as the

importance of both immanence and transcendence
for
assertion that to “be at every

moment

one can

intersection

fully

Furthermore, the

within things and outside of them” captures
the

relevance of speculative thinking for Adorno’s
that

critical thinking.

critical theory.

It is

out of this assertion

discern the stakes of Adorno’s reworked
understanding of the

between subject and object -

a relationship that needs to be rethought after

the age of catastrophe, one that rather than erasing
subjectivity rethinks

primacy of the

object.

writes that “truth

apprehend

its

is

In an essay titled “Notes

it

in light

of the

on Philosophical Thinking,” Adorno

a constantly evolving constellation” that requires the
subject to

different configurations.

But subjective experience takes the object as

point of reflection, even if such a primacy

object, the thinking subject

is fragile,

must “nestle” with

thus in

its

its

mutual mediation with an

it.

* * *

The

dialectical relation

limit

my

of subject-object occupied Adorno throughout his

Here

I

treatment to three formulations: (1) the one offered in Minima Moralia,
(2) the

reflections

on the primacy of the object

in

Negative Dialectics (3) and his
,

means conclusive treatment of this question
the

life.

many

suggestive aphorisms of

in the essay

“On

but by no

Subject-Object.” In one of

Minima Moralia Adorno
,

final,

presents the relation of

subject and object in terms of the paradoxical formulation of “distanced nearness”:

“Contemplation without violence, the source of

all

See Adorno, “Notes on Philosophical Thinking,” 131, 129.

66

the joy of truth, presupposes that he

Who

contemplates does not absorb the object
85
into himself: a distanced
nearness .”

Adorno’s concern with

traditional understandings

of subjectivity

is

evident here: neither

Kantian constitutive subjectivity nor Hegel’s
subject-object as Subject

is

able not to do

violence against the object. The subject needs
to keep

it

gets close: the

impossible

of “distanced

practice

nearness.”

is

It

impossibility of conceptualizing such a relation that
question. In subsequent renderings he does
In Negative Dialectics ,

it

its

distance as

perhaps

due

to

the

seeming

Adorno constantly returned

to the

from the perspective of constellations.

Adorno formulates

the epistemological intersection of

“subject and object” from the perspective of non-identity
and constellational thinking.

One of the byproducts of Adorno’s

rejection of the Hegelian dialectic

of the hope for a meta-context, or for an all-encompassing
position claims to be

more

inclusive than Hegel’s

Namely, as the subject approaches

-

is

the

totality.

abandonment

Still,

Adorno’s

albeit in a qualitatively different

way.

the object through constellations of concepts,

its

particular aspects are rendered visible without incorporating these as a particularity
of the

subject (as

this

Adorno claims Hegel

way Adorno

subject. Besides,

does), and without colonizing or dominating them. In

seeks to undo constitutive subjectivity from the perspective of the

when

dialectics is considered, as

Adomo

does, as a self-critique of the

concept, breaking with sovereign subjectivity from within the subject seems the most
appropriate

mode of

proceeding, especially to non-violently get closer to the object,

....

without colonizing

its

86

Otherness.

In

so doing, Adorno’s non-identitarian dialectic

formulates the relationship between subject and object in terms of the primacy of the

85

Adorno, “Notes on Philosophical Thinking,” 89-90.
86

Adomo, Negative Dialectics,

136.
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^

latter

over the former

identifies in idealism.

positions. Instead,

proclaiming

But

its

it

in

order to undo the hierarchy of
subject over object that he

But

Adorno seeks

primacy and thus

is

hardly an inversion of the hierarchy, a
change of

this is

to lend a voice to the object, to

by

not the purpose of critical thought to place the
object on the orphaned

nothing but an

idol.

this point the reader

anticipated the

might have responded

by the

subject.

On

the throne the object

The purpose of critical thought

may

ask, Is

positing the primacy of the object?

Adorno

difference,

to abolish the hierarchy altogether:

royal throne once occupied

At

its

first

it

What

is

would be

to abolish the hierarchy

possible to abolish the hierarchy

by means of

the political and ethical import of this

is

question and his answer provides an indication of

to the second. In relation to the first question

move?

how

he

he writes: “An object

can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other than a
subject,

whereas a subject by

its

very nature

88

is

from the outset an object

constitutive of the notion of the subject, while subjectivity

object. Or, stated differently, every subject

is

is

as well .”

Objectivity

is

not constitutive of the

an object, but not every object a subject.

Here, once again, Adorno displays dialectical thinking

at

its

best:

a quasi-Hegelian

rendering of the relational character of concepts, but one not cut short by the needs of a
system.

More

importantly, out of this rendering a relational account of subjectivity

emerges: a reworked understanding of subjectivity with a strong ethical and
import.

Adomo, Negative

Dialectics, 181.

Adomo, Negative

Dialectics, 183.

Emphasis added.
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political

along these lines that in the essay “Subject
and Object,” Adorno presents a

is

It

bold claim in order to buttress his assertion
on the primacy of the object: the object can

be potentially conceptualized without the
moment of subjectivity, but the subject cannot
be conceptualized without
its

89
it

being an object

Adorno thus de-centers

.

the subject from

previous position of dominance over the object, and
yet the subject

this is not

merely a

shift in ontology.

On

from

and of the objectivity of
totally effacing

similar vein,

writes:

The

its

s

its

namely,

objectivity

90
its

conditions of possibility

Adorno expands on
object

the primacy

political concern;

subjective side and bring an awareness of

Adorno reconceptualizes

it,

preserved. But

by means of positing

the contrary,

of the object Adorno articulates epistemologically a social
and
to alienate the subject

is

primacy

...

Instead of erasing the subject, or

.

the subject in terms of

his assertion of the

is

its

objectivity. In a

primacy of the object when he

the corrective of subjective reduction, not the denial

91

of a subjective share."
subjectivity yields to a

in a relation

By

means

of respect
of

Hence, the primacy of the object rather than displacing

new

understanding of the subject, a chastened view of the subject,

to the object.

re-cognizing

the

But

this is hardly the

objectivity

in

chastened subject of liberalism.

subjectivity,

the

epistemologically what Adorno has claimed for individuals politically to its possible complicity

subject,

its

refusal to

with domination.

conform

It

is

subject

it

remains

does

alert

the non-identity of the object with the

to the concepts constitutive subjectivity seeks to

impose on

89

See Adorno, “Subject and Object,” in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader
Gebhardt (New York, NY: Urigen Books, 1978), 497-511

,

ed.

Andrew Arato and

E.

90

See, and compare to, Peter Osborne, “A Marxism
(Spring-Summer 1992): 187-88.
91

Adorno, “Subject and Object,” 502.
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for the

Postmodern?”

New German

Critique 56

it,

that forces the subject to think
differently in order to

difference, without dominating or colonizing

Besides, non-identity
Indeed,

by

insisting

is

in its

it.

what allows the subject

on identity the subject

apprehend the object

to

own

objectivity.

objectivity,

and further

understand

fails to realize its

own

silences the object. In order for the subject
to apprehend

its

objectivity and avoid

its

silencing the object as the other, the relationship
between the two needs to be thought of

Adorno suggests

speculatively: as

moments

particular, both

relationship

openness

in his discussion

are “necessary and deceptive,” and

between subject and object

to the other

becomes

possible.

Adorno’s discussion has taken place
type of reflection

“Social critique

From

in a

in

it

is

in conceiving the

equally ambiguous terms that a

Thus

far,

especially in relation to this essay,

high meta-theoretical plane. But for

politically infused; or in his

critical

own somewhat

Adomo

this

different rendering,

a critique of knowledge, and vice-versa.”

is

this

is

of the opposition of universal and

account of subjectivity emerges the possibility for a relation of equality,

an ethical-political sensibility to difference and otherness, one that conveys a concrete
responsibility to the suffering of the object, the other of the subject.

responsibility that

is

An

account of

only concretely discemable within the context of what Rainer Nagle

has conceptualized as the “scene of the other” in Adorno’s thought. This “scene”

scene of the non-conceptual:

it is

the scene

where the subject ends up

in

when

of constitutive sovereignty are undone. In Nagle’s rendering, “The path
conceptual, to the crypt, leads not through rejection of concepts; rather

92

Adomo,

“Subject and Object,” 503.
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it

is

its

is

the

claims

to the

non-

constituted

by

What concepts

them.

draws
is

articulate points

beyond them

to a scene

93
of the Other ” Nagle

account from Adorno’s Negative Dialectics
when he writes: “The truth which

this

met through concepts beyond

their abstract content,

can have no other scene than the

scene of that which has been repressed,
neglected, and rejected by concepts. The
utopia

of cognition would be
.

...

assimilating

to

open

that

which has no concept through concepts, without

94

To

to them.

it

that respects differences

put

it

politically,

it is

the

moment of

and takes these as equal without colonizing them. This

Etienne Balibar has speculatively theorized as “equaliberty”:
a
that seeks to theorize

collectivity for

individuals

substantive equality

‘equality

and

democracy. “Rights

moment of

is

what

universality

liberty together” while reclaiming the language
of

to equality

and liberty are indeed individual, only

can claim and support them. But the abolition of both coercion
and

discrimination (which

we

call

emancipation)

is

always clearly a collective process which
,

can be achieved only

if

many

individuals (virtually

all

of them) unite and join forces

95

against oppression and social inequality.”

Nagle also
practice,”

one

interprets this scene politically:

it

involves “a certain kind of political

that is vigilant to the exclusions that the dialectic

about. Also, this

is

of enlightenment brings

the scene of memory, “of the language of the dead.

Only the dead can
96

speak the language of that no-place, utopia, as long as the living do not

live yet.”

In this

93

See Rainer Nagle “The Scene of the Other,”
(Minneapolis,

MN: The

in

Postmodernism and

Politics,

ed.

Jonathan Arac

University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 105

94

Adorno, Negative Dialectics,

9ff.

95

See Etienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene,

trans., Christine Jones, et alt.

Verso, 2002), 173, 166, respectively.
96

Nagle, “The Scene of the Other,” 108.
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(London and

New

York:

vein,

Nagle presents the importance of the silence
of the nameless others

preceded

us,

and those

that are

still

with us, but excluded as being part of

that

have

this ethical

scene; hence, the importance of history
and historiography in breaking with
these
silences, as well as to lend a voice to the

present.

And

yet, there is

memory of past

sufferings that

still

weigh

in

our

an aspect of the scene of the Other that Nagle
conspicuously

leaves out: the scandal of Adorno’s thought, the
centrality of Capitalism as a social
process, the total process

whose

constitutive

dynamics play out

determining, even if its imperatives also mediate

But

to think

of

this

Etienne Balibar,

I

it.

scene comprehensively

Nagle’s formulation, and instead of referring to
suggest thinking of

it

as the

in this scene, without

it

I

would

like to invert the terms

of

as the scene of the Other, following

Other Scene. In

this scene, alongside the

possibility of relating difference to the non-identity of the object, “the heterogeneity
of

political process” is

it

is

the imaginary terrain in

never reduced to a
at

comprehensively depicted as a mediating

once.

It

is

which the production of

last instance,

the scene in

social

factor.

and

More

political

importantly,

antagonism

is

and these are present as both over- and under-determined

which

abstract conceptions of the proletariat yield to the

uncertain, fugitive and yet vital politics of collective action and contestation associated

with democracy.

The other scene
interrelationship

is

also the scene of the other.

It

between subject and object can be rendered

is

the scene in

in its complexity,

mediation, and the mediation of Capitalism as a socio-cultural process.

scene that one can comprehend the

Balibar, Politics

and

the Other Scene,

moment of objectivity of the

xiiff.
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It is

subject in

its

which the
its

mutual

within this

social

and

political configurations:

democratic-capitalism

an important role of the subject in the
is

as

an object of

understood as the sohpsistic subject
in

which one needs

as a

its

to

respond

form of naked human

universal, particular,

cognition.

this is the

It is

who

is

this

the scene in

order but also

its

which

this suffering

critical theory. In

it

is

is

is

the scene

in

the scene of democratic re-

what follows

would be pondered.

73

- even

can be comprehended

the scene of responsibility to the suffering of naked

the stakes of thinking this scene

of liberal-

of silenced others, which often takes shape

and singular dimensions;

scene of critique and

subject

the bearer of abstract rights. This

to the suffering

life;

political process

human

life.

In

sum,

different formulations of

CHAPTER III
CRITICAL THEORY: BETWEEN THE DIALECTIC
In fact, dialectics

AND THE SPECULATIVE

neither a pure

is

the naive sense of the word.

unreconciled

matter

method nor

It is

a reality in

not a method, for the

-

lacking precisely the identity
surrogated by the thought - is contradictory and resists
any attempt at unanimous interpretation. It is the matter,

not the organizing drive of thought that brings us to

Nor

dialectics.

contradictoriness

is

is

dialectics

a

a

category

simple

of

reality,

for

reflection,

the

cognitive confrontation of subject and thing.

T.

Any

W. Adorno

consideration of the political import of Adorno’s critical theory needs to closely

consider his engagement with Hegel’s theoretical philosophy.

deeply

has been widely noted,

Adorno became acquainted with Kant, Kierkegaard, and

in his early years,

being

As

influenced

by Lukacs’

Husserl, while

Theory of the Novel and History of Class
1

Consciousness as well as by Walter Benjamin’s The Origins of German Tragic
,

Along with these major

texts, there

were certainly other important influences

in

Drama

.

Adorno’s

philosophy such as Marx, Freud, and especially Nietzsche. Without denying the

importance of the aforementioned bodies of work,

of Hegel for Adorno’s
critique of

critique

Hegel

of the

preservation,”

critical theory.

that his

tradition,

own
of

I

shall

I

argue that

original contribution

how

thought

would

is

it

like to focus

is

on the

by means of

his

centrality

immanent

was achieved. Although Nietzsche’s

driven to identity as a

mean of

“self-

along with Marx’s account of the exchange-relationship in Capital

,

constituted the most important elements in Adorno’s critique of identity thinking and his

is Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics (New York: The Free
treatment see Stefan Muller-Doohm’s intellectual biography, En Tierra de
For
a
detailed
Press, 1977).
Una Biografia Intelectual, trans. Roberto H. Bemet and Raul Gabas
Adorno,
Theodor
W.
Nadie:
(Barcelona: Herder, 2003). The German original: In Niemandsland. Theodor W. Adornos intellektuelle

The

classic

work here

Biographie (Frankfurt

am

Main: Suhkramp, 2003).
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concern for non-identity, his conception
of negative dialectics preserves
Hegelian
concepts, and his cntical theory

- mostly

consisting of an ethically and politically
infused

conception of negative dialectics from the
perspective of non-identity - was largely
formulated by means of an immanent critique
of the Hegelian system. To be sure,

Adorno
in

formation was deeply influenced by his interest in
music, especially

s intellectual

the circle of

Alban Berg, and the atonal music of Arnold Shonberg,
which

combination with his philosophical and sociological concerns,
gave expression

of thinking that bas been characterized as a philosophy of dissonance
Still, in

thinking.

It is

what follows

my

I

shall focus

on

his

mode

2
.

engagement with Hegel’s

contention that the political import of Adorno’s

to a

in

dialectical

critical theory,

and the

indispensable relation to Hegel, can be drawn more vividly by paying close
attention to
the centrality of the Hegelian legacy for critical theory, and for western
Marxism.
critical

and

political

import

of Adorno’s constellational thinking cannot be

appreciated if his Hegelian-Marxism

is

neglected. Here

I

Rose’s motto: “Hegel’s philosophy has no social import
thought.”

other

In

words,

for

critical

theory

to

be

at

thought of

it

it

had the absolute

at its

if the

critical

Absolute cannot be

it

cannot

is

and

at

the

same time

it

not

one

command; indeed philosophy must

in order not to betray that thought,

fully

once follow and rework

comprehensively: “After everything, the only responsible philosophy
longer imagines

The

think

that

no

forbid the

must not bargain

See Robert Hullot-Kentor, “The Philosophy of Dissonance: Adorno and Shonberg,” in The Semblance of
Subjectivity: Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory ed. Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge: The MIT
,

Press, 1997), 313.
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away anything of
element.

It

the emphatic concept of truth. This
contradiction

defines philosophy as negative.”

is

philosophy’s

3

* * *

In

one of the best known sections

in the Preface to

Hegel’s Phenomenology; of Spirit,

Hegel deploys the metaphor of the Bacchanalian Revel
the whole,

to depict his

concept of “truth as

a process in which the whole movement of
Geist recollects itself as a

reconciled totality. Here

The True

is

is

the passage from the 1807 text:

thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no

because each member collapses as soon as he drops

member

is

not drunk; yet

out, the revel is just as

much

transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement,
the single

shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are
as

much

positive and necessary

the whole of the

therein,

movement, seen

and gives

recollects

itself,

moments,

as a state

itself particular

whose existence

as they are negative and evanescent. In

is

of repose, what distinguishes

existence,

is

itself

preserved as something that

self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge

is

4

just as immediately existence.

By

reference to this well-known passage of the Phenomenology of Spirit Gillian

Rose presents

,

a critique of

Adorno from

of dialectical thinking, one that seeks

the perspective of her reworked understanding

to retrieve the speculative

moment of thought from

Theodor W. Adorno, “Why Still Philosophy?” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords,
Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 7.
3

G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit,

trans.

trans.

A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 27-

28.
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5
the perspective of “the broken
middle .” In her provocative text, the
essay

“From

Speculative to Dialectical Thinking - Hegel
and Adorno,” Rose invites the reader to
put
aside, at least for a

of speculative and

relation

to this

moment, our very post-modern anti-Hegelian

complex

dialectical thinking in all the three

8
intersection: “the abstract, the dialectical,

and

biases,

to think the

dimensions Hegel granted

and the speculative .”

6

Rose

uses this tripartite structure of Hegel’s thinking to
criticize Adorno’s insistence on a

negative dialectics. For Rose, Adorno’s emphasis on
the negative
pernicious effect of cutting the dialectic short.

(An

moment has

the

ironic charge, given that these are the

7
very same terms Adorno uses to criticize Hegel’s deployment
of dialectical thinking. )

Also, according to Rose, “Adorno reduces speculative to dialectical
thinking, replacing
recollections of the

whole by judged oppositions .”

In fact,

Adorno’s thinking “within the whole and within the
retrieves

rather

and undermines

murky formulation

[it]” that

it

tradition

is

as

by comprehending
he adjudicatively

the possibility for social critique resides, or so Rose’s
9

suggests.

Furthermore, for Rose, Adorno resists rendering his

thought speculatively, and thus resists giving himself up to the third

moment of

the

See Rose’s complex elaboration of this theme in The Broken Middle: Out of our Ancient History (London:
On Rose, see Tony Gorman, “Gillian Rose and the Project of Critical Marxism”, Radical
Philosophy 105 (January/February 2001); Martin Jay, “The Conversion of the Rose”, in Refractions of
Blackwell, 1992).

Violence (London and

New

special issue of the journal

York: Routledge, 2003); and the essays by Howard Caygill and others
Cultural Review, dedicated to her work.

in the

Women: A

6

Rose,

“From

Speculative to Dialectical Thinking - Hegel and Adorno,” in Judaism and Modernity:

Philosophical Essays (London: Blackwell, 1993), 54.
7

See Theodor

W. Adorno,

Negative Dialectics,

trans. E. B.

g

Rose,

“From

Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” 54.

9

Rose, “From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” 55.
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Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 334-38.

dialectic.

Or

as

she states

“Adorno reduces speculative

it,

to

dialectical thinking,

replacing recollections of the whole by judged
oppositions.”"
In this vein,

Rose

identifies in

each other as they came

to

to

suggesting that Adorno’s thought

Adorno

light

in

a failure to “relate [dialectical] oppositions

a

dynamic

is ahistorical,

historical

development,”" thus

while also arguing that Adorno’s

to articulate comprehensive-historical thinking,
alongside with his insistence
in theoretical

Adorno

s

philosophy

at the

expense of

temperament, scholarly

negative dialectics. In Rose

s

estimation,

but

by renouncing

is

to the

Hegelian notion of the
is

speculative

Adorno’s thought renounces the speculative moment of thinking, one

Rose’s

is

critical

outcome of

rather intrinsic to Adorno’s

Absolute, and by insisting on cutting the dialectic off from

any comprehensive

on engaging

political theorizing, are not the

taste, or inclinations,

failure

that

is

moment,

crucial for

theory of society.'”

a rather sophisticated critique of Adorno’s critical theory, one that

deserves consideration, especially from the perspective this study advances - one seeking
to retrieve the ethical

and

political

import of his

critical

theory in order to ponder the

question of responsibility in the aftermath of the twentieth century. In contrast to

commonplace Habermasean

or neo-Kantian critiques of Adorno, Rose’s questions the

import of his negative dialectics from a perspective firmly anchored
tradition.

in the dialectical

That makes her critique politically insightful and important; what

the possibility for critique within dialectical thinking.

By engaging

10

Rose,

“From

Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” 54.

Rose,

“From

Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” 61.

11

12

See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone Press, 1981).
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stake

is

Rose’s critique one

is

is at

in a better position to discern the
contours

Adorno

s critical

It

of not only the role of dialectical thinking

in

theory, but also the critical import of his
formulations.

thus worthwhile to recast the critique
Rose levels against Adorno via a

is

reading of the passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology
that serves as the point of departure

of her critique. In the section of the Phenomenology
on the Bacchanalian
describing the content of philosophy, or what philosophy
consists
it,

-

philosophy has

to

existence within

its

begets and traverses

a

movement

this

do with “the actual,

its

own Notion

[

that

which

posits itself

Philosophy

Begriff].”

own moments” one

in consciousness,

which

passage that

is

is

is

alive within itself

thus “the process which

whole process,

as

4

in turn constitutes philosophy’s claim to truth .'

(or infamous): actuality, process, recollection, and “the

in a

and

Hegel

As Hegel expounds

that is able to recollect the

way, Hegel brings together some of the major concepts

Adorno -

is

of.

revel,

conspicuously

that

have made him famous

whole movement

left

In

is

the truth.”

out of Rose’s account- reads the

Bacchanalian revel passage differently. Out of these differences

in relation to

Hegel the

stakes in retrieving a reworked dialectical tradition are better apprehended. In Hegel:

Three Studies, Adorno, after a long quotation of the passage in question, writes: “Here,

be sure,

...

the standstill

is

reserved for the

totality.

.

.

But

like

every aspect of the whole

in Hegel, this too is simultaneously an aspect of every individual part,

Translators have used both “concept” and “notion” to translate from the
the choice of the translator, and

whenever

I

felt that

it

was needed,

I

to

German

and

Begriff.

I

its

ubiquity

have followed

have added the German term

in

brackets.
14

Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 27. Or as he famously put it in another passage of the same Preface,
“The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its
development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it
truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of
itself.”

See

p.

1

1.
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may have
concealed

prevented Hegel from acknowledging
itself

it.

[Hegel]

from him, a piece of unreflected immediacy.”

speculative thinking in Hegel’s formulation,

Adorno

a rigorous

immanent

is

one of the most important

it;

it

1

'

To

Where Rose

that is

sees vintage

Hegel

posit such a

something thoroughly undialectical

critique of Hegel.

close to

in contrast sees

seeking refuge in “a piece of unreflected
immediacy.”

immediacy, for Adorno,

was too

illicitly

moment of

discemable through

Moreover, such positing of immediacy violates

dialectical principles

absence of a determinate starting point, a

animating Hegel’s philosophy: the

moment of immediacy,

an absolute beginning.

Here, as in other places, Adorno finds Hegel cutting the dialectic
short. For dialectical
thinking

is

thoroughly mediated. At

Adorno’s charge against Hegel

least in

that

Rose

Adorno’s account. Incidentally,
in turn presents against

speculation and totality

-

in order to

its

entirety

-

in light

of Hegel’s

ponder what the stakes are for

precisely

Adorno. But before

adjudicating correctness or incorrectness between Rose and Adorno,
closely read the passage in question in

it is

I

would

own

like to

account of

dialectical theory in

Hegel’s enigmatic equation of the truth with a Bacchanalian revel.

Immediately preceding the passage on the Bacchanalian

revel,

Hegel discusses

the limits of mathematical truth, and the problem of conceiving philosophical truth in

these rather formalistic and abstract terms. Hegel then proceeds to discuss the

of

spirit in its

unfolding,

its

process of self-knowledge. This

is

movement

indeed one of the few

16

places where Hegel expounds his method as such.

Hegel

inserts this

passage

in order to

15

trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993),
of Logic, Hegel suggests that in any concept there is both immediacy and mediation.
See Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York, NY: Humanities Press, 1969), 68.

See Adorno’s Hegel Three Studies,

133. In the Science

For an instructive discussion of Hegel’s dialectical thinking, and the problems of presenting this aspect of
his thought from the Cartesian concept of method, see Stanley Rosen, G. W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the
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clarify the content

which he

of philosophical

and as a clarification of the method through

proceeding, one that Hegel considers intrinsic to the
process

is

cannot be disentangled from

“Philosophy
in so far as

truth,

content. In contraposition to mathematical
propositions,

element and content

essential; its

which

actual, that

and thus

has to do, not with unessential determinations, but with a
determination

...

it is

its

itself,

posits itself and

is

not the abstract or non-actual, but the

alive within itself

is

—

existence within

its

own

„i 7

notion.

This

is

reference to the

cannot, as

a point Hegel reclaimed in the Science of Logic where, in
explicit

Phenomenology he
,

later wrote:

have remarked elsewhere, borrow

I

mathematics, anymore that

it

its

“Philosophy,

method from

if

it

would be science

a subordinate science like

can remain satisfied with categorical assurances of inner

„i8

As Hegel

intuition.

distinct

from

its

states

it

in the

Science of Logic, the method “is not something

object and content.” Here, to be sure, Hegel

method cannot be formulated

in its

is

not suggesting that the

pure form, otherwise he could not have written his

Science of Logic. Rather, he suggests that the method cannot be posited in advance or
externally: the

method

is

the

a journey of self-knowledge.

outcome of the process

Or

as

Hegel - with the

seemingly successful journey - restated

“From

this

it

Spirit (Geist)

satisfaction

embarked

of finding repose

in

after a

towards the end of the dense Science of Logic.

both subjective and objective, for

the pure correspondence of the Notion and

Science of Wisdom
its

which

course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion [Begriff] that has

itself as the absolute,

from

in

(New Haven: Yale

its reality,

its

subject matter, consequently as

as a concrete existence that

is

the

University Press, 1974). For Hegel the method cannot be separated

object.

17

Hegel, Phenomenology, 27.
18

Hegel, Science of Logic, 27.
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Notion

Hence, the absolute

itself."

on the principle of

rests

identity:

identity-in-

difference.

Philosophy

thus neither concerned with positing an
abstract ontology as

is

its

“onginary” point of departure, nor as a method, or a
transcendental principle outside the
actuality

of

posits itself

its

object. Hegel, instead, talks about philosophy
in term of an actual “that

and

is

alive within itself’; a principle of

emerges as part of the whole process, but one
thoroughly mediated.

and

this

“It is the

whole movement

whole process

in

is

what

same

which immediacy

is

is

positive [in

preface, “the truth

sublated

by

it]

is

which the

in

and

its

its

own moments,

truth.” Consequently,

the whole”: namely,

Hegel goes on

called the false, if

it

to suggest, “therefore includes the negative also,

is

is

the

20
.

“This

what would be

could be regarded as something from which one might abstract.” In

other words, the negative

it

it

the constant mediation of its parts with

the totality, the universal with the particular, as these unfold in the singular
truth,”

truth

self-determined, and, thus,

process which begets and transverses

constitutes

as he earlier enunciated in this

that

immanence

moment

is

not expendable,

sublated by the positive moment, which

is

it

is

surely a part of the process, but

where “the whole movement” of

the

process can be discerned and rendered by means of speculative knowledge. Even the

most evanescent of moments, Hegel
truth are contained within

its

insists, are part

totality.

of the process, and

The process

their

moments of

“constitutes the actuality and the

19

Hegel, Science of Logic 54, 826.
,

20

At one point Rose formulated this principle as part of her critique of the Dialectic of Enlightenment-.
“Expressing the dilemma of enlightenment and domination has priority over presenting speculative
experience, Bildung - the relation of universality and particularity as it is actually and potentially
negotiated by the singular.” See Rose,

“From

Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” 59.
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movement of the
he

life

of truth.” Or so Hegel’s
2

own views of the

process go. “The result ,”

’

insists, “is therefore the truth ,”

Hegel

insists

that

this

cannot

result

be thought of as

contingencies, nor as a crass determinism; even
so, for Hegel
teleological process. Later on, in the Encyclopaedia

,

Hegel

is

it

is

one despoiled of
the

outcome of

emphatic in arguing

a

that

teleological necessity need not be conceptualized
as determinism." Hegel, like the

subsequent tradition that ensued from his thought, grapples
with the tension between
necessity and contingency.

And

this in

Hegel manifests

itself in

terms of freedom and the

specific determinations of thought. For the true freedom that
defines Spirit (Geist) and

history

true

is

one

that expresses itself as a differentiated

knowledge

and reconciled unity. Accordingly,

entails discerning the specific determinations

of things, of our objects of

knowledge, as well of oneself an object of self-knowledge. Hegel thus effectively
intertwines epistemology and practical philosophy.

And

in

what constitutes Hegel’s

important challenge to causal conceptions of knowledge, he proposes a conceptual

approach that seizes

reality as

an internal necessity in order to apprehend

it

in

terms of

23

both

its

logic

of the Encyclopaedia he then writes:

necessity and

its

contingency.

In his discussion

of reciprocity

in the smaller

Hegel, Science of Logic, 837.
22

See G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Science of Logic, I (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 158; Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Philosophy of

Spirit,

III

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 337.
23

For a helpful discussion of these questions in relation to Hegel’s logic, see Eliseo Cruz Vergara, La
Concepcion del Conocimiento Historico en Hegel (Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico,
1997), 33, 37.
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Reciprocity

and stands
that

undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation
of cause and

is

on the threshold of the notion; but on

...

our aim

is

a thoroughly comprehensive idea,

that

we

effect,

very ground, supposing

should not rest content with

applying this relation. If we get no further than studying
a given content under the
point of view of reciprocity,

We

utterly incomprehensible.

mediation, which

is

And

unanswered.
applying the

notion, ought,

are left with a

if

we

of reciprocity,

this relation, instead

first

facts,

mere dry

which leaves matter

fact;

and the

call

look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction

of

all,

to

we

see

shall

we must

but recognize them

...

that

it

not

let

the

two

in its

consists

own

for

is still

in

felt

in

of being treated as an equivalent

be known and understood

understand the relation of action

mere given

are taking up an attitude

the chief motive of applying the relation of causality,

relation

circumstance that

we

nature.

the

for the

And

to

sides rest in their state of

for factors of a third and higher,

which

is

24

the notion

Mediation

(

( Begriff)

and nothing

Vermittlung), which

is

else.

also a central concept in

Adorno’s negative

dialectics,

has thus a contrasting role in the Hegelian system: in order to attain an end, there

need for a mean, and

moments
relation

in

Hegel’s system the

mean

is

the mediation between

that in their origins are independent, yet after these are

two

However

mediation and

centrality are hinted at

its

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

in the

the

dialectical

comprehended

of mutual mediation, these are also understood as two moments

internally united.

is

that

in a

are

passage in question not only the restlessness of

by Hegel, but

219.
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also the goal of a “thoroughly

comprehensive” knowledge
the higher unity

Hegel

s

conception of philosophy

is

in the

is

Marx of Capital

Marx of

Buck-Morss aptly formulates

when

the

- Hegel

his

posits

an

the totality of the process

that

she argues that

we

itself

creates space for

it

critical

is

that,

address questions of

for the

Marcuse who had

of

critical theory, as

mature

a strong

an epistemological

theory provides a “cognitive experience

to dispel the illusion

how we

in

at

a level

of the inevitability of events”

in

both their contingency and structural nature,

conceive of them that gives them their aura of

does not yield a critique but

it

to

1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.) Susan

can re-cognize events

and thus demonstrate “that

This in

needs

critical theory.

might explain Adorno’s preference

this crucial aspect

of reflection that has the power

ways such

this

it

in contrast to the Heidegger-influenced

affinity to the early

it

all

to Kant’s failure to

perhaps the most enduring legacy of Hegel for

epistemology, not ontology. (And

„ 25

Verstand)

By comprehending

Stated differently, for critical theory to be critical

fate.”

rests.

mediations, according to Hegel one cognizes the truth,
which turns out to be the

process itself - and this

practice,

Begnff),

(j

thus epistemological; namely, for

of the understanding (reason as

level

Hegelian system

- from Descartes’ methodism

epistemological conception of philosophy.
in all its

both are aspects of the concept

on which the idea of reconciliation

criticism of previous epistemologies

transcend the

And

is articulated.

it

is

an indispensable component of it as

combined with democratic

action, can bring about political

Susan Buck-Morss, Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory
York: Verso, 2003), 42.
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in the Left

(London and

New

change.

All in

all,

the basis of critical theory, at least
since Hegel and Marx,

is

epistemological rather than ontological.

Following a rather condensed exposition of his
epistemological positions, Hegel
proceeds to exemplify the epistemological import
of comprehensiveness through a
discussion of Spartan society. In a passage that

at

once combines a critique of Rousseau’s

paradox of the general will with a critique of ontology, Hegel

what comes

first,

that instills the

instead

the

manners of a people

as

it

bounds and

of remaining within the paradox, or presenting
is

identification

as a point

it

as

constitutes.

But

an antinomy, Hegel

better cast in terms of a comprehensive

understanding of Spartan history and Spartan
(Begriff). In other

of

grounding a constitution, or a constitution

manners associated with the community

speculatively suggests that this paradox

criticizes the question

life

from the perspective of the concept

words, as one commentator has correctly extrapolated,

in

Hegel “the

of the cause with the content shows the comparative convenience of taking

of departure not a concept of

reality as

substances, but of a [comprehensive] unity

...

composed of separated and

for instance, the principle of an

diverse

epoch as

28

what unites and

identifies

...

different

manifestations of spiritual

concepts such as the principle of an epoch are speculative attempts
the sake of comprehensive

knowledge of the

life.”

at a

Hegelian

higher unity for

totality in all its determinations.

Hegel

follows the same principles in speculatively developing a philosophy of history. For

Cf.

Wendy Brown,

Politics

Out of History

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap.

27

For Rousseau’s rendering see Social Contract, especially Book

II,

chaps. I-IV, VII.

28

Cruz Vergara, La Concepcion del Conocimiento Historico en Hegel, 37
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5.

instance, as historical beings both

humans and

Geist participate in a relation of mutual

constitution and mediation.

This process of seeking comprehensive knowledge
can be better understood in
light

of Hegel

s

different renderings of the relation

between the whole and the parts.

In

the Encyclopaedia he writes:

The immediate

relation

is

Whole and

of the

that

whole, and consists of the parts (the form),

one from another.
only

when

It is

its

the Parts.

counterpart.

The

is

when

taken together. But this ‘together’

is

the

parts are diverse

they that possess independent being. But they are

they are identified by being related to one another;

take up the whole,

The content

parts,

or, in so far as

they

the counterpart and

29

negation of the part.

There

is

both identity and lack of identity between the whole and the different parts

constitute

it.

And

these are apprehended within a comprehensive totality, as part of a

process of mutual mediation.
opposites

is

that

found. But the

It is

in this process

moment of reconciliation between

him an

external imposition; rather,

that are

expounded -

is intrinsic to

it

in this case, the opposition

of Logic, Hegel renders

where, for Hegel, the unity between the

this relation in

the oppositions

is

not for

the relation between the oppositions

of the whole and the

parts. In the

Science

terms more evocative of his dialectical-speculative

thinking:

The whole accordingly consists ofparts, so
therefore the

is

only relative, for that which makes

I,

relation

it

is

and the self-subsistent

is

Hegel Encyclopaedia
,

whole

that

it

191.
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a totality

is

not anything without them.

It

but for this reason

it

totality;

rather

its

other, the parts; and

has

it

its

subsistence not within itself but in

likewise the whole relation

whole

...

[the]

whole

is

...

the

whole

is

its

other. [...]

Thus

the parts are

equal to the parts and the parts to the

not abstract unity, but unity as of a diverse
manifoldness;

but this unity as that which the elements of the
manifold are related to one
another,

is

the determinateness of each element through

30

which

is

it

part

.

Identity and difference are thus part of a self-determined
expressive totality, one in
3
both necessity and contingency are necessary, and accordingly
contained.

therefore, the conditions for acquiring

knowledge of an

perceived separate things, or interpretative knowledge,

moment

in the relation

knowledge

is

For Hegel,

amongst two

not met by the dialectical

of oppositions. Rather, Hegel poses the centrality of speculative

in bringing about

as the intuition

internal necessity

'

which

comprehensive knowledge. Speculation

of the existence of a special unity between the

parts,

is

one

thus understood

that goes

beyond

affirming that the parts mutually constitute and determine one another. Once speculative

knowledge

is

achieved, the unity of

all

the parts

is

discerned as part of an expressive

32

,•

totality.

30

Hegel, Science of Logic, 514-16.
31

Cf. Charles Taylor,

Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1979).

32

Cruz Vergara, La Concepcion del Conocimiento Histdrico en Hegel, 255. Here Hegel’s position might be
knowledge as the latter articulated it in the Ethics-, both thinkers share a
tripartite conception of knowledge, in which to comprehend a totality is central. But Spinoza’s monism
posits immanence ontologically and displaces contingency and historicity from its object of knowledge. In
other words, contrary to Hegel, who seeks to cognizes the totality, and does so speculatively, Spinoza
closer to Spinoza’s conception of

hypostasizes the totality in an immanence that does not allow for dialectical mediations, disavows

contingency, and ultimately rehearses a determinist understanding of freedom. For Spinoza, to be free

know
which

the causes of one’s actions rather than living with the illusion of free will: “That thing
exists

from the necessity of

its

deceived in that they think themselves

of

nature alone, and
free,

determined to act by

is

to

called free

itself alone”; "...

men

are

in this, that they are conscious

and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined”; “I say that a thing is free it it
and act from the necessity of its own nature alone, and compelled if it is determined by something
to exist and produce in a certain and determinate way.” See Benedict de Spinoza, A Spinoza Reader:

their actions

exists
else

is

an opinion which consists only

is

88

.

Out of this brief rendering one can see how
is

an important part of the

for

Hegel even the moment of repose

well as constitutive of his system: Spirit
needs to

totality, as

recollect itself in order to gain self-knowledge,
and in this

comprehensive view of the moments of universality and

moment of

particularity as rendered in the

singular events of history can be discerned. In
this recollection

knowledge of the

totality

moment of repose
of repose

is

also

that

by means of

Rose considers

what Adorno sees

the concept

( Begriff)

in

which

comprehension

is

where speculative

emerges. Actually,

crucial for speculative thinking.

But

this

which “the

And

yet, for

Hegel,

single shapes of Spirit do not persist any

determinate thoughts do, but they are as

much

are negative and evanescent.” This

the cognitive

is

positive and necessary

moment

comprehended; a moment

that is both historical

movement, seen

of repose, what distinguishes

as a state

particular existence,

is

is

moment

just as

in

this is the

moment of
more than

moments,

which

as they

whole

the

is

and concrete. “In the whole of the
itself therein,

preserved as something that recollects

self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge

this

33

the possibility of philosophical truth arises, the quasi-mystic

in

it is

moment of “unreflected immediacy,” what

as Hegel’s

he, following Benjamin, calls “dialectics at a standstill .”

moment

recollection a

itself,

and gives

whose

itself

existence

is

immediately existence.”

The Ethics and Other Works, ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 86, 137, 267
This conception of freedom has had important theoretical and political implications - for freedom is
perceived as the ignorance of necessity. Spinoza’s philosophy has been re-appropriated by

Among

liberals

and

where the most stimulating perspectives are found, one finds Louis
Althusser and Antonio Negri, who elaborate an anti-Hegel Marx on the basis of Spinoza. Yet these two
attest to the political problems of such formulations: in the case of Althusser it translated into a causalist
and deterministic Marxism in which a vanguardist conception of “theory” (Spinoza’s reason) was given
Marxists alike.

the latter,

primacy; and in the case of Negri,
but sociological, and

fails to

it

has led to an utterly abstract concept of the multitude that

appreciate the

moment of mediation

in its

is

everything

Spinoza-inspired concept of the

multitude. Cf. Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (London: Blackwell, 2003), 203-06.

Adorno, Hegel, 133. For a discussion of the role of this imagery in Adorno’s epistemology see Rolf
Tiedemann, “Concept, Image, Name: On Adorno’s Utopia of Knowledge,” in The Semblance of
Subjectivity, 123-145.
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Recollection,

here.

seems

It

Hegel

s

system

the equation,

moments
that

that

movement, and self-knowledge

out of the different configurations that these
concepts take within

it is

that his

it

is

concept of the absolute as subject emerges. Or perhaps,

because Hegel presupposes the absolute,

are rendered in the

according to Hegel

way

and

thus

in

its

to reverse

unity, that these

they are within his system. In any case, this

a unity

is

a higher unity comprising both objectivity and
subjectivity.

is

(But as Adorno insisted in different places,
subject”

are the crucial Hegelian concepts

fails

to

this absolute

mediate

dialectically

epistemologically and sociologically, the

latter

in

presumes

that “subject-object

status

its

as

an

object

is

both

terms of the objectification of the

34

subject within capitalism.)

But

moment

how much

recollected?

is

Is

recollected from a

movement of self-knowledge?

process?

immediacy?

How

Does

the

transparent

is

to

moment

have a comprehensive view of the

repose constitute speculative thinking, or unreflected
the repose if

evoke ecstasies and drunkenness?
speculative thinking?

the negative

the particular and the evanescent reality preserved in the

of recollection? Or do “we” need to repose in order
historical

Is

Is

it

this

is

one depicted by means of images

moment of

Does comprehensiveness presuppose

self-knowledge

that

crucial

for

a subject that reposes? These

are all pressing questions, especially because these go the core of the question of the

possibility

falling

for

of retrieving the comprehensive moment of speculative thinking without

back

into an abstract conception

instance,

associates

this

moment

comprehensiveness, and links the
34

of a subject of history, as Subject. Gillian Rose,

latter

of

recollection

with

with the promise of a

the

possibility

critical

retrieval

See Adorno, Hegel, 13. See also Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique,
Domingo (London, UK: Blackwell, 1982), 21.

Willis
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of

of

trans.

Marxism.

Yet Rose

pains to reclaim the epistemological import
of the

is at

recollection without Geist as subject.

Who

then recollects in the absence of Geist?

Humanity?

Who

is

then the possessor of a collective

memory?

Who

is

the bearer of that

read speculatively?

in

What

is

moment of

memory?

memory? Furthermore,

Who?

Or, perhaps, of collected

then,

what does

it

mean

to

the relationship between dialectical and speculative
thinking

Hegel? Does Adorno, as Rose suggests, cut

dialectical thinking short

by stopping

short

of speculation?
In order to clarify the stakes in these questions

the

way Hegel

one needs

to look

more

closely

at

deploys both categories, the dialectical and the speculative. Only then can

one determine the prospects of dialectical thinking, and the possibility of retrieving

it

for

a comprehensive and historicized critical theory of responsibility, one that
retains the
critical

falling

import of comprehensiveness, from a non-identitarian perspective, while resisting

back

into subjectivist formulations such as the absolute as Geist, or of a different

form of identitarian thinking.
that the full philosophical

It is,

indeed,

by

spelling out and exploring these questions

and ethical import of Adorno’s negative

and his

dialectics,

conception of critical theory, can be fully apprehended.
* * *

In order to present the intersection

between the

dialectical

and the speculative

shall call the reader’s attention to another notorious passage

of Hegel’s

in

Hegel,

that is

I

widely

35

Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 220.
36

For

this distinction

between

collective

memory and

collected

memory,

see James E.

Young, The Texture

of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), xi. See also
Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000), 21 Off., and his essay “Toward a Received History of the Holocaust,” History and
Theory 36 (December 1997). I tackle these questions in chapter VI of the present study.
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quoted, and equally misunderstood, even by
Hegel’s
in the

Philosophy of Right

that

“What

own

rational is actual

is

So widespread was the misunderstanding

this proposition

and sought

and what

37

is

actual

is

rational.”

that in the introduction to the first
part

Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830) Hegel

meant by

contemporaries: his statement

to clarify its

felt

compelled

meaning: for

to restate

this

was

of The

what he
a set of

38
propositions that “have given rise to expressions of
surprise and hostility.”
Hegel

explains

the

how he

sees the intersection of the actual and the rational

meanings of these two terms but

rational

and the

real

also their relatedness.

The

by

clarifying not only

relationship between the

needs to be read speculatively, he suggests; such a proposition

relation to the rational

and the

real

is

an argument on behalf of concreteness and

comprehensiveness. Namely, only by comprehensively rendering the present both
identity

and lack of

critique

of the present be re-cognized

Hegel’s

own

.

with

identity,

its

ideals

in light

.

democratic society

its

for a

unfulfilled possibilities and ideals.

is

39

between the two.

undemocratic, one

is

For instance,

if

one suggests

its

own

notion of itself (essence): in

a lack of identity between the existence and the essence,

of present structures

in the

G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of

name of the

Right, trans. T.

9

39

See Knox’s explanatory note

in

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 302.
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this

yields to a

which they

M. Knox (London and New York: Oxford

38
/,

which

ideal that informs them, but

University Press, 1967), 10

Hegel Encyclopaedia

that a

measuring the actual concrete experience and

practice (existence) of a given society against

critique

of

<

t

is

and aspirations, can the possibility

in its

formulation refers to the speculative rendering of essence and existence, and

the identity and lack of identity

case there

in

fall

short in fulfilling, a cntique that at
once

object and

for

by doing so

the unlikely utopian

Adorno’s insistence

Accordingly, the

critical

shows the non-identity between concept and

moment

in the

concept - the

moment of

accounts
4°

any critique of the concept needs

that

latter

to

start

with

it.

Hegel’s philosophy, instead of positing an abstract

imperative, or an ideal state that eludes situatedness,
consists in the attempt to discern the
lack of identity between universal and particular
within actuality,

against the other; an

immanent process through which

present under consideration

by measuring one

the possibility for a critique of the

4

yielded concretely.

is

'

Stated

somewhat

differently,

once

read speculatively, the proposition of both identity and lack of
identity serves as an

important cognitive element in de-reifying so-called democratic institutions
and social
relations that

turn,

might otherwise harbor deeply anti-democratic

might lead

transcendence
constitutional

But

to

principles, a

reconceptualize those immanently, even

(Adorno);

or

for

democratic

instance,

if

move

that, in

with an element of

constitutionalism

rather

than

democracy (Wolin).

this is not the

way

this formulation has historically

been understood. Hegel

partly ascribes the misreading of his position to the dogmatic assertion of divorcing ideas

from experience, an operation
Verstand).

And

that

he identifies with “analytic understanding” (reason as

as a corrective to this, he once again reiterates and expounds the need for

40

See, for instances, Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10: “The cognitive utopia would be to use concepts to

unseal the non-conceptual with concepts, without making

opposed by convicting

it

of non-identity with

concept. Negative dialectics

is

itself

- of

their equal.”

See also

the non-identity

it

p. 147:

“Totality

denies, according to

thus tied to the supreme categories of identitarian philosophy as

departure.”
41

Cf. Rose,

it

Hegel Contra Sociology, 196ff
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its

is
its

to

be

own

point of

philosophic thinking to be speculative

Phenomenology of

Spirit,

42

Hegel, to be sure, insisted on this as early
as the

.

where he defended the importance of “the
speculative

proposition.” But his rendering of the proposition
in the Phenomenology
stark as

it

is

notoriously

seeks to expound explicitly, and somewhat
formulaicly, an aspect of his

presentation

that

constitutive

is

of the text

In

itself.

Hegel’s severe formulation:

“Formally, what has been said can be expressed thus: the
general nature of the judgment
or proposition, which involves the distinction of Subject
and Predicate,

is

destroyed by

the speculative proposition, and the proposition of identity
which the former becomes

contains the counter-thrust against that subject-predicate relationship .” 43
Accordingly,

statements such as “what

is

actual

is

rational

and what

is

rational

is

actual,” or those

on

the identity of religion and state, attest to both the identity and non-identity
of the subject

with the predicate. The identity and lack of identity of the two parts cannot be

demonstrated transcendentally, nor can

it

be judged

in this

way;

rather,

it

needs

as a result not yet attained: both the subject and the predicate acquire

to

be seen

meaning once

44

related to

one another.

separated: as Hegel puts

identity.”

Even

Hence, oppositions such as identity and difference cannot be
it,

“difference

so, the political

...

is at

the

same time an inseparable element of

and social import of the Phenomenology resides

presenting these oppositions in the

way

in re-

these are manifested in different spheres of

life,

42

Hegel Encyclopaedia
,

I,

13ff.

43

Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 38.
44

For a persuasive and stimulating reading of this proposition

in

Hegel see Rose’s Hegel Contra Sociology,

See also Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (London: Blackwell,

49ff.

1991).
45

Hegel, Science of Logic, 33.
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thus imparting a political education
(Bildung) to his audience through an
exposition of
the different stages of

Precognition, and concretely expounding

the absolute in Hegel

philosophy rests on

is

it,

moment

a

or

at

their actuality.

Hence,

not yet attained, even if the critical
import of his

least

in

the

attempt

apprehend

to

reality

from

its

46

perspective.

Speculative thinking thus understood needs to transcend
judged oppositions and
re-present these oppositions in their actual configurations
in different spheres.
intrinsic to rational-philosophical thinking,

is

knowledge,

too.

For Hegel,

The mind or

and for comprehensive social and

spirit,

when

it

is

“But while thus occupied,” Hegel then adds, “thought entangles
loses itself in the hard-and-fast non-identity of

reaching

its

its

object.”

itself in contradictions,

47

itself,

is

caught and held in

which according

view there

is

to

Hegel

its

counterpart .”

is

exemplified by Kant’s

which continues

native rest and independence, ‘that

.

.

solution to

But, contrary to

is

analytic

where mere understanding

critical

philosophy. In Hegel’s

a craving of thought that remains unsatisfied, and “[tjhat craving expresses

the perseverance of thought,

its

political

thoughts, and so, instead of

its

understanding, speculative thinking does not stop here; this
stops,

this

sentient or perceptive, finds

object in something sensuous...” and the mind, accordingly, “renders
thought

i.e.

And

its

own

.

.

contradictions.”

it

true to itself, even in this conscious loss of

may overcome’ and work

out in itself the

48

Or

as

he spells

it

out elsewhere: “ Speculative

thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast to contradiction, and in

46

Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology 214-20.
,

47

Hegel Encyclopaedia

I,

15.

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

I,

15.

,

48

95

it,

its

.

own

self,

but does not allow itself to be dominated
by

it

as ordinary thinking,

where

its

determinations are resolved by contradiction
only into other determinations or into
49

nothing.”

Incidentally,

Adorno would

later

it

is that

“craving” of thought that thinkers like Nietzsche
and

on identify as the

this is not incidental:

it

imperialistic

moment of thought: and

springs from the monotheistic pretensions of

Adorno

for

modem

reason.

(I

discuss this point further in chapter V.)

Following

these

speculative thinking: (1)

renderings,

it

one

distinguishes

moment of

identity,

them; (2) and as the perseverance of thought

to

even

the basis of both functions rest

moment

the cmcial dialectical

two

is

on

if

Encyclopaedia

,

it

relating

how

these

attempts to reconcile these in a

dialectical thinking: but for the

first

the negative while in the second one sees the drive to
,

moment.

Hegel offers a rather formulaic sketch of the

moments of thought, and how each one
centrality

by

for

only conceptually, between

reconciliation in the negation of the negation, the so-called third positive
In the

functions

achieve knowledge of

contradictions are determined, sometimes mutually, as

And

least

the attempt to transcend ordinary thinking

is

contradictions and showing the

higher unity.

at

of the speculative moment

relates to the other,

in his thinking: “In point

which sheds

different

light

on the

of form Logical doctrine

has three sides: the Abstract side, or that of understanding; the Dialectical, or that of
50

negative reason; the Speculative, or that of positive reason.”

of the logic are also moments

(

These stages or moments

that are present in every concept,

and within the concept

Begriff), and cannot be thought of sequentially, or in temporal terms. Hegel quickly

49

Hegel, Science of Logic 440-4 1
,

50

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

113.
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,

warns his readers not

to take then in the abstract

each of them, he needs to expound them
entities,

at

way he

presents them: in order to present

the level of the understanding as
separated

hence his reliance on ordinary thought and the

difficulty in

apprehending his

formulations.

For Hegel, the abstract moment of the Understanding
“sticks

to

characters and their distinctness from one another: every
such limited abstract

having a subsistence and being of
presents

them

Vernunft. This

as

is

its

own.”

unmediated opposites:
the point

-

in

it

The understanding separates

is

fixity

it

of

treats as

things and

confined to reason as Verstand, not as

Hegel’s estimation - where Kantian philosophy stops;

it

cannot be speculative, especially given that Kant associates speculation with
misguided
attempts to apprehend the thing

in

itself,

and with the formulations of ontological

arguments on the existence of God. Or as Hegel put
philosophy

it

in the

Science of Logic, Kantian
5

is

responsible for “the renunciation of speculative thought.”

^

Yet

it

is this

epistemological opposition between the realm of appearances {phenomena and the realm
)

of the thing

itself

(

noumena ), what Hegel

challenges speculatively: after

the boundary-limit of knowledge, exemplified

by

the realm of

think that which lies in the realm of noumena, the very

all,

by thinking

noumena, Kant

is

able to

same thing he claims cannot be

53
,

,

thought.

Following
thinking, one that

this critique

of Kant, Hegel formulates the next stage or moment of

is intrinsically

related to the previous

51

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

113.

52

Hegel, Science of Logic, 25.
53

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

I,

115.
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one as

it

constitutes

its

negation:

the

negation

of the understanding

the

is

dialectical

one

stage,

which “these

in

characterizations and formulae [of the Understanding]
supersede themselves, and pass
into their opposites.”

study things in their

partial

The

own

dialectic

is

moment of

the negative; “its purpose

justify not only the transition

By means

from one moment

moment from

of

this juxtaposition

to

to the other, but also the possibility

of

the negative one

-

if “Dialectic is the

dialectic

is,

very nature

too,

subsumed

next moment: the speculative. Yet, in contrast to the Skeptical tradition,
for Hegel,

“philosophy does not remain content with the purely negative result of Dialectic.
the negative

positive:

own

to

Hegel seeks

and essence of everything predicated by mere understanding,”
in the

is

being and movement and thus demonstrate the
fmitude of

categones of understanding.”

deriving a third positive

the

it

which emerges

contains what

nature.

,,

as the result

it

of dialectic

results from,

is,

because a

absorbed into

result, at the

life itself,

[...]

For

same time

and made part of

its

56

Insofar as

emerged, thus there

By means

is

it

is

a result, the negative also contains that from which

it

both identity and lack of identity between these two moments.

of these formulations Hegel sought

to derive a positive

the negative, a transition that commentators have pointed out

moment from

not entirely convincing,

is

57

not even on logical grounds.

Or

“To equate the negation of

the

as

Adorno eloquently puts

negation

with positivity

it

in

is

Negative Dialectics
the

quintessence

,

of

54

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

115.

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

117.

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

119.

56

See, for instance, Michael Forster, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method,” The
ed. Frederick C. Beiser

Cambridge Companion

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 130-70.
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to

Hegel,

identification;

is

it

the formal principle in

negation of the negation

presupposes positivity
reading, the

Hegel

s

as

purest form”; namely,

“The

thesis that the

something positive can only be upheld
by one who
all-conceptuality

moment of identification

is

- from

58

the beginning .”

posited abstractly, and

is

Adorno’s

In

thus a formal aspect of

philosophy that hardly emerges from experience. What
might be more important,

the identity of the

After

-

is

its

all,

even

two moments

Hegel’s

in

own

movement, and

dialectical

is

is

posited in advance, and hardly arrived

formulation,

the one that

it is

the negative

Adorno reclaims

moment

at dialectically.

that is crucial in the

for his critical reconfiguration

of the dialectic. Just consider one of the most poetic renderings
of the second moment
the Hegelian triad as

formulated in the preface of the Phenomenology’
of

Spirit,

in

a

formulation that attests to the importance of mediation in Hegel’s dialectical
thought but
also

resonates

Dialectics

with Adorno’s “logic of disintegration” as expounded

life

of

Spirit is not the life that shrinks

untouched by devastation, but rather the
It

wins

in truth

life that

say of something that

away and

turn

from death and keeps

endures

only when, in utter dismemberment,

power, not as something positive, which closes

we

Negative

:

But the

it.

in

it

is

nothing or

its

is false,

it

it

and maintains
finds itself.

itself

itself in

It

eyes to the negative as

is this

when

and then, having done with

pass onto something else; on the contrary, Spirit

is this

it,

power only

59

by looking

the negative in the face, and tarrying with

it.

58

Adorno Negative
,

Dialectics, 158, 160.

59

Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 19. For a very stimulating, psychoanalytic reading of Hegel, and the
negative, see Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London and New York: Verso,
1989); Tarrying with the Negative (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); For They Not Know What They

moment of the
Do, 2

nd

ed.

(London and

New

York: Verso, 2002). For a suggestive critique of Zizek’s Lacaman
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Even

so,

in

other

formulations Hegel places the “tarrying
with the negative” as

necessarily leading to a third positive

moment. For

instance, in the Science
of Logic

Hegel offers a more detailed account of the negative
moment,
to grasp the role

of the negative

after stating that the

in dialectical thinking,

method” of his philosophy

“is the

in light

and

of which

its critical

it is

easier

function. Here,

consciousness of the form of the

inner self-movement of the content of logic,” he writes;

[T]he negative

is

just as

much

resolve itself into nullity

positive, or that

what

is

but essentially only into the negation of

[...]

particular content, in other words, that such negation

but

the

negation

consequently
that

is

from which

of a specific

it

results;

has content.

it

predecessor; for

contains

is in this

to

it,

subject

which

it

is

It

richer

strictly

complete

not

all

and every negation

which resolves

that the

itself in a

speaking

is

itself,

and

a tautology, for otherwise

a result. Because the result, the negation,

is

a fresh Notion but higher and richer than

by

the negation of opposite of the

is

latter,

the unity of itself and

system of Notions as such has

to

be formed

its

it

a specific

is

but also something more, and

way

matter

is

its

a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains

would be an immediacy, not
negation

self-contradictory does not

its

therefore

opposite.

— and

It

also has

purely continuous course in which nothing extraneous

is

60

introduced.

But from the specificity of negation, as a determinate one, does not follow

that there

higher unity that follows from the coupling of the negation with

moment. And

its first

engagement with Hegel, see Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment (London and
1995), chap. 12.
60

Hegel, Science of Logic 54.
,
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New

is

a

York: Verso,

yet,

Hegel

is at

pains to argue that the negation leads to a

higher notion. The negation, in so far as

something higher than the

first

thing

is

it

negates. Rather,

it

returns to itself; not to the

understanding of

its

moment. But

it

is

affirmation: a richer and

moment of what

level

of knowledge previously possessed, but

concept.

the

Still,

assumption that

it

this

this third positive

Stated

that the third

moment

somewhat

moment of the

that for

him

does not necessarily follow from
this

dialectic, the positive, is derived.

And

it is

is

the negation of the understanding,

dialectic, but in the speculative a higher unity

immediacy of the

first,

and the mediation of the second

6

as a higher unity.

means convincingly shows,
their

from

differently, the dialectic

that carries both the

moment, thus emerging

is

it

constitutes the kernel of speculative thinking.

and the speculative the negation of the

emerges

to a richer

unity becoming

the dialectical relatedness of the concepts themselves. But
Hegel insists that

moment

is

not merely the absence of the concept or

something higher seems externally posited; namely,

negative

negates,

it

a reflective process in which one pole negates
the other and

same

own

contains a

it

new

is

that out

'

But what Hegel presupposes, and by no

of a speculative rendering of the oppositions

mutual relation and constitution, a unity emerges. Only by positing Geist

in

in its

teleological process of self-knowledge can such an assumption be made, thus confirming

the validity of Adorno’s claim that the positive could only be derived from the negative if

it

is

taken as the

initial

unreflective immediacy.

point of departure, a

how

it

that constitutes another instance of

Adorno presents an analogous

of both subjectivity and objectivity
presents, and

move

masks

critique in relation to the

moment

that the epistemological higher unity, the absolute,

a domination of subjectivity over objectivity. For as

Hegel, Science of Logic, 830ff.
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Adorno

writes, “In the objectivity of the Hegelian
dialectic,

there

something

is

will that

like a will

on the

comes out of a unity

that

which quashes

part of the subject to

is

of the transition from one moment

mere subjectivism,

all

jump over

its

own shadow .”

62

A

posited in advance in order to preserve the
cogency
to the other, but

one

that sacrifices objectivity

and

difference for the sake of identity and subjectivity.

Even

so,

Hegel’s thought remains caught in a tension between the
centrality he

ascribes to the negative dialectical

moment and

moment.

after all, that in

It is

the negative

moment,

genuine dialectical element,
positive

in

moment of the

even

if in

speculative: “It

is

its

sublation in the third speculative

Hegel’s

own view

other formulations he sees

in the dialectic as

it is

it

constitutes “the

as leading to the

here understood, that

is,

the grasping of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative,
that
63

speculative thinking consists .”

Still,

according to Hegel, “The dialectical stage has the

features characterizing the third grade of logical truth, the speculative form, or the form

of positive reason.”

moment

is

negative

is

Or

as he states in a

more expansive

“The negative

the one that [posits] the specific differences of the understanding.”

the

moment of difference - which

while the speculative

moment

is

the

is

one

crucial for

in

62

Hegel, 13.

63

Hegel, Science of Logic, 55, 56.
64

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

I,

119; Cf. Hegel, Science of Logic, 28

65

Hegel, Science of Logic, 28.
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Adorno’s negative

6

The

dialectics

which the unity of oppositions

apprehended and a third affirmative emerges; one

Adomo,

rendering:

that for

Hegel

“is

involved

are

in their

disintegration

and

in

their transition.""

Speculation thus emerges as a conceptual

process. Accordingly, in yet another Hegelian
formulation, the three

one another

in the following

and

dialectical,

because

understanding into nothing;

comprehends the

Once rendered

it

is

it

the determinations fixed; reason

resolves

positive because

the

it

determinations

of

is

the

generates the universal and

67

particular therein

together, in

all

.

their respective determinations, speculative thinking
yields

knowledge of both the universal and the

comprehended

constitute

way:

The understanding determines, and holds
negative

moments

therein. Indeed, there

the opposite direction, at least

is

particular

-

albeit,

the

only once

latter

conspicuously no statement about movement

on Hegel’s

part.

Here the universal has primacy over

in

the

particular, Hegel’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

Hegel also attaches the negative

to the labor

of Geist: “the negative,

constitutes the quality alike of dialectical reason and understanding.”

revolves around the notion of Geist “Spirit thinking
:

in this

way,

dialectic

Spirit, the universal, is

its

own

that

And

which

all

this

external nature.” Conceived

what constitutes consciousness, and under which

of universal and particular takes place. Speculative knowledge,

thus,

is

the

the

cognitive process of comprehensively relating opposites and casting these oppositions

from the perspective of a higher unity, an all-encompassing expressive

At
which

this particular point the

may

cogency of Hegel’s cosmology

account for his insistence on

this richer third

66

Hegel, Encyclopaedia

/,

119.

67

Hegel, Science of Logic 28.
,
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totality.

is

not very strong,

moment, one presumably

carrying with

and

it

a higher unity

states but hardly

between the oppositions - a point he constantly

convincingly shows.

No

stresses

doubt that once different determinations

and relations between concepts are discerned,
the knowledge of how these

are

intertwined increases, and thus a richer
comprehensive knowledge of, for instance, the

way

the universal and particular are intersected and
mutually mediated

may

emerge. But

the cognitive gain need not lead to a positing of
an identity between concept and object in
this

‘higher unity,” or to positing an absolute subject. Yet
that

seems

to derive.

what he seeks

Once

to

again, as

Adorno unequivocally

is

exactly what Hegel

suggests, here Hegel presupposes

prove - the identity of subject and object: “The Hegelian system must

indeed presuppose subject-object identity, and thus the very primacy
of Spirit which
.

seeks to prove.

it

„ 68

Out of these

reflections also

emerges a critique of the epistemological model of

subject-object relation” as formulated

Hegel not only challenges the ways

in

by Hegel’s predecessors

which

this

in

modem

philosophy.

binary has been kept, but also presents

the importance and need to transcend this binary, and posit

it

as a higher unity, one that
69

will

be achieved only

in the reconciliation

“contains thought in so far as this

in its

own

self in so far as

By

it is

is

just as

of absolute knowledge.

much

the object in

its

For consciousness

own

self or the object

equally pure thought."

comprehensively positing the presence of objectivity and subjectivity

poles of the binary, Hegel undoes this binary while sublating

it;

68

Adorno, Against Epistemology

,

4.

69

Hegel, Science of Logic 45; See also Rosen’s discussion in G. W. F. Hegel.
,

70

Hegel, Science of Logic, 49. Emphasis in original.
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a

move

that

in

both

Adorno’s

negative dialectics endorses, as
a positive

moment of reconciliation

least since his joint authorship,

for

And

we

shall see.

is

with

Adorno, Hegel’s philosophy

Max

is

original identity

posited

imposed from the

that is

by

of thought,

neither does

it

dialectics

instead, deeply political.

is,

it

of subject and

the notion of Spirit;

at

it is

7

'

object.

close to a

outside, as Hegel’s deduction from the

relatedness of the concepts does not lead to this; hence
to a constant reconfiguration

aporetic stance

Horkheimer, of the Dialectic of Enlightenment

on the

rests

to unify the oppositions in

by Adorno’s consciously

resisted

the unity, the identitarian principle,

SoUen (an ought)

But Hegel’s leap

leaves no

^
abstractness

its

room

for a

instead leads

It

moment of repose,

albeit

posit an abstract restlessness: the restlessness of Adorno’s
negative

Thus offering a

political

and ethical reading of

theoretical philosophy, not a philosophical reading of politics, such as the ones
offered

by

Hegel, where the individual and the concrete are often sacrificed for the sake of the
universal. Indeed, since the Dialectic

Horkheimer, articulated the
although this time

Unlike

it is

critical

of Enlightenment Adorno, here

import of Hegel’s concept of “determinate negation,”

contrasted with the “rigorism” of instrumental reason:

rigorism,

determinate

negation

representations of the absolute, idols,

does

not

simply

its

reject

by confronting them with

unable to match. Rather, dialectic discloses each image as
read from

in conjunction with

features the admission of falseness

the idea they are

script.

It

which cancels

Language thereby becomes more than

imperfect

teaches us to

its

power and

hands

it

signs.

With the concept of determinate negation Hegel gave prominence

over to

truth.

a

mere system of
to

71

Adomo,

Hegel,

3.

72

See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, on the role of Sollen

105

in Hegel, as well as her reading

of the Logic.

an

element which distinguishes enlightenment
from the positivist decay

consigned

it.

However, by

finally postulating the

known

to

which he

of the whole

result

process of negation, totality in the system and
in history, as the absolute, he
violated the prohibition and himself succumbed
to mythology

73
.

* * *

For Hegel, as already argued, the speculative moment
apprehended, and a third positive

moment of

of disintegration - one surely indebted

while rejecting a third
the

moment of

Adomo

Adomo

In contrast,

to

is

emphasizes the

Hegel’s formulation of the

moment of reconciliation, and

reclaiming the negative

dialectic,

moment

as

difference. In other words, instead of positing a philosophy of identity,

and instead of seeking the “identity

in the difference

all

between each object and

concept,” formulates a “disintegration of the prepared and objectified forms of the

concepts which the cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly .”

of disintegration, one that even

it

which unity

rather formulates a different logic of disintegration: one that “is suspicious of

identity”,

its

the one in

reconciliation (of identity-in-difference)

emerges from the disintegration of oppositions.
centrality

is

it

74

And

it is

this logic

though challenges constitutive subjectivity - or because

does so dialectically - does not erase the subject.

“The farewell

to

Hegel,”

Adomo

argues,

“becomes tangible

in a contradiction that

concerns the whole, in one that cannot be resolved according

to plan, as a particular

contradiction.”

be

Stated

differently,

the

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adomo,
S.

Noerr and

trans.

Edmund

contradiction

sublated

and thus

Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments ed. G.
,

Jephcott (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002), 18.

74

Adomo, Negative

cannot

Dialectics, 145.

106

incorporated in Hegel’s

system as a particular that can be
transcended from the

perspective of the whole; instead,

it

challenges the pretensions to wholeness in
Hegel’s

philosophy. The contradiction Adorno refers
to

is

in relation to the aforementioned

account of method in Hegel, especially in Hegel’s
critique of previous philosophical
attempts to separate a method from
violates his

own

precepts: “Hegel

content,

its

...

its

object. In

Adorno’s reading, Hegel

wanted a philosophy without a detachable form,

without a method to be employed independently of
the matter, and yet proceeded
75

Or

methodically.

least

at

so

much can be apprehended from

his

treatment

of

philosophical categories in the Science of Logic, a text where questions
of method take

precedence, and the leap between the negative and the positive

taken, even if in his

is

other political, epistemological, and historical writings such a deduction
hardly follows.
It is

'

out of this violation of its most basic principle that Hegel ends up positing an
abstract

reconciliation, a

moment

that represents a flight

from the concreteness of objects. Hence,

the aforementioned abstract nature of the concluding chapter of the Science
of Logic
constitutes,

from an Adomian point of view, an example of how Hegel proceeds

methodically, and not merely the absence of the conditions for
as

Rose

its

concrete manifestation,

suggests.

In this vein,

detachable from

its

negative dialectics.

Adorno reclaims

content, a

He

thinking as the radical

method

the Hegelian notion of a

method

that is not

that is not one. This insight is preserved in his

also emphasizes

its

moment of Hegel’s

importance further by presenting dialectical

thinking, one that

Adorno reworks:

75

Adorno Negative

Dialectics, 144.

For a feminist critique of Hegel’s reading of Sophocles’ Antigone along these

Women, Nature, and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University
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Press, 1986).

lines, see Patricia

J.

Mills,

In fact, dialectics

word.

It

is

method nor a

reality in the naive sense

not a method, for the unreconciled matter

is

identity surrogated

unanimous

neither a pure

by the thought -

interpretation.

brings us to dialectics.

It is

Nor

is

is

-

of the

lacking precisely the

contradictory and resists any attempt

at

the matter, not the organizing drive of thought,
that
dialectics a simple reality, for contradictoriness

is

a

category of reflection, the cogitative confrontation
of concept and thing. To

proceed dialectically means

to

think in contradictions,

for

the

sake of the

contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that
contradiction.
contradiction in reality

If reality is contradictory

by means of which
as

its

it

thought needs to recreate those contradictions in the categories

point of departure

a

politically

a contradiction against reality.

comprehends

materialism. In this vein,

from

is

it

this reality. Also,

for reflection

infused

sociological,

moment

dialectics takes

the concreteness of the object.

and

cognitive,

in his formulation

thinking, the experience of the contradiction

mending

Adorno’s negative

resists thinking contradictions ontologically;

constitutes a genuine dialectical

resists

A

is

what

it’s

he rather does so

perspective.

of

Hence

And

this aspect

of

in

what

dialectical

triggers thought; critical thinking

the contradictions theoretically. Instead,

what

critical

theory does

is to

think against those contradictions comprehensively in order to challenge their reified

forms. Thus the contradictions of reality can be comprehended in critical ways in order to

subvert that otherwise reified reality.

By

dialectically,

contradictions in reality

and speculatively, rendering the contradictions

Adomo

in

thought to the

seeks to formulate a dialectics of non-identity in which

77

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 144-45.
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neither

is

identity posited

from the outside, nor

is

difference, or non-identity, reified.

Rather than regressing to a Kantian,
or Cartesian, conception of method,
Adorno
radicalizes Hegel’s account and, ironically,

The

philosophies.

materialist aspect of this

accordingly. Indeed, the materialism here

is

is

truer to Hegel’s critique

mode of

of methodist

dialectical thinking is retrieved

emphasized by the constant mediation of the

object in relation to the concepts that seek to
represent

it.

But materialism here

refers to

the privilege of concrete experience for thinking
rather than a mechanic conception of
reality,

or of history, as vulgar conceptions of Marxism indicate

78
.

Accordingly, Adorno’s negative dialectics cannot be reconciled
or sublated from
a Hegelian standpoint.

sacrificing

is

It

manages

to dispense

with the abstractness of Geist without

comprehensiveness. Additionally, by means of

its

its

logic of disintegration

it

able to present the “untruth” of reconciled subjectivity, of identity thinking.
But this

turn, to

idealist

be

sure,

can only be taken immanently. Adorno’s logic of disintegration takes the

formulation as

its

transcended only in thoughts

own

deductive procedure,

point of departure:

still

call

it

“The

circumscribed by

its

idealistic

magic

circle

can be

figure, in thoughts that follow

by name and demonstrate

its

its

disjointness, the untruth of

79

totality

by unfolding
Still,

emphasizes

its

epitome.”

Adorno’s formulation of
its

comprehended

dialectical

thinking renders itself aporetic.

bottomless nature and non-identity between contradictions - the

latter are

sociologically, not ontologically. Negative dialectics preserves the tension

between what Hegel and Rose considered the two moments of the

78

Cf. Sebastiano

It

Timparano, On Materialism (London:

New

79

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 145.
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Left Books, 1979).

dialectic:

the

1

dialectical

and the speculative.

of reconciliation, he seeks

And by resisting the

to formulate a

more

imposition of a third positive

moment

inclusive dialectic. But one that in

its

inclusiveness does not sacrifice objectivity for
the sake of subjectivity, nor posit
the

domination of subject over object, or of identity over
difference: “But
non-identity has the form of identity, an all-inclusiveness
that
third, reconciling

insofar as

moment.”

is

in reality this very

not governed by any

This more inclusive dialectic has a strong political
import

seeks to do justice to the others but without positing an
abstract concept of

it

the other, or referring to the ethical and political

demand

for responsibility as an abstract

imperative.

The

of Adorno’s critique

political aspect

earlier formulation

qualification

of the same problem

of the

absolutely

immanence can never completely

first

is

in relation to the

in

subjective

disentangle the

and because subjectivity, the organ of

better understood in light of Adorno’s

philosophy of origins: “The

immanence

moment of

founders

because

non-identity within

reflection, clashes with the idea

itself,

of an absolutely

8

first

as pure immediacy.”

Adorno thus suggests

that “the suppression of non-identity”

needs to be understood not only as a conceptual or philosophical problem but also as a
political one: as Peter

Dews

has aptly put

it,

such suppression of non-identity

is

“the

82

expression of a historically and socially determined drive for control.”

Osborne has put

it,

from the subjective

though

in a different context: “... the character

to the objective]

...

is

Or

as Peter

of [Adorno’s

shift

not that of a ‘fragmentation’ or ‘de-centering’

80

Adorno, Hegel, 31.
81

Adorno, Against Epistemology 23.
,

82

See Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment 87.
,
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of the subject so

from

its

much

as either a withdrawal or alienation
of

it

subjective dimension

(objective) conditions of existence (the
withdrawal of an already de-centered

subjectivity into itself), or, at worst,

be

its

its

dissolution,

83

its

reduction to objectivity .”

And,

to

sure, this is a political-economic-cultural
process rather than an ontological one. Thus,
is

futile to substitute, as Gilles

thinking, or the negative

Or

to put

it

Deleuze’s philosophy for instance does, identitarian

moment of dialectics, with an

abstract affirmation of plurality.

differently, these questions of theoretical philosophy

politically in terms

need

to

be thought about

of the possibility of acknowledging the limits of subjectivity and
of

formulating an “open-ended dialectic of concrete experience,” one that

and responsive

more

to difference, but,

is

both

critical

importantly, one that also seeks the overcoming

84

domination.

of

For

as

Adorno

argues,

the

contradictions

of thought

are

contradictions of experience, and even though thought partly constitutes this reality,
also constituted

by

it.

This

is

also

it

is

yet another reason for Adorno’s refusal to posit dialectics as

a philosophical ontology. Rather, he presents negative dialectics as the ontology of the

wrong

As

is

state

of things, and as such

the case in

object.

But

some of Hegel’s

in the case

it is

“neither a [Hegelian] system nor a contradiction.”

formulations, for Adorno, dialectics

is intrinsic

with

its

of Adorno, such an object could be society based on the exchange

principle that presupposes an abstract equality based on the principle of abstract legality

that he, like

Lukacs, sees as intrinsic to the exchange process of

See Peter Osborne, “A Marxism
(Spring-Summer, 1992): 171-192.

for the

Postmodern? Jameson’s Adorno,”

84

Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment

,

late capitalism.

88.

Ill

New German

And

such

Critique 56

abstract equality, thoroughly mediated

by

the

abstract procedural structure of liberalism
and

One of

exchange principle,

its

the tasks of negative dialectics

is

constitutive of the

discourse of rights.

is

thus to illustrate the exclusions of

differences, and the domination of otherness
that are a byproduct of this process.

so

by comprehensively thinking

He

does

the political, the economic, and the
cultural not as

isolated spheres but as mutually mediated. In
other words, only a critical theory that seeks
to

apprehend the role of the universal and particular

mutual mediations of the

in the singular

why

is

moment of thinking. Adorno’s
The power of
It

rendering

the status

must seek

is

worth quoting

quo puts up the facades

to crash

at

some

into

what would not have
the

closest

its

contact

length:

which our consciousness

through them. This alone would free the postulate of

depth from ideology. Surviving in such resistance

in

every particular instance.

in

Negative Dialectics Adorno does not entirely reject the speculative

in

crashes.

to the

the economic, and the political (which are not

cultural,

independent of one another, as dialecticians would know)
This

can do justice

law prescribed
with

the

for

it

objects,

is

by given
and

in

the speculative

facts transcends

repudiating

a

moment:

them even
sacrosanct

85

,

transcendence.

Adorno
Such

relates the speculative

possibility

is

moment of

thinking to the possibility of transcendence.

constitutive of his understanding of critical theory.

following his presentation of the centrality of the speculative

Adorno formulates
voice.

He

his

85
,

moment of

thinking,

well-known statement on the importance of lending suffering

writes:

Adorno Negative

Immediately

Dialectics, 17.

112

a

Where

the thought transcends the bonds

Freedom follows
suffering

the

is

it

tied in resistance

the subject’s urge to express

itself.

the condition of all truth. For suffenng

subject;

its

most subjective experience,

is

its

-

there is

The need

its

freedom.

to lend a voice to

objectivity that weighs

expression,

is

upon

objectively

86

conveyed

.

Speculation, in Adorno’s negative dialectics,
thus consists not only of the freedom of
thought, the contingent and fragile
refusal to let thought’s

moment of transcendence from

law be prescribed by the present;

it

the status quo, or the

also consists of the possibility

of articulating identity from non-identity, and vice versa:
“Contradiction

under the aspect of

makes

identity; the dialectical

primacy of the principle of contradiction

as an ideal of reconciliation, in Adorno’s formulation, speculative
thinking

locates the lack of identity

its

non-identity

the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity.” Instead
of positing “identity-

in-difference

and

is

between the concept

lack of identity with

and freedom

it:

that a given reality uses to

politically, this translates into

measure

itself,

using the ideal of democracy

to criticize societies that in their self-image pretend to

be democratic. More

importantly, rather than abstractly seeking to find unity amidst heterogeneity, dialectical

thinking thinks

criticizes these

to suffering

of difference and heterogeneity concretely, and both defends and

two principles insofar

as in their concrete manifestations they contribute

and domination.

In this vein,

Adorno evokes

the speculative rendering of unity and heterogeneity
87

from the perspective of non-identity.

Consequently, Adorno preserves the speculative

86

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 17-18.
87

Adomo, Negative Dialectics,

5.
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moment even when
moment

is

a break with the idealist formulation
of

it

called for, but this

is

preserved in a richer and broader
formulation. “Even after breaking with

idealism, philosophy cannot do without
speculation, which

tabooed with

it

- meaning

was exalted by idealism and

speculation, of course, in a sense broader
than the overly

88

positive Hegelian one.”

Adorno

think

domination.
theory,

it

the

Only by reworking
of

possibility

“a

possible

needs to be done comprehensively;

instance, in the

that

is

If [Hegel]

non-identity”

without

the forms of suffering

totality that is the “total social process.”

of universal history, he formulates

of the Hegelian absolute:

thinking can

the condition of truth for critical

by casting

is,

Hegel model of Negative Dialectics

identitarian concept

moment of

reconciled

Besides, if lending a voice to suffering

from the perspective of the non-identitarian

positivity

the speculative

,

where Adorno
problem

this

in

For

retrieves a non-

terms of a critique

transformed the totality of historic suffering into the

of self-realizing absolute, the One and All

that

keeps rolling on

to this

day -

with occasional breathing spells - would teleologically be the absolute of suffering” 91

Human

suffering cannot be reconciled and redeemed in Hegelian fashion; rather, to lend

voice to suffering in

its

elements in

its

it

and concrete manifestations

particular

comprehensive narrative

in

'

in

necessary to recast a

which both the contingent and the

can be cognized. In other words,

historical

it is

dimensions,

Adorno’s

structural-capitalist

comprehensively re-cognize suffering,

to

critical

theory

preserves

the

moment of

88

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 15-16.
89

For a fuller explanation, see Simon Jarvis’ suggestive treatment of the speculative moment
Adorno: A Critical Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 226-31.

in

Adomo,

in

90

See
in

Adomo, Negative

Adomo

in chapter

dialectics, 320.

VI of this

I

offer a lengthy interpretation of the question of universal history

dissertation.
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speculation, and aims at the
comprehensiveness, that Hegel, Marx, and
Lukacs aimed

from the perspective of the

moment

is

totality. In

Adorno’s theory,

I

would

preserved in the idea of thinking in constellations. 9

at

like to suggest, such as

'

* * *

Adorno’s attempt
comprehensiveness
identitarian

formulate

to

associated

consequences

is

a

with

theory

speculative

of society that
thinking

without

carries

still

its

found in what, following Walter Benjamin, he

constellational thinking, or thinking

to

critical

idealist

the

or

identifies as

by means of “constellations of concepts.”

In contrast

Hegel’s rendenng of dialectical and speculative thinking,
and the positive identity he

imposes on

it,

Adorno’s formulation of constellational thinking does not
presuppose an

identity of subject

and

object. Instead,

when

the subject apprehends objects through a

constellation of concepts the subject does not seek to provide an
exhaustive account of
the object in

all its

particularities

determinations: a constellation of concepts seeks to bring into light the

of the object, as well as

former, or completely apprehend the

of the object, the side which

its

non-identity, without claiming to exhaust the

“a constellation illuminates the specific side

latter:

to a classifying

procedure

is

either a matter of indifference of

92

a burden.”

Stylistically,

it

is

the essay, as a form, that for

Adorno

presentation that characterizes constellational thinking.

As

best captures the

mode of

early as his inaugural lecture

91

On constellational

thinking, see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics. See also Drucilla
“The Ethical Message of Negative Dialectics,” Social Concept A (December 1987); Max Pensky’s
Introduction to the collection of essays The Actuality of Adorno (Albany: The State University of New
York, 1996); and Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic (London and

Cornell,

New York:

Verso, 1991).

92

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 162. Emphasis added.
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.

of 1931 Adorno was arguing on
behalf of constellational thinking,
and even

at that

he saw in the essay, what he refers
93
to as “essayism,” the ideal
venue.
More than
years

later, in

the “Essay as Form,” he writes:

every intellectual structure

is

"The

constellation

is

necessanly transformed into a force

time

thirty

a force field, just as

field

under the essay’s

,94

The attnbutes of

gaze.

constellational thinking are further elaborated
in terms of the

openness and experimental nature of the essay
as a genre. In the “Essay

Adorno

as

Form,”

writes,

The

essay, however,

is

concerned with what

concepts to pry open the aspect of

its

is

blind in

its

objects.

objects that cannot be

It

wants

to use

accommodated by

concepts, the aspect that reveals, through the contradictions
in which concepts

become

entangled,

arrangement.

in

it.

It

that

wants

Its efforts

the

net

of their objectivity

to polarize the

is

a merely subjective

opaque element and release the

latent forces

are directed towards concretizing a content defined in time
and

93

See Theodor W. Adorno, The Actuality of Philosophy,” in The Adorno Reader
ed. Brian O’ Connor
(London: Blackwell, 2000), 24-38, Much has been made on the continuity of Adorno’s
thinking from this
inaugural essay to Negative Dialectics, and beyond, as well as on the Benjaminian
genesis of the notion of
,

“constellations.” But what these accounts do not emphasize enough is the substantial
reworking this idea
took in Adorno’s oeuvre and the fact that Marxism, as a crucial motif in his work, had not taken
hold yet,
nor that the critique of Heidegger was as vehement as it became later on in the Jargon
Authenticity Also,
the experience of

Adorno did not
Luxemburg was

Auschwitz

is

crucial for

of
Adorno’s materialist philosophy. In contrast

suffer or experience the Great

War

directly,

to

Horkheimer,

nor the tumultuous times when Rosa

assassinated. For a critique of Buck-Morss’ and Jameson’s interpretations on similar
grounds see Osborne, “A Marxism for the Postmodern?,” 176. For a discussion of the changing attitude
towards Heidegger see Bob Hullot-Kentor’s introductory remarks to his translation of “The Idea of Natural

History,” Telos 60

(Summer

Tierra de Nadie,

120-22; on the constitutive role of catastrophe, exemplified in Auschwitz, see the

following works:

J.

M.

1984):

1 1

1-24.

On

Adorno’s “conversion”

Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment

to

Marxism

see Mtiller-Doohm,

En

and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2001), especially pp. 371-96; Terry Eagleton, The Ideology

of the Aesthetic (London: Blackwell,
Rolf Tiedemann’s ‘“Not the First Philosophy, But a Last One’: Notes on Adorno's
Thought,” which serves as an introduction to Theodor W. Adomo, Can One Live After Auschwitz? A
Philosophical Reader, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), xi-xxvii.
1990), chap.

13;

94

Theodor W. Adomo, “The Essay as Form,” Notes
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 13.

to Literature: Vol. 1, trans. Shierry
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Weber Nicholsen

space;

it

constructs a

imagines them
In

its

to

complex of concepts interconnected

be interconnected

describes

it

that

systematic

same way

it

35

in the object.

fragmented and anti-systematic nature, the
essay seeks

object

in the

and

methodist

to capture the aspects

thinking

erase.

of the

Moreover,

by

apprehending those aspects that systematic conceptual
thinking considers as reminders,
or simply does not even notice, the essay,
as exemplary of constellational thinking,
brings
to reflection the non-identity

between the object

that systematic thinkers ascribes to them. Also,

describes and the “objective” structure

it

it

“imagines”

how

the concepts that form

the constellation correspond to the objects they describe,
as they seek to describe objects
in their concreteness.

to

By

devising constellations of concepts, the essay as a form attempts

capture the remainders of the concept without doing violence
to them, as these

constellations also reveal the subjective aspects of the objectivity
of the concept by

rendering objects in their concreteness. Constellations of concepts are
thus able
represent “from without what the concept has cut
.

concept

is

away

within: the ‘more’

to

which the

95

.

equally desirous and incapable of being.”

Besides,

the

possibility

of constructing

a

multiplicity

of context-bounded

constellations negates the possibility for a meta-context, or for an all-encompassing

totality,

without sacrificing comprehensiveness. In

more comprehensive than Hegel’s absolute

this

insofar as

it

way, constellational thinking

is

does not sacrifice non-identity,

and the particular, for the sake of identity and the universal moment of absolute

knowledge.

It

is

more

inclusive, too

-

albeit in a different

95

Adomo, “The Essay

as

Form,” 23.

96

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 162.
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way: constellations seek

to

comprehend objects

in

their

particularity,

without claiming to

exhaust them,

nor

dominating them by means of the
primacy of constitutive subject, vity.
Thinking

in

constellations thus suggests the
possibility of inclusiveness without
domination. In other

words, rather than arguing for an
abstract inversion of non-identity
over

identity,

Adorno

seeks to immanently cntieize identity
from the perspect.ve of its remainder,
non-.dentity,

and thus undo the domination of one
over the other, and speculatively
render both as

tom halves

do not add up.” After

that

all,

contradictions are not ontologically posited,
or

transcendentally deducted by Adorno; instead,
“[Contradiction] indicates the untruth of
identity, the fact that the

concept does not exhaust the thing conceived .” 97

But constellations of concepts need not be
into light the aspects

power of

restricted to the process

of bringing

of the object that identitarian thinking dispenses
with. The cognitive

constellational thinking correlates with the
comprehensiveness the dialectical

tradition running

from Hegel

illustrate this point

it

is

to

Lukacs associates with the concept of

worth considering the role

totality plays in

totality.

To

better

Adorno’s negative

dialectics.

In

The

Actuality of Philosophy” Adorno unequivocally asserted that

philosophical, interpretation needed to do

away with

philosophy must learn to renounce the question of
learn to

do without the symbolic function,

in

which

the particular appeared to represent the general.

size

of which once hoped

It

critical,

the concept of “totality”:

totality,

then

it

implies that

it

“If

must

for a long time, at least in idealism,

must give up the great problems, the

to guarantee the totality,

whereas today between the wide

97

Adorno, Negative Dialectics,

5.

On Adorno

in relation to

discussion in Adorno, 148-74, 193-216.
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Kant and Husserl, see

Jarvis’ informative

meshes of big questions,

8

interpretation slips

away”’ Even

so,

by the time

that

Adorno

wrote Negative Dialectics he
artieulated a more nuanced,
dialectical concept, on of
totality.

“Totality

non-identity

it

to be

is

opposed by convicting

denies, according to

come from an immanent

its

own

of non-identity with

it

concept.”” The opposition

critique of the concept

of

itself

to totality

totality itself. In this vein

- of

the

needs

to

Adorno,

once again, makes explicit the aporetic
stance from which his reflections emerge:
Negative dialectics

is

thus tied to the supreme categories of
identitarian philosophy as

point of departure. Thus, too,

the thing against

committed
writings,

remains false according

it is

conceived.”'

of redemption

that

By means of this

is

the nation of totality:

is

it

clear that

both values

totalitarian tendencies.

its

Adorno’s

It

is

its

to

immanently

criticize

to say, their historical implication with

both domination and the possibility of redemption.'

it

remains

formulation Adorno remains

namely, instead of positing neologisms, he seeks

this point

it

manifested so strongly in Walter Benjamin’s

concepts and render their double-character, that

At

to identitarian logic;

00

which

to the idea

it

its

0'

critical

theory has an ambivalent relation to

comprehensiveness but, as

in this vein that later on, in

I

have argued,

rejects

Negative Dialectics

,

he

articulated a concept of totality not as an abstract conceptual category, but as a social

98

Adomo, “The

Actuality of Philosophy,” 32.

99

Adomo, Negative Dialectics,

147.

100

Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 147. Unlike Jacques Derrida, who from a deep Heideggerian vein
attempted to undo the Western tradition of philosophy by means of the notion of differance, Adomo rather
proceeds by means of dialectically undermining the concepts from within. An immanent procedure that
allows

him

to

avoid positing an abstract notion that winds up as a neo-transcendental mode of

argumentation, as Derrida ultimately does.
101

I

compare

Adomo

and Benjamin on the question of history

universal history.

119

in chapter

V

as part

of

my

discussion of

totality [gessellschaftliche
Totalitdt] in

dialectical theory” are
expressed,

totality itself: the legality

totality

winch both “substantial individual
analysis and

which Adorno

of exchange [Touches ]!

of the social process

that

also sees as “the abstract
legality of

02

Adorno suggests

It is

by means of the mediation of the

the intersection between
subjective and

objective experience needs to be
apprehended, comprehensively and
concretely.
In

sum, despite his protestations against
both

of totality, Adorno considers society as
a social

impose

in

totality,

one

and materialist conceptions

that capitalist social relations

an abstract form. Once a system has
pretensions of total dominance, one cannot

conceptualize

it

otherwise.

comprehensively

exhaust

his

Still,

this

totality

constellations of concepts in order to

shed

dialectically cognize the intersection

Adorno

idealist

tries to

approach
in

all

light

on

to

its

it

not

is

one

determinations

that

but

seeks

constructs

objects: to cast a glance at society and

between universal,

and

particular,

singular. This

achieve without suggesting that by so doing he
redeems the domination

and inequality found

in the

identitarian philosophy

system - a redeeming impulse

of history and

that

that is present in Hegel’s

Adorno vehemently

rejects.

The

possibility of

apprehending objects through constellations of concepts, which delicately
glance
object of cognition,

is in itself

theory’s contribution

“redeem the

to

is

not enough to alter their reality, or to redeem

perhaps confined to

this

it.

Yet

at their

critical

domain: although the conditions

bill” that critical theory presents are not present yet,

it

still

to

presents this

102

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 47. I have slightly amended the
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 57.

Dialektik (Frankfurt

120

translation.

For the original see Negative

utopian moment, and thus reminds
traditional criticism of its share
in “the blindness of its
object

.”'

03

To
theory

further explore the eentrality

dialectical thinking for

Adorno’s formulations and the conception of
from
it

it.

I

would therefore

emerges

Adorno’s

critical

important to consider the relationship
between the emphasis on non-idem, in
ty

is

it

of

like to articulate the

in his reflections

on

critique

and

critical

theory that emerges

importance of immanent transcendence as

cultural criticism.

* * *

It is

important to note that Adorno’s emphasis on non-identity
avoids hypostatizing non-

identity,

that

is,

the postulate of non-identity

domination of concepts over objects, as well as
identitarian conceptual

antagonism
dialectical,

in

it

especially in

is

thinking.

society.

It

the refusal to avoid the

their remainders, that

which

Accordingly, this theorization of non-identity

commitment

is left

out by

refuses to conceal or reify the domination and

also deeply political in

its

comes from

its

critique

is

thoroughly

of domination, and deeply

ethical, too,

to lend suffering a voice.

As Adorno wrote

Moralia, the utopian impulse of non-identity comes from a reconciled

Minima

in

ideal, yet not a

forced one:

The only philosophy which can be responsibly
contemplate

all

redemption.

[...]

world, reveal

it

things as they

practiced in face of despair

would present themselves from

is to

the standpoint of

Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estranged the

to be,

with

its rifts

appear one day in the messianic

and crevices, as indigent and distorted

light. [...]

Even

its

own

impossibility

as

it

it

will

must

at

103

Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged
and

New

York: Verso, 1990), 27.
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Life trans.
,

Edmund

Jephcott (London

.

last

comprehend

for the sake

of the possible. But beside the
demand thus placed

on thought, the question of the

reality or unreality

of redemption

itself

hardly

104

matters.

Hence, as early as
not to

redeem past

in

Minima Moralia, Adorno

introduces the standpoint of redemption

sufferings, or reconcile those in a
higher unity or in a third

Redemption stands here

for the

that is relentlessly critical

of

moment of transcendence,

political

it

the utopian content of thought

and epistemological domination, of the suffering

social inequalities produced. Reconciliation
thus

moment. Or as he puts

moment.

emerges as a critique of Hegel’s

third

Negative Dialectics "The idea of reconcilement
forbids the
,

positive positing of reconcilement as a concept.”"’

5

For reconciliation to be concrete, the

utopian promise of emancipation, abstract reconciliation,
needs to be negated. Also, in a

formulation with echoes of
to

Max

Weber’s celebrated phrase on aiming

achieve the possible, Adorno reclaims the

promise

that

moment of

informs the immanent critique, the

latter

at

the impossible

transcendence as a utopian

working within the realm of the

concrete.

The

relation of

immanence and transcendence

in

Adorno’s

critical

theory

is

acutely spelled out in Adorno’s rendering of dialectical theory as a practice
of cultural
critique in the essay “Cultural Criticism and Society.” In this essay

Adomo

at

once

criticizes

understandings of culture that posit culture as an unmediated autonomous

sphere of

life,

and those

that present

formulating a unique notion of

it

as a

critical

mere

theory from the perspective of a reworked

104

Adomo, Minima

Moralia, 247

105

Adomo, Negative

reflection of material production, while

dialectics, 145.

122

understanding of the relationship
between immanence and transcendence
in dialectical
thinking; a critical activity that
even though
critique, also

does justice to the

Adorno
the concept.

s

immanent

criticism

it

in relation to the question

less the dialectical

It

involvement

must
in

more

relate the

to the

it

is

it

immanent

in thinking.

deeply indebted to Hegel’s account
of

departs from Hegel’s account in
significant

of identity:

method can today presuppose

subject and object, the

moments.

privileges the activity of

moment of transcendence

But as already mentioned,

ways, especially

The

retneval of

it

is

the Hegelian identity of

obliged to be mindful of the duality
of the

knowledge of society as a

totality

and of the mind’s

claim inherent in the specific content of the object
that

it

be apprehended as such. Dialectics cannot, therefore,
permit any insistence on
logical neatness to encroach

light

on an object

in itself

on

its

right to

go from one genus

to another, to

hermetic by casting a glance at society,

to

shed

present

society with the bill which the object does not redeem.

Once

again, the

main difference between Adorno and Hegel, and not an

according to this passage,

is

the

way

insignificant

one

the former presents non-identity, and thus resists the

externally posited identitarian unity of the latter’s philosophical system. In addition to
spelling out differences,

of subject and object
relational nature

moments

as

is

Adorno

also issues a warning: given that unity, or reconciliation

not posited, critical theory needs to be more mindful of the

of the oppositions, the negative moment, and avoid freezing

unmediated

comprehensively rendered,

oppositions.

albeit

Knowledge’s

aporetic

nature

dialectical

needs

to

be

never reconciled. Thus, the task of dialectical thinking

106

Adorno, Prisms, 33. Emphasis added.

123

is

to attempt to

or to freezing

apprehend the

it,

totality

of the social process without claiming

of oppositions;

in a set

task

its

is

to think

it

comprehensively

determinations, even if the latter are
impossible to apprehend in their

given Adorno’s ultimate rejection of Lukacs’
concept of
different

approach

to

dialectically render society

According

to

and

its

of ideology

Adorno

present.

Or

in all its

Besides,

forced to devise a

is

social

process,

in social relations,

criticism.

at least that is

Such

a conception can

what Adorno finds

is

identitarian dialectical conception,

Adorno

be fully understood only

in social conflicts .”'

rejects a conception

resignation [with the status quo]

in

terms of

in

to

itself.

refers to

That

is,

given the role

of social critique

that solely

wind up being complicit with

the

whole.

Thus

to

in order to elaborate a non-

Marx’s contention

Only through a nuanced

Without

the

09

that culture cannot

dialectical rendering

for critical theory resides:

Criticism retains the mobility in regard to culture by recognizing the

within

is

08

Hegel’s philosophy, whose “tendency

undeniable .”'

of immanence and transcendence the possibility

position

and

Adorno, a critique of culture based solely on immanent
criticism
of ideology

on immanent

total

he

totality.

it,

antinomies.

insufficient to discern the “role

relies

totality,

apprehend and comprehend the

to capture

such

freedom,

without

transcending the immanence of culture, immanent criticism

latter’s

consciousness

itself

would be

107

For contrasting interpretations of Adorno’s relation
Melancholy Science.

to Lukacs, see

Gillian Rose, The
108

Adorno, Prisms, 29.
109

Adorno, Hegel, 44.
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Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality and

.

inconceivable: the spontaneous

someone who

is

movement of the

not entirely engulfed by it."

object can be followed only by

0

Only from a comprehensive, speculative
perspective can

the

whole

in

which

a part can be thought, apprehended
in order to re-present {Darstellung)

claiming fixity and exhaustiveness for

where the

it.

In such a

possibility for critique resides. For

it

culture plays

even without

it,

comprehensive view of the whole

is in

consciousness, with

its

capacity to

transcend the limitations imposed by the
status quo, where the possibility for

freedom can be found. Yet
position. Rather,

it

comes

this

as part

capacity

of the

critical activity

of thinking, whose possibility

to

make

to

whom

later

on puts

it

in

pay

for in their relations with their

the moral and, as

they say

it

it

cannot see

norms -

is

Negative

“If a stroke of underserved luck kept the
mental composition of

:

individuals not quite adjusted to the prevailing

enough

critical

not determined by a privileged subject

is

nothing more than an outcome of contingency.
Or as he
Dialectics

is

some

a stroke of luck they have often

environment -

it

is

up

to these individuals

were, representative effort to say what most of those for
or, to

do justice

to reality, will not allow themselves to

111

see.”

Still,

immanent

criticism carries with

it

a

moment of transcendence.

This

moment

of transcendence often takes the shape of a spontaneous moment of thought, a moment
that escapes the necessity

put

it

-

that partially

of the social and cultural laws - of the imperative, as

rather

determine and constitute the sphere of culture. Although culture

does not fully escape the laws of capital in an exchange society,

110

Adorno, Prisms, 29.
in

Adorno, Negative

I

dialectics, 4

1
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it

is

not fully determined

.

by

it,

either: culture

and society are mutually mediated,
and both are constitutive and

constituted of one another.

It

is

worth mentioning

that

Adorno's critique of

only springs from the Nietzschean
motifs of his work;

an important way, identity

in

thinking correlates the exchange principle
of capitalism, even

And

as part

of “the

total social

identity not

if

it

process” the sphere of culture

cannot be reduced to
is

also mediated

imperatives of capital. Mediation, however,
does not stand for “alternation.” In

it.

by the
fact, to

conceive of mediation as the alternation of the
different moments of identity and non-

of the particular aspect of a cultural formation with
the universal moment of a

identity, or

particular process, entails renouncing the
indispensable

moment can

this

dialectical

is

identity

non-identity be understood as a contradiction,
which

To conceive

mediation.

moment from Adorno
too

moment of

s

it

is

- only from
the core of

otherwise, entails obliterating the dialectical

formulations. “The antithesis between universal and particular

necessary as well as deceptive. Neither one can exist without
the other, the

particular only as determined and thus universal, the universal
only as a determination of

a particular.

Both of them

....

are

and are

not. This is

one of the strongest motives of a non-

113

idealist dialectics.”

Yet cultural forms possess moments of spontaneity.
thinking to critically transcend the
these

moments -

albeit

immanence of culture,

its

It

is

one of the tasks of

object, in order to apprehend

doing so immanently. This invocation of transcendental critique

is

hardly a regression under the spell of the Kantian idea of transcendental critique as

expounded

in

the

Critique of Pure Reason.

Nor

is

this

an instance of a quasi-

112

On
the

these points see Osborne’s poignant critique of Fredric Jameson’s Late Marxism
Postmodern?” 179-80. This paragraph is indebted to his essay.
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Theodor W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object,”

in Critical
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Models, 257

in

“A Marxism

for

transcendental form of thinking
currently associated with Derridean
deconstruction .'
Instead,

Adorno immanently

immanent cntique. And

discerns the need

for

a

moment of

this insight reverts in the
intersection

universal in Adorno’s critical theory:

“Hence

transcendence in

between particular and

the task of criticism

search for the particular interest-group to
which cultural

14

must be not so much

phenomena

to

are to be assigned,

but rather to decipher the general
social tendencies which are expressed
in these

phenomena and through which
singular,

which

is

the

most powerful

the cultural in this case,

is

interests realize themselves .”"

5

The

posited as a mediated object in which both

elements of the general social laws of production and
regulation in a

capitalist-liberal

regime, along with the particular interests these serve,
can be apprehended. But culture
also formulated as a sphere construed

by

is

particularities that are not reducible to universal

or general socio-economic imperatives.

By
of

thus framing the task of critique

dialectical conception

theory that oscillates between immanence and transcendence. Or
as he

critical

articulates

Adorno ends up with a

it:

“The

alternatives

—

either calling culture as a

outside under the general ideology, or confronting
crystallized

—cannot

be accepted by

immanence and transcendence

is to

it

critical theory.

whole

with the norms which

To

insist

it

itself

has

on the choice between

revert to the traditional logic criticized

polemic against Kant. As Hegel argued, every method which

from the

into question

sets limits

by Hegel’s

and

restricts

114

See, for instance, Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit
1992).
115

Adorno, Prisms 30.
,
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(New York and London:

Routledge,

.

itself to the limits

of

objects thereby goes

its

beyond them .”'

16

At

Hegelian understanding of conceptuality
resurfaces. In Hegel there

this point

Adorno’s

a strong critique of

is

Kant’s claim that the sphere of the
noumena constitutes a “boundary concept.”
Insofar as
it

constitutes a

boundary concept

not have access

And

to.

and his care

dialectic,

means of

whole

its

own

moment

in the

for non-identity, his thought is
particularly sensitive to this,
is

a tendency intrinsic to the activity of thinking:

totality

concept, hence

moment

Adorno

combine

presumably does

it

“To think

is

Nevertheless thought needs to break through the drive
to conceptuality by

transcendental

Indeed,

already sidesteps into the realm

given Adorno’s insistence on the
negative

especially since identifying

to identify.

it

takes place

immanent moment. And

its

-

relates the perspective

although this transcendental

as

fetishization

reification.

reified.

Hence,

its

its

not a pure one.

to the

view of the

weakness and the need

to

with immanent critique:

The position of transcending
dialectics

is

of purely transcendent critique

of the social process as

this perspective

such breaking

in

culture

the consciousness

of the

is

in

a

certain

sense presupposed by

which does not succumb

intellectual sphere. Dialectics

in

advance

to

means intransigence towards

The transcendent method, which aims

at totality,

seems more

the

all

radical

than the immanent method, which presupposes the questionable whole. The
transcendent

critic

assumes an as

it

were Archimedean position above

116

Adorno, Prisms, 3 1
117

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 23.
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culture and

.

the blindness of society, from

how

massive, into flux ."

which consciousness can bring

8

Henceforth the possibility of an Archimedean
point, an outside perspective,
fiction.

The seemingly

no matter

totality

relative advantage

is

an abstract

of transcendental criticism turns out not

one. If a transcendental perspective allows
for a discernment of the whole in
stage, its abstract nature could easily lead
to

is.

It is,

then,

no surprise

essentially dialectical.”

its

reification,

Adorno considers

that

the

immanent

to

critique to be “the

immanent

thinking,

by

virtue if

its

own immanent

is

as

it

more

critique in his

reworking of the dialectical tradition from the perspective
of non-identity. Or
formulates this relation elsewhere, “the concept of the transcendental

be

reified

and thus leave everything

Adorno gives primacy

In this vein

its

to

as he

a reminder that

elements of universality, transcends

its

own

120

And

inalienable individuation.”

it

the non-identity between the mutually mediated

is

dominant ideology and the material conditions from which
constitutes,

where the space

intrinsically tied

as an

immanent

up with the
activity:

for

dialectic

“it

is

critique

of non-identity

to

grasp

Accordingly,

Immanent

criticism

is

critical

and also
theory

untrue but rather

of intellectual and

is

its

artistic

through the analysis of their form and meaning, the

....

121

contradictions between their objective idea and that pretension.”

1

emerges,

that presents the ideological critique

not ideology in itself which

pretension to correspond to reality.

phenomena seeks

resides.

it

18

Adorno, Prisms, 3 1
119

Adorno, Prisms, 32.
120
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But, as

is

the case

With a reified view of transcendent
critique, immanent critique
cannot be taken as the sole

mode of

social and cultural criticism:

resolve the contradictions under which

mind on

its

own

failure is limited

altering the existence to

which
1

take comfort

on

its

own

its

“On
it

its

labours.

by the

own [immanent
Even the most

fact that

it

Hence immanent

Even though

the

it

need

transcendental element into

claims

to

sovereignty.

transcendence in

criticism cannot

22

between immanence and transcendence,

is

not sufficient on

its

own,

capable of embodying the contradictions of society
“in
presents

of the

idea.”

only emerges as a true dialectician, in addition,
the speculative

Adomo

radical reflection

remains only a reflection, without

failure bears witness.

In rendering the relationship

fleshed out.

critique] is unable to

critical

for

it,

This

he

immanent
still

it

its

and

critique,

is

moment of his
immanent

not

thinking

is

critique that

is

innermost structure.” While
its

primacy, by infusing a

avoids abstractly positing

rendering

Adomo

it,

and thus mitigates

of the centrality of both

its

immanence and

thinking has been formulated as Adorno’s “impossible practice

123

of cultural criticism.”
conception of

But, as the previous discussion suggests,

critical thinking, a surely difficult one,

More

importantly,

a bottomless

but not impossible: rather,

Adorno’s account of conceptuality, an aporetic yet necessary practice
cast the present in a critical light.

is

it

its

aporetic stance

that

is

is

it

is like

needed

to

not ontological,

122

Adomo,

Prisms, 32-33.
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See
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Bernstein, “Introduction,” The Culture Industry (London and

16-20.
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New

York: Routledge, 1991),

social: “I,

is

>t

pursues the logic of

its

aponas, the insolubility of the
task

itself. In

such

24
antinomies criticism perceives those
of society .”'

Adorno seeks
immanent

to think these aporias

criticism through

comprehensively and defends a mode of

which the aporias of the current ideology,
or of

self-image, can be rendered in their
social dimension; thus his cultural
criticism

by

a strong sociological

and

political content.

It is

Adorno’s conviction

aporetic rendering, society’s antinomies can
be discerned

more

significantly, spaces for action

more

society’s

infused

is

that through an

intelligibly.

And, perhaps

and critique are opened up once the aporetic

logic of

theory renders society’s antinomies comprehensively,
in their structural and

critical

ideological aspects; a rendering infused
political

commitment

to

change the

by

a strong sociological perspective and

status quo, to alter “the existence to

which

its

by

a

failure

bears witness.”

* * *

In light

of the preceding discussions, Adorno stands out as offering the most
conceptually

sophisticated political reading of theoretical philosophy
tradition.

As Rose

suggests,

focuses on the latter
part of a larger

unfinished The

even

if his

s

coming from

Adorno does not engage Hegel’s

theoretical philosophy.

political writings

But such focus was

agenda of ideological critique

that correlates,

German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy

own work

Adorno’s “failure”

to

is

deeply indebted

to that

engage with Hegel’s

the western Marxist

and rather

politically infused as

and surpasses, Marx’s
in its conceptual

power,

of Marx. Thus, rather than dwelling on

political writings, or with political theory in

general, as a sign of a political deficit in his version of critical theory,

124

Adorno, Prisms, 32.

131

I

seek to draw from

his critical theory

politically,

interest

on

and

from the

attest to its political

critical perspective that

emerges from

political questions or concepts is
a matter

rather than intrinsic to the theory

cannot be

fully

of Auschwitz for his

Rose

is

itself.

And

in the

his writings. His lack of

of his theoretical temperament

case of Adorno, his contribution

understood without considering his unique
engagement with the

Hegehan-Marxism springing from
centrality

theory by engaging theoretical
quest, ons

the tradition

of western Marxism, as well

reflections.

thus partly right: Hegel’s social thought
has no political import

absolute cannot be thought.

as the

But the

truth

in

such remark resides

in

the

if

the

level

of

speculative comprehensives that Hegel’s absolute
claims, and not in the absolute as
subject.

One cannot

not think comprehensively.

132

CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT WAR: CATASTROPHE, VIOLENCE, AND
CIVILIZATION
One speaks
it

is

of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But

not a threat

barbarism

- Auschwitz was

continues

long

as

as

this

relapse,

the

fundamental

and

conditions that favored that relapse continue largely

unchanged.

Theodor W. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz”

The

brutality ot imperialism, slavery, war, civil war,

hundred years - from 1492 on - notwithstanding,
century that the image of

human-made

and conquest of at

it is

least the last five

with the advent of the twentieth

catastrophes and excesses finally captures the

Occidental imagination. Aside from episodic ruminations such as Augustine’s on
the sack

of Rome, the “lettered” European reaction

to the

Lisbon earthquake, or the sense of

uneasiness brought about by “the Thirty Years War” of the seventeenth century,

it

was

the experience of the “Great War,” and the calamities that followed, that finally brought
to

European consciousness the

an experience so traumatic
be called

of the

literatures

atrocities

perils

that

it

of senseless human suffering.

The Great War was

generated, alongside modernist literature, what might

of catastrophe composed of works

that,

by means of representations

of the war, challenged the European self-satisfaction embodied

idea of steady progress that flourished in the nineteenth century.

1

1

in the

2

Europeans, to be sure, experienced fierce religious wars following the Refonnation and the crusades.

yet, the sense

of catastrophe and brutality these brought about, does not correlate with the

later

And

experience

of the Great War.
2

See Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern

it:

Memory

“[The Great War] was a hideous embarrassment

the public consciousness for a century.

It

(Oxford University Press, 1975). As Fussell puts

myth which had dominated
See also Samuel Hynes, A War
of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great

to the prevailing Miliorist

reversed the Idea of Progress,”

8.

Imagined (London: Bodley Head, 1991). Cf. Jay Winter, Sites
War in European Cultural History (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
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Press, 1995).

Paul Fussell, in his classic work on
the impact of the war on
English

The Great War and Modern Memory
summarizes
,

great

war was

‘history’

future .”

3

Or

as

literary

Samuel Hynes puts

historian

is

4
.

“anti-monumental”

in history.

literature that

sense

was often

Thus the notion of a break

responded

to the calamities

translated into an

in history

violence of imperialism that preceded

it,

Occidental understandings of civilization

in

which very

image

sprung from the

of the Great

experience of loss these brought to European consciousness, rather
than

The anti-monumental works,

of radical

thus changed, at the very least, the perception
of

Indeed, the sense of discontinuity

of a void or gap

“This

it,

to

an essential element in what eventually took form
as

Myth of the War.” The Great War

loss,

states that the

involving a coherent stream of time running
from past through present

what was possible
of

theme when he

the last one “conceived as taking place
within a seamless, purposeful

discontinuity of present from past
the

this

literature.

War and

the

in relation to the

rarely led to a questioning of

5
.

some

cases a part of modernist literature, finally

brought the sense of rupture and void that violence creates to European

literary

consciousness. But by focusing on the historical break that the sense of loss and
discontinuity

depicted,

even

the

anti-monuments

seeking

to

challenge

the

monumentalization of the war ended up inscribing the narrative of progress they sought

3

4

See Fussell, The Great War, 21.
Hynes, A War Imagined

,

xi

5

See Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993). On the Great War and the
emergence of the discourse of memorialization and anti-memory, see Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of
Mourning. See also Hynes, A War Imagined, chap 15. Indeed, in the works of previous literary figures, such
as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, to “exterminate all the brutes” was often part, sometimes even an
intrinsic one, of the path of progress. See Sven Lindovist, “Exterminate all the Brutes’’, trans. Joan Tate

(New York: The New

Press, 1996).
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1

to

debunk. Stated differently, by making the
Great

War

a turning point, these literary

representations effectively excluded the
imperial violence that often accompanied
the

previous era of progress, or

at least displaced

political consciousness. Catastrophe

itself,

became

it

from European

a trope only

the

same

century

silencing narrative of progress:

it

critics

involved “civil war”

of progress reinstated

only seemed to have stopped

in the twentieth

6
.

Although more often than not
terrain

it

and

when war ravaged Europe

and the senselessness of violence was realized
because

between Europeans rather than fighting “brutes.” Thus
the

historical narratives

of

and

literary historians

literary representations

critics, this

development

of catastrophe are the

in the field

of

literature

correlate in early twentieth-century political and philosophical
thought. After

had a

all,

the

roots of political theory as a critical activity have been traditionally
intertwined with a

sense of crisis

7

And

.

yet,

not enough attention has been paid to the

catastrophe not only informs twentieth-century political thought, but

on the

historical assessment

of a tradition that

is

way

how

the

it

image of

also reflects

deeply Occidental. Indeed, one can find

important parallels between the reaction to catastrophe in literary works and the works of
political theory.

6

On

silencing as an Occidental historiographical practice, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
7

See Sheldon

S. Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought,
Martin Fleisher (Atheneum, 1972) and Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory (William
Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1970). See also the preceding chapter of this study. Recent political

ed.

second half of the
30 years there has been a relative silence in relation to violence and
th
terror, and only after a September 1
Anglo-American theorists have started to rethink these connections.
Susan Buck-Morss work is an important exception coming not incidentally from the tradition of critical
theory. See Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000); and
theory, especially in

twentieth century.

its

liberal variant, has paid little attention to these experiences in the

Indeed, in the

last

’

Thinking Past Terror (London and

New York:

Verso, 2003).
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For the generations living through the
Great

War and

its

aftermath-comprising

towering figures such as Sigmund Freud
(1856-1939), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976),

and

Max Weber

World War

(1864-1920) -

- which

I

to the

one reaching

includes Theodor

threat,

Max Horkheimer

(1895-1973), Karl

and Simone Weil (1909-1943) - the experience of
the Great War, the Bolshevik

and the

an image and

and

on the eve of

Adorno (1903-1969), Hannah Arendt (1906-

1975), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Ernst Bloch,
Jaspers,

intellectual maturity

second Thirty Years War”

memory of war and

political visions.

that subsequently

consumed Europe,

created

catastrophe that significantly shaped their theoretical

As Enzo Traverso

decade from Weil’s reflections on the

has correctly indicated, in the time span of a

Iliad,

composed

in 1940, to Arendt’s Origins

of

Totalitarianism in 1951, vigorous reflections on force, totalitarianism,
anti-Semitism, and

genocide were largely framed by the notions of barbarism and violence,
history as
catastrophe,

Benjamin
(1942),

s

and

the

category

of totalitarianism.

works one

finds

Adorno and Horkheimer’s

Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) Horkheimer’s

Minima Moralia (1944-47), Gunther Anders’

essays,

published as Die Antiquiertheit des Menchen (1956), Karl Jaspers’ The Question of

German

Guilt (1946), Primo Levi’s If This Is a

“The Responsibility of Peoples” (1945). 8

8

these

“Theses on the Concept of History” (1940), Franz Neuman’s Behemoth

Eclipse of Reason (1946), Adorno’s
later

Among

Man

(1947), and

Dwight Macdonald’s

All of these reflections were, with different

See Enzo Traverso, La Historia Desgarrada: Ensayo sobre Auschwitz y los Intelectuales, trans. David
It is worth noting that Weil’s essay was published in

Chiner (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 2001), 21-22.
English for the first time in MacDonald’s Politics.
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degrees of emphasis, historically minded
meditations on the catastrophes of the

of the twentieth century

first

half

9
.

In the first half

of the twentieth century, violence and
barbarism occasionally

provided the background of a theorist’s reaction
to the catastrophe of the Great War,
the
rise

of Fascism and Stalinism, and World

narrative

on these experiences,

for instance,

War

II

in

marred Isaiah Berlin’s

second half of the twentieth century only Hannah Arendt,
in the

Europe. (The cold-war

who

liberalism.)

liberal

But

experienced World

in the

War

II

vulnerable predicament of statelessness, continued to
pursue systematic reflections

on violence as such. And

in her case

American context; namely,

it

was done

the Black liberation

in reference to subsequent events in the

movement and

the increasingly spreading

anti-war sentiment during the “sixties,” albeit always doing so from
the perspective of a

“century

of wars

and

revolutions,”

thus

constantly

historicizing

from

these

the

perspective of what John Keane has called “the long century of violence .” 10

However,

for all the turmoil

it

caused in the United States, the Vietnam

not evoke a sense of catastrophe comparable to the Great
a sense of urgency to theorize violence in

its

War

in

War

Europe, nor did

multifarious forms, even if

it

it

did

instill

certainly

9

It is,

then, not until the

second half of the twentieth century that there has been an astonishing paucity in
and its ethico-political implications, especially amongst the generations that

reflections of political violence

gained theoretical and political consciousness from the 1960s onwards. In fact, despite being part of the
mainstay of political theory, the problem of violence is hardly present in any major post- world war II
political theorists, especially within the Anglo-American tradition, where John Rawls’ work was the
primary reference point up until the mid-90’s. More recently, his reflections on justice and liberalism have
had to share center stage with Habermas’, while the work of some disciples of Leo Strauss and Michel
Foucault zealously playing a lesser role.
10

See

Amo

J.

Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror

in the

Princeton University Press, 2000), 82; Hannah Arendt,

York: Harcourt Brace

&

“On

French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton:
Violence,” in Crises of the Republic

(New

Co., 1969). See also John Keane, Reflections on Violence (London: Verso, 1996),

especially his discussion of the twentieth century as “the long century of violence,” in pp. 3-31.
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evoked a new sense of

intellectual responsibility.

11

On

the contrary, these experiences

often led to a laudable, even if often
idyllic stance of anti-violence,
which easily
the subsequent public idealization
of Martin Luther King,

Malcolm X, among
Kurds

in northern

others.

Iraq

The mass murder of Cambodians by

of

As

it

the

Khmer Rouge,

turned out,

it is

of the

as part of the

against Iraq), South Africa’s apartheid,
or the

occupation in Palestine

Israeli

untheorized.

US war

into

and demonization of

by Saddam Hussein (only recently deployed

retrospective legitimation of the
brutality

Jr.

fit

and

resistance,

its

have gone largely

with the US’s perceived failure to act preemptively

in

the genocide of the Tutsi of Rwanda, and of the
Croats, Muslims, and Albanian Kosovars
in the

former Yugoslavia, along with the attacks of

recaptured the attention of the West.

It is

1 1

September 2001,

as if in the intermediary sixty years, as violence

and barbarity was displaced from the mainlands of Europe and the
US,
its

that violence has

changing nature was not a worthy concern. Then, as

in

for the Barbarians, the barbaric hordes were mostly kept

J.

at

to theorize about

M. Coetzee’s
bay - while

novel Waiting

their

shadows,

both real and imaginary, remained menacing even when somewhat contained. But current
reflections

have hardly explored the multifarious and complex nature of violence. Rather,

11

See, for example, Noam Chomsky’s well-known essay “The Responsibility of
Review of Books 23 February 1967.

Intellectuals,”

New

York

,

12

Important exceptions here are Franz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, and Etienne Balibar. Not
of them worked, within the context of French imperialism. Fanon became the theorist

incidentally, the three

of colonial and post-colonial violence in the “third world”; Sartre revisited his philosophy in
Algeria; Michel Foucault briefly discovered the discourse of war, even while failing to situate

light

of

in

an

it

imperial context, in his 1976 lectures “Society Must Be Defended”; and Balibar has not only offered
sobering reflections of nationalism and racism in France, but his reflections on violence deal with its global

and

political manifestations in the contemporary world. See Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth trans.
Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1986); Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason
trans. Allan Sheridan-Smith (London: Verso, 1991); Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended (New
,

,

York: Picador, 2002); Etienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene,
Verso, 2002), especially chaps.

imperialism and race, see

Ann

1

and

Laura

7.

trans. Christine Jones, et al.

For a provocative reading of Foucault’s lectures

Stoler,

Race and

the Education

Press, 1997).
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(London:

in relation to

of Desire (Durham: Duke University

and not without irony, the new focus
has ultimately
explicitly, to the legitimation

contain the violence that

is

led, tacitly

of military interventions of an imperial
nation-state

largely the offspring of the nation-state

In contrast, the age of catastrophe,
as historians Eric

Rabinbach

call the forty years

World War

redemptive attitude

example of

this.

on those catastrophes

in relation to violence, modernity,

By means of her

reflections

on the

that

13

Hobsbawm and Anson
to the aftermath

of

often yielded an anti-

and progress

14
.

political aspects

able to incisively historicize the genocide of the Third
Reich

to

.

from the outbreak of the Great War

led to reflections

II,

and sometimes even

Arendt

is

a

good

of these years was

by reference

to

European

nineteenth-century imperialism in The Origins
of Totalitarianism. Yet she also clung to

an anti-redemptive view of violence and revolution

that

more than occasionally

led her to

problematic distinctions such as the one between power and violence, one that
ultimately
rests

on the simplification of the former. These are especially discemable

in

On

Revolution and in her critique of what she sees as Fanon-inspired rehearsals on behalf
of
the redemptive

in

moment of violence

Arendt one finds a figure

and European imperialism,

that

in the

former colonial world. In other words, even

if

comprehensively understood the link between genocide

in her

one also finds a disdain

violence of the social (where the realm of production

is

for attempts to redress the

located) politically, or to see the

democratic promise and import of some of the Fanon-inspired forms of violence she so

vehemently despised,
13

let

alone the violent nature of capitalism as a system of power.

Archetypical examples of the two faces of

this trend are Samantha Powers’ highly acclaimed book ‘A
America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002) and Philip
Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003).
For an insightful interpretation of the latter, see Gopal Balakrishnan, “Algorithms of War,” New Left
Review 23 (September/October 2003): 5-33.

Problem from

Hell’:

14

See Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes (Vintage: New York, 1995); Anson Rabinbach, In
of Catastrophe (Berkley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1997), especially
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the

Shadow

pp. 1-23

Like Arendt’s,

many of the

aforementioned reactions were paved by

ethical ambiguities in relation to
violence

and modernization came
look

some of

at

to

and war, which had an

be seen retrospectively.

It is

effect

and

political

on how modernity

thus worthwhile to take a closer

the earlier formulations of the questions
of violence, focusing on the

reflections found in three

main thinkers of the age of

Weber, and Simone Weil.

A

critical

catastrophe:

Sigmund Freud, Max

excursus through these thinkers paves the

reappraisal of late-modern violence in

its

way

for a

intersection with political responsibility.
* * *

In a short essay written in 1915,

Goethe

on the occasion of a commemorative volume

Country, Sigmund Freud narrates a

’s

summer walk

titled

in the countryside with

two

unidentified companions: a friend that he describes as “taciturn”
and a young poet. The
poet, swift to contemplate the beauty of “the scene” was, however,
unable to enjoy

Freud

s

it.

In

view, the transience of the natural beauty, in a climate of seasonal changes,

deeply disturbed the poet: “All that he would otherwise admire seemed

of its worth by the transience which was

its

doom.”

15

to

him

Freud takes the poet’s

to

be shorn

attitude as a

point of departure in order to offer a succinct reflection on what he sees as the mind’s

workings

in relation to transience; a reflection in

which he intimates the argument of

widely discussed essay “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay composed

in

the

1914 but not

published until 1917.

However,
piece

may

violence

15

lie

as important as these intimations are, the political significance of the

somewhere

else. In

it,

unleashed by the Great

Freud also presents some important reflections on the

War,

its

impact on

Europe’s

understanding of

Sigmund Freud, “On Transience,” in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Volume 14, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001).

Freud,
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civilization,

and the shattered image of progress the
experience of the war

the “conversation with the poet
took place in the

Freud

to further reflect

beauties.”

16

on the psychic

effect

summer

instilled.

For

before the war,” a fact that led

of a war that “robbed the world of

its

For Freud,

[The war] not only destroyed the beauty of
the countrysides through which
passed and the works of

art

which

it

met with on

its

it

path but also shattered our

pride in the achievements of our civilization,
our hopes of a final triumph over the
differences between nations and races.

loose the evil spirits within us which
centuries of continuous education

much

that

we had

by

tarnished the lofty nakedness and

It

we

thought had been tamed for ever by

the noblest minds.

[...] It

robbed us of very

showed us how ephemeral were many

loved, and

let

things that

we

regarded as changeless. 17
Indeed, the experience of brutality and catastrophe that the Great

War

Europe was

of progress and of the

for

Freud an experience of loss, the loss of the

innocence often accompanying the ideal of

illusion

civilization.

optimistic about the war, as well as supportive of

it

-

a

18

Even

if initially

sudden happenance

so zealously against “illusions,” this to the extent that Peter

Gay

17

home

to

naively

for a thinker

signals the episode as

Freud “suffering an unexpected bout of patriotism” - by 1915, Freud

16

brought

started to see the

Freud, “Transience,” 307.

Freud, “Transience,” 307.

18

In “The Future of an Illusion” Freud conceives of illusions as the “fulfillments of the oldest, strongest,
and most urgent wishes of mankind.” But an illusion needs not be false by definition; indeed, according to

Freud, they sometimes correspond to
a prominent factor

What makes a belief an
doing so we disregard its

reality.

its motivation, and in
by verification.” See “The Future of an
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 21, 3 U

itself sets

no

in

store

141

illusion

is

“when

a wish-fulfillment

is

relations to reality, just as the illusion

Illusion,” in

Standard Edition of the Complete

.

war

as a destructive experience. 19

The war, however, not only meant

Freud’s sons and eventual mobilization
to the

front,

but as

an economic and intellectual setback for
psychoanalysis.

two what, according

to

Gay, relentlessly “tested the

Gay

And

limits

it

notes,

is

it

the enlisting of

also represented

a combination of these

of Freud’s patriotism.” 20

Freud, however, also saw an opportunity in
the time of war:

it

ironically provided

an unexpected setting that might allow him to
advance the credentials of psychoanalysis.

For as he spells

out in a letter of 28

it

December 1914,

the

war has ultimately confirmed

two tenets of psychoanalysis: the persistence of “primitive,
savage, and
mankind,” even
In this

same

if in a

repressed

state,

letter

Freud further

war— the

cruelties

and injustices

different

ways

which they judge

in

and the

states: “If

for

you

fragility

will

now

which the most
their

own

lies

evil

impulses of

and feebleness of the
observe what

is

21

intellect.

happening

in this

civilized nations are responsible, the

and wrong-doings and those of

their

enemies, and the lack of insight which prevails-you will have to admit
that psychoanalysis has been right in both

its

theses.”

22

In Freud’s view, the war, to

formulation, “has deprived everyone of the illusion that humanity

And

rather than discrediting psychoanalysis

it

is

borrow Gay’s

originally good.”

provided the best example to display

23

its

explanatory power. Or so Freud hoped.

19

20

21

See Peter Gay, Freud: A Life For Our Time (New York: Norton, 1998), 346.

Gay, Freud, 350-51.
Freud, “Letter to Frederik

Sigmund Freud, Volume
22

Ibid.

Van Eeden,”

in

Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of

14, 301.

301-02. See also his comments on

how

the

war dispelled

the conventional illusions about death,

thus validating another important tenet of psychoanalysis. See Freud, “Our Attitude

Towards Death,”

Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume

291

23

See Gay, Freud, 356.
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14,

in

still,

the

war was experienced by many Europeans
with

loss that according to Freud,

needed

who

is

to

a sense of loss; a sense of

borrowing the language from “Mourning
and Melancholia,”

be worked through rather than acted

out, especially

by those who,

like the poet

incapable of loving things for their transience
and have renounced the belief in the

values of civilization in the face of the
atrocities of the war, are in a state of
mourning.

They mourn

And

loss.

spontaneously

yet,

comes

capacity for love

is

although a painful process, in the individual
mourning always

an end - an end that

to

once again

be true of the losses caused by

free. “It is to

this

an individual level indicates that the

at

be hoped,” Freud writes, “that the same

war.”

Rather than rejecting civilization as just another illusion

hopes

that the

work of mourning would eventually show

experience of loss during the war, should dissipate:
will

will

we once

clung

to,

Freud

that the true illusion, the

“When once

the

be found that our high opinion of the riches of civilization has

mourning

lost

is

over,

it

nothing from our

4

discovery of its fragility.”" Instead, what the war has showed

is

how

savage our instincts

could be once the repression civilization imposes on them ceases, themes that he
further

developed in his

letters

and writings of 1915, and,

(1927) and in Civilization and
about

how

hard

it

was

to

its

Discontents (1929). In the

The Future of an
latter

prove the existence of the “death instinct”

the relative ease in proving that of Eros.

24

later on, in

25

But the

final

Illusion

Freud would write
in

comparison with

proof came within the contest of

Freud, “Transience,” 307.

25

See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and
W. Norton, 1989), 77-78.

its

Discontents, trans. James Strachey
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(New York and London: W.

the war:

“A more

external world and

To

was

fruitful idea

comes

to light as

the ideal of the savage,

Renaissance; that

is,

which

how

imagination

27

of Freud’s reaction

diverted towards the

to the

war and

his insistence in

important to see the role played in his narrative
by

is

filled “the

For

.

is

one of the root metaphors of the West,

is

he

it

of the instinct

an instinct of aggressiveness and
26
destructiveness .”

fully grasp the significance

salvaging the idea of civilization

European

that a portion

at least since the

savage slot” that has been constitutive of the

instance,

“The

in

Disillusionment

of War,”

Freud

confidently asserted that “[w]e cannot but feel that
no event has ever destroyed so
that is precious in the

common

intelligences, or so thoroughly

possessions of humanity, confused so

debased what

confidence of scientific discourse. Yet

it is

is

highest .”

28

many of the

much

clearest

Also, the war has shattered the

the role of psychoanalysis,

a science, to alleviate the feelings of loss of the non-combatant

which

for

Freud

by offering ways

to

is

cope

with the feelings of bewilderment the war imposes, in order to make the
experience more
bearable. But

what

is

loss recast in order to

the coping

“make

it

mechanism

if

one despoiled of the

~7

embarked on a

illusion

“order” are important signs of

26

Freud offers?

How

is

the experience of

easier” for the non-combatant to find solace?

In this quest for solace, Freud

even

that

its

sanitizing of the idea of civilization,

of the eradication of violence: “cleanliness” and

presence even

if “intellectual, scientific,

and

artistic

Freud, Civilization, 78

On

this idea

of “the savage

slot” see

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Anthropology and the Savage

Poetics and Politics of Otherness,” in Recapturing Anthropology, ed. Richard G.

American Research

Fox (Santa

Slot:

The

Fe: School of

Press, 1991).

28

See Freud, “The Disillusionment of the War,”
of Sigmund Freud, Volume 14, 275.

in

Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
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achievements” are taken as civilization’s
most characteristics features

29
.

For “[w]e were

prepared to find that wars between the
primitive and the civilized peoples,
between the
races that divided

by

the colour of their skin-wars, even,
against and

of Europe whose civilization
for

was

some time

come.”

to

witness this

to

civilization.

burden

savagery on their

when he

has fallen

own

what Europeans were not prepared
turf,

to rehearsing

asserts that “we,”

consuming

The war has touched

make

namely Europeans, expected

it

And

to

way “of

settling conflicts

The war thus removes

and lays bare the primal

here Freud recurs to the

—

so Freud suggests that our unconscious,

man

is

“almost exactly the same as that of primeval

a “valueless illusion”: “It strips us of the later accretions,

in

each of us .”

32

In a similar vein, Freud also invokes

as archetypical

striking rehearsal

of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s image of the savage:

of the projection of

See Freud, Civilization 46-47.
,

30

31

32

which we have

myth of “primeval man”

Homer’s Odyssey

29

of

be mediated by “the psychoanalytic method of investigation, the

only one which reaches such depths,”

man.”

that the leadership

radically challenged “the attitude

sense of our relation to death

whose access needs

cherished

a sensitive psychic cord of belief in the inherent goodness

hitherto adopted towards death .” 30

order to

own

on the “white race” would have brought about “creative
powers”

of mankind and civilization insofar as

in

their

for

an earlier version of the “white man’s

allowing for the discovery of a civilized and peaceful
interests.”

nationalities

developed or has been lost-would occupy
mankind

In Freud’s perspective,

Freud then comes close

idea

role that

is little

among

Freud, “Death,” 289.

Freud, “Death,” 296.

Freud, “Death,” 299.
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life

unto death as well as offers a

in the

savage

“lies

concealed a vein of ethical sensitiveness
which has been

lost

by us

civilized

men .” 33

But

unlike Rousseau, this admission
does not lead to a trenchant critique
of civilized society;
rather leads to a disenchanted

it

view of

civilization that ascribes

its

negative aspects to

remnants of a primeval past while hypostatizing
aggressiveness as part of human nature,

and presenting an account of civilization as
a rather
threatened, that “has to use
instincts

and

formations .”

hold

to

the

its

utmost efforts

manifestations

achievement, one constantly

in order to set limits to

of them

man’s aggressive

check by physical reaction-

in

34

The war thus represented
illusion

fragile

about

albeit

it,

for

Freud the loss not of civilization as such but of an

a crucial one.

Freud accordingly proceeded to formulate a

prophylactic view of civilization. This view seeks the
aggressive impulses and deathdrives repressed only partially

an

uncivilized

past

rather

by

civilization

than

as

and casts these as archaic, as remnants of

intrinsic

to

“Observation showed, to be sure, that embedded

the

civilizing

process

itself.

For,

in these civilized states there

were

remnants of certain other peoples, which were universally unpopular and had therefore
only reluctantly, and even so not
civilization, for

fully,

admitted to participation in the

which they had shown themselves

suitable

enough .”

35

common work
But

it

would be

mistake to take the war as a shattering experience for the ideal of civilization per

of science

for the progress

experience of the war

33

34

is

in unveiling reality

one

that allows the shattering

See Freud, “Death,” 294, 295, respectively.
Freud, Civilization 68, 69-70
,

35

and discrediting

Freud, “Death,” 276.
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of an

of

se,

a

or

illusions. Rather, the

illusion: instead

of the

shattering of the ideal of civilization,

what the confrontation with death and

what the war shows
finitude destroyed

is its fragility.

was

Furthermore,

the idea of invincibility and

immortality associated with the belief
in progress, meanwhile rendering
civilization,

which

in its enlightened version
represented the struggle against prejudice,
myth, and

illusion, itself into

become

indeed,

an

illusion.

Accordingly, Freud could confidently assert,

interesting again;

it

has recovered

its

full

content .”

brought about “disillusionment” but of a salutary
kind. Freud sharply

36

“[l]ife

has

The Great War

who

criticizes those

voiced their disappointment with civilization because
of the war. Even

if

Europeans’

sense of being the holders of a superior civilization
was somewhat shattered by their
display of a brutality previously unseen in the continent,
the sense of disappointment was

misguided. For Freud, the experience of the Great

War

“consists in the destruction of an

illusion.”

By

the time Freud wrote The Future of an Illusion he

the major task of civilization,

its

actual raison d’etre,

is

to

was already

asserting that

defend us against nature .” 37

In this text, Freud then engaged in an anthropocentric analysis of religion
as he states that
religion arises

from the same need

that civilization

seeks to address, “the need of

defending oneself against the crushingly superior force of nature .” 38 Both lay claims

human

36

'

needs. Religion, however,

is

an illusion that needs to be dispelled, a rejection

to

that

Freud, “Death,” 291.

7

See Freud, “Future,” 15. See also Freud, “Civilization,” 64-145. For a classic critical engagement with
Freud that sought to theorize the possibility of a “non-repressive civilization” from the tradition of Critical
Theory see Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon
Press,

1966). For informative discussions of Marcuse’s engagement with Freud see Patricia

J.

Mills,

Woman, Nature, and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), chaps 4-5; and Joel Whitebook,
Perversion and Utopia : A Study of Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 2441, 61-73.
38

Freud, “Future,” 21
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largely arises out of the

the book, Freud

dispel

one

you want

is at

emergence of

scientific

knowledge.

And

yet towards the end of

pains to demonstrate that scientific
knowledge does not merely

illusion to replace

to expel religion

it

with another. As Freud’s

from our European

fictive interlocutor states: “If

you can only do

civilization,

it

by means of

another system of doctrines; and such a system
would from the outset take over

all

the

psychological characteristics of religion-the same
sanctity, rigidity and intolerance, the

same prohibition of though-for

its

own

defense .”

Freud makes an important concession: “I
perhaps the hopes
is

I

also an illusion,

have confessed
it

illusions, the illusion

carries the

of

to are

means

scientific

39

Admitting the force of the objection,

know how

difficult

is

of an illusory nature, too.”

for

its

own

to

Still,

But contrary

knowledge does not demand unconditional

to religious faith

science offers “evidence” of

“our science

is

no

Yet Freud

illusion .”

its

even

- and

if

science

correction. In contrast with religious

indeed open to the possibility that some of its tenets can be illusions
and
truth.

avoid illusions;

this is a crucial aspect

successes and claims.

He

it

belief.

It

is

can bear such

of Freud’s argument -

thus confidently concludes:

40

may have

underestimated the force of the objection here. Scientific

discourse has monotheistic ambitions as well.

ambitions were not formulated until after World

And even

War

II,

if the

when

major impact of those

the technocratic discourse

of instrumental reason and bureaucratic organization had reached a point beyond Freud’s
bleakest

39

40

expectations,

its

broad outlines were clear

Freud, “Future,” 51
Freud, “Future,” 54-56
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at

least

since

the

seventeenth

century.

Also, like the discourse of civilization,

violence in relation to both

humans and

racism and bigotry, especially in the
late

twentieth-century sensibility

Civilization

and

its

Discontents he

late

we

by man and

everything, in short, which

of use

more than

has been episodically complied in

to

“We

find that in

intnnsic dynamics of

recognize

...

that countries

them everything which can

in his protection against the forces

him-is attended

so, Freud, for all his zealous

its

it

its

nineteenth and early twentieth century.
But the

able to write:

is

the exploitation of the earth

Even

has

obviously absent from Freud’s milieu.
Thus,

is

attained a high level of civilization if

is

nature, as

own

it

to

in

have

assist in

of nature-

and effectively carried out .” 42

defense of civilization, unwittingly laid bare

repressed “primal” nature. In his reflections one also finds
an important

displacement of the question of responsibility from the perspective
of accountability,

in

addition to adding ambiguity to this concept. In other words,
while in Freud’s reflections

violence

is

ontologized as part of

human

nature, his depiction of the battle between the

values of civilization and primal violence does

away with Kantian

notions of rational

accountability and of responsibility as the categorical obedience to the moral law.
In light

of these reflections on war, violence, and
accountability

is

misguided

at best.

figure in these reflections. Yet

some

civilization, to think

To be

sure, the question

of responsibility as only

of responsibility does not

extrapolations can be made. Alongside the loss of

the illusions Freud dispels, one can add the loss of innocence in relation to violence, a

41

See Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas from
Abelard to Leibnitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Collins, From Divine Cosmos to
Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of the Idea of Order in Renaissance England (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). See also Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific
Imagination: from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986).
42

See Freud, Civilization 45.
,
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loss that has implications for
a conception

reflections

of political responsibility. But

it

is in

Weber's

where the contours of these implications
can be more vividly found.

Freud's reflections on violence are
thus a testament of the relentless
effort to not

merely salvage the discourse of civilization
innocence.

this legacy.

It

in the face

will take another big catastrophe,

And even

of catastrophe, but

and another generation,

then these questions are far from

to

proclaim

its

to reckon with

settled.

* * *

Max Weber’s

sociological definition of the state as the ultimate
holder of the legitimate

use of violence has significantly shaped discussions
of state power and political violence
in

twentieth-century sociological

Vocation”

-

thought.

originally a speech given at

43

In

his

celebrated

Munich University

in

essay “Politics as a

1918

in the anxious

context of the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the
Bolshevik triumph, and the

German

revolution from the top of late 1918

responsibility, violence,

clear, for

violent

-

and the nation-state,

an aggressive-militant

foundations of the

complex

is laid

liberal like

state

the

bare.

Weber

intersection

As

there

between

political

the tone of the essay

was no need

makes

to conceal the

while somewhat prudentially defending a

liberal

democratic constitutional framework, such as the one the short-lived Weimar Republic

would

offer,

as a preferable form of governance.

44

On

the contrary, “Politics as a

43

For a sample of sociological approaches to state formation and violence that take Weber’s account as one
point of departure, see Norbert Elias The Civilizing Process (London: Blackwell, 1987) and Anthony
Giddens, Violence and the Nation-State (Berkley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press,
1984).
44

The secondary literature on Weber’s political and sociological thought is vast. Here I list the works that I
have found particularly helpful: Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. II, trans.
Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (New York: Anchor, 1970); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Crises of
Understanding,” in Adventures of the Dialectic, trans, Joseph Bien (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1973); Sheldon S. Wolin, “Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory,” Political

Theory 9 (August 1981); Wolfgang

J.

Mommsen, The
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Political

and Social Theory of Max Weber,

trans.

Vocation,” presents a politically
infused lecture on the nature of
political leadership and
the

meaning of its

stated “a colossal

German Nation

calling.

For as early as 1895, in his Frieburg
inaugural

programme of political education”

but also as “the ultimate goal

as not only the

of our science.” 45

...

arguably never abandoned: albeit in a
variety of forms,
sociological and methodological writings.

it

lecture,

main goal of

And

the

this goal

found expression

The scope of Weber’s

Weber

he

in his

lecture is sweeping, as

he moves effortlessly through the prospects
and travails of the political in the age of mass
politics,

an age in which for him the “calling” of politics
can only be the prerogative of

the political leader

instrumental

-

the only figure

And,

rationality.

in

who can
doing

truly

so,

be free

in the

age of mass politics and

he offered probing reflections on the

legitimacy of the use of violence, leadership, the increasing
bureaucratization in the age

of mass

politics,

and

political responsibility. Particularly important is

discussion of power, violence, and authority within the
excellence, the

modem

state,

emerged

authority: traditional, rational-legal,

his

modem

how

out of Weber’s

political association par

well-known account of three ideal-types of

and charismatic.

All of these concerns have received significant scholarly attention by sociologists,
political scientists,

and more recently by

political theorists

-

the last

paid particular attention to Weber’s complex liberalism. Even
political responsibility that

so,

two groups have
the reflection on

accompanies these concerns has commanded significantly

less

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and, more recently, Harvey Goldman,

Politics, Death, and
and Power in Max Weber and Thomas Mann (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1992); Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001),
chap. 4; and Fernando Mires, Teoria de la Profeson Politico: Corruptos, “Milicos, " y Demagogos (Caracas:

the Devil: Self

Universidad Central de Venezuela, 2002).
45

Max

Weber, “Economic Policy and National

Translation, ed.

W.

G. Ruciman

trans. E.

Interest in Imperial

Germany,”

Mathew (Cambridge: Cambridge
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in

Max

Weber: Selections

University Press, 1978), 267.

in

)

even when his account of responsibility
stems not only from his observations

attention,

on the rationalization process

modem

that in his

nation-state, but also out

discussions

where

responsibility are

reconsideration

important

view accompanied the consolidation
of the

of his theorization of

elements

of the

political violence.

relationship

between

in these

is

It

violence

and

found, reflections that provide the
basis for a politically infused

of

this

intersection

in

light

of the

violence

and barbarism

that

characterized the early years of the twentieth
century. Weber, as has been correctly

pointed out by a perceptive
reflections

on the

contributions

distinction

responsibility

attests to

coming out of

(

the

the political theorization of catastrophe.

ethic

Verantwortungs

Weber

s

intellectual integrity”

is,

of conviction
is

(

Gesinnungsethik)

46

and

the

See Wolin,

ethic

of

largely presented as an interesting coda that further

it

is

interpreted in relation to the tensions between

and “moral integrity”

of course, a basis for these readings
in

but his

Weber’s

Still,

in his liberalism, or as

Weber’s attempt

the “painful” aspect of political leadership, a warning for those suited for

interpretations,

46

se,

relentless critique of the idealist bent of socialism and the
political

naivete of the bourgeoisie, or

show

never developed a political theory per

between violence and responsibility constitute one of the
major

link

between

critic,

what follows

“Max Weber,”

I

in

47
it .

to

There

Weber’s corpus. Rather than challenging these

would

like

to

focus on the question of political

401-24.

47

See, for instances, Villa, Socratic Citizenship 213-31; John Patrick Diggins, Politics and the Spirit of
Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 26 Iff. Villa is certainly an acute and insightful reader of Weber.
And yet, his reading of the centrality of the questions posed by his moralistic “Socratic citizenship’ to the
heart of Weber’s reflections constitutes the least compelling aspect of his reading. Something similar could
,

be said in relation to his otherwise rigorous and insightful readings of Arendt. Unfortunately, the same
cannot be said about Diggins’ treatment of Weber - while his book often provides important insights, his
infatuation with Lincoln and the founding fathers leads

him

to

some unhelpful hasty comparisons of

Lincoln, the Federalist papers, and Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation.”
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responsibility and present

power

in the

violence and

way

it

as central for

Weber's understanding of violence
and

age of mass politics and bureaucracy,
thus looking

power from

1

ponder Weber’s theorization of the

and the account of responsibility and violence
Ultimately,

terms of the specific means peculiar to

it,

use of physical force.” 48 For ‘“nearly

all

modem

state sociologically

community

formations,’ including those of

Weber famously

suggested.

placing the use of physical force as one of the “specific
means peculiar” to the

Weber

reducing

struggle.

at

once acknowledged the centrality of violence

functions

its

to

the

mitigation

For Weber the central question

violence that allow for

its

or negotiation

that

emerges

legitimacy. In Weber’s

intersection of power, violence, and legitimacy, “...

human community

that

only in

as to every political association, namely,
the

political associations, ‘have their origin in
violence,’”

state

modem

that henceforth emerges.

Weber, “one can define the

for

the question of

the perspective of political
responsibility, instead of the other

around. In this vein, in what follows,

state

at

state

(successfully) claims the

is

in the

state

modem
without

are the representations of

precise formulation of the

we have

to say that a state is a

monopoly of

the legitimate use of

physical force [Gewaltsamkeit] within a given territory.” Immediately following

48

“Politics as a Vocation,” in

Mills
49

50

As

(New York: Oxford
cited,

and

Here Weber

From Max Weber: Essays

in

By

of perpetual violence and

what

more

modem

49

this

Sociology, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright

University Press, 1946), 77-78.

slightly paraphrased, in

Mayer, The Furies, 79.

open contrast to Carl Schmitt, who in writings such as The Concept of the Political,
The Crises of Parliamentary Democracy, or the 1937 essay “Total Enemy, Total War,
and Total State,” while also reflecting on the importance of violence, its legitimacy, and its representations,
namely, whether or not right is independent from might, ended up offering an idealization of the principle
of enmity in his conception of the political, while rejecting liberalism, parliamentary democracy, the Treaty
of Versailles. For a brief but instructive discussion of these themes in Schmitt, see Mayer, The Furies, 80is

in

Political Theology,

82.

For a comprehensive treatment of Schmitt, see Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual

Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000).
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formulation he adds: “Note that
‘territory’

That

’

one of the characteristics of the

anchored on a delimited space, which

1S

centrality

of the

in

modernity

is

51

the nation-state. Here the

triad Nation-State-Territory for the
representation

of violence

is

the state polices the use of violence
and force within the given territory, which
its

state .”

the legitimacy of the use of
violence, the legitimate configuration
of right and

is,

might

is

exposed;

is

where

sovereignty resides. In other words, the state
controls the use of violence as well as

its

representation within a given territory, even if
the exercise of violence oftentimes takes

place outside the bounds of the nation-state that
generates the power behind
in

Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan

violence and over

its

,

the

monopoly of

representations.

And

the state

the

latter

is

is

it.

Thus, as

twofold: over the use of

what ultimately adds

the

legitimacy to the former.
Yet, even if the state’s
the use of violence and

usage,

at the

its

monopoly of violence

legitimation,

it

translates into the authorization of

does not necessarily give access

present time, the right to use physical force

is

ascribed to other institutions

or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits

acknowledges

that

the

same

actor,

though

it

is

it

exercised by

means of

Weber,

“Politics,”

state. In

territory, its actual

78

154

Even
use

is

modernity, state-sanctioned

the military, the police, and

market.

51

tacitly

“the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.”

provides legitimacy to the use of violence in a given

is

Here Weber

insofar as these have the legitimacy of

not the sole prerogative of the sovereign or head of

violence

it.”

or institution, does not always perpetrate state

violence; institutions and groups can exercise
the state. Accordingly, the state

to its direct

more

indirectly,

by the

In this way,

Weber sought

to

answer for

occupied the likes of Plato and Aristotle:
what
is

well-known, according

polls

(i.e.

institutional

realization of that end.

violence

at

for

s

Greek polis was the place where man,

nature as a political being; consequently,
the means of

mechanisms, slavery included) were conducive

But what are the equivalents

the center of his theorization of the

and Hobbes

Weber

its

times the ancient question that

the end of a political association?
For as

to Aristotle, the ancient

the zoon politikon, could realize
the

is

modem

in shifting the terms

modem

of the discussion,

in

modem

state,

Weber

albeit

times?

the question

is

not so

much what

placing

follows Machiavelli

with one main difference:

are the necessary

such as glory, in the case of Machiavelli, or order and
Rather, the question

is

how

to

cope with the forces

more important from our present
controlling these, as well as

in

modernity

socio-political standpoint is the

managing them pmdently, even

be carried on for the sake of an aggrandized national
oscillated

leadership as an answer to this question.

still

future.

between some balance of both
5

"

to attain an end,

stability, as is the

work

at

means

bureaucracy, and rationalization) each of which have forms of violence

Weber

the

times were also the times of capitalism, bureaucracy,
and the nation-state. Now,

Weber

Weber

By

to

if for

At

political

In other words,

case in Hobbes.

(i.e.,

capitalism,

at its center.

Even

problem of somehow

Weber

these needed to

different stages of his life

education

even

and

political

in the vocation essays,

stands on his professed hope of 1895 of educating the bourgeoisie for political

leadership; and echoes of this are found in the epic longing for a “political hero” in

1918.

52

53

A

political

hero

that

confronts

Weber, “Inaugural Address,” especially 266ff; see

daunting

a

also

Weber, “Inaugural Address,” 267-68; see also Weber,
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Weber,

task:

the

“Politics.”

“Politics,” 79-80, 128.

forces

behind

the

rationalization

process,

bureaucracies of the

expressions of which are

modem

constitutive of the

is

modem

mechanisms of organization; indeed, a necessary
one given

rationalization, a path that in his

Iron Cage.” For the

controls the total

the

in

modem

most bleak descriptions

state,

means of political

led to

the

state.

It is

modem

organization.” Analogous to the

king in the sole person of the leader. Nor

is

way

the

monopoly

modem

state, the

version of an absolute

the responsibility for the actions that are

constitutive of the different organizational imperatives
of

one individual. In the new configuration of power
is

path of

alongside the effective monopoly of violence,
also

centralization of political organization hardly reverts
to a

demanded

one of

Weber’s metaphor of the

of violence does not always translate as violence
perpetrated by the head of

is

rational

state.

For Weber, a rational bureaucracy
its

found embodied

modem

that the

bureaucracy placed on

modem

a changed concept of political responsibility.

state represents,

And

what

the seeds for this

concept are found in the process of de-personification that the
rationalization process
brings about:

stores, tools,

“No

single official personally

owns

the

money he pays

and war machines he controls. In the contemporary

essential for the concept

is

the institution.

capitalism

completed .”

Weber

54

Responsibility

Weber,

is

means of

staff,

is

of the

administrative

thus displaced from the individual actor to

sees this process as comparable to both the development of

and the emergence of

modem

traditionally intermediary classes, or estates,

54

‘state’— and this

of state-the ‘separation’ of the administrative

administrative officials, and of the workers from the materials

organization

out, or the buildings,

science.

Parallel

were eliminated

“Politics,” 82
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to

the

way

in

which

in route to the centralization

of social and

political

power -

also parallel to the

way

which the big

in

capitalist-

monopolistic entrepreneurs gradually
expropriated independent producers science, or
scientific discourse, effectively

role

managed

to run off the field potential
claimants for the

of theory such as theology and
philosophy

55

Politically

.

speaking, the

State

increasingly took over the roles assigned
to the estates, the feudal remnants
of the
absolutist state,

place .”

and by means of a rational bureaucracy

is

able to “stand in the top

56

All in

association

all,

out of this process the

which organizes domination”

modem

insofar as

state

“[it]

emerges as a “compulsory

has been successful in seeking to

monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means
of domination within
territory.

The

state thus successfully is able “to inaugurate the
expropriation

of

a

this

58
expropriator of the political means, and therewith of political
power .”

Weber, however, remained somewhat ambiguous
process and the consolidation of the

Tocqueville and Karl Marx,

daunting nature of

Weber

modem power -

modem

state.

in relation to the rationalization

In

the tradition

perceptively theorized

his “Iron

Cage” metaphor

the

of Alexis de

unprecedented and

correlates with

Marx’s

Herculean views of capitalism and deployment of Prometheus as a metaphor

for the

proletariat,

inaugurates.

and with Tocqueville’s views of democratization and the new despotism

And

modem power
55

56

57

58

On Weber’s

like his predecessors,

at the

same

level

Weber

also longed for an agent that could

of force and coherence, even

views of science, see Wolin, “Max Weber,” 404ff.

Weber,

“Politics,” 83

Weber,

“Politics,” 82-83

Weber,

“Politics,”

82
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if his

it

match

yearning was more

in

tune with Tocqueville’s anstocratic
defeatism, and his low esteem for
the bourgeoisie,
than with the optimism of the young

Marx of

early 1840s, or with the latter’s
positive

assessment of the bourgeoisie in The
Communist Manifesto (1848). 59 In

redeeming proletariat

German
his

Weber’s formulations. Already

in

in 1895,

fact, there is

when he

no

declared the

proletanat economically “mature” in comparison
with Germany’s bourgeoisie,

political

assessment of the proletariat inverted the equation: “/
pjolitically

working class

is

infinitely

politically educated, nor

was

less

it

mature...”

60

And

foreseeable to educate

yet,

it

neither

in “the

was

deep

Weber, a self-professed bourgeois, who, nevertheless,
could not confer political credentials to his
formulation

is

class.

the

the bourgeoisie

power”

instincts for

that characterized true “political leadership,”
61
at least not at the time.

,

Or

at least

not for

the time of his inaugural address

at

62

what

Instead,

is

found

Weber’s

in

the figure of the “political hero,” one that confronts the
meaningless of the

world (as famously depicted

in

Weber’s methodological essays); one

that in spite of the

conglomeration of the imperatives of capitalism, science, and bureaucratic
organization

and administration, comprising the rationalization of
calling

as a

59

of

politics.

political hero’s

remarkable appearance

at the

end of the “Politics

Vocation” merits lengthy quotation:

This tradition

On

The

heroically responds to the

life,

is

masterfully depicted in several of Sheldon S. Wolin’s essays. See

“Max Weber,” 414-15.
Marxism: Nomos XXVI, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W.
York University Press, 1983). And on Tocqueville, see Wolin, Tocqueville

Marx, “On Reading Marx

Chapman (New York: New

Politically” in

Between Two Worlds: The Making of a

Political

and Theoretical

Life (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 2001).
60

61

Weber, “Inaugural Address,” 266.
Weber, “Inaugural Address,” 266.

Weber, “Inaugural Address,” 264. Here Weber writes: “I am a member of the bourgeois class: I feel
myself to be such and have been brought up on its opinions and ideals. [. .] When I ask myself
whether
the German bourgeoisie is at present ready to be the dominant political class in the nation, I cannot at
present answer ‘Yes.’” Emphasis in original.
.
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.

.

.

Politics is a strong

and slow boring of hard boards.

perspective. Certainly

all historical

It

takes both passion and

experience confirms the truth-that

man would

not have attained the possible unless
time and again he had reached
out for the
impossible. But to do that a

man must be

as well, in a very sober sense

a leader, and not only a leader but
a hero

of the word.

And even

those

who

are neither leaders

nor heroes must arm themselves with that
steadfastness of heart which can brave

even the crumbling of all hopes. This

is

necessary right now, or else

be able

to attain

politics

who

view

too stupid or too base for what he wants. Only he

this

is

can say

is

even

that

which

is

possible today.

so sure that he shall not crumble

‘In spite

of all!’ has the calling

Only he has

when

for politics

men

will not

the calling for

the world from his point of

who

in the face

of

all

63
.

Passion, perspective, the boldness to reach out for
the impossible, sober heroism,

unwillingness to crumble or seek refuge

when

the world does not

conform

to his ideals

-

these are the attributes of Weber’s political hero, the possessor
of the true vocation for
politics.

Yet with these

whose

role in

come

a special responsibility, a political responsibility

Weber’s formulation of political leadership

if responsibility is

decisionism.

attributes

A

closer look at Weber’s rendering of the question of responsibility

allow for the groundwork for

Weber,

sometimes overlooked, even

a leitmotif in his discussions of science and his formulation of political

provides the basis for a reconceptualization of

63

is

this

concept politically, or

this reconceptualization to proceed.

“Politics,” 128.
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at least

might

Earlier in “Politics as a Vocation”,

Weber

political leader: “the leading
statesman” has

locates responsibility in relation
to the

“an exclusive personal responsibility
he

cannot and must not reject or transfer .” 64
But here Weber might be reclaiming
an idea of
action that

seems anachronistic by

he described.

For

a

byproduct

his

own

of the

standards, or at least in light of the
processes
rise

of a centralized bureaucracy

is

the

depersonalization of political relations and the
transfer of responsibility that comes
along

with the process of rationalization as
bureaucratic administration displaces
responsibility

from ordinary individuals. Even
sense of responsibility

modem

is

so,

Weber claims

nation-state the leader

head of the

modem

is

not bounded by estates, nor

state, the leader

is

characteristic

Stated

differently,

the

is

responsibility

understood in terms of accountability. There
political leader here

is

of the

the leader always the

modem

is

done

in the

of the

name of

leader

must have — the one Weber argues cannot be

not the actor that carries on

all

the violence

cannot

be

it

simply

transferred: a “feeling

is

presented as one of

the “preemptive qualities [that] are decisive for the politician ...” 65 That

is

-

a different sense of responsibility the

of responsibility,” alongside “passion” and “a sense of proportion,”

leader

nation-state

only manages politics but ultimately the leader

cannot be held accountable for everything that
authorizes.

new

thus bestowed on the leader. But unlike previous
epochs, in the

actor given the separation of functions that
as

that in such a predicament, a

is,

even

if the

the actions that he authorizes, so thus cannot be

personally accountable for every action carried on in his name, that would be utterly
abstract, as the level

64

65

Weber,

“Politics,” 95.

Weber,

“Politics,” 115.

of accountability depends on the nature of the action and the moral

160

and

political stakes involved, the
leader bears a different sense

of responsibility

informs his actions. In other words,
responsibility defined as the need

respond to a certain predicament, face
the burdens of
obligations

involved.

Here we thus find a

distinction

responsibility that correlates with the
one given
relation to the Third Reich:

sometimes

guilt

accountability

accountable

it,

and vice versa

66
.

With

the

Judeocide

and assume the

between accountability and

by Hannah Arendt decades

Germany was

not the

later in

same

in the

same

as to be

the advent of bureaucratization the
question of

becomes ambiguous. And

for

to politically

and responsibility are found

individual, yet to be guilty of a crime
in Nazi

responsible for

political action,

that

as the endless debates

under the

responsibility cannot be conflated, especially

Third

when

Reich

on who can be hold

attest,

violence

is

accountability

and

depersonalized by the

mediation of institutionalized bureaucracies.

How

does Weber negotiate

this tension

of the bureaucratization process with the
leader?

As he

distinction that

s

reflections

are

Understanding: 1930-1954,

the question to his audience:

its

of one individual, the

Weber introduced an

might provide a way out of this paradox, or

quite independently of

Arendt

call for responsible action

gets closer to concluding the lecture,

Weber poses

differently.

between the increasing depersonalization

at least

“What

goals within the total ethical

negotiate

it

important

somewhat

calling can politics

fulfill

economy of human conduct -

found in “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in Essays in
Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), 121-39. See

ed.,

also Paul Ricoeur, The Just, trans.,

David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1 1have debated these questions at length in relation to the role of ordinary individuals under
the Third Reich and the literature is immense. For one of the most well known positions, see Daniel
Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Vintage,
1997). Goldhagen’s thesis has been effectively criticized by a number of historians such as Dan Diner,
35. Historians

Omar Bartov, and, especially, Christopher Browning, whose nuance account provides a salutary contrast to
Goldhagen’s excesses. See Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Batallion 101 and the Final Solution in
nd
Poland, 2 ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998). For yet another nuanced, and more recent, treatment,
see Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
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which

is,

question,

so to speak, the ethical locus
where politics

Weber

the relationship

ethics

in

describes politics as an ethos a
“cause.”
,

between

relation

to

home ?” 67 Preceding

at

is

He

this

then proceeds to interpret

cause and an ethics, and in doing so
he redefines the role of

this

politics.

This

question

is

exemplified

in

reference

to

“the

responsibility towards the future” that
takes precedence once a nation that
has been at
is

declared victorious, and to the ethic of
the defeated, one that for

with the past, as “no nation forgives

if its

Weber

concerned

is

honor has been offended .” 68 And

war

yet,

Weber

ultimately finds both accounts wanting. In
their place, he rehearses, not unambiguously,
the ancient question of this relationship
and after briefly considering “the ethic of the

gospel’

- whose ngor

absoluteness

point

-

it

is

ultimately

for

fails to

Weber “no joking

-

matter”

ask for “consequences.”

a concern for the consequences of actions that

And
is

asserts

this for

that

him

is

for

all

its

the decisive

constitutive of an ethic of

responsibility.

Thus, rather than pondering the compatibility, or lack thereof, of
“the ethic of the
gospel” with politics, he poses the question politically by looking
into the relationship

between action and
intersection

between

its

consequences, and

ethics

and

how

this relationship, in turn, resides at the

politics. In so doing,

Weber

offers the familiar distinction

between an “ethic of ultimate ends” and an “ethic of responsibility”: the former has
with intentions and the
one’s action. Even

latter

if principle is

h8

Weber,

“Politics,”

1

17.

Weber,

“Politics,”

1

18.

do

has to do with the ability to foresee the consequences of
not entirely absent from an ethic of responsibility, or a

concern with responsibility absent from the ethic of ultimate ends, there

67

to

162

is for

Weber an

abysmal difference

in the

outcomes

that

can emerge out of following
these two

Moreover, both ethical stances require
judgment:
individual has to discern what

collide, as

of responsibility judgment needs

one’s actions

may have - even

possible to foresee

if in

to

Greek tragedians remind

be exercised

it

may

is

more

boundless, and

mean

likely to take place than others, especially in
relation to

to the intersection

of ethics and

politics,

it is

never

that certain reactions

human

are inevitably situated within institutional
and historical constraints

comes

while for the

evoke, contingencies are often

structured and the ultimate boundlessness of
action need not
are not

us;

in relation to the possible reactions

important ways, action

the possible reactions

all

of ultimate ends the

the principle that takes priority in
a given situation, since

is

two competing valid principles often
ethic

for the ethics

69
.

70
.

an ethic of responsibility

actions that

Thus, when

is

it

better suited

to the challenges entailed in acting in the political
realm.

Even

so, the ethic

justifying certain

the fact that in

means

71

“decisive

And

to reach

to

...

violence.” For

is

paradoxes remain vivid, since even

demands of politics,

69

70

Weber,
Here

I

it

Weber,

bound

is

if the ethic

to the fact that

at least

realm of politics -

whoever embraces

dangerous

after all, its

“politics as a vocation” these

of responsibility

is

a combination of both that constitutes a

the better suited for the

“man who can have

the

“Politics,” 120-21.

am

in critical dialogue with Patchen Markell’s

University Press, 2003).
71

is

pay the price of using morally dubious means or

this is a risk especially pertinent to the

means

in

an end. For Weber, “No ethics in the world can dodge

numerous instances the attainment of ‘good’ ends

one must be willing
ones ...”

of responsibility does not resolve the dilemma often involved

“Politics,” 121.
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Bound by Recognition

(Princeton: Princeton

'calling for politics .’” 72 This

is

a conclusion

Weber

reaches after surveying the role
of

violence in negotiating the conflicts
arising from the relative coexistence
of both ethics

from the Pagan world
political formulation

or religious one: “It

human
politics

associations

to Calvin’s Protestantism. After
surveying these,

of the intersection between ethics and
is

the specific

means of

which determines

the

reaches a

politics rather than an ethical

legitimate violence as such in the hand
of
peculiarities

of

ethical

all

problems of

.” 73

To

think of responsibility politically therefore
entails taking into consideration the

dynamics of violence, power, and legitimation - the
the basis for the distinction

Weber

Weber

s

between the

first

two.

more often than not providing

latter

Or

at least

so

much

is

suggested by

formulation of this problematic, especially in light of his
assertion that “the quite

different tasks

of

to the ubiquity

violence and

politics

can only be solved by violence .” 74 Yet one need not subscribe

of violence

its

in order to gain insight

from Weber’s formulations. Even

if

representations are central for politics, the legitimate use of violence
does

not exhaust the meaning of politics, or the meaning of power for
that matter. Perhaps

another

way

to gain insight

from Weber’s formulation

is

to bear in

mind

his

warning

to

those that “contract” with violence: “whoever contracts with violent means for whatever

ends— and every

politician

does— is exposed

Weil once suggested, there
without being swayed by

72

73

74

75

Weber,

“Politics,” 127.

Weber,

“Politics,” 124.

Weber,

“Politics,” 126.

Weber,

“Politics,” 124.

its

is

so

to its specific

much compromising

destructive logic.
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And

consequences .”

75

As Simone

with violence that can be done

yet, like

Weber, such a warning did

not translate into a principled
rejection of violence. Instead,

of responsibility

in

tune with the demands of politics

-

it

led her to reclaim a concept

albeit politics

conceived

in a

way.

different

* * *

If for

Freud and Weber the experience of the Great

War and

the Bolshevik threat

left

an

imprint in their theoretical reflections, even
if it did not lead to a wholeheartedly
rejection

of civilization and

its

values, but to a rather sober assessment
of

Arendt, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Weil,
the subsequent brutality of the Spanish Civil

vigorous reckoning with catastrophe.
the catastrophic

European

first

And

it

is

War and of World War

all

for authors such as

a combination of this experience with

II

that led to a

three authors reckon with the

half of the twentieth century

civilization. In the case

it,

by looking back

at the

of Arendt, the “extraordinary events of

more

meaning of

very basis of
this

century”

forced her to follow the path of a writer reflecting on
the meaning of freedom and
politics, ancient

and modem, the ambiguous revolutionary legacy, and the public/private

divide in modernity in order to understand totalitarianism. In
contrast, an important
aspect of what Horkheimer and
pertains to

Odyssey

went

to

largely

War

Adomo

power and instmmental

to reflect

Homer’s

theorized as “the dialectic of enlightenment”

reason, and they reached as far back as Homer’s

on the origins of instmmental reason

Iliad to reflect

prompted by the

atrocities

as cunning.

Meanwhile, Weil

on the blindness of violence and power, a
of the Spanish Civil

War and

the

first

reflection

year of World

II.

Weil, in her essay “The Iliad or the

Poem of Force,”

proclaims not Achilles as the

hero of the epic poem, but “Force employed by man, force that enslaves man, force

165

before whieh man’s flesh shnnks
away.”
effects

of force on the humans

76

In her essay,

that participate in

nature offeree, even if she never
redeems
is

capable of converting a

the

effect

human

On

it.

into a thing

11
.

it

Weil goes on

to dwell

on the

in order to suggest the
transformative

the contrary, in Weil’s estimation
force

For Weber the

rise

of bureaucracies has

of displacing responsibility, and
instrumental reason might lead

dehumanization of human beings, thus paving
the way

for

what Weil considers

to

a

their

treatment as things. For Weil, force, especially
once manifested in war, has the same

dehumanizing

Even more

effect

and

it

also effectively blurs the realm of action
and responsibility.

so, since force “in its grossest

sovereignty over

life

and death-it

is

one into a thing, a corpse. Yet
expression,

is

and most summary form” takes the shape of

“the force that kills” the one that effectively turns

force,

for

its

propensity to end

not something expendable from the

human

life

in

its

crudest

condition, at least not so

according to Weil. Indeed, she ventures to suggest that force
comes along almost as a
birthright.

Perhaps

violence; yet this

is

all

men, by the very

motif of Weil’s reflections on

way

that both the strong

power or lack
are the

weak

thereof:

is

force. This blindness

of power manifests

and weak, once engaged

“The strong

are, as a

absolutely weak, but neither

is

fact,

aware of

this.”

Weil, “The

Poem of Force,”

163, 184-85.

Weil, “The

Poem of Force,”

173.
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Weil:

is

the central

itself clearly in

in war, miscalculate their relative

matter of

Simone Weil, “The Iliad or The Poem of Force,” Simone
Grove Press, 1986), 163.

78

are destined to suffer

evocative since the blindness of power

76

77

bom,

a truth to which circumstance shuts men’s eyes .” 78

The metaphor of blindness

the

act of being

never absolutely strong, nor

And

An Anthology,

this lack

ed. Sian

of awareness

Miles

(New

York:

Weil

identifies as

humanity

an offspring of the refusal of both
parties to acknowledge

Both weak a nd strong refuse

humanity— albeit

it

relative positions.

means of

But

it

Weil constitutes the

weakness, respectively. For “the

man who

through a non-resistant element; in the
the

power

reflection

to

.” 79

interpose,

And

prudence resides.

is

it

And

their

mutual implication

precisely this capacity for action, which

is

force, that for

acknowledge

mutual implication what takes away the
absoluteness of

that

is

to

their shared

illusion

of absolute power and absolute

this

when

yet,

“tiny interval”

force and

seems

to

walk

substance that surrounds him nothing has

between the impulse and the
in

their

often carried on by

the possessor of force

is

human

is

in

act,

where the

power become

the tiny interval that

is

possibility for justice and

their

only ends,

it is

precisely

that already constrained space for reflection that
is further shrunken.

In

upon.

On

Weil

s

reading of the Iliad another aspect of this blindness of power

this occasion,

it

is

forms that also blinds those
is

the lack of reflection that accompanies violence in
that

contract” with

it

to the fact that

is,

the subject implicated in the use of force eventually

to the heroes

and combatants of Homer’s Iliad Weil

reflected

its

crudest

once a cycle of violence

unleashed, consequent acts might turn the violence back against

That

is

becomes

its

its

previous agent.

object. Referring

illustrates this point,

“These men,

wielding power, have no suspicion of the fact that the consequences of their deeds will
length

come home

to

them-they too

will

bow

the neck in their turn.”

power usually do not even remotely consider
historical evidence for

79

80

it.

this possibility,

80

even

Weil thus captures the hubris often found

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

163.

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

174.
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And

at

yet, those in

if there is

ample

in the unyielding

figures of Homeric

And

it

is

poems and Greek

tragedies in her depiction of the
blindness of power.

precisely the blindness of pure

power

as violence that

Weil deemed the most

senseless. Cruel acts that are the
offspring of power, often unleash
cycles of violence,

even
so,

if

and

these remain unarticulated for

some time -

might change over time. Also,

their lot

boundless nature of action

after all, the

in its blindness

weak

are never absolutely

power neglects

the relative

81

In important ways,

.

political actions that are

captured in the ephemeral

human

actions are boundless, especially

backed up by raw power. This neglect

moments of

for

is

Weil neatly

invincibility that characterize the victors of
the

different battles; the victorious “forgets to treat
victory as a transitory thing .” 82 Also

and

analogous to their refusal of a shared humanity with the
defeated -

this is

victorious

the

possibility

of self-destruction

seems

like

an

impossibility

-

for the
83

This

.

shortsightedness shows a lack of awareness of the finitude
accompanying any political

and social relation as well as a miscalculation of the actual amount
of force

at

the

perpetrator’s disposal.

But these formulations hardly exhaust Weil’s reading of the
suggests yet another aspect of power and violence that

even

if

it

is

of utmost relevance today, especially

and knowledge and the logics of violence and

is

often not given

in relation to the

terror,

namely, the effects violence has on those touched by

it,

Iliad.

once the

its

This reading

due

attention,

despotism of science
latter are

especially on

its

unleashed;

perpetrators, an

81

Here it is important to signal Arendt’s powerful reflections on the boundlessness of action in The Human
Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958). For a recent deployment of this concept of

action

by means of

Recognition, chap.
82

83

a

stimulating reading of Sophocles’ Antigone, see Patchen Marked,

3.

Weil, “The

Poem

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

of Force,” 175.
174.

168

Bound by

effect that correlates to the

things.

de-humamzing impulse of converting
human beings

Weil writes, “Violence

just as external to

its

obliterates

employer as

anybody who

to its victim.

And from

feels its touch.

It

comes

this springs the idea

to

into

seem

of a destiny

before which executioner and victim
stand equally innocent, before which
conquered and

conqueror are brothers in the same distress .” 84
In

of action with

its

no

less violent reactions, a

the futility of fighting violence with
albeit paradoxical, fate for

this rendering,

Weil couples the power

coupling that suggests,

more violence

85

among

other things,

Weil thus conceives of

.

a

mutual

both parties involved in the cycle of violence.
But Weil

is

hardly arguing for a categorical or principled
rejection of the use of violence and force.
After

all,

as part of her political practice, Weil herself
joined the Republican side during

the Spanish civil war,

and acknowledged the inevitability of fighting Hitler

position in relation to violence

was thus much more

popular readings of her essay suggest.

“A moderate

which alone would enable man

suggests,

would require superhuman
something

virtue,

like Machiavelli’s

which

politically

Her

ambiguous than some

use of force,” Weil unequivocally

to

escape being enmeshed in

is

as rare as dignity in

“economy of violence”

86
.

is

its

machinery,

weakness .”

thus called forth

88
.

87

Here

But Weil

is

not ready to endorse the politics of deception that accompany Machiavelli’s practice of

84

85

Weil, “The

Poem of Force,”

179.

For an stimulating survey of the history of the couple action/reaction

in

its

multiple scientific,

psychoanalytic, and political usages see Jean Starobinski, Action and Reaction: The Adventures of a
Couple, trans. Sophie Hawkes (London: Zone, 2003).
86

87

88

See Simone Petrement, Simone Weil: A
Weil, “The

On

Poem of Force,”

Life, trans.

Raymond

Rosenthal

(New York:

179.

Machiavelli, see the classic treatment of this question in Sheldon

Continuity

and Innovation

in

Pantheon, 1976).

Western Political Thought (Boston:

chap. 7.
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Little,

Wolin, Politics and Vision:
Brown, and Company, 1960),

S.

politics,

matter.

nor his proto-consequentialist
ethics, nor Weber’s ethic of
responsibility, for

(And unlike Weil,

humanizing

force,

even

neither

if

Machiavelli nor

Machiavelli condemned

Weber saw
its

that

violence as a de-

crude manifestations, as his

depiction of Agathocles attests in the
Prince.) Indeed, for Weil, Machiavelli’s
“economy

of violence”

Even

is

not a possibility.

so,

Weil ultimately rehearses the early

modem

view, often exemplified by

Machiavelli ’s works, of the necessity of a
virtuous or prudent individual to responsibly
exercise power. Here Weber’s political
hero and Machiavelli’s prudent and virtuous
(as
in virtu) Prince find their correlate
in

Weil does not invoke such superhuman virtue

sure,

that

Weil’s invocation of “superhuman virtue.” To be

accompanies violence;

still,

it

in

order to curtail the indifference

might allow for the tiny space of reflection

that is

needed.

Weil thus
moderate

tries to sort

out the implications of her admission of the need of “a

of force.” And

use

in

what constitutes

an

insightful

combination

of

Machiavellian, Hobbesian, and Rousseaunian motifs, Weil further writes:
“moderation
itself is not

of

its

without

perils, since prestige,

strength, rests principally

upon

that

from which force derives
marvelous indifference

the weak, an indifference so contagious that
^89

of it.”

Still,

the

what emerges
results in

89

Weil, “The

is

more

more violence
a

dynamic

is

it

at least three-quarters

that the strong feel for

infects the very people

unleashed the less shocking

its

that often leads not to a lessening

who

effects

are the objects

become;

that

is,

of violence but rather

violence, as forms of violence are cushioned both aesthetically and

Poem of Force,”

179.

170

aesthetically

90
.

Indifference thus

moderate use of force
for a different kind

that

Weil’s

own

of

is

becomes the order of

the

day

91

In light

.

of

this, the

an ambiguous aspiration; hence,
Weil’s insistence on the need

virtue,

theoretical

one above our human

need

way

to find a

all

too

human

predicament.

It

seems

out of the cycle of violence leads her
to

rhetorically vindicate the possibility
of opening up space for such practice,
even if that
possibility

seems foreclosed by her own understanding
of the blindness of power.

Another byproduct of “the nature of force”
converting a

man

into a thing in “a double sense”
(as

perpetrator), but also has an effect

For Weil,

in the Iliad

on how

finitude

it

it

not only has the capacity of

dehumanizes both victim and

and the human soul are understood.

only the figure of Patroclus displays the kind
of “god-like”

generosity she defends,

even

“moments of grace”. 9 ^ And
in the

is that

it

is

if

she acknowledges that the

poem

presents

sparse

the latter that leads her to a vindication of the epic
genre

concluding section of her essay, citing instances of the combination
of “grace” and

force that constitute the

human

condition as depicted by Homer: as she puts

purest triumph of love, the crowning grace of war,

of mortal enemies. Before

it

is

it,

“But the

the friendship that floods the hearts

a murdered friend no longer cries out for vengeance .” 93

Grace, thus conceived, has the capacity of breaking the cycle of force, the one that leads

and reaction of senseless violence and

to action

Iliad, like

90

in

Aeschylus’ Oresteia,

illustrates

retribution. In light

of

this assertion, the

ways out of the cycle of violence

that the logic

See Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered”
October: The Second Debate (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).

91

On indifference to political suffering and persecution, see the probing reflections in Beatriz Martinez de
Murgia, Descifrando Cenizas: Persecucion e Indiferencia (Barcelona: Paidos, 2001).
92

93

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

185, 188.

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

187.
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Of action/reaction of violence leads
for

Aeschylus,

also fragile,

is

it

a fragile political solution.

and even though

could be destroyed by
Weil,

It

is

among

condition.

it.

it

Hence

its

perhaps more

because

so,

greatest calamity the

it

is

so, as the Iliad suggests,
grace is

But there

that speaks to

is

something very

it

its

dynamics and

poem, not only

for

its

political about the Iliad.

its

impact in the human

reflection

on

force, but,

deals with “the destruction of a city”, which
for Weil

human

grace;

value as a document of Occidental
civilization - as

also a deeply political

is

It

poem of force

Even

it

could be the means to stop the
excesses of violence,

others, firmly believed.

not merely a

the case of Weil’s reading of
Homer,

to: in

race can experience .” 94

is

“the

Also, in the Iliad in what could be
,

considered another parallel with tragedies like
the

Oresteia,

“neither victors,

vanquished are admired, scorned, or hated.” Rather, what the
poem
regret that

men

are capable of being so transformed.” Thus,

provides a detached perspective that neither
this perspective rather

without

“pride

unattainable.

seems

And

lost to us

Weil

or

s

shame”,

even

if

picture of

such

enduring legacy:

it

nor victimizes the defeated;

in all its contrariness

perspective

sense of

is

and

admittedly

cruelty,

sometimes

of the epic genius, something

that

95
.

meditations thus qualify Weber’s realism, and by means of her rereading

attitude

in the

Western

tradition, the Iliad, attempts to

towards violence in the present.

Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment
theoretical

temperaments

94

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

189.

Weil, “The

Poem of Force”,

190-91, 193.

95

a

war

this sobering perspective is part

of a foundational text

on the

shows a sobering

vilifies the victor

its

instills is a

nor

differ:

is

striking,

even

Weil read the Iliad
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The

parallel

if the

shed a
with

critical light

Adorno and

impulses animating their

politically in order to

show

the

paradoxes and complexities of violence;
Horkheimer and Adorno read the
Odyssey
illustrate

the

to

of enlightenment, and the roots
of instrumental reason and

dialectic

bourgeois rationality in the catastrophes
of the twentieth century.
* * *

The expenence of

violence, in whatever manifestation, led

the question of violence in

politics in

its

these thinkers to ponder

relation to civilization (Freud), to lay
bare

its

both normal times and

repercussions of

all

in times

of crisis (Weber), and

inner logic politically

its

uses.

But the

awareness of the

brutality

(Weber and Weil). And

fragility

and barbarism

of civilization

in

Weber

role in

to think about the ethical

in different

Weber, Freud, and Weil equally struggle with the
representation of violence
with

its

as well as

that in Freud’s reflections led to an

led to a conception of political action

based on an ethic of responsibility that he only outlines an ethic predicated on an

of a

political hero,

one

that

ways

ideal

under the conditions of the modernity Weber describes seems

anachronistic. Weil s reflections, like those of Weber, also present
a political ethic, even
if

one

that is hardly spelled out.

what she does invoke

When

is

But unlike Weber, she does not invoke a

“superhuman

political hero;

virtue”.

combined, the distinctive perspectives of Freud, Weber, and Weil

plethora of insights on our

own

offer a

predicament, one in which the then nascent dreams and

catastrophes have already unfolded, even if history has not ended: civilization as fragile

and ambiguous legacy, the constitutive nature of violence
blindness of power, especially in

of responsibility

in the

current predicament

its

modem

military form, and the centrality of a

new predicament

when an

in the

the Great

War

nation-state, the

new

conception

inaugurated. Furthermore, in our

“incoherent empire” seeks to hold sway of the globe, Weil’s

173

reflections

on the “blindness of power” might
shed a

well as on our present
relation

96
.

Along similar

of leadership and conceive
or, as in the

And

this

its

responsibility.”

means, among other things,

political responsibility in

contemporary formulation of the

actions done in

on our recent history

lines, a self-reflective turn

Weber’s reflections on the “ethic of

to

democratically conceived.

political

critical light

can be invoked

in

But responsibility

to displace the question

terms of the actions of the demos,

ideal of liberal

democracy,

to reflect

name. In other words, rather than invoking
superhuman

hero that in Weber’s celebrated quote aims

as

at

on the

virtue, or a

the impossible in order to reach

the possible, or ontologizing violence
and thus salvage a prophylactic, even if repressive,

understanding of civilization, what
politically,

perhaps called for

is

from the perspective of democracy - here defined

of citizens sharing
“liberal

is

political

power.

Still, to

to

as the active participation

do so requires bringing the democratic back

democracy”. This, along with a consideration of violence

awareness of the forms of power behind
Ironically, in the

ponder the question

exercise,

its

politically,

and the ends

it

to

demands

legitimizes.

age of post-democracy only democratic action can change our current

lot.

Even

so,

one of things

it

is

important to recognize the limitations of these three thinkers.

that these three representatives

catastrophe

failed

Analogously

to the

to

achieve

was

“anti-monumental”

to

of twentieth-century

historicize

literature

the

And

political theory

representation

of the same period, they

of

of violence.

fail to cast

the

violence of the twentieth century historically, question the narrative of progress, and

96

See Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London and New York: Verso, 2003). See also, Anatol Lieven,
“The Empire Strikes Back,” The Nation, July 7, 2003, 25-30. Also relevant are Robert Brenner, The Boom
and the Bubble (London and New York: Verso, 2002) and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American
Power (New York: The New Press, 2003), especially pp. 13-27.
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ponder the legacy of imperialism
Accordingly, in the next chapter
barbarism,

the

responsibility,

logic

in

I

twentieth-century forms of
political vtolence.

recast the relationship

of violence, and the need

by means of a

political reading

175

to

between

retrieve

a

civilization

political

ethic

of the “dialectic of enlightenment”.

and

of

CHAPTER V
READING THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
Critical

thought,

before progress

POLITICALLY

which does not

itself,

call a halt
requires us to take up the

cause of the remnants of freedom, of
tendencies
toward real humanity, even if they

seem

powerless

in

face of the great historical trend.

Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer

Nowadays, hardly any

historian

or social

observer,

regardless of her/his

political

persuasion, doubts the unprecedented nature of the
forms of violence and suffering in the

previous

century.

The twentieth-century

violent, or at least significantly so: for Eric

is

perceived

Hobsbawm

as

remember

uncharacteristically

“the old century” brought about

unprecedented violence and catastrophes for humanity;
political philosopher Isaiah Berlin: “I

either

in the

words of the

liberal

[the twentieth century] only as the

most

terrible century in history;

while a historian of a different political orientation and

historiographical temper than

Hobsbawm

of the century, as

in his final

s,

such as Francois Furet, shares a similar view

major work, The Passing of an

Illusion

,

where the century

is

portrayed as one marred by ideological excesses that led to catastrophic results that were
costly for

human

life;

for critical

Susan Buck-Morss, who

theorist

gravitates within the Left, even if “the construction of

dream animating

the twentieth century,

it

mass utopia” was

like

Hobsbawm

the constitutive

also often led to “the catastrophes of war,

exploitation, dictatorship, and technological destruction”; and for intellectual historian

Anson Rabinbach

the past century

is

“on balance

...

far richer in

occurrences that inspire faith in progress and collective purpose .”

1

1

cataclysms than in

With varying degrees

Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals Between Apocalypse and
Enlightenment (University of California Press, 1997), 20.

176

)

of pessimism about the future
prospects for the dreams of
modem, ty
shattered at the end of the century,

let

alone radically divergent
theoretical and political

temperaments informing them, these
views converge on the idea
violence constitutes an unprecedented

were seemingly

that

moment of modem

that twentieth-century
2

history.

epochs embodied the brutality of
barbarism, slavery, and pillage

in

Even

ways

if

previous

that correlate to

the twentieth century, the general
tenor of the aforementioned positions
indicates a sense

of uniqueness and lack of precedent
of the genocidal

dreams

into catastrophes in

statement:

ways not previously

The 20 th century was

the

politics that render humanity’s

seen.

most murderous

in

In

Hobsbawm’s unequivocal

recorded history.”

Yet, even a cursory look at the global
history of the

suggests that violence, terror, and catastrophe
are hardly
sure, to assert the presence

of violence and catastrophe

in

new

it

-

is

or unprecedented.

-

in

To be

ways

that

indeed, oftentimes these

it

could aptly be described as “a genocide of

In other words, the singularity of the catastrophes
that unfolded in the

twentieth century

is

certainly undeniable, for as

Hobsbawm

Century more human beings had been killed or allowed
ever before in history.

to die

suggests, in “the Short

by human decision than

Also, the Great War, as suggested in the previous chapter,

“marked the breakdown of

2

hundred years

not a claim that single-handedly denies the uniqueness
of the

twentieth century, especially since
genocide.”"

five

previous centuries,

not only correlate with the experience of the twentieth
century

paved the way for

last

the

(

western

civilization

of the nineteenth century,” a

Hobsbawm, “War and Peace in the 20 th Century,” London Review of Books, 21 February 2002. Cf.
J. Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The Final Solution in History’ (New York: Pantheon,

Eric

Amo

1988), 18-35.
3

See the comparative study found

in Eric

Weitz,

A Century of Genocide:

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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Utopias of Race and Class

capitalist civilization “in its

economy;

liberal in its legal

bourgeois in the image of its
characteristic hegemonic
science,

and constitutional

class; glorifying in the

structure;

advance of

knowledge, and education, material
and moral progress; and
profoundly

convinced of the centrality of Europe,
birthplace of the revolutions of
the sciences,
politics,

arts,

and industry, whose economy had
penetrated, and whose soldiers had
subjugated

most of the world...”; thus inaugurating
“the age of

total

war,” in which civilian

populations became expendable, an age for
which Hiroshima and Nagasaki bear witness

Yet one need not deny these unprecedented
developments
referent that informs

Hobsbawm

(incidentally, as

world ceased

Hobsbawm

to

himself suggests,

fashioning from the Renaissance on,

explicitly related to the

the

pages

to

restricts his

made

4

Eric

its

breakdown

narrative, for all

account of “the

in

its

is

of

light

its

self-

global pretensions

Age of Extremes”

European process. Hobsbawm

to calamities

thus able to write about six

in the twentieth century

of the globe with histories

parts

European developments - even
is

the end of the twentieth century the

while dedicating a mere

the third world,” and largely offering a cursory look at Palestine
and

Middle East — both

There

at

Hobsbawm’s

hundred pages on the age of extremes
fifty-four

to notice the Occidentalist

diagnosis. Rather, than problematize the
idea of Europe

be Eurocentric), and historicize

and memorable depictions,

4
.

if the

occasional reference

that are intrinsically related to

is

made throughout

something disquieting about Occidental innocence

5
.

in relation to

man-

catastrophes, especially during the nineteenth century, the time in which the second

Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A

and chap.

1,

respectively.

History of the World, 1914-1991 (Vintage Books, 1994),

12, 6,

Emphasis added.

5

Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes chaps. 12 and 15. For a critical survey of Hobsbawm’s histories, see
Perry Anderson, “Confronting Defeat,” London Review of Books 17 October 2002, 10-17.
,

,
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.

wave of European imperialism was
violence.

It

seems

at its

that the traveling

apogee along with

its

rapacious brutality and

of violence from the former Empires
back

to the

6

metropolis struck the European sensibility
in ways imperial violence
and devastation

could not do. Even

if in the

seventeenth century, from 1618 to 1648, fierce
religious wars

wracked the continent, what retrospectively came

War

did not have the

religious,

same

effect as the second,

to

be known as

this first Thirty

from 19 14-1 945. And yet once

wars could be seen as remnants of the past

these

enlightenment would soon replace - even
with religious ones.

The same could be

that

if in reality secular objectives

cast as

secular

liberal

were entangled

said of the violence and brutality initiated

Crusades and the Inquisition. In the words of historian

Amo

J.

Years

by

the

Mayer: “Notwithstanding

the horrors, miseries, and terrible costs of the religiously
infused warfare of the Thirty

Years

War of the

seventeenth century, the myth and lore of holy war — of crusading war —

were not discredited. They persisted under the

surface, to be revitalized and exploited

three hundred years later, during the General Crises and Thirty Years

War of

the

8

twentieth century.” Yet, as

war” stayed dormant

component of

I

shall suggest below,

it

for about three centuries, so

is

not so

much

much

as that

that this “lore

it

became an

of holy

intrinsic

the initially religiously infused, and later on secular colonization of non-

European peoples.
Indeed, the only experience of catastrophe that significantly marked the European
imagination, in

6

On

this periodization see

Peace
7

8

ways analogous

in the

20

th

to the sack

of

Rome

(the latter not incidentally

Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?,

Century.”

Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?,

20ff.

Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?, 30-3 1
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20.

was

a

See also Hobsbawm’s “War and

constitutive element in the then
nascent Orientalist narrative of the
West),

the

well-known earthquake of Lisbon.
This was an expenence

was

the case of

marked

that

eighteenth-century European imagination
in ways that a similar natural
disaster
colonies failed to do.
disaster took

Even

was

it

in the

the case with the crusading
violence, this natural

on religious connotations, so

European self-image,
brutality

so, as

the

that

even

did not effectively challenge

if

it.

it

It

and catastrophe of the world wars, with
Auschwitz as

somewhat

shattered

the

the expenence of the

is

their

epitome and

signifier

brought to the forefront of the occidental
imagination the violence and brutality of

that

civilized”

faith

European modernity.

If

Lisbon represented a powerful

and providence, thus leaving

Auschwitz has come

march

to progress,

Auschwitz thus came
so,

to represent the loss

human-made

of

hapless victims with no existential comfort,

of

faith in the

innocence of humanity’s steady

and a sense of discomfort. After Auschwitz solace

prohibitive given the

Even

its

strike against ideas

nature of this human,

all

is

even more

too human, catastrophe

9
.

to signify the caesura in western modernity.

Auschwitz, for

all its

uniqueness, hardly represented a radical break with

previous forms of violence, especially the violence bred during the Imperialist
ventures
that

as

go

the

all

way back

early as the

‘forties

to the sixteenth century.

and early

‘fifties,

saw

Both Hannah Arendt and Karl Korsch,
in

nineteenth-century imperialism a

constitutive element of the violence and brutality unleashed

Arendt

it

the race-thinking that

stemmed from

by

the Third Reich: for

the process, that, along with the lack of

thought that marked the organization of colonization by means of bureaucracy, were two
constitutive elements of Nazi rule closely associated with Imperialism; while for Korsch

9

Cf.

Susan Neiman, Evil

Press, 2002),

238

in

Modern Thought: An

Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton University

ff.

180

“The novelty of
'civilized'

totalitarian

politics

...

simply that the Nazis have
extended

is

European peoples the methods

hitherto reserved for the ‘natives'
or ‘savages'

0
living outside so-called
civilization.'"
Actually, in the

Germany had
from the

with

ideologies

especially in the

USA,

of progress, freedom, and

as well as in Australia

wave of European imperialism

without dwelling too
prelude

decade of the century

Europe and America racism and genocidal

much on

the

as a historian has called

it,

-

all

in the sixteenth

first

even domestically,

cases following the path of the

and seventeenth centuries. This

intra-European silent genocide, the “Armenian

even

Ottoman East - the symbol of despotism

equality,

politics

where the annihilation of indigenous

populations followed the settlement of
Europeans
initial

first

already been involved in the
genocide of the African Hereto. "
Indeed,

fifteenth century on, in both

coexisted

to

if

for

one committed within the bounds of the

much of the West

for the past five

hundred

years.

is

It

emerged

by going

in the

all

the

way back

to the discourses

Renaissance that the roots of all

of savagery and order

this imperial violence, in

both

its

that

concrete

See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and Co., 1975); Karl
Korsch, “Notes on History: The Ambiguities of Totalitarian Ideologies,” New
Essays 6 (Fall 1942), 3,

The insights provided by these two thinkers are masterfully developed in Enzo Traverso, The
Origins of Nazi Violence trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 2003). Traverso
summarizes his

respectively.

,

findings as follows:

“The genealogy traced in the present study emphasizes the fact that the violence and
crimes of Nazism emerged from certain common bases of Western culture. It does not show that
Auschwitz
revealed the fundamental essence of the West; however, it does suggest that it was one of its possible
products and, in that sense, was one of its legitimate offspring.” See p. 150. Thus Traverso avoids
functionalist interpretations of the Judeocide. Or as Mayer, who argues for a comprehensive historicization
of this catastrophe, has put it: “But while ...
unprecedented magnitude of the Jewish catastrophe,
the modernity and banality of the killing process is

it

rampant functional rationality contributed to the
was not its immanent mainspring. To overemphasize

to risk diverting attention from its taproots, purposes,
and indeterminacies. Just as the latest weapons were not needed to feed the fury of the two world wars, so
the latest technical and bureaucratic skills were not essential to feed the fury of the Judeocide. Mayer, Why

Did
11

the

Heavens Not Darken?, 18-19.

Astonishingly, this instance of genocide

and genocide, or only mentioned
12, 46. Incidentally,

is

in passing.

Weitz follows Arendt’s

either

A

nowhere

to

be found

in

most

found

in

Weitz,

partial exception

intuition here.
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is

histories

of Nazi violence

A Century of Genocide,

and symbolic dimensions, can
be found. Humanity, as a
species, can hardly reclaim
violence as

its

unique attribute

in relation to other

mammals;

still,

historically

it

has had a

unique “capacity for systematically
experimenting with violence and for
justifying the
results ”

This

is

easily grasped in

how from

century the only violence that disgusts
and
as senseless, violence that

is

is

the Renaissance to the early
twenty-first

found appalling

seemingly without purpose

Afew York Times and Wall Street
Journal

at

once

12
.

is

the one that

is

Thus, periodicals such as the

tacitly

sanctify the violence of

“Neoliberalism” and “Development,” usually
by means of just silencing

condemning what seems
even vilifying the

latter

to

be the senseless violence of dispossession;

by naming

it

perceived

“terrorism.” Indeed, the

in fact,

it,

while

sometimes

by no means unambiguous

preference to distinguish between force and
brute force, or between violence, naked
violence, and power, or to sharply disassociate
might from right,
it

is

very telling

in itself

—

suggests a struggle to simultaneously control and
disguise forms of violence that has

constantly appeared in the history of Western political
thought from Antiquity to the
present

13
.

To be

sure, there are different threads running through the

indeed, Plato’s Republic

even

if

is

an attempt to

fly

Thrasymachus’ position could be read

from the violence of
as an assertion

of

its

Western

politics

tradition:

and the

opposite; in manifold

ways, the question of controlling, and/or disguising violence, or simply presenting
constitutive of politics,

is

also present

from the sixteenth

state,

it

as

to the early twentieth century in

the theories of Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Grotious, Pufendorf, Rousseau, Kant, Marx,

12

Sheldon

S.

Wolin, “Violence and the Western

Political Tradition,”

33 (January 1963), 15
13

See Wolin, “Violence,”

16ff.
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Weber, Lenin, and Schmitt, among

and

others;

liberals like

Locke, and other champions

of legality and the rule of law,
are anxious about unlimited
power, even
leave open the possibility for
special “prerogatives.”

acknowledgement of the violence
is

nowhere

in the creation

The

of a

if

they oflen

latter tradition represents
a tacit

political order

- an association

that

better seen than in the increasing
coupling of the question of violence
with

civilization. “Civilization is never
finished

Norbert Elias. In this account civilization
individual self-discipline,

as well as

it

and always endangered,” writes
sociologist
is

dependant on “a relatively stable

level

also “linked to specific social structures”:

is

of

"The

supplying of goods, the preservation of the
accustomed standard of living are among
[these structures], and especially social
pacification,
conflicts

within

civilization?

the

1

state.”'-

But what

Does one represent

the

is

the betrayal

that is

the non-violent settling of

relationship

between violence and

of the other? Does the endangering of

civilization lead to the unwitting use of violence?

one another, a coupling

i.e.

Or

are these

two

intrinsically linked to

both semantic and historical?
* * *

Civilization,

imperialism, violence, and the idea of order are constitutive
of what

Horkheimer and Adorno

called, in

critical theory, “the dialectic

what became the founding

of enlightenment.”

And

yet,

text

Adomo

of twentieth-century

and Horkheimer’s

does not deal with these questions head-on. Rather, as a text belonging
called the political theory of catastrophe,

of enlightenment that seeks
civilization

14

by casting

it

to

offers a theoretical reflection

to explain the caesura that

text

what could be

on the

Auschwitz represent

in

dialectic

western

the west critically, as portending a dialectic of progress and

See Norbert Elias, “Civilization and Violence:

On

Infringements,” Telos 54 (Winter 1982-83), 134.
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the State

Monopoly of Physical Violence and

its

destruction that they referred
to as the d.alectic of
enlightenment. But unlike other

contemporaries

who saw

this

caesura as a twentieth-century
phenomena, for the authors

of the Dialectic of Enlightenment
that “caesura” has been
there

at

least

since the

seventeenth-century coupling of enlightenment
with scientific-instrumental
rationality.
Better

its

still, at

modem

European

some

points they even suggest that the
dialectic of enlightenment antecedes

form and could be found
civilization,

Homer's

in

what they considered the founding

Odyssey.

Without

anachronistic assertion, in the reminder of
this chapter

and complement

text

it

I

endorsing

the

offer a reading

text

latter

of

this

of

highly

founding

with a political reading of the dialectic
of enlightenment,

a

reading that provides the groundwork to
historicize twentieth-century catastrophes
from
the perspective

and

late

modem

By way

of the multi-dimensional coupling of

civilization, violence, imperialism,

despotism.

of preliminaries, something needs

to

be said about the form and stmcture

of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, an aspect sometimes
neglected by many
even

if

these two authors, especially

seriously.

As

is

the case of Adorno’s

Adomo,

work

interpreters,

take the question of representation very

in general,

an important aspect of the

and theoretical significance of the work arguably found

dialectical expression in

political

its

form.

Also, rarely

is

interpreters

mostly focus on one aspect of the work and extrapolate conclusions

relation to the

the structure of the text, as a totality, taken together. Instead, scholars and

main theme of the

text: the historical

called the dialectic of enlightenment.

Fragmente

in the original

the text in 1944), the text

German
is

As

process that the authors speculatively

the subtitle of

(also the original title

composed of a

set

184

in

DE

indicates, Philosophische

of the mimeographed version of

of philosophical fragments

that

experiment

wkh

different genres: in addition to
the preface, there

a philosophical essay on the

is

concept of enlightenment that sets the
theoretical foundation for the
two “excursus”
follow

-

its

main

thesis consists in an attempt
“to gain greater understanding
of the

mtertwinement of rationality and social

reality, as

well as the intertwinement, inseparable

from the former, of nature and the mastery
of nature ”

way

that

for “a positive concept

An

essay that

of enlightenment which liberates

it

is

from

meant

its

to

pave the

entanglement

in

blind domination .” 15 In this vein, the
different excursuses staged the proposition
that the
first

essay sets forth

mythology

:

- “Myth

in the excursus

is

already enlightenment, and enlightenment
reverts to

on the Odyssey the

dialectic

of myth and enlightenment

is

traced while developing a theory of sacrifice
and renunciation from the perspective of

ego-formation, and the entwinement between mythical
nature and the domination of
nature; the second excursus,

which takes Kant, Sade, and Nietzsche

as

its

central objects

of reflection, ponders the emergence of the sovereign rational
subject

at

especially in relation to enlightened-abstract moral and rational
formalism.

The essay on

the culture industry then follows these

Adorno

two

initial

center,

excursuses. Here Horkheimer and

delineate the contours of the dialectic of enlightenment in liberal
capitalist

society. This discussion

domination of nature

of the culture industry

that

emerged out of the

haunt humanity with the advent of fascism.

illustrates

some of

the aspects of the

abstract emancipation the enlightenment

brought about, one in which humanity repressed
to

its

its

A

own

nature, and, later on,

came back

process that for the authors also finds

expression in the liberal-capitalist midst in the bogus diversity of the otherwise unitary

world of

artificial

15

Max Horkheimer

S.

Noerr and

trans.

sensuality and false happiness that liberal-capitalist societies often

and Theodor W. Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments ed. G.
Jephcott (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), xviii; DA, 5-6
,

Edmund
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embody. Here,

what the authors admitted was a
more fragmentary

in

regression of enlightenment to ideology"
the “Theses

is

discussed by means of rad, o and
film. Then,

on Anti-Semitism” dealing with “the
reversion of enlightened

barbarism” are found in a somewhat
essayist form.

aphonsms

that illustrate

reflection. In its

work

here.

form there

is

And

final

civilization to

then the text ends with a set of

the themes explored and open
up topics for future

something resembling Adorno’s logic of
disintegration

Rather than proceeding systematically, or
deductively, the

without offering a
positive

some of

section, “the

statement of

main

its

thesis, or

at

text breaks off

an explicit formulation of the

concept of enlightenment. Rather, the text remains
open, and the conception of

reason and enlightenment that informs

it

can only be discerned by reading and rereading

the text itself; a process that does not require
the sequence in

which the materials

are

presented.

Interpreters

the

of Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

for the

Odysseus excursus and the culture industry essay -

most
albeit

part,

have often privileged

seldom read together -

in

reading the text, often to praise and immanently read the former,
while condemning, and
externally reading, the

has largely gone overlooked

back

to the question

Negative

In

philosophy

16

An

86
17

is

And

latter.

16
.

with few exceptions, the fragmentary form of the texts

But there

is

a strangeness to these fragments that goes

of presentation (Darstellung), especially

Dialectic

Adorno

asserted

that

“the

is

Adorno’s

representation

not an external matter of indifference to

important exception here

in

it

critical theory.

[Darstellung]

but immanent to

its

of

idea .”

17

Christopher Rocco’s essay “Between Modernity and Postmodemity,” 81-

.

Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics

Negative Dialektik, 29.

1

,

trans.

have slightly modified the

E. B.

Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973),

translation.
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18;

Indeed, he later refetred to this
question in relation to one of the

of Hegel’s formulation of the

dialectic: substance cannot

rather methodically, thus violating

Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit

is

unfulfilled aspee.s

be separated from form. And

even though Hegel criticized Kant on
those grounds, according

wound up proceeding

many

its

to

own

Adorno, he ultimately

principle.'

8

(Even

if the

not necessarily vulnerable to this
critique, the

mature Hegel of the Science of Logic and the
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
certainly

is.)

For Adomo, the form

in

dialectically intrinsic to the critique

which a
19

itself.

A

critique is presented, or articulated,

principle that

is

is

thus

operative in the Dialectic

of Enlightenment.

When

it

comes

political principle

Horkheimer and
anticipated

to the

form of the Dialectic of Enlightenment there

animating the fragmentary nature of the

Adomo

some of

accounted for

this

text. In the

is

also a larger

preface of 1944/47,

fragmentary form and in doing so they also

the objections to the difficult and abstract language they
deploy

throughout. For this authorship the task of retrieving the political import
of enlightenment

imposes demands on the authors of the

text as

much

as

it

does on the reader. In order

to

prepare the groundwork for what they termed “a positive concept of enlightenment”
requires breaking with the

language.

the

18

demands

its

current positivistic formulation imposes on

“By tabooing any thought which

prevailing

modes of thought

Adomo, Negative Dialectics,

sets out negatively

obscure,

as

convoluted,

from the

facts

and from

and preferably foreign,”

144.

19

Cf. Adomo, “The Essay as Form,” in Notes to Literature: Vol. I, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991); “The Actuality of Philosophy,” in The Adorno Reader ed. Brian
O’Connor (London: Blackwell, 2000). Stimulating discussions of this aspect of Adorno’s critical theory are
,

found in Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence
of the Dialectic (London and New York: Verso, 1990); and Marta Tafalla, Theodor W. Adorno: Una
Filosofia de la Memoria (Barcelona: Herder, 2003).
;
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Horkheimer and Adorno observed,

“that concept [of clarity] holds
the

mind captive

in

ever deeper blindness .” 20 Undoubtedly,
there are echoes here of the
expenence of the
authors in the Anglophone philosophical
world, where they - especially Adorno

found themselves forced into a
milieu

often

expression entirely alien to their intellectual

21
.

This, however,

principle of clanty

fact,

mode of

-

was only

stemming from an enlightenment

what they perceived

They

that has reverted into

mythology. In

as the absence of “a conceptual language
of opposition ” 22

forced the authors to steer
implies.

part of the reasoning behind their
subversion of the

away from

the clarity that enlightenment, as a metaphor,

resisted the ideal of clarity that stems from
enlightenment thinking, thus

providing the foundation of a dialectical reversal of the
language of clarity and obscurity
that correlates with the dialectical reversal

insistence

on

clarity there is a call for

engage with these

facts that the

subversion of such language

It

is

in the nature

is

of myth/enlightenment. To be

conformity with the

facts.

And

in order to critically

language of clarity comfortably casts positively, a

called for.

Or

as they put

it,

of the calamitous situation existing today

honorable reformer

who recommends

by taking over

its

20

21

,

False clarity

“Adomo in America,” in Permanent Exiles: Essays
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

188

at

once.

is

It

xvii.

See Martin Jay,
to

it.

Myth was always obscure and luminous

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment

Germany
22

for myth.

even the most

worn-out categorical

apparatus and the pernicious power-philosophy lying behind

name

that

renewal in threadbare language reinforces

the existing order he seeks to break

only another

sure, in the

xv.

in the Intellectual

Migration from

has always been distinguished
by

of concepts

familiarity

its

and

its

exempt, on from the work

23
.

But Horkheimer and Adorno’s
rejection of what they see as a
“worn-out categorical
apparatus

never

led, especially in

Adorno,

to a principled rejection

language and categones of their received
intellectual
for obscurity for its

own

philosophical categories.

which

is

On

often

immanent subversion of
Dialectic

logical

Adorno

altogether, indeed,

inherited

the contrary, the imperative of clarity
they perceived in the

its

tradition, as well as in the positivist

surrogate, needed to be resisted from within.

it

is

were

capable of thinking against

without abolishing

itself,

from the received

tradition,

Adorno asks

from the one

the reader to break the established

that concepts,

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

by giving these

and the experience these seek

Dialectics,

its

own

legality;

141; Negative Dialektik,

without abandoning

144.

Here

I

it,

we can

rendering better captures the meaning of the
or,

German

to

conceptual

am

original.

The Persistence of the Dialectic (London and

189

it

using Fredric Jameson’s
reads:

“Thought needs not

think against out thought, and if

it

were

seems to me that Jameson’s
Jameson’s can be found in his Late Marxism:

possible to define dialectics, this would be a definition worth pursuing.”

Adorno,

its

a

xvii

translation of the passage rather than E. B. Ashton’s. In Ashton’s translation

be content with

itself

abandoning the categories of thinking

capture and portray, have, thus critically engaging the status quo in both

Adomo, Negative

its

definitions of the dialectic possible, that one might be worth

Stated differently, rather than

different configuration

"4

Namely, an

the received conceptual tradition that at one
point in Negative

patterns of these concepts from within, without abolishing them, but

23

the need

spelled out in the following terms: “Thought need not
rest content in

regularity;

proposing.

Nor do they pose

tradition.

sake, let alone the use of neologisms
to replace older historical-

mostly Anglo-American analytical philosophical
social science

of the conceptual

New

It

York: Verso, 1990),

17.

representations and in their concrete
reality
insights,

25
.

Immanent

and even new formulations of old
concepts

that

criticism thus yields

can add a different meaning

the concepts under scrutiny
without erasing their historical nature
easily fulfilled if the historicity
of these

is

new
to

- an operation not

not reflected upon. Horkheimer
and Adorno

thus gave the question of clarity a
political intent. This, in turn, leads
to the politically

infused reflections that follow in the rest
of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Accordingly,
the
Dialectic of Enlightenment presents a series
of politically infused philosophical fragments

from an explicitly aporetic stance
point of departure of

26
.

all reflection,

But again,
nor

is it

this aporetic stance is not as

an absolute

a condition of possibility for reflection as

such, as in the thought of Jacques Derrida, for
example; instead, the aporetic stance of the

DE

is

such insofar as the reality

mending

and

further

reifying

this authorship reflects

social

reality

on

by means

is

aporetic, thus avoiding

of theory.

For

Adorno

unequivocally refuses to sharply distinguish nature and society or to
posit one or the other
as point of departure in a monad-like way. But
reflections?

What

is

the

political

import

what

is

the intent of these aporetic

of aporetic thinking other than

critical

representation?

The

- and here Adorno and not Horkheimer should be taken as the
quo has been subject of debate among different scholars in
relation to figures otherwise dissimilar from Adorno’s theoretical and political temperament. See, for
instances, the invocation of Adomo to justify the infelicitous prose of Gayatri Spivak, or the often obscure
prose of Judith Butler. To be sure, in neither Butler’s work, nor Spivak’s, does Adorno’s thinking figure at
all. On these questions see James Miller’s essay in the now defunct Lingua Franca.
See Terry Eagleton’s
brilliant polemic against Spivak, which provoked a reaction from Butler in which one of the
aforementioned invocations of Adomo occurs, “In the Gaudy Supermarket,” London Review of Books, 13
May 1999. See also the recently published collection of essays on this subject, Just Being Difficult?:
Academic Writing in the Public Arena, ed. Jonathan Culler and Kevin Lamb (Palo Alto: Stanford
relative merits of linguistic obscurity

archetype

-

as a

way

to subvert the status

University Press, 2003).
'6

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xvi. On the composition of the work, see G. S.
Noerr’s “Editor’s Afterword,” pp. 217-46. See also the discussions found in Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Back
to Adomo,” Telos 81 (Fall 1989): 5-29; Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe, chap. 5;
Christopher Rocco, “Between Modernity and Postmodemity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment Against
the Grain,” Political

Theory 22 (February 1994): 71-97.
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As

already stated, one of the
professed objectives of these
fragments

investigate “the self-destruction
of the enlightenment”

done

name of freedom, and

in the

for

- something

Any

enlightenment

itself in

order to retrieve

its

it

critical

message of

And

rather than

utopian impulse.

unreflectively abandoning the concept, or
offering a

prophylactic reformulation of

in society is

investigation of the complicity of
the

enlightenment with freedom needs to take
as a point of departure the
the

somewhat

ahistorical

and highly

such as the one done by the self-appointed
heir of the

Jurgen Habermas, or taking the enlightenment
as one coherent project

tradition,

to

that is unequivocally

Horkheimer and Adorno “freedom

inseparable from enlightenment thinking.”

is

that

needs either to be rejected or embraced (what
Michel Foucault suitably termed “the
blackmail of the enlightenment”), Horkheimer and Adorno
ask for a critical-reflective
turn within enlightened thinking / 7 In so doing,
they seek to render the concept of

enlightenment

historical

self- reflective in its

predicament that

is

concrete manifestations; hence in light of a concrete

contradictory, and marred

progress and regression, an aporetic stance

is

what

by
is

the

ambiguous legacy of both

called

for to reflect

on the

conditions of unfreedom and domination; “The aporia which faced us in our work
thus

proved

to

be the

enlightenment.”

first

To do

matter

otherwise,

thus be tacitly complicit with

it.

we had

to

would be

The

to

investigate:

the

masquerade the

aporetic stance

is

self-destruction

reality

historically

of the

of suffering, and

and politically infused,

not a philosophical axiom.
Indeed, Horkheimer and Adorno vehemently maintained that the “self-destruction

of the enlightenment”

27

Cf. Patricia

J.

Mills,

in

its

concrete historical articulations, especially in

Women, Nature, and Psyche.
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its

despotic

modem

comprehend
of

this

and cultural forms, need not

political

to

lead to

this dialectic requires a critical
reflection

concept, in both

articulations

its

on the

its

rejection.

historical

Rather, to

double character

progressive and regressive tendencies.
In

its

historical

the concept of enlightenment has
had both a radical political

inasmuch as

import

argued for the emancipation from hierarchies
of birth and tradition

it

that

were perceived as naturalized and a regressive
element complicit with domination.
element of regression presents a sharp

if

Its

untenable distinction between myth and

enlightenment that oftentimes conceals domination not
only of one class over another
the current

historical

- over

difference

constellation

of power, capitalism, but also of identity over

the others that escape

its

binaries of self-other, humanity and nature.

Both tendencies, as the argument of Dialectic
of Enlightenment shows,

are historically

located under the rubric of enlightenment. Hence, such appraisal
of the enlightenment

not only conceptual, or philosophical, but also deeply political.
That
reflection

whose genre has

elicited debate

among

of history and, thus, tainted with the stigma of

its

interpreters: is

this discredited

it

a

is,

it

theory

new philosophy

genre? Or

is it

a social

we have

believe

write:

perceived with equal clarity

that the

very concept of

no

less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions

which

is

intertwined, already contains the

it

For a stimulating discussion of these

New

possibilities see

York: Routledge, 1997), chap

1.

Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno
is

...

thinking,

(London and

their

predicament of exile - a crucial experience for Adorno’s version of critical

- Adomo and Horkheimer

We

28

II

is

provides a

myth, the true historical behind the history of civilization ? 28 Bearing the imprint of

World War

in

the other best single

volume on

Adomo

to

Simon

germ of

Jarvis,

that

of society with

the regression

which

is

Adorno: A Critical Introduction

Alongside Gillian Rose’s The Melancholy Science: An

(New York: Columbia

appear thus

192

far in English.

University Press, 1977). Jarvis’

taking place everywhere today.
If enlightenment does not
assimilate reflection on
this regressive

moment,

seals

it

destructive side of progress to

pragmatism

forfeits

relation to truth

By
this

its

its

its

sublating

own

fate.

By

leaving consideration of the

enemies, thought in
[aufhebenden]

headlong rush into

its

character,

and therefore

its

29
.

calling attention to this regressive

moment

in

its

concrete historical manifestations

authorship of Horkheimer and Adorno embarks
on a “primal history of subjectivity”

(Urgechichte der Subjektivitat), a genealogy of
reason that speculatively comprehends
the coexistence of

mythology.
binary

And

in

myth and enlightenment, and how enlightenment has
doing so not only do they seek

enhghtenment/myth but

also

in

ancient/modem, rendering enlightenment
and

the

reverted into

to dispel the illusion portrayed in the

historical-temporal

self-reflective about its

categories

own

such

relation to

as

myth

tradition, as well as bringing to bear the enlightening
elements that the sharp binary

neglects in the historical practice labeled mythology

and enlightenment, the self-image of
practice of sacrifice.

The regression

its

to

30
.

Odysseus

is

thus called bourgeois;

proponents notwithstanding, partakes

mythology and barbarism

is

in the old

accordingly not

external to the enlightenment as a historical process, or cast as a remnant of a primitive
past; rather, these are already contained within the historical

of enlightenment
culture, nature,

‘9

itself.

myth

And

as a

and concrete manifestations

commentator has correctly noted, pure notions of

or enlightenment are unthinkable, especially for

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment

,

xvi.

Adorno

Quotations from the original

Dialektik der Aufklarung: Philosophische Fragmente (Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988),
30

Cf. Jarvis,
31

Jarvis,

Adorno 21-24.

Adorno

,

,

especially chaps.

1, 3, 8.
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31
.

5.

come from

But the regressive element hardly
exhausts the concept.

On

the contrary,

complicity with historical forms of
domination and unfreedom calls for a

genealogy of
destructive

its

formulations in both their institutional and
political complicity.

aspect of enlightenment’s

pondered. In doing
critical

theory to be

faith

in

its

critical

the

It is

progress that needs to be critically

so, the authors delineate the task
pertaining to critical theory: for
critical,

and avoid forfeiting

its critical

and emancipatory promise,

it

has to epistemologically inquire into both
the conceptual and the concrete historical
formulations of the enlightenment and

emerging from

it.

Accordingly, “What

betrayal of the promise of emancipation

its

is at

issue

...

is

not culture as a value

necessity for enlightenment to reflect on itself if
humanity

A reflection

in

which the memory of suffering provides

is

the guise for critically theorizing

in

Minima Moralia Adorno

stake

is

not conservation of the past but the fulfillment of past hopes .” 32

fulfillment entails

more than

the contrary, in order to

referred to as the standpoint of redemption:

the imposition of imperatives for future

fulfill

but the

not to be totally betrayed.”

from what
is at

...

human

past hopes, one of the pressing tasks

is

“What

And

such

On

relations.

to look at the

history of concepts that, in important ways, both enacted and constrained those hopes; in
this case, the

concept of enlightenment

itself,

paradoxes and changing historical significations

and

to

comprehend

the concept in

in specific historical periods.

But

so involves

more than

his Science

of Logic an impossibility from Adorno’s epistemological perspective.

involves

do

a purely conceptual analysis such as the one Hegel carried on in

,

more than a

to

its

It

also

historiographical narrative of the different misgivings of the

enlightenment in different episodes of European history. Instead, episodes of both are

32

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
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xvii.

entwined in a series of philosophical
fragments
self-destruction

that

approach the main quest.on - “the

of enlightenment” - from different
perspectives, shedding

question without seeking to sort out
the question in

all its

light

on

this

manifestations, each section

thus comprising an element in a
constellation of meanings. Hence, the
fragmentary nature

of the text

attests to its epistemological
intent.

This preliminary reading hardly exhausts

with

this text.

Long considered

all

the complexities interpreters identify

as the founding text of the critical
theory tradition in the

twentieth century, Horkheimer and Adorno’s
Dialectic of Enlightenment
the

most discussed and

text has

been depicted

described

as:

understood text within

least

in a variety

“a radical

once one of

This complex and rich

of ways with different degrees of approval.

critique

domination” (Habermas); “a

this tradition.

is at

It

has been

of reason denouncing the union of reason and

difficult

book

to criticize, for

it

is

a series of hit-or-miss

aphorisms rather than a sustained argument” (Rorty);
Horkheimer and Adorno’s
response to Marx’s critique of political economy,” one that
sought “to decode the
history of the philosophical subject as the domination of nature
whether under the guise

of myth or of enlightened reason” (Rose); a text
mediating

text,

that

modem/postmodem
shows the

“is

uniquely situated” to

asses

the

...to unsettle philosophy

first

way”

its

defunct

that in turn

two (Rocco); a “genealogy of reason, whose

by exposing

critical

of dual vision, “a

now seemingly

divide, thus offering a sort of theoretical “third

limitations of the

while retaining a

that provides a kind

effect

was

complicity with the forces of anti-philosophy”

concept of reason and tradition that reverses Friedrich

Nietzsche’s will to power into a “will to powerlessness” (Wolin); a text that continues

Hegel’s critique of the dialectic of enlightenment and superstition
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in the

Phenomenology

,

,

°fSpirit bUt d0GS S ° by com bmmg
the Webenan theme of
rationalization with a concern
'

with the domination of nature, thus
reclaiming “the utopia

(Wiggershaus);
rationality

...

authors’

its

multilayered

against the

first

mere technological or

myth or

“attempt

to

in the

concept of reason”

enlighten

enlightenment and

fetishism of technology and the

scientific rationality;

second against

absolution

of

rationality in the service of

class domination; third, against the
repressive exclusion of the other, the alien,
the idiot,

the outsider, and last but not least,
‘undomesticated’ nature or life” (Brunkhorst 33
).
Intriguingly, this text

theorists.

remains uncharted territory for contemporary

Out of the aforementioned readings, the ones

(Habermas) or

its

more widespread
part to at least

American West:

that either

pose

its

political

irrational core

irrelevance for the twentieth- first century (Rorty)
turn out to be the

in

Anglo-American contemporary

two

distinct features

of

seems

passes for critical theory

is

political theory. This

this activity as

liberalism, as a tradition, has

the last century, and

currents

still

to continue to

it

is

be due

in

practiced in the Anglo-

become hegemonic

be so

may

in the last quarter

in the early twentieth-first;

of

and what

mostly Habermas’ version, which along with post-structuralist

of thought, often reclaim

critical

credentials but

formulations oftentimes remains a mystery. These

what

commonly

is

critical

in

their

held charges, however,

33

Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (MIT Press, 1981); Richard Rorty, “The
Overphilosophication of Politics,” Constellations 7 (March 2000): 128; Gillian Rose, The Melancholy
Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 4-5; Christopher Rocco, “Between Modernity and

Postmodemity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment Against the Grain,” 72; Sheldon S. Wolin, “Reason in
Exile: Critical Theory and Technological Society,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition ed.
Arthur M. Melzer, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 167; Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt
School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1994), 327, 331; Hauke Brunkhorst, “The Enlightenment of Rationality: Remarks on Horkheimer and
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment ,” Constellations 7 (March 2000): 134, respectively.
,
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wildly

miss

the

disingenuousness

mark,

due

either

to

misreading

to

be lacking

its

political import. In other

remained untheorized. This

is

is

the perspective of their political
instance, in a careful and

words, even when the authors’

politically infused, the political aspect

significance,

reflections in general, are read from

the verdicts

are

often negative.

complex reading from the perspective of

western political theory, Sheldon

S.

Wolin has suggested

that the text,

exemplifies, ultimately lacks political import

-

Christopher Rocco, a more sympathetic reader, has put

politics.

the text,

its

the

authorship, suggest an openness that

Formally speaking
let

it,

this

might be accurate.

And

yet,

For

the tradition of

and the vocation of
for theoretical

its call

distance has led to an uprooted distance from both
politics and the political.

intersecting voices of

of this

especially so given that in the few
instances in

which the Dialectic of Enlightenment, or Adorno’s

it

plain

a political reading of Dialectic
of Enlightenment in

is

reading of the dialectic of enlightenment

theory

perhaps just

.

order to critically discern

critical

or

34

What seems

dialectic

willful

Or

as

form of

the text and the

in tune

with democratic

is

democracy

is

not a theme in

alone the political aspect of the dialectic of enlightenment — even when

thinkers such as Kant and Hegel are discussed, their political writings are
seldom

mentioned. Illustrative also,

34

is

the fact that the authors

managed

to discuss

Bacon and

Most of these charges have been countered by

serious scholarship and some terrific readings of the text
Habermas’s misreading, see the conclusive rebuttal by Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Back to
Adorno,” Telos 81 (Fall 1989). See also Hullot-Kentor’ s introduction to his re-translation of the Odysseus
excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment in “Notes on Dialectic of Enlightenment Translating the
Odysseus Essay,” New German Critique 56 (1992), 101-108. Other interpretations of the text that are

have emerged.

On

:

of Habermas’ are found in Romand Coles, Rethinking Generosity (Cornell University Press, 1997);
Rocco, “Between Modernity and Postmodemity”; and Martin Morris, Rethinking the Communicative Turn
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2001). The most stimulating readings of the text can be found in the aforementioned
critical

essays

by Rocco and Wolin, and

in

Anson Rabinbach, “Why Were

Critique 8 1 (Fall 2000).
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the

Jews Sacrificed?”

New German

Descartes while never mentioning
Hobbes, even

who most

influentially constituted the discourse

enlightenment’s demise. Finally, there
text.

is

if,

arguably,

it is

this triad

of thinkers

of science and domination

that led to

no sustained analysis of

modem power

in this

All these seemingly adding ammunition
to Wolin’s ultimately negative
verdict.

Even
follows,

I

so,

would

the political import of the text
might
like to offer a reading

of the

-

in

Enlightenment

what follows

politically.

I

- which

far

rather pose the question of

This question

is

else.

In

what

text that contrasts with these readings.

instead of offering yet another corrective
exegesis
dissertation

somewhere

lie

But

exceeds the bounds of this

how

to read the Dialectic

pursued by taking on some of

its

central

themes and offer a reading of how the process Horkheimer
and Adorno spelled out
relation to theoretical philosophy

somewhat

differently, instead

and cultural theory could be cast

of trying

of

in

politically. Stated

to find the political implications

of the

text itself,

the present reading endeavors to find the political
correlates to the process this authorship
reflected

on

in order to spell out its political dimension.

And

thus to offer what could be

considered a political excursus of the dialectic of enlightenment - an
excursus

that

includes both an exegesis of certain sections of the Dialectic
of Enlightenment and an
extrapolation of

its

themes by means of reading other

traditions within

Western

political

thought.
* * *

A

theme

that

emerges prominently

in the Dialectic

aspiration of reason. In the second excursus

of Enlightenment

Horkheimer and

Adomo

is

the monotheistic

write:

“The demise

of idolatry follows necessarily from the ban on mythology pronounced by Jewish

monotheism and enforced

against the changing objects of adoration in the history of

198

.

thought by that monotheism’s
secularized

enlightenment .” 35

form,

Enlightenment’s

concept of reason emerges as a
suitable candidate for a similar
place to the one once

clamed by Judeo-Christian monotheism,
even
as

myths already

more deeply
creative

in

entail enlightenment, with

mythology.”

God and

if

despoiled of

its

mythic

attributes. “Just

every step enlightenment entangles

itself

36

Furthermore, they write: “In their mastery
of nature, the

the ordering

mind

Man’s

are alike.

sovereignty over existence, in the lordly
gaze, in the

command .” 37 Here

conceived as enlightenment’s

Also,

moment

totalitarian

38
.

God

likeness to

consists in

resides

what they

Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the
advance of thought, has

always aimed

Yet

the

at liberating

wholly

human

enlightened

beings from fear and installing them as masters.

earth

is

radiant

with

triumphant

Enlightenment’s program was the disenchantment of the world.
dispel

It

calamity.

wanted

to

myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge. Bacon, “the
father of

experimental philosophy,” brought these motifs together

39
.

Although not noticed by Horkheimer and Adorno,

it is

are theorized together as part of a political theory,

which alongside Bacon and Descartes,

in

Hobbes where

fear

and mastery

constitute the triad of thinkers that are constitutive of the culture of instrumental
reason

and despotism

that

Horkheimer and Adorno

and with the form of

35

36

37

38

39

modem power

that

identified in the Dialectic

came along with

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

89.

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

8.

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

6.

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

4:

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
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1

it.

“Enlightenment

And

is

fear

of Enlightenment,
and necessity are

totalitarian.”

,

also constitutive of the
culture of despotism that emerges
as part of the political logic
of

the dialectic of enlightenment.
Within enlightenment, freedom

with

scientific

necessity,

while

superstition

Enlightenment discerned the old powers

becomes

in the Platonic

this

increasingly understood

opposite

it

40

“But

.

the

and Aristotelian heritage of

metaphysics and suppressed the universal
categories’ claims
In

is

to truth as superstition .”41

formulation of the enlightenment,
Horkheimer and Adorno found a

complicity of identity thinking

of idealism that

is

- which

in

Adorno’s philosophy

complicit with domination

- with

translates into a

remnant

the abstract discourse of science and

mathematics preferred by the enlightenment. “For
enlightenment,” they write, “anything

which does not conform
suspicion .”

42

And

contingency in

thinkers a

in

of calculability and

a correlate of this process

this discourse:

arrangement, history to
implications:

to the standard

the

schema

fact,

“The

multiplicity of forms

making

realm,

must be viewed with

found in the hostility

things to matter .”

epistemological

for

is

utility

is

to multiplicity

and

reduced to position and

43

Abstract discourse had

“[formal

logic]

offered

is

once two

Enlightenment

the world calculable”; while, politically,

equations govern bourgeois justice and enlightenment’s canon .” 44 This

at

“The same

nowhere more

evident than in Descartes understanding of freedom as emancipation from
prejudice and
opinion, but a conception of freedom that

is

indifferent to history,

40

and that paves the way

See the highly suggestive reading of Hobbes and despotism found in Sheldon S. Wolin’s essay “Hobbes
and the Culture of Despotism,” Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory ed. Mary G. Dietz (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 1990), 9-36.
41

42

43

44

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

3.

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

3.

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

4.

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 4
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for a culture not

that

only of individual doubt and
skepticism that

partakes in a particularly

economic liberalism coalesce
Stated

somewhat

schemata and categories

modem

is

constellation of power,

in itself, but

where

political

one
and

45
.

differently, as in Kant’s philosophy,
to

dogmatic

where the subject

apprehend the world, and thus the mind

is

offers the

conceptualized as

the “lawgiver" of nature, the
principle of abstraction plays a part in
the understanding of
rights

and justice of bourgeois liberalism. Both
procedural-instrumental reason and an

abstract discourse of rights, liberty,
justice, and tolerance are part of the
dialectic of the

enlightenment

own

-

it

terms, given

offers an emancipatory promise that

its

historical complicity with

hostility to substantive difference,

from Parmenides
equivalence that

ruled

to colonize

...

it

makes

It

by means of

Unity remains the watchword

A principle

of

of liberalism, as well as

in

such as Ronald Dworkin’s, or

in

in contractarian versions

recent versions that are presumably

more

egalitarian,

its

dissimilar things

gods and qualities must be destroyed .” 46

once present

its

Both also present signs of

by equivalence.

to abstract quantities.

to Russell. All

is at

is

not attainable from within

opposite.

and thus attempts

abstract language: “Bourgeois society

comparable by reducing them

its

is

difference-living liberalisms of John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin, and George Kateb,
where
individuality

45

46

47

is

praised, albeit

See the discussion

in

Sheldon

S.

it

also in an utterly abstract

47
.

Here abstraction

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 354-57.

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
William

way

E. Connolly’s liberalism

is

an exception

4-5.

to this,
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though

it

has other significant problems.

is

a

correlate

of colonization,

might be different

is

made

which

in

the

same

substantial differences are
subsumed.

” 48

Accordingly:

Thinking, as understood by the
Enlightenment,
unified,

scientific

“Whatever

is

the process of establishing a

order and of deriving factual
knowledge from pnnciples,

whether these principles are interpreted as

arbitrarily posited

axioms, innate ideas,

or the highest abstractions. The
laws of logic establish the most universal
relationships within the order and define
Politically, the dialectic

them

of enlightenment translates

coupled with indifference and lack of meaningful
identification

blocs

all

],

49
.

into the standardization

political participation.

of difference

“Only the

total

of the population with these monstrosities of
power [‘armed power

they write,

so deeply imprinted as to have

become second nature and stopping

the pores of consciousness, maintains the masses in
a state of absolute apathy which

makes them capable of
isolated formulation,

that is

found

in

their

even

miraculous achievements .” 50 Admittedly,

if a

very striking one, due to the sensibility for the

embryonic from. But what

any of these formulations;

it

is

this is a rather

is

significant is that difference

rather standardized and

subsumed

in

is

political

not denied in

ways such

that their

recognition does not translate into a threat to the system of power that both economic and

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

8.

For as Horkheimer and Adorno

“Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment stands in the same relationship to

its

spell

objects as fate,

it

out:

whose

concept

it eradicates: as liquidation. Under the leveling rule of abstraction, which makes
everything in
nature repeatable, and of industry, for which abstraction prepared the way, the liberated finally themselves

become herd ( Trupp ), which Hegel
49

identified as the

outcome of enlightenment.”

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

Ibid. 9.

63.

50

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 169. They further write: “The reification by virtue
of which the power structure, made possible solely by the passivity of the masses, appears to those same
masses as an iron reality, has been consolidated to the point where any spontaneity, or even the ability to
conceive of the true sate of affairs, has necessarily become an eccentric utopia, an irrelevant sectarianism.”
Ibid., 170.
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political liberalism constitute.
Indeed, the

affixation of d.fference

is

constitutive of the

status quo.

Even

so,

as

is

“enlightenment,” there
reason,

which

for

is

the

case

with

other

concepts,

such

as

Horkheimer and Adorno manifests

itself in the

ambiguity the concept

moment of

emerges Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic
of Enlightenment, even
its

and

a double character to the historical
articulation of the concept of

bears in Kant’s philosophy. Also in
that ambiguity, the utopian

sabotaged by

“progress”

own entwinement

if

it

thinking

ultimately

is

with domination by means of the instrumental

understanding of reason that accompanies

Kant’s

In

it.

formulation:

“The whole

represents the idea of true universality, utopia.”
Yet, alongside this utopia emerges the

other aspect of reason: “reason [as] the agency
of calculating thought .” 51
dialectic

of reason

contrary, these

is

And

hardly innocent to the emergence of capitalism in Europe.

two processes

are pretty

much

this

On

the

intertwined, as the speculative presentation

of the identity-non-identity of these shows: “The true nature of the
schematism which
externally coordinates the universal and the particular, the concept
and the individual
case, finally turns out, in current science, to be the interest of industrial
society.” In other

words, insofar as enlightenment “equates truth with

scientific thinking”

complicity with an economic system, capitalism, and
liberalism,

and

its critical

import

is

thus nullified

52
.

Or

its

historical

to state

it

it

ends up

political

somewhat

in

logic,

differently,

according to Horkheimer and Adorno, capitalism, whose emergence in Europe coincided

with enlightened views of freedom and progress, especially through the establishment of

51

52

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

65. See also, 66, 68-74, 93.

Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

65, 66, 73-74.
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commerce,

is

everything but innocent in this
dialectic. In

aftermath of World

War

II,

in liberal-capitalist societies,

of commodity exchange further
contributed
pliability

of the masses

53
.

This

is

what

its

historical form, close to the

such as the

to the disappearance

the principle

of the individual and the

on Adorno would

later

USA,

refer to as the fascist

tendencies of post-war liberal democracy
in the following stark terms:
“I consider the
survival of National Socialism within

democracy

the survival of fascist tendencies
against

to

be potentially more menacing than

democracy .” 54 Indeed, capitalism’s complicity

with an abstract liberalism renders suspicious
the self-satisfying disassociation of
capitalism from the dialectic of enlightenment
in
totalitarian regimes,

By

its

extreme forms:

which became the trademark post world war

and

commodity form and
further reassurance

orthodoxy.

II liberal

- Marx’s

analysis of the

the exchange principle figure too largely in the
analysis to merit

- nor were

they simply asserting that enlightenment

therefore nothing stands outside of

at the intersection

55
it .

Rather,

by comprehensively, and

of the catastrophes of the Great

War

is totalitarian,

speculatively,

with liberal-capitalism,

the authors are able to break the spell of the ideological divide of East/West and

common

Thus a more comprehensive

critical

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

xvii;

DA, 4

Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords,
Columbia University Press, 1998), 90.
For a

essay

critical appraisal

“From Speculative

See also

the

theory can emerge, one in which the

54

55

show

ancestry of these catastrophes and liberal-capitalism, along with their mutual

complicity.

53

fascist

casting capitalism as part of the dialectic of
enlightenment the authors were

not merely reasserting the Marxist bent of their
reflections

looking

Stalinist

liberal

Jarvis,

of Adorno’s relation
to Dialectical

to

Marx

trans.

Henry Pickford (New York:

see the Rose’s The Melancholy Science and her

Thinking,” in Judaism and Modernity (London: Blackwell, 1992).

Adorno, especially chap.

2.
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entanglement of instrumental reason,
power, and domination can he
discerned, which
allows them, for instance, to see
the complicity of the dialectic
of enlightenment

Semitism, as well as

its

critique in the

name of the

in anti-

discourse of universality that

is

also

present in enlightenment’s utopia:
“Only the liberation of thought from
power, the
abolition of violence, could realize
the idea

Jew

is

a

human

being. This

would be a

which has been unrealized

step

away from

drives both Jews and others into sickness,
and toward a

Enlightenment

itself,

having mastered

itself

until

now:

that the

the anti-Semitic society, which

human one .” 56

and assumed

its

own

power, could

break the limits of enlightenment ” 57 The
Dialectic of Enlightenment thus attempts
recast the concept of

seeks to retrieve the

to

“enlightenment” as a critique of suffering and
domination that

critical

import of enlightenment from

its

modem

manifestations as

instrumental rationality, the imperatives of formalistic
organization, and the principle of
identity.

As Horkheimer and Adorno

some of their

critics,

“The

critique

formulate

as

Adorno

thinking

is

later

58

from

Only

in this

way

...

is

found

in

Rabinbach,

its

165.

“Why Were

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

172.

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,

xviii.
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intended to prepare a positive

entanglement in blind domination .” 58

“An adequate

philosophical

reified replica in consciousness but

is

does reflective thought become more than

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
is

its

passage conveniently bypassed by

articulated this critical impulse:

itself. [...]

Dialectic of Enlightenment
57

it

not only critical of the status quo and

equally critical of

56

on

in a

of enlightenment

concept of enlightenment which liberates

Or

it

The
the

best treatment of anti-Semitism
Jews Sacrificed?”

in the

a

repetitive

presentation of wha,

experienced.

is

Its

rationality,

as

a

critical

one,

transcends rationalization .” 59

At

this point crucial questions

enlightenment entail? What exactly
translate that

is

to

relationship with the cause of
freedom?

is its

like in the

Adorno and Horkheimer formulated

to the

contemporary world? Or

metaphor

for the critical distance

what truncates the

exile

How

to

freedom politically? But perhaps a more
important question

what such a reckoning might look

after

is

commitment

emerge: What does such a posttive
account of the

contemporary world, more than

their critique? Is

to state the question

needed

political

to

reason

still in

somewhat

fifty

years

exile in relation

differently, is exile a

preserve the critical dimension o( reason? Or

import of critical theory ? 60

Yet, even while in exile, reason’s concern
with domination has a political

dimension

that manifests in the authors’

political culture

concern with indifference and the lack of

of democratic participation

that they

conceived as characteristic of the

reign of instrumental rationality in the catastrophes of the
age of Auschwitz, Hiroshima,

Gulag, and Dresden.

reminder of

It

is this

this chapter

by means of

abstract aspirations of reason,

'

9

60

particular political dimension that

shall explore in the

the political correlate of the monotheistic and

which have found expression

Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Philosophical Thinking,”

On

I

in Critical

in a culture

of despotism,

in

Models, 133.

the contrasting views of the critical import of exile in

of the
Exile,

Adorno see Edward W. Said, Representations
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994), especially pp. 47-64; and his essay “Reflections on
Edward W. Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

Intellectual
in

For a different view, see Sheldon S. Wolin’s essay “Reason in Exile: Critical Theory and
Technological Society,” in Technology and the Western Tradition, ed. Arthur Melzer, et al. (Cornell
University Press, 1993). For Wolin, the notion of exile in Dialectic of Enlightenment became to signify a
2000).

lack of political engagement, the “loss of political context”:

“To wander

is

to

have no context.

We

might

think of exile, therefore, as signifying a certain kind of loss, loss of political context,” p. 172. Thus, for

Wolin, the Dialectic of Enlightenment, despite

because of

it,

its

trenchant critique of instrumental reason, or perhaps

leads the authors to rehearse the ancient quarrel between philosophy and politics with anti-

political results.
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the despotism

of

liberal

democracy, and the understanding
of v.olence and

that are also intnnsic to
the dialectic

of enlightenment. Even

if

civilization

Horkheimer and Adorno

conceptualized the dialectic of progress
and barbarism that stems from the
enlightenment
as a response to the caesura
that Auschwitz represented
for Occidental civilization, the
fact that

they try to do so historically allows
for the self-reflective turn that
follows. In

doing so,
explore

would

I

how

like to first explore the coupling

coupling

this

Renaissance. Even

Adorno’s

text,

if

the

is

of civilization and barbarism, and then

operative in the constellation of

power inaugurated

an analysis of power as such hardly
figures

emergence of a new form of power

in

in the

Horkheimer and

intrinsic to the dialectic

of

enlightenment should not be overlooked. In the
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels

immortalized

this

image of unprecedented power:

constant revolutionizing of society

of the

new

intrinsic to

...

a seemingly

permanent revolution, “a

[and of] production,” was perceived as trademarks

kind of power that the bourgeoisie has brought about,
and that was indeed
61
it.

.

Intrinsic to this

intrinsic to its origins

new form of power was

was imperialism and

a culture of despotism.

And

the discourse of political sovereignty. All of

these are important components of the constellation of
power that the dialectic of

enlightenment constitutes.
* * *

As

part of the dialectic of enlightenment, civilization and order are coupled in

ways

that

simultaneously conceal the violence in the discourse of civilization, while being
explicitly concerned

with violence. But as a historical concept, civilization entails

“notions such as improvements in comfort, advances in education, politer manners,

61

See Karl Marx and Fredric Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party.
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cultivation of the arts and sciences,
growth of

commerce and

industry,

and acquisition of

material goods and luxuries .” 62 In
contrast to an earlier, primarily
linguistically based

formulation, the discourse of civilization
carries with

what were considered primeval
what the content of

civilization stood for.

modem

the

world,

an ideal that stands in contrast

to

of humanity, whose attributes were the
negation of

states

the sixteenth century, Europeans had
this
In

it

Even before “natives” were stumbled upon

in

image of the uncivilized, the barbarian.

civilization

thus

becomes

a

Unitarian

discourse that

describes “a fundamental process of history, and
the end result of that process established

an antithesis between civilization and a hypothetical
primordial state (whether
nature, savagery, or barbarism )” 63

It

it

be called

also portends ideals of cleanliness, politeness,

refinement, and civility, ideals that would be coupled with
the intellectual and political

discourses of modernity: science and liberalism. The

first

modem

articulations of this

concept of civilization are found in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries; formulations
that

would

later

on take

such thinkers as

full

Adam

shape in the eighteenth century’s philosophies of history of

Ferguson and Condorcet. Yet, the transmogrification of the

concept in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had important implications for

from the eighteenth century on, which
Accordingly, in

late eighteenth-

such as Condorcet,

Adam

Jean Starobinski, “The

64

Starobinski,

“The Word

when

is

usages

actually coined

64
.

political thought, figures

Ferguson, Benjamin Constant, and John Stuart Mill finally saw

Word

Civilization,”

in

Blessings in Disguise , trans.

Arthur Goldhammer

3.

Civilization,” 5.

See Anthony Pagden, “The Defense of Civilization

Human

the term “civilization”

and early nineteenth-century

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993),
63

is

its

in

Eighteenth-Century Social Theory,” History of the

Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires (New York: The Modem
Library, 2001), especially chaps. 7-10; Starobinski’s “The Word Civilization”; and Raymond Williams’
discussion in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
Sciences

1

(1988), 35. See also,

208

the path to civilization
secured: even if Constant deplored
“the spirit of conquest”
latent in

still

Europe, in the emergence of
commerce he saw alternative means to
acquire the

same end

that

was pursued through war,

“that of possessing

what

is

desired”; meanwhile,

Condorcet and Mill could foresee only
a few scattered impediments

to the otherwise

“natural flow of knowledge,” in
European’s civilization path of history as
progress; in the

case of Mill, even the possibility of
a “stationary state,” a notion deplored
by classical
political economists,

was something both achievable and

commercial society” was an

European

political

commercial

component

intrinsic

for eighteenth-

thought. Constant’s liberalism

society

became

a

premise

that

desirable

is

65

Indeed, the idea of a

.

and nineteenth-century

archetypical here:

imposed

constraints

for him,

on

the

political

understandings of rule. Constant thus associated progress
with the emerging “commercial
society.

that

view he echoed the anti-Spaniard sentiment of eighteenth-century
Europe

saw commerce,

view
to

In this

that

as

opposed

even though not

to conquest, as a

legitimate form of imperialism

uncritical in relation to the possible vices

Europe, was entirely silent about an

pillage

more

intrinsic

Still, in its historical

and has had a double legacy

formulation, the term “civilization”

that

needs

to

a

commerce can bring

element of it: the violence,

accompanying Europe’s newly fashioned commercial empire

-

brutality,

and

66
.

is

hardly unequivocal

be dialectically understood.

On

the one hand,

6

On Condorcet, see Pagden, “The Defense of Civilization,” 36; see also, Benjamin Constant, “The Spirit
of Conquest and Usurpation and their Relation to European Civilization,” in Political Writings, ed. and
trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 53.
66

Constant’s views of on commerce and civilization are suggestively explored in Biancamaria Fontana,
“The Shaping of Modem Liberty: Commerce and Civilization in the Writings of Benjamin Constant,”
Annales Benjamin Constant 5 (1985), 3-15. See also George Armstrong Kelly, The Humane Comedy:
Constant, Tocqueville,
the oppositions

and French Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University

of commerce and conquest

in

Lords of All The World: Ideologies of Empire
Yale University Press, 1995).

modem
in

Press, 1992), 55-61. For

European imperial ideologies, see Anthony Pagden,
Spain, Britain, and France c. 1500- c. 1800 (New Heaven:
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dunng

the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries

judge those

who were

civil, zahon

i,

was been deployed

as a criterion to

considered barbarian, savage, and
uncivilized; on the other hand,

became a

critical

concept

within

those

already

As Jean

civilized.

Starobinski's semantic history of the
tern, suggests, at this particular
historical juncture
“it

is

no longer enough
67

civilization .”

part

for a

Accordingly,

when deployed

of the general concept of

irregularities

and

and others,

it

Rousseau
and the

injustices.

signified

a

civilization

By

civilization,

the

same

to

civilization,

in relation to those

it

performed a

it

must be

who where

critical task in

a

true

considered

denouncing

token, in the hands of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau

negative process

s discourses, for instance,

be a

that

was detrimental

do not break with

civilized. Instead, in his writings the

the contrast

comparison

is

humankind.

for

between the savage

merely inverted, and the

civilized is cast in a negative light from the
perspective of an idealized conception of the

savage. Civilization also has had the function of a
normative concept deployed in order to

discriminate between the civilized and

its

opposites, leading thus to the two shapes that

the critique of the discourse of civilization has taken:
“a critique of civilization and a
critique formulated in the

Still,

name of civilization .” 68

civilization as a discourse

became an increasingly

took on a sacred aura,” and preeminence in the Enlightenment
its

69
.

unitary concept, as

As

such,

it

antonyms. Thus infused with monotheistic pretensions, the acceptance

modes of being - already very much
67

Starobinski,

“The Word

Civilization,” 31-32.

Starobinski,

“The Word

Civilization,” 7-8.

Starobinski,

“The Word

68

69

Century Social Theory,”

constrained by the representation of

Civilization,” 17. See also Pagden,

35ff.

210

“The Defense of Civilization

“it

demonized

for different

its

others as

in Eighteenth-

barbarians and

savages- declined, and the
sanctification of

proportion to the vilification and
demonization of
turn,

its

defenders grew

in

detractors; a relationship that,
in

its

provided a mantle of legitimacy for
the violence of civilizational
discourse. To be

sure, within the Enlightenment,
the colonial discourse

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

Herder.™

And

yet, as the

was

criticized

of conquest

by

that took place in the

figures such as Condorcet and

case of Condorcet suggests, this
condemnation was in turn

marred by a secular equivalent of religiously
saturated colonization: rather than
evangelize the savages,
colonization

and

it

is

time to civilize and emancipate them, the

assimilation

71

While

.

the

sacred

connotation

new euphemism
was

for

rejected

its

monotheistic ambitions were retained.

Different degrees of variation notwithstanding,
in the West, from the imperial

adventures of the Greek city-states to the American empire,
the peace and prosperity

home

at

has been secured by external expeditions that often do not
guarantee the same

principles abroad, thus creating a dual conception of

allowed the West to sustain a civilized

one of his most acute observations,

way of

Max Weber

life,

power and sovereignty

that has

while brutally civilizing abroad

tacitly identified imperialism,

the French Revolution, at the root of modernity:

“The

historical

72
.

hi

along with

origin of

modem

70

For an argument on the presence of an anti-imperial strand in the Enlightenment, which includes Kant’s
and Herder’s accounts, see Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment and Anti-Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
71

Starobinski,
72

From

“The Word

a historical point

distinct phases,

and

its

Civilization,” 18.

of view,

Roman

it is

roots,

important to distinguish

from

modem

European imperialism

in its

two

the Athenian experience. Helpful discussions are found in

Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires. See

also Pagden’s earlier book, Lords of All The World. In the past
books dealing with the new American imperialism have been published. In my
judgment, Michael Mann’s book constitutes the most lucid account yet published. See Michael Mann,
Incoherent Empire (London and New York: Verso, 2003). Mann’s book should be read alongside Ellen
Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (London and New York: Verso, 2003).
year, a plethora of

211

freedom has had certain unique
preconditions which
enumerate the most important of these:

First, the

Cromwell, in the French constituent
assembly,
breeze across the ocean

is

felt

...»”

will never repeat themselves.
Let us

overseas expansions. In the armies
of

in our

whole economic

Also, as Richard

life

Tuck has put

formulation attests to "The historical
conjunction between liberal politics

‘expansion of Europe’

overseas ...”

even today the

at

Weber's

it,

home and

the

74

In

fact,

the

origins

of liberalism cannot be

disentangled from this imperial context
of war and violence: “a period of astonishing
violence and political transformation,
comparable to anything seen in the twentieth

century .”

Rawls,

75

Even

Charles

so,

most twentieth-century

Taylor,

and

beyond,

liberal theories,

have

conveniently

Undoubtedly, there have been scattered divergent voices

from within the western

tradition.

And

from Judith Shklar

that

silenced

this

have questioned

to

John

history

76
.

this duality

these questionings that have taken shape by

means

of political, secular and eschatological languages, though these
have almost always been
marginal

77
.

Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 71-72.
Richard Tuck, The Rights of
to

75

,

trans.

and

ed.

H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills

War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius

Kant (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999), 14-15.

Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, 233.

See for instance, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993),
Rawls narrative explicitly follows Shklar when he anachronistically traces “the historical origins of
political liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) [in] the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long
controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.” See also Charles
xxiiff.

Taylor’s essay

“Liberalism and
77

“Modem
its

Social Imaginaries,” Public Culture 14 (2002): 91-124. Cf.
Discontent,” Political Theory 30 (June 2002): 320-38.

Raymond

Geuss,

Instances are found in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War, especially the speeches by Pericles, Kleon,

Nikias, and Alcibiades in

Books II, III, and VI, respectively; Bartolome de Las Casas’ A Short Account of
Benjamin Constant, “The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and their Relation to
European Civilization,” 60-67; Sheldon S. Wolin, “Brave New World,” Theory & Event 5 (2001) and
“Inverted Totalitarianism,” The Nation, May 19, 2003. See also Pagden, Peoples and Empires, especially
the History

of the

Indies',

chap. 5.
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But what then

the precise relationshtp between
imperialism, the discourse of

is

political sovereignty, the

French Revolution and the nation-state,
with the dialectic of

enlightenment? Also, where does the
civilizational discourse of the west

fit

within this

constellation of power?

* * *

In the historical juncture

of the Renaissance, a constellation of ideas
and practices

coalesced to shape the intersection between
violence,

and capitalism.

If

1492

signified

other of the European imagination

an insight that in the early

beginning of the

the

imperialism, Europe’s expansion to

reason, anti-democracy,

first

phase

of European

West, the presence of the East as a constitutive

its

was already present

modem

modem

Greek and Roman world -

in the

period did not escape Montesquieu’s attention. 78

Herodotus’ barbarians found equivalents in Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero. “Without the

Greek there

is

was perceived

no barbarian.

79

According

as incapable of speech

translate into a gradation

—

a

to the Greeks, a barbarian

raw understanding

this definition,

common

does not immediately

of the barbarian’s humanity or lack thereof. Historians have

pointed out that the Egyptians of the seventh century

under

that

was someone who

BC

were considered barbarians

and the Greeks evidently did see them

thread running through

of the barbarian vis-a-vis the

all

these conceptualizations

civilized, at least

as inferiors.

was

Even

so, the

the sense of inferiority

from the fourth century

BC

on,

when

“barbaros had become, and was forever to remain, a word which was used only of

78

79

See “The Discovery of Two

New Worlds,”

•

Francis Hartog, as

cited

by

Starobinski,

in

The Spirit of the Laws Book 21, chap. 21.
,

“The Word

Civilization,” 8.
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cultural

or

mental

inferiors”*"

concept, on of barbansm that

Indeed,

informed the

Renaissance will be found. Here,
natural slave.” But

it

is

too,

in

Aristotle's

Roman and

barbarism would be

on barbarism goes back

philosophy where

Christ, an

not until the eighteenth century,
in

civilization, that the discourse

imagination

is

it

initially

its

worlds

until

the

the

equated with the

discursive coupling with

to center stage in the

European

81
.

Political theories

emerging

in the Renaissance,

such as those of Jean Bodin and

Niccolo Machiavelli, were infused by
comparisons of European and Asian

social

formations, especially due to the relative
closeness of Turkish power, which increasingly

became

the preferred point of contrast for the

West

82
.

As barbarism had played

delimiting role for the ancients, and as
Aristotle’s philosophy provided the

framework
and

to understanding the

new world -

jurists in the sixteenth century attest

structures served as the “other” through

identity

was

as the debates

- Asian

a

initial

amongst Spanish theologians

social formations

and

institutional

which the increasingly conscious European

increasingly constituted. In other words, during the Renaissance
both east

and west, along with the rediscovery of

antiquity,

were

crucial for the construal of the

See Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins
of Comparative
Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 14ff.
Ibid.

See also Pagden, “The Defense of Civilization

Starobinski,
8

“The Word

in

Eighteenth-Century Social Theory”; and

Civilization,” 17ff.

The discussion in this and subsequent paragraphs, is indebted to the following works: Perry Anderson,
Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), pp. 15-59, 221-35, 397-549; Anthony Pagden,
Lords of all the World-, Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man-, and Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two
Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
"

chaps. 1,17, 25-26.
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European imagination

83

Indeed, within Feudalism

.

- which

in its

European variant

is

best

described as a somewhat decentered
system of parcellized sovereignties there was a
significant level

of transnational interaction, even

commerce. And such

commerce

interactions informed these contrasts.

- mostly due

History of the Indies which
,

Europe - came

made

to

was

An

newly found American

intrinsic

at

home

wars

until

conflict

83

Turks also

component of the

dialectic of

was ceaseless

in

was

home was

its

secured by a

crude exercise. In the

significantly reversed. This

Europe from the sixteenth-century

And

all

European wars were

yet, the brutality

to

is

not

religious

have an internal and an external

and violence outside

,

in the

zones of exception

As Perry Anderson puts it: “The Renaissance remains ... the crux of European history as a
moment of an equally unexampled expansion of space, and recovery of time. It is at this

the rediscovery of the Ancient world,

acquired

that

while legitimizing them abroad,

double

84

- invocations

the treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, and that from
the

seventeenth century on,

component.

in the eighteenth

the

was secured by

twentieth-century, with the Great War, this process

armed

Incidentally,

continent. Progress at

counter-violent state while barbarism abroad

that

token, as

84
.

the constant invocation of oriental imagery

once caution against excesses of violence

deny

power

same

the brutality of the Spaniard conquest
famous through

and were thus identified with the Turks

especially in the

the

symbolize the destruction and brutality associated
with the principle of

to

violence and progress

to

By

Bartolome de Las Casas’ A Short Account
of the

symbolized Europe’s image of despotism.

at

mostly based on conquest rather than

increasingly replaced conquest as the
axis of imperial

century, the Spaniards

conquest,

if

its full

and the discovery of the

singularity.” See Lineages, 422.

See Pagden, Lords of all the World, 86-89.
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New

World,

that the

to the

whole: the
point, with

European state-system

European domestic rule

that

comprised the colonial worlds,

with internal violence, hardly parallel

albeit

sometimes correlating

it.

But the significance of the Renaissance

for imperialism

and the

dialectic

of

enlightenment hardly ends in the contrast
of east and west, and the dual nature
of the

language of barbarism, and as

upon the Caribbean

I

shall argue shortly, despotism.

in 1492, the archetypical

With Columbus stumbling

example of Europe’s construction of

others began to take place: the
conquest of America. 85 If the European order
historically constituted

shape

by a

in reference to the

and savagery,

this

series

of oppositions

Ottoman Empire

to barbarism,

in the East,

its

was

which increasingly took

along with the interplay of utopia

encounter provided Europeans with a concrete and
historically existing

“database” for the

latter.

But as

historical anthropologist

Michel-Rolph Trouillot has

argued, the significance of 1492, “from the point of view
of contemporaries,” resided in
the conquest of

Granada

Muslim kingdom, and

that represented its annexation to Castile

in the

and the downfall of the

expulsion of the Jews from the newly Christian

“Indeed,” Trouillot writes, “nascent Europe could turn

its

territory.

86

eyes to the Atlantic only

because the consolidation of political borders and the concentration of political power
of

85

See, for examples, J. H. Elliot, The Old World and The New: 1492-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970); Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America (New York: Harper Perennial, 1984);
Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man and European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to
Romanticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Anthropology and the

Savage

Slot:

Fox (Santa

The Poetics of Otherness,” Recapturing Anthropology: Working

Trouillot,

“Anthropology and the Savage

Slot,” 30-31.

Europe, informative and stimulating discussions are found

From

in the

Present ed. Richard G.
,

Fe: School of American Research Press, 1991): 17-44.

Antiquity to the European Union

On

the historical constitution of the idea of

in the essays collected in

The Idea of Europe:

Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), especially Pagden’s introduction and essay, as well as the essays by Talal Asad, Biancamaria
Fontana, J. G. A. Pocock, and James Tully. See also the essays collected in The Question of Europe ed.
Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (London and New York: Verso, 1997).
,

ed.

,
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the Christian

God

presaged the advent of internal
87
order .”
The internal order that

Trouillot detects found

its

correlate in the outside in an
imperial order that

eighteenth-century has supplanted
conquest with

commerce

its

dnving

by

force. In this

the

new

configuration of external and internal
power the triad of savagery, utopia, and
order

became

a crucial component. Although

century, this triad

was hardly innocent

it

was

initially

to the scientific

impulse of nineteenth-century imperialism.
In

became

the representative text.

constitutive of

conceptualized in the sixteenth-

At once

racism and the civilizational

this juncture,

Thomas More’s Utopia

contained the main “slots” that where

it

European utopian thought: the element of
non-place, an outside was

constitutive of the utopian ideal, along
with order, and the colonization of the savage

Out of these senes of
gave birth

slots

to a plethora

emerged

different constellations

shown, not only gendered and

to,

)

there

is

familial

89

In fact, as scholars of imperialism have

.

metaphors

(i.e.

“virgin lands” and “the savage as a

pervade the apprehension of the new world, but gender dynamics
were

and constitutive

no

of,

that

of intersections between European ideologies and the
new world

across the axes of class, race, and gender

child

of power and ideology

88
.

imperialism in both

“last instance” here

-

discursive and institutional forms

its

race, gender,

intrinsic
90
.

and class were mutually constituted

And

in the

87

Trouillot,

“Anthropology and the Savage

88

Trouillot,

According

to

Slot,” 30-31.

“Anthropology and the Savage Slot,” 3 Iff. See also Pagden, Lords of all the World, 76-77.
Meiksins Wood, More was “the first major English writer to revive the ancient Roman

concept of colonia to designate the settlement of foreign lands.” See her Empire
of Capital, 74-75.

On how modem

understandings of gender, race, and class emerged as part of the dialectical relationships
its Others, see Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education
of Desire: Foucault's

between Europe and

History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Carnal
Knowledge and Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest
(New York: Routledge: 1995).
;

90

See McClintock, Imperial Leather, 1-17.
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.

different htstorical articulations
of

European imperialism.” Once
again, an -order”

by the eighteenth century would
mostly be based on the

substitution of

tha,

commeree

for

conquest as the guiding forces of
overseas expansion. Thus Kant’s and
Constant’s rather
naive invocations of world peace
and the end of the

be cast in a different

commercial society

of conquest, respectively, can

Constant was entirely oblivious to the
effects of the

light:

in the

spirit

non-European world; Kant,

his self-professed anti-imperialism

notwithstanding, winds up endorsing the
narrative of historical “stages” that
served so

well

imperialist

adventures,

constitutional imperialism

and,

many

that

it

historian

have

this constellation

its

J.

harmony,

at

economic and

perhaps

lies in the

epistemology of

thus tried to

that took

home], as a process of assimilation, as a

and as a “savage”

tried to bring the increasingly

modes of thought, and
order,

to

brought about, one similarly predicated on an
identitarian principle

principle of attachment,

of

was oblivious

92

forms: as colonization [liberalism

Europeans

Constant,

.

But the true significance of

power

like

slot

in

all

its

different

configurations.

abundant newness of the new world into

accommodate

it

by reference

to

its

Christendom’s ideas

unity in diversity,” etc. For sixteenth-century Europeans, as

H. Elliot has put

it,

“Everything that could be

known about America must

place in the universal scheme .” 93 Or as intellectual historian Anthony Pagden has

suggested, in the very term “discovery” resides the idea that something

new

presents

As Ann Stoler puts it in relation to the often-neglected role of sexuality in discussions of imperialism:
“Colonial discourses of sexuality were productive of class and racial power, not mere reflections of them.”
See Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, 174.
9

"

See James Tully, “The Kantian Idea of Europe,”

Enlightenment Against Empire, chap.
93

Elliot,

The Old World and the New,

5.

3

1
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in

The Idea of Europe, 332-33, 335. Cf. Muthu,

.tself ,0

one’s gaze, and for Europeans,

their cosmographical,
geographical,

The encounter with

framework, leading

the

new

the Christian

axiom of “the

thus entailed

be incorporated into

integrity

intrinsic

of the human

recognition within this universal

its

a principle of attachment

to

,o

and anthropological understanding.”
And an

component of such a perspective was
94
race .”

“A ’New World’ had now

in

which the Amerindians were

recognized without a process of
re-cognition taking place. In typical
identitarian
the unfamiliar

was

easily provided

transplanted to the familiar

logic,

by means of a principle of attachment

that

a “content” for the savage and
utopian “slots" of early European

modernity. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the descriptions varied, even

if

almost always anchored in Aristotelian
categories: from “barbarian” to “natural
slave,”

and from “nature’s slave”

to “nature’s children .” 95

While

in the British

Empire of the

nineteenth century, infused by scientific racism,
the discourses of gender and race both

abroad and

way,

home were mutually

at

racial discourse started to

constituted

by these encounters with

the new. In this

permeate conceptions of class within Europe, while

conceptions of family and domesticity started to mutually constitute
European discourse
at

both levels

Still,

96
.

it

is

in

the

first

phase of imperialism, which was primarily based on

conquest, with Spain as the main imperial power,
justice, or lack thereof,

94

95

96

of imperialism, and the

Pagden, European Encounters with the

New

World,

5,

status

discussions of the

of the Amerindians took place

in

1 1.

For a thorough discussion, see Pagden’s The Fall of Natural Man.
For examples, see McClintock, Imperial Leather, especially, 1-74. On race and class, see Michel
Must be Defended, (New York: Picador). Also see Stoler’s discussion of this intersection
Race and the Education of Desire, especially chap. 4.

Foucault, Society
in

when unprecedented
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Europe.

And

these discussions had no
equivalent in late eighteenthand early nineteenth-

century imperialisms

commerce

By the

in both

97
.

Indeed, by shifting the grounds
for imperialism from
conquest to

France and England, questions
of legitimacy took a different form

nineteenth century the discourse
of science had effectively bestowed
legitimacy to

civilizational discourse, first

to

98
.

the

emergence

rationalization

by means of commerce, then by
peripheral

of capitalism

as

a

global

phenomenon,

and

activities linked

the

increasing

of genocide of the "brutes,” of the
“dying races .” 99 Medieval Aristotelian

categories were thus displaced by
abstract scientific discourse, even if the
violence and
brutality

of the

civilizational

imperative remained the same, albeit
disguised by the

account of civilization and progress anchored
on the idea of commerce and a culture of
despotism. Even

Amencan

Spain, France and England, for instance,

saw

colonies as “objects of commerce” rather than
as “objects of conquest,”

the spread of

”

if in contrast to

commerce,

Pagden, The Fall of Natural

much

as

Man

,

as the nationalism brought about

it

the

was

by Napoleon’s

especially chaps. 4-8. See also Pagden, Lords of all the World chaps.
,

98

Thus Pagden ’s claim that since the questions raised by Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, “there
had existed a powerful argument that overseas conquests were inevitably as destructive for the imperialists
as they obviously

were for the victims,” needs significant qualification. For the no less destructive
nineteenth-century universal imperialisms of France and Britain, as well as the imperialism of capital,
found certain self-satisfaction

in their expansion being predicated on the ideal of commerce rather than
witness the great liberals, Constant and Mill, in this regard). On capitalism, see Ellen
Meiksins Wood, The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View (London and New York: Verso, 2002) and

conquest

(just

Empire of Capital.
99

See Sven Lindovist,

Patrick

Brantlinger,

"

Exterminate

‘“Dying

all the Brutes”, trans.

Races’:

Joan Tate

genocide

(New York: The New

Press, 1996);

in
The
Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power, ed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu
Parekh (London: Zed Books, 1995).

rationalizing
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in

the

nineteenth

century,”

Empire, perhaps even more,
that eventually yielded
capital

Yet

it

to the

imperialism of the age of

100
.

is

with the advent of the absolutist

state that

commerce

started to eventually replace

conquest as the principle of transnational
relationship, as the economic
increasingly took

primacy over the

“Economic

At

political.

its

point of transition, as Perry
Anderson suggests,

centralization, protectionism and
overseas expansion aggrandized the
late

feudal state while they profited
the early bourgeois.” 10

'

Actually,

it

absolutism that the centralization of power
becomes constitutive of
with the

split

of the economic and the

political

it

became possible

to coexist with a deregulated market,
or at least the idea

centrality

of administration

states the role

in

is

with the rise of

political theory.

And

for a centralized state

of it. Indeed, with the increasing

both the absolutist and the

modem

liberal-democratic

of state power as a regulator and administrator, as
well as

facilitator,

of an

increasingly systematized and procedural understanding
of politics and the market was
finally

consolidated.

sovereignty.

Its

And

theorists,

theorize absolute

with absolutism

who were

very

power accordingly. Yet

Absolutism’ was a misnomer.” 10 ^ That

is,

also

emerged a despotic conception of

much aware of both
as a historical

absolutist

and despotic

rule.

Still,

Cf. Pagden, “Introduction,” The Idea

10

of Europe, 13-20. On

Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital (New York:
Old Regime (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

see Eric
the

the despotic

102

Anderson, Lineages,

phenomenon

—

the latter

49ff.
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“the very term

was associated with

element of absolute obedience, of

the nineteenth

Vintage: 1994) and

'Anderson, Lineages, 41.

and west, would

monarchs never enjoyed the same

prerogatives that where associated with total absolute rule
tyrannical

east

Amo

and early twentieth centuries
J. Mayer, The Persistence of

,

made

necessity,

way, even

its

if

only in embryonic form, into
the understanding of

sovereignty defended by the
most eloquent theorist of absolutism:
Jean Bodin.

According

commonwealth ...”

to Bodin, “sovereignty is
that absolute
103

But Bodin quickly qualified his
statement by suggesting

"absolute” in absolute power cannot
be taken too
absolute

power means exemption from

who can be

all

to certain

the princes

And when

words:

a popular state

outcasts,

came
is

who encourage and

command
that

it

cannot be

made

“If

for

to express his dislike

always the refuge of

we

is

insist

however

no prince

in the

of the earth are subject

human laws common

however, was clear that the preferred
structure
centralized.

literally:

law whatsoever, there

all

regarded as sovereign, since

of God and of nature, and even

"...

and perpetual power vested

to

all

in a

that

that

world

to the laws

nations .”

104

such absolute power needed

Bodin,

to

be

of democracy he was not short of

all

disorderly spirits, rebels, traitors,

help the lower orders to ruin the great.” “The
ability to

equal, as the citizens of popular states desire, for

some have no more judgment than

the brute beasts.

.

.

all

Yet those who want

we know

to

make

all

things equal want to give sovereign authority over men’s
lives, honour, and property, to
the stupid, ignorant, and passionate as well as to the
prudent and the experienced .” 105

With Bodin, the discourse of sovereignty
borders: a

monarch has absolute power over

of sovereignty” provided a link

become

103

is tacitly

a delimited territory.

that in the nineteenth

intrinsic to the triad nation-state-territory

105

—

The

“territorialization

and twentieth centuries would

in turn,

one of the enduring legacies

Jean Bodin, Six Books of Commonwealth ed. and trans. M. J. Tooley (New York: Barnes
A discussion of Bodin can be found in Anderson, Lineages, 50-52.

1967), 25.
104

linked with the notion of political

Bodin, Six Books of Commonwealth, 28.
Bodin, Six Books of Commonwealth, 192-93.
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&

Noble,

of the French revolution.'* And
absolute

power

that holds a

yet, also

with Bodin, the

monopoly of

political action,

and a privatized sphere of

individual opinions, as opposed
to actions, starts to hold sway.
in the social contract tradition

Locke and Spinoza,
After

Hobbes’s

to

And

Rousseau, and

the last

two

in the liberal tradition

this

theory.

conception
In

of sovereignty found

expression

Hobbes, the idea of popular sovereignty

in

is

embryonic form alongside a conception
of power and sovereignty with
pretensions. For as

are found

of

especially in the latter’s
Theologico-Political Treatise.

Bodin,

political

from Hobbes

between a centralized and

split

Hobbes make

of political regime. Or

to state his

clear,

popular sovereignty

arguments

by means of the necessary reasoning

is

Thomas
found in
absolutist

compatible with any type

differently, popular sovereignty is confined

that leads

from the

sense of collectivity or collective endeavors, to

its

state

of nature, where there

temporary abdication

is

no

to a sovereign

authorized by the consent of the same individuals
that live within the borders of the

commonwealth.
democracy
found

its

Leviathan

107
.

way

A

Also,

sovereign could be organized as a monarchy, an aristocracy,
or as a
not until the seventeenth century that the discourse of despotism

it is

into the

— perhaps

new

scientific

language of

the

modem

testament

politics; not incidentally, in

of the

confluence

of an

Hobbes’
absolutist

understanding of sovereignty, a despotic political culture, and an institutional apparatus
that

both centralizes the

legitimate

counterrevolutionary violence built in

use of violence

and has a predisposition

to

at its core.

106

See the instructive discussion of “the territorialization of sovereignty” found in Etienne Balibar, We, The
People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship trans. James Swenson (Princeton: Princeton
,

University Press, 2004), chap.
107

8.

See Hobbes, Leviathan, Part

II,

chap. 19.
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* * *

The most

arresting contemporary
theoretical formulation of the

form of power consonant with
the

dialectic

of enlightenment

emergence of
is

this

new

found in Sheldon

S.

Wolin’s theoretical reflections where questions of power are always
thought of
politically

and from a democratic perspective. 108
In reference

modem power

found

greatest achievement

power

that

Its

(2)

,

Wolin

writes:

the production and reproduction
of change”

main elements

utility,

technological

the

State

political expression in the writings

an

important

role

in

“Modem’s power
-

a conception of

of Descartes, Bacon,

are (1) the cultivation of scientific

having

formulation of

knowledge

supporting

for

training, (3)

and a different kind of power,

economic, and military power, as

research,

this

if

compared with

form of power

is

traditional,

able to reproduce itself

with no foreseeable limits and appears non-coercive, as
geared towards improving the

of humankind.

growth of

its

and economic invention, and an education
geared towards technical

knowledge and
political,

is

Communist Manifesto

found theoretical and

and Hobbes.
political

in the

to the

109

modem

Wolin summarizes

this

lot

process in the following formulation: “The

science, the organization of

it

around technological applications, the

phenomenological expansion of economic production, the development of ever more
destructive weaponry, and the growing penetration

Westem world
108

all

meant

that

by Western nations of

the non-

powers of unprecedented magnitudes were reshaping

the

modem and postmodern power are scattered throughout his essays and books, of
two decades. See, especially, “On Reading Marx Politically,” in Marxism: Nomos XXVI, ed. J.
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1983); The Presence of
the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989);
Wolin’s reflections on

the last

Modem Power: An Essay on Juxtapositions,” The First
Department of Political Science, York University (1990); “Hobbes and
the Culture of Despotism”; and Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, especially chap. 1.
“Constitutional Order, Revolutionary Violence, and

York Lecture

109

in Political Science,

Wolin, “Constitutional Order,” 6-7.
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world, uprooting traditional
social and political forms,
and reconstituting nature ”" 0

As

in

the dialectic of enlightenment,
in this conception of power,
an abstract and ahistoncal

conception of reason reigns; a concept
of reason that portends an equality
historically ingrained differences,

culture that

is

one

that is blind to

that finds a fertile terrain in
a privatized political

hardly participatory and only
superficially egalitarian ."

rendering of this dialectical process:

“A

distinctively

modem

1

Wolin’s

In

revolutionary tradition was

forged in which destructiveness and
innovation were inseparable, the one the
necessary
condition of the other.”"'

And

with

it

came

a

new conception of

political culture: a

managerial and technocratic culture was privileged,
rather than one that was “shared and
publicly accessible,” thus formulating an

elitist

technocratic discourse that

increasingly at odds with the democratic
ideal that
specialized discourse that
citizenry

is

led to

despotism
scientific

paid

lip

is

combined,

all

service

that

to;

not accessible to ordinary individuals, especially

not educated to have a critical attitude towards power

When
power

was

it

became

when

yet another facet of the dialectic of enlightenment, the
despotism of

knowledge and instrumental

rationality. Its political correlate is also

found

this

as

already mentioned, emerges in modernity and

by Hobbes.

112

113

modem

culture of despotism.” This culture of

emergence of the discourse of sovereignty within modernity. And

111

the

113

the

110

a

.

these elements of the dialectic of enlightenment and

what Wolin has aptly called “a

is,

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds,

14.

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 570.
Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 22.
Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 29-30.
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is

articulated

new

in

despotism,

If the

philosophical essay on the
concept of Enlightenment, in
the Dialectic of Enlightenment,
relies heavily

on a

critique

of Bacon’s concept of scienee
and the formalism and

conceptions of progress and
knowledge that he exemplify, the
political thinker

in

the

which

both the scientific and
epistemological dimensions of the
enlightenment are intertwined

new form of political despotism

with a

political

is

Hobbes. Indeed,

modem

Furthermore,

when

it

came

to

the

new

found. If there were a

built into his conception

would be Hobbes, and the book Leviathan.

despotism as such, Hobbes was very
unapologetic,

extent that he not only recognized

“Of Dominion

is

Hobbes where

author and a book that exemplify
the intersection between

violence, power, and despotism,
the author

entitled

is in

despotism associated with the
paradigm of science

quintessential^

was

it

it

to the

as a legitimate form of rule, but a
despotic element

of sovereignty. In chapter

XX

of part

II

of Leviathan.

Patemall, and Despoticall,” Hobbes
introduces the distinction

between commonwealths by acquisition and by

institution.

Although

fear provides the

foundations for both types of commonwealths, in
the former subjects fear the one they

ceded power

to,

while

another, and not of

fear that,

in

despotism

—

in the latter

him

whom

“men who choose

they institute.”

the eighteenth century,

their Sovereign,

do

it

for fear

of one

114
It is

Montesquieu

precisely this equation of rule and

identifies

as the sole

domain of

a conception that would prove crucial for the other great
theorists of

despotism, Alexis de Tocqueville.

In

its

pre-modem

formulations, despotism, as a concept, resonated with the

conception of monotheism. In more than one sense, both were predicated on a

and centralized conception of theological and
114

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds 138.
,
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political

power. But

totalistic

this intertwining

of

despotism and monotheism seems
to suggest something else
the dialectic of enlightenment

Horkheimer and Adorno

because the basis for the
enlightenment’s challenge
basis

of a

political

theology sharing

attributes

to

that is intrinsieally related
to

forcefully identified. This

myth and

is

so

tradition rested

on the

monotheism,

further

with biblical

suggesting the entwinement of myth
and enlightenment: in other words,
rather than a

omnipotent god, what

is

in place is a

omnipotent reason and a faith

with power and knowledge, as Bacon’s
philosophy

attests to.

and early eighteenth centuries, the
challenge

myth and

predicated in the political theology
dialectic

to affirm the

tradition was,

differently, the secularization

rational aspect within a similar structure
to the

takes place in Hobbes’s political theory

and

its

ironically,

Wolin suggests,

on

politics is the intellectualization

entailed

of despotism

one

that served

is

not the abolition of

myth and

of despotism, an activity

dissolving the figure of the despot and reconstituting

that, as

it

as an

absolute reason, a combination of power and reason that disguises power as

rational legislator.

In this way, the concept of freedom

became

increasingly defined

by an ideology of rational necessity - which often times found expression with
of progress — thus leading,

115

to the

replacement with enlightened reason; instead, what emerges
from his

scientific reflections

-

in the late seventeenth

despotism of science.

What

abstraction

of its

entwinement

sought to challenge, thus further contributing

of myth and enlightenment. Or stated

led to an affirmation

tradition,

it

to

But

in its

in

Hobbes’s

texts, to “the science

See Wolin, “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism,”
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16.

of despotism”:

the idea

The laws of nature were

the decrees of a rational

despot-God^ir of a

despotism— Nature. The science of
despotism was
each had a

common

rational

the despotism of science,
and

opposite: not freedom, because
freedom

became

assoc, ated

with accepting rational necessity,
but prejudice. Thus modernity
takes shape as
the struggle not simply
between scientific rationality and
science/ignorance but

between despotism/science and inherited
prejudice

By means of

116
.

the language of natural law,
the problematic of freedom
and necessity

displaced for a dichotomy, freedom/prejudice.
Accordingly, the question

of identifying despotism as an enemy
of freedom. Rather, the need

- often

is

no longer one

to eradicate prejudice

articulated as mythical or as part of
pre-enlightenment notions of tradition

privileged,

is

-

is

and the new “rational despotism” becomes
the landmark of modem thought

in

the writings of

despotism.”

Bacon and Hobbes.

And

this culture

Stated differently,

it

later

on

led to a “culture of

of despotism consists in “a social mentality and
practice

that

enable power to operate unhindered .” 117 In this
culture of despotism, the sovereign holds

sway public
In

and

discourse, even if mildly so.

Hobbes,

calculability,

this culture

of despotism

is

coupled with the language of abstraction

as well as with an ahistorical bent, that

identified with reason’s

demise

into

its

Horkheimer and

Adomo

instrumental form. “The skills of making, and

maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithemetique and

Geometry; not
the leisure, nor

116

117

(as Tennis-play)

men

that

on Practice onley: which Rules, neither poor men have

have had the

leisure,

Wolin, “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism,”

17.

Wolin, “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism,”

17.
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have hitherto had the curiosity, or the

method

to find out."" 8 This

method takes

suspends differences for the
compact
equally powerless. In light of

import

is

to

the form of an ahistorical
state of nature that

be made, one out of which
subjects emerged

Hobbes’

this,

tacit

way of depriving memory of

remarkable and worth mentioning.
In Hobbes’ account,

memory

associated with imagination, which
for him consists in “This
decaying sense,

would express

we would

the thing

it

self (I

mean fancy

selfe,)

wee

express the decay, and signify that the
Sense

Memory. So

that

Imagination and

considerations, hath divers names.”
the political

ruling in

it

is

1

Memory

are

is

but

call

Imagination

...

fading, old, and past,

one thing, which

polittcal

is

closely

when wee
But when

it is

called

for

divers

19

In contrast to Machiavelli,

where the memory of

crucial for the accumulation of experience
that is needed for successful

The Prince, and

for virtuous citizenship in the
Discourses

on Livy, Hobbes

suggests that “The Present onely has a being
in Nature; things Past have a being in

Memory

onely, but things to

come have no being

at all; the

Future being but a fiction of

the mind, applying the sequels of action Past,
to the actions that are Present; which with

most certainty

done by him

is

enough.”

In this

which would

later

and the drive

to forget.

This

118

119

120

on become one of

Thomas Hobbes,

its

of despotism

political logic. If

Leviathan, ed. Richard

Hobbes, Leviathan,

has most Experience; but not with certainty

way, Hobbes neutralizes the potential

culture

accompanied by

that

political

import of memory,

liberal theory’s character traits: its abstract equality

finds

Hobbes

expression

is

in

the

contemporary

the theorist of the culture

Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University

16.

Hobbes, Leviathan, 20.
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world

of despotism,

Press, 1996), 145.

it

iS

AleXiS de T0CqUeVille

Wh0 would “Scutate

the despotism of liberal
democracy.

Writing in post-revolut.onary
Europe, and largely informed
by the American experience
in the

new

world, Tocqueville would reclaim
the notion of despotism,
what he refers to as

“democratic despotism,” and
political expression.

dialectic

in his

conception traces of

this culture

Both are constitutive of the
constellation of power

of enlightenment

of despotism find
that

embodies the

in its present form.

* * *

An

excursus through Montesquieu’s notion
of despotism

comprehend

explicit association

it

complex

empty” - an

is

set

antithesis

assertion that for

sites

they rarely speak of

the lack of civil law:

whose

of power. In other words, despotism

and procedures. “Thus when travelers describe countries
1

civil laws.”'"

There

of a

may

attributes

is

at

once the

institutionalized civil codes

to us

is

everything

signifies the absence

political culture

of decentralized power, structured government, and

he continues,

of the Laws,

is self-sufficient;

Montesquieu

of civil laws, or of a rich and complex

be plurality and multiple

In the Spirits

between despotism, simplicity, and emptiness.

one of the most well-known formulations,
“Despotism

around

necessary in order to fully

the political import of Tocqueville’s
conception.

Montesquieu makes an
In

is

where despotism

reigns,”

a link between emptiness and

the despot reigns in a Hobbesian state of nature

where there

is

no

recognizable civic code. But unlike Hobbes, as already suggested, Montesquieu only

makes

Book

121

the connection between despotism and fear

3,

of Part

I.

- which

In chapter 9 he writes: “Just as there

See Spirit of the Laws, Part

I,

Book

6,

chap.

1.
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is

found

must be virtue

in the often-cited

in a republic

and

monarchy, there must be
state

“extreme obedience”
It is

is

in a despotic

demanded from

in this connection

infallibility that

FEAR

government .” 122 And

the subjects.

between obedience, a culture of

Montesquieu points

such a

in

fear,

and the pretension of

an important aspect of the culture
of despotism: a

to

simplified political culture,
privatized citizens, and obedience
to “rational” laws in a

highly legalistic culture. Ironically,
power not only operates unhindered in
such a
formulation, but

power appears

laws, in a despotic state there

absence of a complex

as decentralized.

is

no

political culture,

might be up for grabs, thus making
despotic government driven by fear
leads

civil strife,

is,

nor

civil

is

And

similarly to the absence of civil

which

is

largely the offspring of the

there present an institutional structure
that

war a very unlikely occurrence. Even

so, a

according to Montesquieu, one “where everything

abruptly and unforeseeably to revolutions.”
Accordingly, the lawlessness of

revolutionary upheavals

is

presented as a correlate of the simplified absence of
law

in a

despotic state.

But by the time of the French Revolution -

modem

political theory

-

the uses of these categories

least significantly transformed.

in

many ways

was questioned vehemently,

“Despotism” was polemically used

compare the monarchy of Louis XIV with

the Turkish

image of eastern backwardness was deployed

to cast the ancient

122

'“ 3

Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book

See Melvin Richter, “Despotism,”

in

3,

chap.

the watershed of

or

at

in order to tacitly

Grand Seigneur; namely,
regime negatively

123
.

the

An

9.

Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 5

1973), 2:14.
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vols.

(New York:

Scribners,

Orientalist perspective that
in Hegel's Philosophy

of History finds express, on

infamous characterizations of the
“Oriental despotism” of the
“unhistorical”

Occ, dental biases aside,

became

at least since

Montesquieu’s formulation of

a signifier for arbitrary,
absolute rule, even if

125
it .

it,

2"

despotism

applications were sometimes

its

misguided. Within the French
Revolution, despotism became
revolutionary terror and a condemnation
of

East.'

in h,s

at

once a self-description of

This had, however, the unwitting
effect

of further problematizing the
relationship between violence and
representation, which

modem

political thinkers

to the eastern equivalent

had been coping with since Hobbes.

of the savage

-

slot

And

it

did so

by reference

the discursive space occupied by the
oriental

despot. But in the immediate aftermath
of the French Revolution the cognitive import
of

despotism seemed to be a thing of the

The

past. In

Spirit

of Conquest and Usurpation

,

for

instance, Constant associates despotism
with an antiquated form of rule, with a thing
of

the past. In

its

place he established “usurpation” as a more
adequate term to explain the

reign of terror and Napoleonic domination following
the French Revolution. In contrast
to

despotism, which “stifles freedom of press,” usurpation
“parodies

despotism

government

owner of

124

125

126

rules

by means of

condemns him

usurpation

exist, are

...

in

which the

to

will

and leaves

silence,

speak ...”

126

of the master

is

According

man
to

the only law;

it”;

and while

the right to be silent...

Constant,

where

“despotism

is

a

political bodies, if they

simply his instruments; where the master regards himself as the exclusive
his empire...

where

liberty

can be taken away from the citizens without the

See Hegel’s Philosophy of History.
Richter, “Despotism,” 13-14.

Constant, Political Writings, 96.

232

authonties deigning to explain their
motives, and without citizens
having any nght to

know them;

[and]

are attributes

where the courts are subjected

“which

occurrence in the present.
a

commercial

society.

And

-

all

original

whims of power ...” 127

make despotism

civilization” that

is

of them

associated

by Constant with

institutions

of a bygone era

formulation

despotism that takes place in the

first

of Montesquieu’s conception, or
is

It

there

an unlikely

at

slavery, the spirit of

128
.

of the intersection between revolution and

despotism emerges in the writings of Alexis de
Tocqueville.

despotism.

Still,

these attributes Constant associates
with the emergence of

Despotism

conquest, and monarchy

The most

modem

are specific to

to the

volume of Democracy

Much

in

of the discussion of

America

is

done

in

terms

following the traditional understanding of

least

not until the second volume that Tocqueville offers
a full-fledged

conception of despotism, even
already found in the

first:

if in assertions

such as the following intimations are

“In the French Revolution there were two

movements

in

contrary directions that must not be confused: one favorable
to freedom, the other to

despotism .”

129

Towards the end of

Europeans and encourages them
in order to

the

volume Tocqueville warns

to establish a “peaceful

first

his

fellow

empire of the greatest number”

avoid “the unlimited power of one alone.” This

citizens” in the “ideas and sentiments that

1

first

is

required to educate “all

prepare them for freedom and afterwards

27

Constant, Political Writings, 114.
128

the
129

Ibid. 140-42.

Modems,

See also his seminal speech of 1819, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with

in Political Writings,

that

of

309-328.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy

in

America,

trans.

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 92.
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Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop

permit them the use of
significantly shattered

by the sobering

In the chapter titled,

rehearses the

avoid “an equal tyranny of

it” to

“On

reflections

the Philosophic

common view of the

advanced

But

all

in the

this

opfimism

is

second volume.

Method of the Americans,” Tocqueville

origins of enlightenment thinking
and the protestant

revolution in Europe. In the seventeenth
century, Francis Bacon and Rene
Descartes
fulfilled

the promise of the sixteenth-century
reformers

in

seeking to “abolish the

received formulas, destroy the empire of
traditions, and overturn the authority
of the
master.”

But as already suggested

authority,

master,

what took place was a

received

tradition

in relation to

Hobbes, rather than the overturning of

shift in authoritative discourse, or a

was supplanted by

a

scientific

changing

in the

conception with similar

monotheistic ambitions, albeit disguised under the banner
of secularism. For Tocqueville,
the political correlate of this process did not
take place simultaneously with
politically, the process entailed

it.

Rather,

breaking with the decentralized power that characterized

the parcellization of sovereignty associated with feudalism,
or the political complexity of
the early absolutist state

132
It

.

had

had become nearly the same and

to wait for the advent

men

almost alike.”

13
'

Ironically, the

accompanied the new language of science and reason was
simplified political culture, one

130

Tocqueville,

Democracy

in

America, 302.

Tocqueville,

Democracy

in

America, 404.

131

132

in

133

more

See Perry Anderson’s discussions

in

Passages from Antiquity

Democracy

in

America, 405.
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to

complexity

politically in tune with a

suitable for despotism

Lineages of the Absolutist State.
Tocqueville,

of equality, “when conditions

-

albeit

of a

new

that

more

type.

Feudalism (London: Verso, 1974) and

“Despotism,”

“which

in

isolation

the

its

nature

in a formulation

is fearful,

of men, and

human

it

still

echoing of Montesquieu’s,
Tocqueville writes,

sees the most certain guarantee
of

ordinanly puts

heart that agrees with

it

as

all its

much

own

its

duration in the

care into isolating them. There

is

no vice

in

as selfishness: a despot readily
pardons the

governed for not loving him, provided
they do not love each other.”
Furthermore,
“despotism makes a
despotism

relies

sort

on both

of public virtue of indifference ” 134 Accordingly,
isolation

and indifference.

And

in

modernity

both are attributes he identifies

with the emerging combination of
liberal-democratic principles. In conditions of
equality,
in

which simplicity and a propensity towards sameness

despotism to emerge.

And

yet,

reign, there

is

a fertile ground for

according to Tocqueville, democratic nations zealously

defend equality, sometimes even to their

own

detriment, thus

is

it

very unlikely that a

despotism embodied in the figure of one individual with
claims of absolute power might
emerge.

On

the contrary, the

despotism. But this

is

menacing prospect of equality

in

for a

new kind of

a despotism that exploits indifference and individual isolation,
the

offspring of the simplified political culture that

complex society

is

which instrumental reason

is

the ironic

reigns,

outcome of a technologically

which

is

also a correlate to the

culture of despotism that the dialectic of enlightenment bred: what he calls
“democratic

despotism.”

In

“What Kind of Despotism Democratic Nations Have

spells out the nature

of this despotism. Right away, he warns

new kind of despotism

to take a familiar shape: “It

established in the democratic nations of our day,

134

Tocqueville,

Democracy

in

America, 485.
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it

seems

to

Fear” Tocqueville

his readers not to expect this

that if

despotism came to be

would have other

characteristics:

it

would be more extensive and milder, and
In other

largely

words, even

due

would be more widespread,

its

operations would be unhindered,

societies. Equality is thus entangled
in the dialectic

same equality
ground

government

But

it

would degrade men without tormenting .”>«

to its capacity to coalesce well
with the simplicity, indifference,

of democratic

fertile

if

it

that facilitates

despotism tempers

for despotism: “I believe that

in a

it

is

it.”

of enlightenment: “the

Furthermore, equality makes for

easier to establish an absolute despotic

people where conditions are equal than in any
other.

this is a

form of despotism of a

different kind.

,” 136

One of

attributes

its

absence of a strong sense of collective purpose in
which each individual

and

apart, is like a stranger to the destiny

immense

tutelary

power

and watching over
for the

at

way

that

it

is

elevated,

of

all

the others ...”

their fate.” Tocqueville’s characterization

modem power

that

many

signifies lack

of power.

On

is

the

“withdrawn

is

“above these an

yet,

enjoyment

their

of this power

but were not able to fully articulate. Although this power

detailed, regular, far seeing,

And

which alone takes charge of assuring

captures an aspect of

and isolation

is

remarkable

before him have hinted

is

“absolute,”

and mild.” But the mildness of this centralized

it

is

also

state hardly

the contrary, “it provides for their security, foresees and

secures their needs, facilitates their pleasures, conducts their principal affairs, directs their
industry, regulates their estates, divides their inheritances; can

entirely the trouble

135

136

it

not take

of thinking and the pain of living?” Furthermore,

despotism “the sovereign extends
wills, but

it

its

arms over society as a whole

softens them, bends them, and directs them;

Tocqueville,

Democracy

in

America, 662.

Tocqueville,

Democracy

in

America, 666.
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it

away from them

in this

...

rarely forces

it

new form of

does not break

one

to act, but

it

constantly

opposes

itself

to

one's

acting;

i,

[...]

compromises, enervates, extinguishes,
dazes, and

does

not

tyrannize,

finally reduces

hinders,

i,

each nat.on

to

nothing more than a herd of timid and
industrious animals of which the
government

shepherd

.” 137

So

significant

was

this

notion for Tocqueville that he
recapitulated

The Old Regime and the Revolution. In
two arresting formulations he
features. In the first Tocqueville
laments the passing

that

it

spells out

being

is

the

it

in his

its

main

of the ancient regime and the

ties

provided:

People today, no longer attached
or family, are

all

to

one another by any

ties

too inclined to be preoccupied with their

of

caste, class, guild,

own

private interests,

too given to looking out for themselves
alone and withdrawing into a narrow

individualism where

all

public virtues are smothered. Despotism, rather
than

struggling against this tendency,
citizens all

common

occasion for
to

common

feeling, all

action.

It

makes

it

common

irresistible,

needs,

all

Tocqueville
despotism:

s

it

it

walls them up inside their private

them;

They tend
chills their

it

lament aside, here he formulates an important aspect of
effaces the sense of

political identity. Accordingly,

commonality of purpose, of

any experience of the

This particular form of tyranny, which

middle ages had no

Tocqueville,

isolates

lives.

all

freezes them.

associated with democracy. Despotism privatizes and does

137

away from

takes

it

need for communication,

keep themselves apart from one another: despotism

relations;

because

Democracy

in

idea,

we

was already

America, 663.
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political

away with

this

new

collectivity

the any sense of

political is hardly present.

call

democratic despotism, of which the

familiar to the physiocrats.

No more

hierarchy within society, no more
classes, no more fixed ranks;
people composed

of almost identical and entirely equal
individuals,

jumbled mass recognized

this

the sole legitimate sovereign,
but carefully deprived of

might permit

And

it

to direct

a culture of pnvatism

and even oversee

own government

its

emerged from within democracy

the faculties

all

as

which

138
.

as an offspring of despotism

that eventually replaced a participatory
democratic culture 139
.

Interpreters

have

tried to

ways. For instance, according
diagnosis of

modem

was perhaps

right

society.

to

make

Raymond Aron,

As he

on the point

states

that carries along

and industry.
societies,

[...]

it:

modem

formulation points

this

at

Tocqueville’s

“Tocqueville was both right and wrong.

that highly

disputatious than revolutionary. But he

movement

sense of this original formulation in a variety
of

He

developed democratic societies are more

was wrong

to

underestimate the principle of the

democratic societies: the development of science

Apart from the fundamental social conservatism of democratic

a revolutionary principle

is

at

work: science .”

Lamberti displays a more poignant awareness of the stakes

140

Meanwhile, Jean-Claude

in Tocqueville’s formulation,

even when his conclusion remains unsatisfactory: “Before Tocqueville’s day, Edmund
Burke,

Madame

de Stael, and Benjamin Constant were

democracy and despotism. Yet

critical

of the links between

cast their aspersions essentially

all

despotism, and their works ceased to provide effective support to the

138

Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution,

Vol.

/,

trans.

Alan

S.

on revolutionary
liberal

cause and

Kahan (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1998), 87, 213.
139

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds 570.
,

140

See Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought,
Weaver (New York: Anchor, 1965), 288-89.
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Vol.

/,

trans.

Richard Howard and Helen

,

became increasingly outmoded

was

left to

between

to diminish.

It

and the ancient and revolutionary
forms of despotism.”

it

Indeed, according to Lamberti
contrast, for

Wolin

was

is

a

a deficit in liberalism what leads
to despotism. In

is

way around

the other

perhaps

it

greater

141
.

According

theoretical

to

Wolin “the theory of modem

achievement:

the

postdemocratic ‘beyond that did not yet exist .’” 142
“Despotism

power .”

seemed

Tocqueville to develop the theory of
democratic despotism by drawing
a

careful distinction

despotism

as the risk of a great revolution

is

intimation

of a

the abnormality of

143
It

reflections,

is

thus worth considering the image of
despotism that emerges in these

and ponder

its

relationship with the dialectic of the enlightenment.
In Wolin’s

interpretation, the despotism that Tocqueville
hints at is of a different order not only

because

it

is

something ostensibly new, but also because contrary

understanding of “cycles of regime change” the emergence
of the
cast

as

a corruption

or degeneration of a previous

form.

to

the classical

new despotism was

Rather,

despotism was

conceptualized as growing “out of [American democracy] rather
than imposed on

Wolin

rightly suggests that the

image

one of “depoliticized man, of the
encourages

at

that

emerges from

citizen

once a complex and a simple

technological culture but one that

institutionalized,

grounded

in

a

is

as

archaic.”

- because

Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies
Harvard University Press, 1988), 223, 238-42.
I4

“

In

simple.

other words,

“[Despotism] becomes

-

culture

and

the State:

New Europeans

Perspectives, ed. John

35-71.

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 340.

239

...

and

Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge:

,

143

despotism

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds 399. Cf. John Keane, “Despotism and Democracy,”

Society

is

modernity even a highly

depoliticized

trans.

it.”

conception of despotism

culture: in late

politically

congenial

this

not

Keane (London and

New York:

in Civil

Verso, 1988),

,

camouflaged by modernity.”'*

how

did

it

emerge from

In Tocqueville’s

If

despotism seems to be the antithesis
of democracy,

it?

oeuvre as more than one commentator
has argued, the tension
,

between democracy and liberalism emerges
both Wolin and Lamberti identify in

in a particularly revealing

this tension the root

way. For instance,

of Tocqueville’s account of

despotism. But as already suggested the
valuation of the tension radically

Lamberti

it

is

a deficit of liberalism, while for

Wolin

it

the opposite

what elsewhere he has called “the liberal/democratic
divide”
Despotism, in Tocqueville’s depiction,

democracy but a

crises in

its

which increasingly became

political

economy. And the complex
is at

It is

in

from Constant

casts

different

light:

the self that emerges out of a liberal

political culture that is constitutive

of democracy, a

odds with the simplicity, relative apathy, and

to Berlin cherished so

it

-

solipsistic

the kind of “negative freedom” that

much, which

finds

contemporary expression

an increasingly dwindled and apathetic conception of political participation.
This

diluted conception of citizenship that

social mentality

constellation

and practice

is in

to operate

unhindered.”

And

“democratic despotism”

is

rights

yet another

of the dialectic of enlightenment.

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds 345.

145

Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds,
Democracies, 233, 238ff.

8,

a

a part of the

It is

of power around the notion of the individual: individual

for the political correlate

is

tune with the discourse of consumerism and “a

power

that enable

solipsistic self-interest are thus coupled.

144

a

Wolin thus

articulated as self-interested in the discourse of

conception of individual rights that ensues from
liberals

in

for

not the result of crises produced by political

liberal variant.”

society,

kind of political education,

is

145
.

differ:

350. See also Lamberti, Tocqueville

240

and

the

Two

and

name

When

combined, the insights from Hobbes,
Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Wolin

can provide an illustration of the
entwinement of the culture of despotism
logic historically associated with
the dialectic

in the political

of enlightenment. For as Hobbes' and

Montesquieu's accounts suggest, regularity,
simplicity, and instrumental

some of

the trademarks of traditional
despotism that

made

culture of despotism. Simplicity, not
to be misled here,

one clearly sees
neoliberalism

in

- even

if

of instrumental

rationality.

In

power

The

role

facilitates the

of the citizen

is

modem

imperative that

democracy with

the language of complexity that

which

politics,

other words,

complex

into the

- an

is political

more often than not coupled with

societies are technologically and sociologically

simplicity.

way

the late twentieth-century coupling of
liberal

accompanies a managerial understanding of
correlates

their

rationality are

is

one of the

political

while contemporary western
their political culture is

one of

reduced to that of the consumer, and a centralized

unhindered operations corporate-despotic power. In the meantime,

average citizens are powerless spectators with a rather naive
attitude towards power.
Neoliberalism and liberalism both participate in the despotic element of
modem power.

* * *

Tocqueville’ s depiction of democratic despotism

contemporary liberal-democratic regime
not anticipated. However,

answer
taken

to the question is not

away

is

striking for

USA, even

its

resemblance

if its imperial

to the

ambitions are

perhaps because of those imperial ambitions that the

unambiguous: superpower

liberal

democracy has

certainly

“the trouble of thinking” (for instance, as in the incitation to “keep America

rolling” in the

This

it

in the

is

immediate aftermath of

new despotism

1 1

September) even

if

hardly the pains of living.

constrains the possibility for political action:

241

“it

confines the action

of the

will in a smaller space

citizen.”

The

last part

of

and

this

little

by

little

steals the

very use of free will from each

statement might be an exaggeration,
while the former

is

hardly so.

At

least

since the

drive to

expansion in the early American republic,
the

democratic identity of the collectivity has
been increasingly compromised. Aristotle’s
depiction, in

The Constitution of Athens, of

Athens captures

this

merely a change

in office but a

it.

Pisistratus’ seizure

of power in democratic

element rather nicely. The tyrant’s seizure of
power represented not

change of “constitution.” This

once Pisistratus called for an assembly

is

to discuss matters

how

Aristotle described

of importance

for the

collectivity, but

he monopolized the conversation, he “talked and talked,”
as his soldiers

collected

weapons from

all

the

Only

the people.

then, he told the people to “go

take care of their private affairs, since in the future he
the state,

would attend

home and

to all the business

of

thus effectively monopolizing public discourse and constraining
the realm of

action for the citizens. In liberal-democratic regimes such
as the United States, Pisistratus

can become an allegory of corporate power and the
formulation of liberal-democracy, in both
liberal is privileged

From

while the democratic

its

is

State. Also, in the

theoretical

and

contemporary

political manifestations, the

constantly undermined.

the eighteenth century on, and especially after the French revolution,

despotism became increasingly perceived as a secularized form of power one of whose
attributes is its boundlessness

146

See Kurt von
1950 ), 83

Fritz

-

a boundless

power

that blindly crushes

any

local or

and Enrst Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts (New York,

.
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independent impediment to

its

movement,

to holding

away of

society.

147

But with the

exception of Tocqueville - and in
his case the insight occurs
somewhat unwittingly -

what the eighteenth and nineteenth
century
the

new despotism

is

not predicated in lawlessness.

century, especially after 1945,
the

of despotism

theorists

West and outside of

it.

it

would operate within

The despotism of

liberal

On

failed to see

was

that

the contrary, in the twentieth

a culture

of despotism both within

democracy was entwined with

the

despotism of the market. Both are perceived
as decentered forms of power. The
apparent

paradox of the twentieth century being,

have ceased

to rule, but the slaves

exists complicity

centrality

of

integrating

to

borrow Lutz Neithammer’s phrase, “the

remain slaves” 148 But under closer scrutiny
there

between the two. This might explain

a formulation

political

such as today’s

mechanism

in

liberal

advanced

democracy:

and financial

institutions

the coupling of liberal

such as the

UN and the

to the rest

it

of this couple while imposing

its liberal

and hegemonic

has emerged as a consensual

is

one not coming from

imposed from above from

IMF. Also,

of the world.

increasingly found anchorage in liberal democracy, by

Cf. Keane,

it

at least since the

democracy and neoliberalism have become the

American Economic Polity has exported

147

the ideological

industrial societies, but

below, or as the outcome of democratic struggle. 149
Rather
political

rulers

150

1980s on,

finest products

the

Indeed, neoliberalism has

means of deflating

the democratic choice

component.

“Democracy and Despotism,” 66

148

As cited and paraphrased by Perry Anderson, “Confronting Defeat,” London Review of Books, 17
October 2002, 15.
149

Anderson, “Confronting Defeat,” 14-15.

150

On the “Economic Polity,” see Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989). George W. Bush’s remarks at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec are
revealing of this tendency as he deployed democracy and free trade in the same breadth: “We seek freedom
not only for people living within our borders, but also for

commerce moving across our borders. Free and
open trade creates new jobs and new income. [...] It spurs the process of economic and legal reform. And
open trade reinforces the habit of liberty.” See “Bush Links Free Trade With Democracy at Quebec Talks,”
The New York Times April 21, 2001.
,
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* * *

By way of
how

the

conclusion,

question

it

is

worth looking a

of violence emerges

bit closer

-

albeit hardly exhaustively

from the formulation of the

-

dialectic

at

of

enlightenment here put forward. Auschwitz,
Dresden, the Gulag, and Hiroshima these

urban locations have become archetypes
of catastrophic moments of the twentieth
century.

However, oftentimes the

and violence associated with these

brutality

cities are

solely associated with savages, with
animals, brutes, and with barbarism. But
as the

preceding discussion has shown, the picture

is

more complicated than

Anthropologists have long insisted that every

included

- has

its rituals

human

in

one

is,

rituals

[t]he function

of sacrifice

is to

translating the language of

in

ways with

vengeance

into

of violence without

sacrifice

risk

quell violence within the

prevent conflicts from erupting .” 151 The goal

of vengeance,” as

societies

and with

of sacrifice are actually intertwined with practices of violence:

influential account, “a sacrifice is an act

Historically

- occidental

of violence, and in the ancient world of western, and even
non-

western, civilization violence has been linked in important
the sacred. That

society

that.

is

of vengeance.”

community and

to prevent perpetual

one of retribution

to

vengeance by

to avoid the “vicious cycle

Aeschylus’ Oresteia, where a fragile compromise

is

reached to

appease the menacing furies - largely a prudential calculation rather than a bold moment

of democratic inclusion - by means of the legitimacy of the new order, even

151

if

with a

See Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973),

14.
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13,

strong reminder of
that she holds the

As
when one
is

its

monopoly of violence embod.ed

in

Athena’s threats and reminder

keys to Zeus’ thunderbolts box. 152

the previous discussion suggested,
in the confines of modem
political thought,
thinks of efforts to keep vengeance
in check, the

Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651): a

the state of violence

modem

first

text that in the midst

image

that

comes

of the English

civil

to

mind

war and

and masterless men proposed the centralization
and organization of

violence in the Leviathan: a constant reminder
of that “brutish, nasty, and short” state of
nature. Retribution and “revenge” need
to be centralized in a collective

preserve the

if

commonwealth and

to deflect the cycle

each individual carries out his or her
This

is

own

what Etienne Balibar, also

of violence

power

that will

in

order to

be perpetuated

retribution.

in reference to

Hobbes, has called a strategy “of

preventive counterviolence” that in the contemporary
global predicament takes shapes as
the forms of violence sanctioned

or counterinsurrection.” 153

to

be found

the state

in the classic,

that

is

monopoly of

And
and

by “the

as already

still

very

politics

of global preventive counterrevolution

shown, the

much

human community which

modem

relevant,

.

.

.

culmination of this effort

Weberian depiction of the

is

state:

(successfully) claims or exercises the

the legitimate use of physical violence or force within a given territory.”

Indeed, following this Weberian definition,

we

can even take a step

further, with

Benjamin, and present yet another dimension of the question of violence

in the

Walter

modem

world as either one of law founding, or of law preserving violence. Perhaps more
importantly,

1

modem

sovereignty

is

predicated on the presence of wild zones of power, or

52
'

See Aeschylus, Eumenides, 827-28, 886, 900. Markell’s reading of these moments as Athena’s “risky
is hardly any support in the text for such
contention. See Marked, Bound By Recognition, 190-93.
strategy of inclusion” are not entirely persuasive as there

151

Balibar, We, The People

of Europe ? 116-17.
,
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so

we

could leam from the Cold War:
wild zones of power that const,
tute

exception in which the language of
violence,
in spaces

machinery of the

steammg morass of chaos

arbitrariness of power,

national sovereignty, globalization,
the

globalized’ world into

North and South

it

manifests in the so-called

which

in turn “has

come

to

of

attest to this

1 1

September, with

produced

a

growing division of

democracy turning

liberal

war and

that in

role.

power

is

Yet

it

is

unclear

this

USA

blind. Until very recently

decade of the twentieth century. 155

we had been
in light

Still,

and

citizens’ sense

of

that after the disappearance

would not lead

which more and more human

of war have been rendered anachronistic
last

how

aggressive

crystallized in the current

an important sense,

depends on the presence of an enemy; an enemy

play this

its

terror outside, calls for alliance

dynamics of sovereignty as these

One could argue

a cycle of vengeance in

again,

that

moment of decay of

of the Soviet block took the rather amorphous shape of a war on drugs.
has

rampage -

154

histoncal juncture.

collectivity

the

zones and death zones ” that correlate the dichotomy
of

life

side back inside, while relentlessly pursuing

shows

power on

,

In the aftermath

unity

torture’s certain uncertainty

on the underside of order and without which

that lies

order could not exists” (Taussig); or as

of

and despotism rule (Buck-Morss);
or

of death situated “in the land of the living
where

[feeds] the great

great

terror,

states

lives are

Now

terrorism

to the perpetuation

going to be

lost.

of

Once

told that traditional understandings

of the “new wars”

these so-called

that characterized the

new wars

are intertwined

154

See, respectively, Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, especially chap. 1; Michael Taussig,
Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 4; Balibar,
We, The People of Europe?, 126ff.
155

See Mary Kaldor,

New and Old

Wars: Organized Violence

University Press, 1999).
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in the

Global Era (Palo Alto: Stanford

With the universalization of
neoliberalism. Also, ours
global

economy

hostile places.

And

liberal

force. Indeed, as a

to the

in

democracy has spread along with the imperatives
of capitalism

American hyper-nation]

which brought

a world where the function of the

assured by private armies that protect
the interests of corporations

is

by sheer economic
the

is

contemporary observer has put

it:

“Democracy

[in

the contemporary equivalent of the
old ‘civilization,’

is

backward peoples of the world the European
colonialism of the

nineteenth century, the humanitarian character
of which has been largely forgotten. Then,
too, the colonialists

fanaticism .”

156

and freedom

It is,

-

in

were supposedly rescuing the oppressed from tyranny,

Imperialism thus renders inoperative the prospects for
actual democracy

many parts of the

world.

then, hardly surprising the role of global violence
in the contemporary world

a world that

is

presently divided into “life-zones” and “death zones” that
are often

found within the boundaries of a single
suffering of naked

is

their

human

humanity but

non-political

-

in

city. In

life that is at stake:

that in the triad

those zones of violence and terror

human

exclusions

take

is

variety

immigrants, political prisoners both

at

1

.

'

7

Naked

life is

of particular

rights of

the

to

be

man,”

the singular in which these

forms:

statelessness,

home and abroad (Guantanamo),

See Regis Debray, “The Indispensable Nation,” Harper’s Magazine, January 2004,

refugees,

the inner city

dispossessed, vilified minorities that are susceptible to violence with impunity,

156

is

of nation-state-territory humanity turns out

thus denied

a

it

beings whose only political attribute

what Hannah Arendt considered the “paradox of the

the right to have rights

universal

slavery, and

etc.

One

16.

For a powerful theorization of this notion see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and
Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998) and Means Without
End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vicenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: The University of
Minnesota Press, 2000).
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Of the forms that

this

might be taking

consists in the triple jeopardy of what

But

to responsibly

revitalization

The

are found in

well

as

Europe

of a new apartheid;

is that

Mike Davis has

of

political collectivity

to

maintain

emancipated from

latter

a

political

and redrawing

its

civil

their boundaries politically.

action

“Such a

while

state,

by

and rights ascribed from

making

citizenship into “an

process, rather than a legal status.” In other words, making

citizenship a political category,

actor.

political stakes

understanding of collective

requires the direct participation of the demos," thus

and collective

its

and of

subjugation to liberalism, as

definition, cannot consist (or cannot only consist)
of status

active

it

to this condition, as Balibar
suggests, requires the

that in turn rethinks the question

democracy - the

striving

it

USA

called “the three borders .” 158

universal element resides in the notion of
humanity, and

politicizing the borders

above,

in the

of a seemingly archaic discourse, the
language of universalism, and of

democracy; a language
borders.

respond

in

Democracy understood

which

is

the central category of democracy, the citizen as

as people sharing in

power

to

change

their lot

159
.

“Rights to

equality and liberty are indeed individual', only individuals can claim
and support them.

But the abolition of both coercion and discrimination (which

we

always clearly a collective process, which can be achieved only
(virtually all

Balibar, We, The People

City

if

emancipation)

many

is

individuals

of them) unite and join forces against oppression and social inequality.” But

such a conception seems out of sync. For

USA

call

(London and

of Europe?, chap.

New York:

3.

it

to

be possible, for the sake of responding

Mike Davis, Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent

to

the

Verso, 2002).

159

Ibid.,

119, 132. See also Sheldon S. Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” Constellations

“Norm and Form: The

Constitutionalizing of Democracy,”

Reconstruction of American Democracy, ed.

J.

Peter Euben, et

in

al.

(April 1994);

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994);

“Democracy: Electoral and Athenian,” PS:
Political Science and Politics 26
“Democracy, Difference, and Re-cognition,” Political Theory 21 (August 1993).
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1

Athenian Political Thought and the

(September 1993);

th,s specific suffering,

of the naked

ironically yield to the politics

then a

power

that pretends to

life,

the politics of difference and
particularity has to

of universalism,

solidarity,

and

collectivity.

be universal can be equally matched.
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Perhaps only

CHAPTER VI

UNIVERSAL HISTORY, HISTORICISM AND ETHICO-POLITICALHISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
1

Universal history must be construed and denied.
After
the catastrophes that have happened, and in
view of the
catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say
that

a

plan for a better world
it.

is

manifested

in history

and unites

Not

that

to be denied for that reason, however, is the
unity
cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered

moments and phases of history—the

unity of the control
of nature, progressing to rule over men’s inner nature.

History

is

the unity of continuity and discontinuity

.

Theodor W. Adorno

One of the markers of our
lack of historical

present

is

precisely the present-mindedness that saturates

memory, of historical consciousness. Cotemporary

referred to this as “the amnesia of the present.” For

debates

about

-

postmodernism

of

which

most of the

cultural critics

eighties

and

Jameson’s

Fredric

it;

the

have

nineties, the

seminal

essay,

“Postmodernism, or the Logic of Late Capitalism” constitutes the most eloquent, even
highly contested, theorization

transition

-

often dealt with this question in terms of the so-called

from the primacy of time and temporality

twentieth-century

modernity,

the

to

primacy

of

in

the nineteenth-

space,

the

Theodor W. Adomo, Negative Dialectics

,

trans. E. B.

and early

spatialization,

postmodemity. Out of this transition had emerged a postmodern culture

1

if

that

is “ill

in

with

Ashton (New York, NY: Continuum Publishers,

1973), 320
2

Fredric Jameson’s essay

is

found

in

New

Left

Review 1/146 (July/August 1984), 53-92. See

also Fredric

Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press,
1992), The Cultural Turn (London: Verso, 1998), A Singular Modernity (London: Verso, 2002), “The End
of Temporality” Critical Inquiry 29 (Summer 2003), 695-718. For a stimulating account of modernity and

The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London and New York: Verso
modernism and modernity on questions of temporality are found in T. J. Clark,
Farewell to an Idea (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2001) and Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and
Catastrophe (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000).
time, see Peter Osborne,

1995). Other accounts of
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amnesia.” Put slightly differently,
a culture
consciousness

Even

in

which

a

strong

everything but present.

is

so, this is also the era

of the History Channel and commemorations

West. At least within the United States, there
seems to be an insatiable
historical

historical-political

knowledge - what

I

thirst for sanitized

shall call history without historicization

perusal in the shelves of giant bookstores like
Barnes

&

Noble would

in the

-

as a cursory

And

attest.

during

the nineties ahistoncal history buttresses
the increasingly abstract patriotic discourse

emerging alongside the increasing militarism of the
American empire-

just consider the

plethora of biographies and war-related books, Films,
and

such as Stephen

TV

series

Ambrose’s The Band of Brothers Steven Spielberg’s Saving
Private Ryan and Ridley
,

,

Scott’s

Hawk Down

Black

September juncture.
the

eighties

fiftieth

the latter praised

by George W. Bush

This, along with the series of

commemorations

in

the post

11

that took place in

and nineties (bicentennials of the American and French revolutions;

commemorations on
and

,

the armistice of the Great

anniversaries of the Third Reich,

Gay) contribute

to this

War; the famous and infamous

Normandy, and

boom of history without

the controversy of the Enola

historicism. Furthermore, one also found

a strong sense of triumphalism associated with the ending of

communist

and thus the end of “history derailed,” and a memory boom

in

trauma converged started

memory boom

to take

that has yet to

show

rule in the East,

which both triumph and

hold in public discourse and in the humanities (a
signs of exhaustion).

Indeed, if in the eighties Pierre Nora articulated the need to reclaim
liberate its insights

fortieth

from the yoke of “scientific” history - a laudable

3

memory and

call

from the

On the militarism of the United States, see the informative discussion in Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows
of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004),
especially chaps. 2, 4, 6.
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perspective of the “history wars” within
French historiography, where one’s
stance in
relation to the Revolution is taken
as constitutive of one’s present
political position

nowadays we might be experiencing
identified

twenty years ago seems

to

the opposite. But today the problematic
that

suggest that an inversion of Nora’s formulation

of memorialization.

(In

Nora

be reversed as the drive towards memorialization

has overshadowed the interest in history. 4
Accordingly, in this chapter

yoke

-

the

US,

is

for

I

would

like to

called for: to liberate history from the
instance,

as

commissions

for

the

memorialization of 11 September 2001 are appointed,
an honest reckoning with the
history that can shed a light on the attacks
differently, to bring history

back

is

nowhere

to

be found.) Or,

in order to historicize the

to state

memory boom, and

reclaim the ethical and political import of thinking the intersection
of history and
speculatively.

I

it

thus

memory

shall return to this last question at the end.

The dilemma of thinking

the historical dimension of the present

is

a paradoxical

one: on the one hand, as the end of the millennium approached,
attempts to assess the

present from the perspective of the past were carried on in the hope of
situating the

present in the course of historical time; on the other hand, what emerged out of these

assessments was a “sense of
terminally

ill

with amnesia,” the

historically about the present.

and limits the prospects

See Pierre Nora, “Between
1989), 13-15. This essay

memory

crisis often articulated in the

in France.

was

5

for a

It

seems

that the

way of any

same amnesia

that

reckoning with our recent history,

Memory and

is

attempts to think

pervades our epoch,

is

closely intertwined

History: Les Lieux de Memoire”, Representations 26 (Spring

monumental undertaking of reclaiming the “sites” of
memory and history opened up a series
between history and memory.

the introduction to the

Nora’s articulation of the relationship between

of important reflections on the intersection
5

later standing in the

reproach that our culture

See Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Making Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York and London:
2. Cf. Jameson, “The End of Temporality”, 695-718.

Routledge, 1995),
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With a lack of historical nuance in
relation to the dreams and catastrophes
of the past
century, especially in relation to
processes that predated these dreams.
Cultural

Andreas Huyssen represents an example of
such thinking. According
short twentieth century

“was simultaneously a century of

to

critic

Huyssen, the

indescriptible catastrophes and

of ferocious hopes, and often times the utopian
ideals animating the hopes ended up
legitimizing

pacified

some

dictatorship of the future (the pure race, the
classless society, the

consumer

paradise), turning a blind eye to persecution and

mass

destruction,

voracious exploitation of resources and the environment,
migrations and dislocations of

whole populations
think historically,

to

an extent the world had never witnessed before .” 6 In his
attempt

Huyssen looks

at

recent history but what his gaze captures

complicity of utopian ideas in twentieth-century catastrophes.
tenor of his reflections leads

such vindication

it

also

him

to a vindication

what truncates whatever

of memory might have. In his assessment, even

of

if the

a

not incidentally, the

democratic

liberal

political

And

is

to

institutions.

Yet

and ethical import the cultures

discourse of “historical trauma” has

gained currency in our present, not only in the West but also in Latin America and South
Africa,

“Human

methods

rights activism, truth

for dealing with historical

commissions, and juridical proceedings are better

trauma .”

7

But Huyssen might be dispensing with
faith

this question too

on the discourses and mechanisms of

subsumption of the question of historical trauma
mentions presupposes that the conditions

6

7

Huyssen, Twilight Memories,

liberal-capitalist

democracy.

in the institutional

that led to the

For the

mechanisms

that

he

emergence of the traumatic

2.

Andreas Huyssen, Presents Past: Urban Palimpsests and the

University Press, 2003),

quickly by placing undue

9.
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Politics

of Memory (Palo Alto: Stanford

events in question are a thing of the
past. But this
Stated

somewhat

is

differently, rather than reclaiming

an unfounded assumption

memory and trauma

at best.

as part of a

public discourse in which both are critically
historicized in order to ponder their
weight

on the living -

to cast the present conditions in a
critical light

and thus discern the

complicity of present-day institutional
arrangements in the dynamics that served as
condition of possibility of the traumas - Huyssen
winds up within the confines of a

colonizing liberalism that assumes that the
to

be recommended

to the rest

way American

of the world. Or

liberals

at least to reflect

understand

memory

is

on the conditions of the

present that allow for such a self-satisfied approach
to the dispensation of memory, and

what

that

means

in terms

of

its

political

and ethical import. Indeed,

it

seems

that current

discourses of memorialization find their analogies in the discourse
of historical apologies:

both have the effect of constituting a break between past and
present, of claiming
herald history while denying

it.

relation to historical apologies:

- and the past

my

to

“My apology

sets a

Additionally, historical

memory, suggest

particular kind of historicity”

make

8

doomed

apologies,

my new

relation to

to fail, largely

like

most

where “history

autonomous

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Abortive

of the

subject, thus depicting “a
9

is

both denied and heralded .” Apologies are

because the epistemological and

possible their enunciation

articulations

continuity between past actors and present ones, as they

at

the

same time

political conditions that

constitute barriers for the transformation

Rituals: Historical Apologies in the Global Era” Interventions 2

(2000), 174
9

in

8

also privileged the liberal understanding of the

thus

it

temporal marker between those things

which they belong - and a present characterized by

interlocutor .”

discourse of

For as Michel-Rolph Trouillot suggestively puts

to

Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals”, 176, 181
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Of the structures of power and domination
that historically constituted the
catastrophe or

trauma

that

witness the

one

US

is

apologizing

apology

to

for, as

well as their structural analogies in the
present. Just

Hawaii, or Clinton’s apology for slavery.

The same rhetoncal operation

performed by Huyssen’s displacement of the

is

import of historical trauma to the realm of liberal

by means of a discourse of memory

institutions.

The

past

is

not redeemed

that presents a break with the present.

On

the

contrary, to critically conjure the ghost of
the past in the present involves bringing into

bear a challenge to present-day the crystallized
forms of power, institutions, and practices
that not only served as conditions

of possibility for the past trauma but

new

that reinstate

forms of suffering and domination. For the structures of power,
privilege, and domination
that constituted the

trauma are historically constituted and renewed

representation in a historical narrative

is

the past and the present, even if that

historicizing catastrophes like

But

their

a precondition to illustrate the relation between

not enough to alter them. After

is

all,

after

Auschwitz one can understand the forms of violence, and

the practices, policies, and ideological formations that enable

meaningful

in history.

political action in the present

it.

Yet only

vigilant

and

can prevent the emergence of new forms of

these structures. In Silencing the Past Trouillot formulates the stakes of reclaiming the
,

political

import of the past

But the

historicity

fort the

of the

present quite eloquently:

human

and domination be renewed.
in the

name of our

pasts.

colonialism, or the holocaust

It is

The
-

condition also requires that practices of power

that

renewal that should concern us most, even

so-called legacies of past horrors

-

are possible only because of that renewal.

renewal occurs only in the present. Thus, even in relation
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to

The

if

slavery,

And

that

Past our

authenticity resides in the struggles of
our present.
true or false to the past

we

Accordingly, the only responsible

Only

in that present

can

we

be

choose to acknowledge. 10

way

engage with the past

to

rhetorical strategies for the present,
or secluding the role of
juridical practices that carry a primarily
exculpatory mission,

prudential: to deflate cycles of violence,

by avoiding exculpatory

is

memory

and whose primary aim

which does not necessarily

conditions that led to the cycle of violence
to begin with.
responsibility politically entails reclaiming the
discourse of

perspective in order to represent the past in

ways conducive

to institutional

entail

The

is

changing the

task of thinking

memory from

a historical

to act democratically in the

present.

* * *

At the beginning of the twenty- first century the antinomies and paradoxes
of modem
are far

from being resolved, or

distinct epoch,

it is still

shaped by the

in 1789,

and the way these unfolded

idealist

blank

responsible for

Even

settled.

indictment

many of

if

one periodizes the twenty-first century as a

political

antinomies of the imaginary inaugurated

in the twentieth century.

of reason,

or

life

even humanism,

And

if

that

presents

one adds the neoreason

these catastrophes, with the effect of almost erasing

as

human

agency, responsibility, and the complexities of the catastrophes themselves as political-

human-cultural-economic processes, the continuities and discontinuities of our present
with the recent past are obliterated. In

fact,

for

many

contemporaries

it

is

easier to

conceive of something like a deviant “cunning of reason” responsible for historical
catastrophes of the century, or of a

10

homogenous

totality called

modernity

that posits a

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon

1995 ), 151

.
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Press,

subject that with cold rationality
dominates

and

cultural,

demand

a

socio-political

domination.

good deal of imagination; and

its

other,

and

Ironically,

yet, there

responsible for sexual, racial,

is

these

theoretical

constructions

does not seem to be enough impetus

to

imagining, for instance, the possibility
of the breakdown of capitalism, or even
the
possibility

of alternatively rendering the antinomies and
aponas of the present

that allow us to

comprehend these catastrophes

in their

complexity

ways

11

Or, politically, to

.

imaginatively reclaim the language of democracy,
thus breaking with

with liberal-capitalism, and immanently undoing the

in

its

present coupling

Rather than comprehensively

latter.

reckoning with recent history, most reflections on history
assume a melancholic and
bleak tone, or what Gillian Rose has appositely called
“a despair rationalism without
reason,” one in which

bathwater

as there

is

more

very

often one feels that “the

little

baby

is

thrown out with the

tolerance for equivocation and a thorough reflection on
,

the strengths and shortcomings of a concrete deployment of an idea
or utopian principle
is

replaced

by unequivocal

rejection

12
.

* * *

For the greater part of the second half of the twentieth century, with the exception of
Marxist historians and cultural

critics,

history and historicized thought have been largely

neglected, at a time in which “critical theory” as a publishing and scholarly label has been
in

vogue.

reflections

11

Cf. Fredric

Out of the so-called

- along with some

post-structuralist

scholars inspired

by

his

work -

only Michel Foucault’s
are infused with a strong

Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994),

also F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Palo Alto,
12

tradition

Gillian Rose,

Mourning Becomes

the

CA: Stanford University

xii, Iff.

See

Press, 2001).

Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press, 1995), 1-14. Cf. Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford,
Publishers, 1993), 1-24, 37-51, 225-57.
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UK: Blackwell

historical

sensibility.

In contrast, theorizations based

on other

thinkers, such as the

Spinozism of Gilles Deleuze, or of Derridean
deconstruction have proven
history. furthermore,

most of the Anglo-American

political theory

the twentieth century hardly fares any
better, largely due to the

of the

immense

allergic to

last quarter

of

influence of the

neo-Kantianism of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas.

But

this trend started to

change

in the last

decade of the twentieth century. For

in

the last couple of years, perhaps as an
offspring of the fin de siecle mentality that

captured both public and lettered discourse, political
and

once again pay attention
from the perspective of

to the historical

critical theory.

dimension of

of all

dimension

to

political theorizing, especially

end of history,” and the possibility

for a critical

for rescuing

mass democracy animating twentieth-century dream worlds, by

Wendy Brown and Susan-Buck-Morss have
historical

have begun

Recent reflections on the possibility

historical-political consciousness at “the

the utopian idea of

critical theorists

for critical theory.

critical theorists

And

- who has served

reopened the question of the importance of a
it

is

Walter Benjamin — the most melancholic

as the inspiration for these important reflections.

Indeed, Benjamin’s well-known critique of progressive-teleological history in the “The

Theses on the Concept of History,” and his historiographical reflections

Arcades Project serve as the
,

starting point for

Brown’s

retrieval

of a

in his unfinished

historical-political

consciousness, and for Buck-Morss’ dialectical reconstruction of the dynamics of mass
utopia in East and

West during

the twentieth century.

Brown and Buck-Morss have posed
ways

the question of historical consciousness in

that provocatively point to the challenges

and also

to the

importance of rethinking

our present in historical-ethico-political terms. Their reflections resonate with Rose’s

258

aforementioned motto insofar as they theorize
a predicament of losses in ways
sensitive to

its

historical

shattered images and

that are

dimensions, and are conducive to rendering
some of the

dreams of equality and freedom

in their current

brokenness

to

reclaim the emancipatory promise these carried they thus pose the question of history

and

historical consciousness,

reflect

on how

Even

to politically

and

critically

reckon with our recent history,

in order to

apprehend the present.

so, their reflections are

marred by some of the ambiguities

Benjamin’s original formulations. For instance,

Morss assume a universal-comprehensive

like

that afflicted

Benjamin, both Brown and Buck-

historical narrative that neither

one theorizes,

or renders explicit. Benjamin’s were contextually bounded
reflections seeking, almost
desperately, to contest the enemy, Fascism

ceased to be victorious.”

1

'

-

in his words,

Benjamin thus invoked theological

an “enemy

[that]

has not

figures and tropes such as

angels, and even a Messiah, as part of his constellation of concepts
to apprehend the past

and his present. In order

to

comprehend the stakes

of critical theory from a Benjaminian perspective,
assess both

Brown and Buck-Morss’

In Politics

remainder of

this section

Out of History Brown extrapolates from Benjamin’s

political consciousness that

,

politics

would mobilize and

fulfilling,

taming, or jettisoning

intimates

ways of re-conceiving

.” 14

of “hauntology”

in

Politics

Out of History,

shall

reflections and

order to articulate “a

activate history rather than submitting to,

By means of

Brown

historical consciousness that are responsive to

human

Walter Benjamin, Illuminations ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1973), 255.

Brown,

I

her retrieval of Benjamin,

it

,

14

in the

dimension

appropriation of Benjamin.

combines these motifs with Derrida’s

13

in reclaiming the historical

173.
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suffenng, thereby resisting present-day
tendencies to cynically retreat into
what she,

again following Benjamin, has aptly
called Left-Melancholia, or into
a pernicious, and
equally conservative, political moralism.

To

her credit,

Brown does

so without positing

an ethico-pohtical imperative of passivity,
and avoids positing abstract imperatives
of

openness

to

Otherness that are often found in Derrida-inspired
scholars. Rather, Brown

argues on behalf of a democratic retrieval
of the collective emancipatory project of
equality and freedom, one responsive to claims
of difference but critical of the current
fetishization

of politicized cultural

forged

of contingently

out

attachments.

in

doing

While pursuing

identities, especially

entrenched,

this path

and

Brown

often

when

the latter are sometimes

resentment

“wounded

driven,

casts the present in a critical light.

And

she not only poses the question of reclaiming a
historical-political

so,

consciousness, but poses the need to conceive history in non-positivist,
objectivist, or
teleological ways, as well.

In order to formulate her understanding

Brown conspicuously invokes Benjamin’s
Benjamin devised
the angel as a

of a reconceived historical consciousness

angel.

Brown, writing

his celestial imagery, reclaims this context-bounded

metaphor

for the present

-

signifier

at

no other

On “wounded

moment

after

mournful image of

quotation:

has Benjamin’s angel been such a poignant

of our predicament. Without vision or a strong sense of agency, we are

blown backward

15

historical

50 years

albeit ostensibly resisting its melancholic

moment. Brown’s appropriation of Benjamin merits lengthy
Perhaps

at least

into the future as debris piles

up

in the single catastrophe that

is

attachments” see States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. New Jersey:
is continuity between her critique of identity politics inscripted in

Princeton University Press, 1995. There

the liberal discourse of rights and her most recent
contemporary configurations of identity politics.

critique
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of political moralism and the way

it

plays out in

history

beyond and outside of human

subtle unfreedom.

We

intervention, a history of both
dramatic and

cannot close our wings against the storm,
cannot not be

moved-that moment has been

extinguished by contemporary history

Our

itself.

capacity to intervene in the trajectory and wide
range of effects of capital (as the

most powerful moving force

in modernity), to

whatever extent

it

once existed,

appears exhausted. So history surges on, but with
no promise that past suffering
will

be redeemed, with no promise of eventual
worldwide or even

local

emancipation, well-being, wisdom, or reduction of suffering.
Nihilistic seems
too thin a term to describe such circumstances

By

presenting Benjamin

present condition.

more

And

s

far

16
.

angel as a signifier of our times,

Brown

the picture of the present that emerges

is

significant about this appropriation of Benjamin’s angel

seeks to spell out our

pretty bleak. But what

is

how Brown winds

is

up,

perhaps unwittingly, ascribing the impotency of the angel’s attempt to
“make whole what
has been smashed” to us, humans, in our present predicament.
appropriates the epistemological vantage point reclaimed
roles,

and

in

one stroke bestows

the angel and

attributes

its

us,

by

Brown,

of the present

is

historically, the

Politics

Brown

helplessness. Thus, in this rendering, one of the most important
the uncertainty of agency, the lack of control or mastery over

is

absence of guarantees,

not lead to a depiction of impotence

16

so,

humans, with both the epistemological perspective of

particularly fond of, the present predicament

However,

doing

the angel, and thus switches

the world, the lack of assurance; or in a phrase that Stuart Hall

is

By

Out of History,

- and

more than ever one without
at least
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guarantees.

since Niccolo Machiavelli, does

political theorizing

139.

made famous and Brown

without guarantees,

critical

,

thinking without banisters

democracy, the

latter

what Brown has endorsed elsewhere

is

defined as sharing and participating in
political power

transposition of the difficult agency of
the angel,
catastrophe, to our current
suggests,

moment

“we cannot

very

condition

is

itself

endeavor

alongside

which

the

s efforts

away, one “with no promise

promise of eventual worldwide or even
reduction of suffering,”

One can

how

can

itself,”

it

be

is

one

contention

deterministic than ever before.” Yet, if history

one

is

how can

it

name of

17

Still, this

.

one single

If,

Brown

as

moved— that
be, in such a

less deterministic than

in her account, but hardly less deterministic.

is,

it

offers a bleak picture of the present,

precarious

history

intriguing at the very least.

emerges as both weightier and

Weightier indeed

.

whom

close our wings against the storm, cannot
not be

predicament, that “history

Brown

human

for

has been extinguished by contemporary history

ever before.

in the

is

in

which agency emerges

that

history

becomes

as a

“less

a single catastrophe, one that blows

that past suffering will

be redeemed, with no

local emancipation, well-being,

wisdom, or

less deterministic?

ascribe this difficulty

- conceiving agency once

the perspective of the

angel has been endorsed - to a rhetorical sleight of hand in Brown’s part. But given the
rigor and vigilance found in

Brown’s work,

this

is

hardly the case. The roots he

elsewhere. Indeed, Brown’s bleak picture of the present emerges as part of Benjamin’s

deeply melancholic outlook - an unexpected turn from Brown, but not so unexpected
those familiar with Benjamin. Stated somewhat differently, only

if

for

one accepts the

perspective of Benjamin’s angel on the singleness of the catastrophe can such claim be

17

Brown, Politics Out of History, chap. 5; “Resisting Left-Melancholia” in Without Guarantees:
of Stuart Hall, ed. Paul Gilroy, et alt. (London and New York: Verso, 2000).
18

Brown,

Politics

Out of History,

5.
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In

Honor

made. Brown

is at

pains to grapple with this question, due
in part to her refusal to
render

the oppositions at stake

-

contingency/necessity, whole/part, and
universal/particular

-

comprehensively and speculatively.

Even
that in the

so, at

one point Brown manages

midst of the facile proclamations of the end of
history,

what has ended “but a

as a

dumbfounding .” 19

way

way

20

Out of

politically about the past,
21

one

this,

that

Brown’s tone

life

and

to discern

according to Brown, emerges a

perhaps “offers modest
is

new

Brown,

Out of History,

Politics

“Recasting the Left

at the

Benjamin

22
.

But somehow she

includes a response from Derrida, see the

20

21

's

it.

still

But

thinking

possibilities for the

is at

at least in

manages

this is

pains to

some

to instill a

hardly the sense

163. For a critique of the juxtaposition of

Benjamin with Derrida see
of Derrida’s Marx, which
essays collected by Michael Sprinker, Ghostly Demarcations: A

End of History.” For

Symposium of Jacques Derrida

way of

cautionary here. Like Benjamin, she

chastened and very thin sense of transformatory agency in

19

(for political

and fashion openings

distance this latter formulation of freedom from the possibilism that
readings, have been ascribed to

much

develop political consciousness of the historically

to

of contemporary political

possibilities there .”

practice of freedom .”

ghostly form, producing “amazement” and

its

do history”; instead, these are meant “as a way

actors) to think historically, a

and

not history per se

In this juxtaposition, Benjamin’s reflections figure
“not so

(for historians) to

inflicted construction

it is

certain concept of history, a concept that
nonetheless continues to

grip political thinking and reaction even in

literal

to grapple with this tension as she
suggests

different, albeit, critical appraisals

Specters of Marx (London,

Brown,

Politics

Out of History,

172.

Brown,

Politics

Out of History,

173.

~2

UK:

Verso, 1999).

This reading is found in Irving Wohlfarth, “The Measure of the Possible, the Weight of the Real, and the
Heat of the Moment: Benjamin’s actuality today,” New Formations 20 (Summer, 1993). Not incidentally
this text figures largely in Brown’s defense of the relevance of Benjamin’s historical reflections for the
present. See Politics

Out of History, 164-66.
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of democratic practice, one

that is collectivist

and transformatory,

that she has

elsewhere

offered as antidote to the reproachful
moralism often found in politicized identity
politics.

A

question thus remains:

how

can such a politics be carried on

impotence? Brown does not ponder
If the politics

new

types of

and

moralism sometimes found

present and

its

this,

late

23

why

missed opportunities,

awesome

for the

power, and Brown’s critique of the

contemporary articulations of

in

then

modem

predicament of

.

of fragmentation and difference are hardly a
match

modem

acute awareness of

this question

in a

leftist politics

political

suggests an

does Brown posit such a ahistorical picture of the
in a rendering that places the possibilities

beyond human reach? Despite her intimations on the

contrary,

present might have inherited Benjamin’s melancholia.

It is

of agency

Brown’s depiction of

within this tension that

the

Brown

presents a most pressing question: the feasibility, or effectiveness,
of what she calls a

“empirical or materialist” history in addressing the intersection between
present and past,

and

how

the different configurations of this intersection politically constitute our
present

predicament.

The complex political problem of the
to the future is resolved

by

relation

between past and present, and both

neither facts nor truth. While scholars of postcolonial

orders understand this well, precisely because colonial histories discursively
suffuse the postcolonial present so overtly,

historiography of the [metropolises]

historical

23

24

and

political salvation

Brown,

Politics

Out of History, 26.

Brown,

Politics

Out of History, 141.

24
.
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still

it is

no small irony

that the

hegemonic

holds our objectivity as a form of

Brown invokes

the postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism
to suggest better

ways

in

which

theorists can understand the politics
of historiography for political actors,
although not

necessarily for professional historians.
But the invocation of postcolonial critics
revealing.

and

how

It

poses a divide in the

way

history

is

perceived in the narratives of the West,

so-called subaltern critics conceive the

different narratives. This

same

history (Histone)

a distinction that posits a divide that

is

further questioning; namely, a radical divide

is

Brown

passes by without

between the so-called subaltern

the metropolitans narratives, even though these
are often

by means of

histories

bounded by the same

and

events,

emplotted in divergent historical narratives (history as
Gechichte). But such a

albeit

divide further questions Brown’s usage of the perspective
of the angel of history.
Besides,

as

already suggested,

catastrophe that

is

history

when Brown

presents the existence of that “single

beyond and outside of human

intervention, a history of both

dramatic and subtle unfreedom,” the possibility of a differentiated narrative
in which
both dramatic and subtle unfreedom” are emplotted

Brown

is

presupposed but never theorized.

surely invokes the figure of the angel in order to critically undermine the idea of

teleological progress.

Then she

translates this epistemological stand to a subject for the

narrative she presupposes but never acknowledges: the notion of an “us.” For Brown,

is

not the task of the angel but of an

ill

defined “us” to interrupt this force [a “single

catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage”], to seize
as possibilities for action .”"

What

is

5

But who

is

the collectivity invoked here?

divide in a

more

Brown,

Politics

moments

in the present

the “us” that occupies the position of the angel?

Does

this collectivity transgress the postcolonial

universal, or perhaps global, narrative appealing to a global-collective

subject?
25

“it

Out of History,

156.
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Thus

far

I

have been arguing

formulations are too melancholic to

consciousness demands. Or as

I

that

Brown might be invoking

whose

the critical task her call for
a historical

fulfill

shall argue

a thinker

momentarily,

this

reading of Benjamin not

only does not fully explore the ways
Benjamin’s analysis might not easily coalesce
with
the complexities of the present,
especially in relation to the possibility of
thinking the

present comprehensively and of rendering
agency meaningful. But also, like Benjamin’s,

Brown’s reluctance

to theorize a non-identitarian, albeit

comprehensive, universal leads

her to a bleak depiction of the present, which in
turn leads to a theoretical incongruence

between her account of the present and her

call for

democratic agency.

Yet, despite her bleak depiction of the present-day
prospects for

Brown poses

the need for devising critical

shies

away from

come

out of concerted

ways

human

efforts,

rendered comprehensively in

histories

to think about this predicament. Still, she

and

to differentiate the catastrophe that

its

is

possible only

when

relation to the past; that

Benjamin’s

the present predicament

is,

in

ways

in

which

the

and moments of freedom are depicted alongside catastrophes.

In

contrast

to

Brown, Buck-Morss’

proceeds along different

lines. In

articulation

Arcades Project, especially his
and one

of the Benjaminian project

good Benjaminian fashion Buck-Morss seeks

an originary history of the twentieth century, one that

history,

agency,

thinking the present comprehensively, to think possibilities that can
only

angel impotently witnesses. Such thinking
is

human

dialectic

relies heavily

to present

on Benjamin’s

of dream and awakening, his notion of

that seeks to recover dialectical

images

in order to discern

ur-

and rescue the

utopian dream that in the twentieth century miscarried. (Buck-Morss has recently come to

such theorization, but only

in

terms different from the more Benjaminian motifs
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informing her work - in order to do so
she actually goes back to Hegel 26
.)
Furthermore,
also like Benjamin, both theorists
are at pains in conceiving, and
concretely defining, a

collective subject, a “we,” that witnesses
the “piling of

the current condition presumably imposes

of the historical-political consciousness

which

its

27

If

.

Brown, on one hand, assumes

that she seeks to retrieve,

contents are placed, and, like Benjamin,

agency and resistance

in

wreckage upon wreckage,”

is

that

the content

and the narrative

in

unable to articulate a conception of

correspondence with the diagnosis of the present; Buck-Morss,

on the other hand, offers a comprehensive history of
the twentieth century

gravitating

around the oppositions the cold war brought about - East
and West - and geographically
places

it

in

terms of the European continent and the United States.

Indeed, despite her nuanced account of recent history, Buck-Morss’s
commitment
to

a modernist dialectic of

dream and awakening and

dialectical materialists in the construction

of her analysis. What

presupposed

in the

is

more

in

Buck-Morss’s

relevant for

form

in

discussion, in

all

limit the prospects

cases a universal

narrative, but never fully

Benjamin’s philosophy

recent history of the twentieth century

different

my

The Benjaminian impasse of the

effort to retrieve

ambivalent role of the

of dialectical images might

form of a universal history or

or theoretically spelled out.

the

- although

this

collective

is

is

acknowledged,

better discerned

in order to critically

ponder the

question comes up in a slightly

her reflections. Rather than diagnosing the present, Buck-Morss

suggests the existence of a dynamic of dreamworlds and catastrophes in the twentieth
century.

26

27

See Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” Critical Inquiry 26 (Summer 2002), pp. 821-65.
See Benjamin, “Thesis on the Concept of History,”

Schocken, 1973), 257.
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in Illuminations , ed.

Hannah Arendt (New York:

By means of her re-presentation
to

of the concept of dreamworld,
Buck-Morss seeks

rework the intersection between memory
and

from

history, present

traditional Marxists-progressive
teleological conceptions

Buck-Morss faces a predicament of
Buck-Morss, out of

and

past, thus departing

of history. Like Brown,

losses; for her, “‘History’ has failed
us.”

this failure “there is

no reason

to believe that

...

But for

Utopians hopes

caused history to go wrong, and every reason,
based on evidence of the abuses of power
that

propelled

history

forward,

to

believe

the

opposite .”

observation that “History,” in the aftermath of an era,
“breaks
their stones,”

28

Following Benjamin’s

down

into images, not into

Buck-Morss’s emphasis on rescuing the utopian moment

is far

from being

a call for a progressive-teleological understanding
of history. Rather, situated in the

aftermath

of “the

interpretations

short

twentieth

of the images of the

past experience

is

century,”

past,

Buck-Morss’s

by seeing them

as

is

a

call

for

partial

“dream images,” “wherein

rescued and perhaps redeemed.” Her representations of loss

in is

presented in purely historical terms:

“History” has failed

is

so profound that

us.

it

No new

chronology will erase that

all.

But

to

wholeness

never did

dream’s realization.
history’s failure,

28

—of

we

is real

exist,

[...]

at this

point

to

it

tragedy in the shattering of the

social utopia, historical progress,

submit to melancholy
that

History’s betrayal

cannot be forgiven simply by tacking on a “post-” era

(post-modernism, post-Marxism). There

dreams of modernity

fact.

would be

and material plenty

to confer

for

on the past a

confusing the loss of the dream with the loss of the

Rather than taking a self-ironizing distance from

—the “we” who may have nothing more

Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe,

68.
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or less in

common

than sharing this

way

time—would do

well to bring the ruins up close
and

work our

through the rubble in order to rescue
the utopian dreams that modernity

engendered, because

we

cannot afford to

let

them disappear

29
.

Thus, instead of rejecting the utopia of mass
culture, and the democratic ideal
animating
this

dreamworld

and

catastrophes “in the

catastrophes,

its

name of

expression”; the reason,

Buck-Morss proposes a

the democratic, utopian

“A world

hope

to

critique

of these

which the dream gave

organized by global capital in which industrial

production continues to expand, but this time indifferent
to the well-being of the masses

and unfettered by
disappear .”

30

By

political

retrieving

meaning, Buck-Morss,

and

politics.

its

like

Hence

constraints,

this

not a world in which catastrophes will

is

utopian-democratic hope through constellations of

Benjamin, ends up working within the realm of representation

the

power and

significance that

Buck-Morss

ascribes to the

constellations of meanings emerging from “[the] juxtaposition of
these past fragments

with our present concerns might have the power to challenge the
complacency of our
times,

the

when

new

history

is

global capitalist

said

by

its

victors to have successfully completed

hegemony claims

but never theorizes

Still,

30

31

We

although she presents

is

its

one

as a

that, like

We

that

course, and

field .”

31

Brown, she presupposes

may

only share

this time.

here Buck-Morss seems to be suggesting a universal time, one that regardless of

cultural differences

'9

—

have run the competition off the

to

But Buck-Morss’ s articulation of a

its

is

shared in

common.

Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe

,

Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe,

In other words, not only does her account

68.

xiv.

Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, 67-68.
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presuppose a universal historical narrative

that she, in

Dreamworld and Catastrophe

refuses to theonze, but also her account
even presupposes a
like

Benjamin she places a

is that, in

deployed metaphorically,

at best.

social collective terms, such dialectic
can only be

Dream understood

metaphorical, Buck-Morss

dreamworlds and catastrophes
intelligible.

as aspiration, not as a collective

do not share a cerebral cortex, or a collective
memory. Rather, one

can only talk about collected memories. 32 But even
is strictly

time. Moreover,

of emphasis on a modernist dialectic
of dream and

lot

awakening. The problem

state: collectivities

common

,

still

that her

if the

account of collective awakening

has to theorize a

common

narrative in

which the

books so suggestively depict can be rendered

Otherwise claims such as her statement on behalf of global
rights

aftermath of September 11 th remain abstract:

“Humanity

if

is

in the

the subject of the global

public sphere” there needs to be a comprehensive narrative of
both continuities and
discontinuities,

large.

and memories, whose significance appeals

histories

to

humanity

at

33

* * *

Ever since the news of Benjamin’s
idiosyncratic

theoretical

style

theoretical reflections ranging

architecture,

traditions,

and even the

Marxism and

work has always defied

32
I

and

tragic

literary

genius

from Frankfurt School

politics

of deconstruction.

highly unique

his

have

influenced

critical

By

and

and often
informed

theory to literary studies,

bringing together,

among

other

surrealism, along with a strong presence of Jewish motifs, his

classification.

One of the major

take this to be the guiding contention of James E. Young’s

Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meanings
33

suicide,

intellectual

work on memory.

(New Haven: Yale

See Susan Buck-Morss, “A Global Public Sphere?” Radical Philosophy
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achievements - and

See, for instance, The

University Press, 1993),

1 1 1

xi.

(January /February 2002),

7.

this is crucial for the

purposes of the question

of theorizing consists
look

at the

in the

way

at

hand - of Benjamin’s melancholic
mode

his reflections provide a provocative
and critical

way

to

present historically; one that appears
to resist what are considered
worn-out

ideas of universal history, or historicism,
but

is

able to articulate a critique of

still

progressive history that posits the need to redeem
the present from the perspective of
“the

image of enslaved ancestors .” 34

Theodor W. Adorno, Benjamin’s

In contrast with his

reflections

younger

on history and

friend,

historical

and interlocutor,

knowledge

figure

prominently in his writings, and the presence of
theological and Judaic motifs often

overshadow the Marxist ones

35
.

This

is

not incidental if one contrasts these two thinkers’

divergent tempers and styles, a contrast that has received
ample scholarly attention in

highly suggestive ways, especially in relation to the
debates these two had about
aesthetics

and

dialectical

thinking

36
.

Yet, their differences in relation to historical

progress and historical knowledge have received scant attention, even

if a consideration

of these might refreshingly reopen the terms of the debates between Benjamin
and

Adorno

37
.

Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Concept of History,” 260. The complex and often paradoxical role of
melancholia in Benjamin’s critical ethos is suggestively developed in Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics:
Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning (Amherst,
35

MA: The University of Massachusetts

Press, 1993).

See Irving Wohlfarth, “On Some Jewish Motifs in Benjamin,” in The Problems of Modernity: Adorno
ed. Andrew Benjamin (London, UK: Routledge, 1989), 157-216.

and Benjamin,
36

For instances see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics and Jameson’s Late Marxism
Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic (London and New York: Verso, 1991). See also Adorno and
Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence: 1928-1940, trans Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1999).
37

The exception here is Gillian Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 207 See also her review-essay “The Origin
of Negative Dialectics; The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.
.

Adorno,” History and Theory 18 (February, 1979), 176-35. Martin Jay’s otherwise stimulating reading of
the similarities between Benjamin and Adomo in relation to the question of history and progress fails to
notice the singularity of Adorno’s claims in “Progress,” ascribes a nuance to Benjamin’s formulation that
these lack, and thus obscures the differences between their respective treatment of these questions. See
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Adorno, as already suggested, shared with
Benjamin a strong
progress.

Adorno,

teleological reason

like

critique of historical

Benjamin before him, rejected the notion
of

marching

in history, or

a

universal

of any other form of historical teleology.
But

contrary to Benjamin, in Negative
Dialectic Adorno unequivocally stated,
“Universal
history

must be construed and denied.” Indeed, Benjamin
conflated universal

history and

histoncism while single-handedly rejecting both:
“Historicism rightly culminates
universal history,” towards the end of his
history,

“Its

Benjamin was

he wrote

life,

38
.

And when

it

comes

in

to universal

also unequivocal: “Universal History has no
theoretical armature.”

method,” moreover, “mass a data

to

the

fill

homogenous, empty time .” 39

In

open

contrast with Adorno’s dialectical comprehension
of the “double character” of concepts
in their

equivocal historical articulations

that consists in the crafting

discern the

its

negation)

a

mode of reading and

of nuanced immanent readings

moment of truth of even

consisted in

—

most

the

- Benjamin’s

that allow

reified concept or

reflections

interpreting

him

phenomena
to critically

phenomena (which

often

on history took the form of a complex

and rich mixture of theological and politico-revolutionary motifs, highly informed
not
only by Judaism and Marxism, but also by Blanquism, modernism, and surrealism. The
theoretically rich juxtapositions of

in

all

these motifs

is

perhaps nowhere more evident than

Benjamin’s Theses. As Buck-Morss once observed, “In the theses on

theological pole of Benjamin’s thinking

was

strongly evident, not so

Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept From Lukacs
Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984), 262-66.
38

39

Benjamin, “Theses on the Concept of History,” 262.
Benjamin, “Theses on the Concept of History, ”262.
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to

much

history, the

alongside the

Habermas (Los Angeles and

”

materialist pole as within

it

.” 40

Or, as Perry Anderson has stated

it,

“Modernist

alert

and

millennial expectation intertwine in the
‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’
without

exhausting the richness of these,

Marxism, the

at the

end of the

thirties .”

41

Antichrist, the Messiah, and the historical
materialist: these are

all

motifs and metaphoric characters that figure
largely in Benjamin’s reflections on
history.

While

interpreters agree that there is a critique of
positivist historiography (Ranke), the

social

democracy of

his day,

these reflections are informed

of each motif

and historicist-progressive accounts of

by

all

in his reflections

of the aforementioned

history,

and

traditions, the relative

of history have been subject

to controversy.

that

weight

Openly

contrasting with a historicist historiography that posits the
past as a causally connected

sequence of events, when surely located within a continuum of what
he
time,” the historical materialist, Benjamin argues,

is

one

who “must
history.

materialist “the past

whose locus

becomes

the subject of a construction

time, but the particular epoch... he breaks the epoch

continuity ....

4

^

It

is

away from

its

“empty

sacrifice the epic

dimension of history,” or what Nietzsche called monumental
...

calls

For the historical

is

not empty

reified historical

the task of the historical materialist not only to “brush history

against the grain” but also “to blast open the continuum of history,” to break with
historicism’s

dream of linearity and uninterrupted progress and

presence of the

40

41

4

'

(Jetztzeit

).”

43

To

by the

bring to bear the incompleteness of the past in the

Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics, 169.
See Perry Anderson,

A Zone of Engagement (London and New

York: Verso, 1992), 47

Walter Benjamin, “Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian,” in One-Way Street and Other Writings,

trans.,

43

now

posit “a time filled

Edward Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London and New York: Verso,

Benjamin, Illuminations, 262.
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1979), 352.

present, with

broken promises of redemption,

its

Benjamin’s project, one

that

for the sake

of redeeming

it,

that

is

sought to enact the cntical import
of the historical

perspective associated with Marx, while
resisting vulgar or mechanistic
Marxism.

Out of Benjamin’s formulations of

this

interpretation elicits the

most debate

image from Benjamin’s

theses. In Thesis IX,

Novus

in order to starkly

Here, indeed,

is

where

expound

thematic the one single reflection whose

perhaps ironically, the most frequently
invoked

is,

Benjamin

is

depicting Paul Klee’s Angelus

his critique of progress, while reflecting

on

history.

his critique of progress is found in stark
terms. This recurrent

image has been interpreted

in a variety

of often-contradictory ways, with the intersection

and relative theoretical importance of Jewish and materialist
motifs being a source of
44

contention,

even today

interpreters

have brought

[Reflection

IX of the Thesis],” Niethammer

.

Lutz Niethammer has summarized the different traditions
to bear

on

this

image. “In attempting to decipher
writes, “various interpreters

bear a wide range of materials and angles of vision from Benjamin’s

from Klee’s subjects and views on

art,

this

passage

have brought

own

to

biography,

from the spread of the angelic allegory

in

nineteenth-century cultural history, from Marxism, from the angelology of Kabbala, from
the Torah and the

Many

mythology of Antiquity, and from

interpreters share the

view

that

Benjamin

the science of

thermodynamics .”

identified with the angel in the text

4

46

44

For an account of the different interpretations see Lutz Niethammer, Posthistorie: Has History Come to
trans., Patrick Camiller (London and New York: Verso, 1992). See also Gillian Rose’s essay
“Walter Benjamin Out of the Sources of Modem Judaism,” in Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical

an End

—

Essays. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993, pp. 175-210.
45

46

Niethammer, Posthistoire: Has History Come
This

much one

gathers from Benjamin’s

probingly interpreted by

—

sign of Saturn

own

to

an End?, 108-09.

reflections in the fragment “Angesilaus Santander,” a text

Gershom Scholem, and where Benjamin

writes “I

came

into the

the star of the slowest revolution, the planet of detours and delays.”

according to Scholem

is

the only place

where Benjamin “reveals
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his

own

world under the

And

the text

melancholic character.”

where

And Niethammer

sides with a

more

theological reading. For him,
the angel neither

represents Benjamin “fleeing from
catastrophe into religion” nor
does

Benjamin himself; what the angel represents

is

it

represent

a “divine messenger,” one that
reclaims

“the hopes of redemption stored in
the religious tradition" while
introducing these hopes
as a

meaning and yardstick

into

human

contact with history.” 47 Thus, the angel
signifies

a religious motif that brings into play
a transcendent standard for the politics
of earth, and

thus constitutes a religious trope distinguishable
from the historical materialist motifs.

Rolf

Tiedemann

makes

the

opposite

case.

In

a

thorough

reconstruction of the thesis against the background
of Benjamin’s earlier

Arcades Project, Tiedemann suggests

that the angel

reading

and

work and The

of the ninth thesis “by no means

represents the Messiah”; instead, he argues, “Benjamin
indeed intended the angel to stand
for the historical materialist.” 48 This

1937

essay on

much

is

discemable once one juxtaposes Benjamin’s

Edward Fuchs, where he

vividly

depicts

his

brand of

historical

materialism, with his reflections on the historical materialist in the
thesis. Following

Marx’s rather unwitting integration of incompleteness
invocation of an unredeemed past,

in

the

in

history,

Eighteenth Brumaire,

by means of
Benjamin

his

writes:

Niethammer, Posthistorie, 1 12. Lutzhammer rests his case on the strong religious overtones of the notion
of the angel and in framing the angel, and the actions Benjamin attributes to it, within the context of the
Hebraic religious tradition. Yet his textual case is fairly thin. Religious metaphors pervade western
conceptualization of history and of universalism and one can trace them back to Paul’s letter to the
Galanthians and to Augustine’s City of God. Moreover, nineteenth-century philosophies of history are part

of a dialectical relationship between secular, eschatological, and religious motifs. In any case, following his
concluding reflections on “the dissolution of history,” Nietahmmer could have discerned that

own

Benjamin’s critique of “empty time” compellingly undermines Judeo-Christian eschatologies. For an
influential treatment of the intersection of religious and secular motifs in nineteenth-century historical
thought, see Karl Lo with, Meaning in History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956). The best
survey of the different historical and theoretical articulations of this notion of “the end of history”
in Perry Anderson’s essay “The Ends of History” in A Zone of Engagement, 279-375.
48

is

found

Rolf Tidemann, “Historical Materialism or Political Messianism?” in Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics,
ed. Gary Smith (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 181.

and History,
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“Historical Materialism does not regard
the
for

Marx “Men make

own

their

work of the

history, but

circumstances, but under circumstances

...

...

that shatters the

new

present.

one

“weighs

that

Benjamin invokes the notion of
the past to the present, in

of these images
Still,

is

Tiedemann

sum

make

it

under self-selected

set to

work an engagement with

has recourse to a consciousness of the present

like

a nightmare

refers to “the tradition of all

on the brains of the

living,”

dialectical images, a concept that bears the relations

a flashing

is

moment,

“dialectics at a standstill .”

51

And

materialist. Either

,

or he chastens his previous claim on the angel’s

he goes for the former, and

in a dialectical twist to

disguises himself as the angel of history

may

Marx’s formulation, while

not be one after

angel of history as the materialist historian, Tiedemann
“totally unable to turn to the future.”

mythical make-up of the world .”

51

52

53

the

he limits the possibilities for change from

posing the question of agency, Tiedemann writes: “The historical materialist

50

of

too vigilant a reader to remain unambiguous in his depiction

the perspective of this materialist

49

If

the historical materialist.

of the angel as the historical

identity;

is to

continuum of history .” 50 And where Marx

dead generations,

crafter

It

they do not

done with .” 49

given and transmitted from the past,” for

Benjamin, “The task of historical materialism
history original to every

past as over and

And

is

like the angel,

all .”

52

Benjamin, “Edward Fuchs, 352. See Tiedemann, “Historical Materialism,” 183ff.

Tiedemann, “Historical Materialism,” 200.
Tiedemann, “Historical Materialism,” 200.
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latter as

he “remains entranced by the

Benjamin, “Edward Fuchs,” 360.

3].

presenting the

forced to interpret the

53

See Benjamin, The Arcades Project, [N 2a,

By

who

But what neither Tiedemann nor Lutzhammer
consider

is

that regardless of

what

the angel stands for, the historical materialist
or “the hopes of redemption stored in
the
religious tradition,”

what

taken for granted

is

is

the cognitive attributes ascribed to the

angel, and the relation of the critic to this
epistemology of history. Stated
differently, for the angel to

account of

its

development

comprehend the
that informs the

pattern of history, there

gaze of the angel.

is

somewhat

a comprehensive

And Benjamin,

to

be

sure,

rejected wholeheartedly the concept of universal
history, even if the cogency of his
critique requires

some form of it.

In order to fully grasp the significance and theoretical-political
import of the
retrieval

of Benjamin’s angel

A Klee painting
about to

it

is

necessary to quote Reflection IX in

named “Angelus Novus” shows an

move away from something he

staring, his

mouth

is

is

angel looking as though he

is

turned toward the past.

is

how one

it

in front

of his

feet.

The angel would

make whole what has been smashed. But

like to stay,

a storm

is

pictures the

Where we perceive

events, he sees one single catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage

and hurls

is

fixedly contemplating. His eyes are

open, and his wings are spread. This

angel of history. His face

its entirety:

a chain of

upon wreckage

awaken

the dead, and

blowing from Paradise;

it

has

got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close

them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back
turned, while the pile of debris before

call

54

progress

him grows skyward. This storm

54
.

Benjamin, Illuminations 257-58.
,
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is

is

what we

In this rendering of the angel of
history there

“where we see a chain of events, he
Thus, not only

seems

to perceive history as a chain

an

no discontinuity or

undifferentiated

of events, even

remembrance and
catastrophe.

comprehensive account of history

forgetfulness; the angel,

The

historicism with “time filled

by

that

who

angel

therefore

substitutes

the presence of the

now

irremediably

seen in a temporal sequence of

if

at least

possesses

it

Jetztzeit ].’’ ’ Either

an

conceives of

empty-time of

the

[,

on the contrary

either

epistemological position that ordinary humanity does not share, or
a

radical ruptures,

of history] sees one single catastrophe.”

the position of the angel inaccessible to
humanity,

is

continuity and discontinuity,
sees

[the angel

is

positivist

way

the angel

posits the critique of historical progress from a comprehensive universal
narrative that

never theorized; in
Besides,

events,

by brushing
even

if

Benjamin

fact,

rules out the possibility for such a history in advance.

aside the linearity implied

is

it

reflected

on

in

by

the notion of history as a chain of

terms of periodically disrupted breaks and

modem

discontinuities, the standpoint of the angel negates the

while, at that

same

tine,

Benjamin’s notion of

modem

Jetztzeit.

experience

is

In Perry Anderson’s

apt

deploy

idea of progress

this idea

it

of an angel of history

55

new

In this

in order to

that is the hallmark

it,

that is the sign

way, and despite

of the
of the

his valiant

undermine historicism and the

portends, Benjamin ends up reinstating an empty-time in the angel’s

perspective to the point of even betraying his efforts to rework historical materialism.

55

to

formulation, “[Benjamin’s]

the sudden transfiguring blast of the messianic into

revolution, in the over-pitched versions of either .”

effort to

experience of history

what permeates and gives meaning

concept of Jetztzeit combines the continuous flow of the

modem, with

is

Anderson, A Zone of Engagement 47.
,
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It is

thus not without irony that while undermining
progressive historiography and

historicism Benjamin posits history as “one single
catastrophe.” Insofar as historicism

and universal history are conceived as positing history
as a chain of events

moment

aside for the

attest,

as cyclical histories)

comprehend difference and
question

positivist

it

leave

the fact that the notion of a “chain of events”
could easily be

emplotted in a narrative of decay, or as the Greek and

experiments

(let’s

- one

that

Roman

presumably

is

historiographical

not only unable to

discontinuity, but also silence historical experiences that

- both end up imposing

a

homogenous

historical narrative

may

anchored

in

epistemology and a universal teleology. But Benjamin’s angel does the same

and equally reinstates

this

empty-time, as

is

evident in his critique of progress and in the

undifferentiated conception of history that informs
Interestingly, running along the

same

lines

it.

of his critique of progress, there

is

yet

another dimension in Benjamin’s formulation of his critique that most interpreters have

conspicuously

is,

and

is

left out:

thus able to

the angel discerns the totality and unity of the catastrophe history

comprehend

that the “piling [of]

wreckage upon wreckage”

is

not

only the result of a whole that once existed, but of one that “has been smashed.” Hence,
despite the single catastrophe that progress brings and hurls in front of Benjamin’s angel,

one whose “pile of debris grows skyward,” and despite
nature of the ideology of progress

- one

that in

his critique

of the unreflective

Benjamin’s image of a storm keeps going

forward accumulating more and more debris - his reflections ultimately re-posit the same
linearity

and are thus immersed

in a narrative

combining hopes, secularized or

not, for

messianic intervention, or almost mythically hoping for a modernist notion of awakening

anchored

in a questionable

Jungian model of “collective consciousness.”
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Indeed, Benjamin’s angel resonates with
one of Jorge Luis Borges’ ingenious
literary tropes:

and unable

“Funes,

el

even

to act,

Memorioso

if for the

undifferentiated catastrophe that

mythical make-up,

Funes

differentiated

Funes

to

is

an inability

an

witnesses, and the magnitude of the catastrophe,

its

angel: the angel

is

no adversary, perhaps not even

weight the catastrophe that history

in detail that

to

overwhelmed
is

imposes on the

is

the opposite of the angel: as his relation to the
past

and rich

is

opposite reasons: history for Benjamin’s
angel

overwhelms the

historical materialism, for the

In contrast,

it

” Like Funes,
Benjamin’s angel

he cannot abstract from

it.

But

is

living.

so thoroughly

this richness leads

experience the temporality of history and memory; his time

is

perhaps empty-time, too.
In Borges’ narrative,

Funes was incapable of abstraction, of general

ideas, as he

could remember and seize every single

moment he

how he

every single time he’s thought about

felt at

the time, and

how

he’s

felt

experienced,

surroundings, and

its

instance, etc., to the extent that a universal-comprehensive account of

Thus Funes experiences the present

in

it

was

it

in

every

impossible.

such a differentiated and rich manner

that

it

is

certainly overwhelming, even unbearable. His perception, so rich and differentiated,

capture the richness of the present as well as his most ancient and
present that he cannot experience temporally:

everything that happened the day before.”

can

call

it;

One might

Funes’ preservation of the past memory. For

forgetting,

of

“it

which consists

“Memory”

in

in the disappearance

Tzvetan Todorov’s phrase,

280

of the
“is

trivial

memories; a

took him one day to remember
certainly argue that only a Borges

memory
past,

is

neither the opposite of

nor of the exact preservation

always and necessarily an interaction

of these two .” 56

And

yet, the

“accident” that bestowed on Funes a
prodigious

Funes physically immobile. And Borges
suggests

memory

left

he might be mentally immobile,

that

too:

I

suspect, nonetheless, he

was not capable of

thinking. Thinking

differences, to generalize, to abstract. In
Funes’

anything but details.

cramped world

is

forgetting

there weren’t

57
.

,

Funes’ “memory” renders him incapable of acting,
or even thinking, in ways

conducive

to bringing about

any creative deed or

overwhelmed by the weight of memory, even
stay,

awaken

the dead, and

blowing from Paradise;

it

is

yet “... a storm

is

has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel

singleness, for unity. Benjamin’s

it

is

not of history: “The angel would like to

is

overwhelmed by

the opposite, the manifoldness of his

redeem the past but

Like Benjamin’s angel, he

make whole what has been smashed,” and

can no longer close them.” While the angel

overwhelmed by

if

act.

is

the single storm, Funes

remembrances cannot account

is

for

the perspective of a melancholic angel that wants to

not able to do so. Ironically, the same melancholia that partially

inspired Benjamin’s cognitive genius and informed his critical vision end ups curtailing
the critical potential of his historical reflections, at least from the perspective of the

present predicament.

All in

historical

56

all,

despite his rejection of the idea of universal history, Benjamin’s

reflections

presupposed a universal comprehensive narrative.

See Tzvetan Todorov, “The Uses and Abuses of Memory,”

Ethics in Contemporary Thought, ed.
57

Howard

Marchitello

in

What Happens

Jorge Luis Borges, “Funes El Memorioso,” in Obras Completas

Spain:

Emece

Editores, 1996), 490.
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to History:

(New York and London:
I:

And, as

I

The Renewal of

Routledge, 2001),

12.

1923-1949 (Mallorca and Barcelona,

mentioned

earlier,

by entangling universal

history with historicism, Benjamin
shied

from offering a more nuanced account of
his critique of progressive-teleological
and of articulating a comprehensive account
of universal history

in

which

away

history,

his diagnosis of

the present can be emplotted and
apprehended. Because of his reluctance to
give up

comprehensiveness, Adorno emerges as one of the most
relevant thinker

And
in

in his critique

which the

of progress Adorno deploys his very

continuities and discontinuities, as

much

in the present

own mode of immanent

reading,

as the progressive and regressive

elements, in the history of a concept are aporetically
discerned, and rendered
these lines that the debate between Benjamin and

58
.

59
It is

.

Adorno might be more

along

fruitfully

reopened.
* * *

What

is

the political and cognitive import of the idea of Universal history?

history yet another concept of a bygone,

behind

its

modem,

era?

different theorizations during the eighteenth

the political import of this concept? In what follows,
the concept of universal history and render

it

I

their

local

politically,

Cf.
59

to

the Eurocentric impulse

and nineteenth centuries exhaust

explore the possibility of recasting

My

contention

is

that the present

be thought out comprehensively and politically

in

both

and global dimensions. By reworking the concept of universal history

from

immanently read

58

need

universal

responsive to the political and ethical

challenges the post-Auschwitz predicament imposes.
ethico-political challenges

Does

Is

Adorno’s
in

its

negative

dialectical

perspective,

this

concept

equivocal formulations in order to disentangle

it

can

be

from the

Jameson, Late Marxism.

Theodor W. Adorno, “Progress” in Notes to
NY: Columbia University Press, 1992).

Literature: Vol

York,
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II, trans.,

Shierry

Weber Nicholsen (New

Eurocentrism of the Hegelian formulation, even

if

within Hegel - as a rigorous
exposition

of his concept of historical knowledge suggests there are important conceptual
that

need not be entirely discarded

60

Indeed, a rereading of Hegel’s
conception of

.

universal history, as well as of his reflections
for

Adorno’s

From

retrieval

of universal

on

historical

knowledge, provides the basis

history.

the early nineteenth century on, Hegel’s
philosophy of history set the terms

of most discussions not only on the nature of historical
knowledge, and
possibility, but also

of

its

political

creatively rework the reflections

and philosophical import

on

historical

61
.

its

conditions of

Not only did Hegel

knowledge posited by some of

predecessors, including towering figures such as Giambattista
Vico, David

Immanuel Kant, but
albeit often left

come

the imprint of his reflections on historical knowledge

unacknowledged -

contemporary debates on what,

in

is

his

Hume, and
also found

historical

-

after Dilthey, has

be known as the relationship between “explanation” and “interpretation”

to

another,

insights

in

and cultural knowledge. 6 " But nowadays Hegel has become synonymous with

still

infamous, influence. This

is

nowhere more evident than

in the

way

in

which

philosophical conceptions and ideas of universal history and dialectical thinking are often

assessed today. Indeed, these are hard times for Hegelianism, and perhaps rightly

60

In an earlier incarnation of this chapter, there

sake of the concerns of this dissertation,
bl

On

medieval and early

excellent study Theology

modem
and

I

was

so.

a lengthy discussion of Hegel’s philosophy. But for the

have eliminated

it.

accounts of history and historical knowledge see

From

Amos

Funkenstein’s

Middle Ages to the Seventeenth
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). For Hegel’s influence on contemporary debates
on the status of historical knowledge, and his influence on thinkers as diverse as Wilhem Dilthey, Charles
Taylor, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, see Eliseo Cruz Vergara, La Concepcion del Conocimiento Historico en
Hegel (Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1997).
62

Cruz Vergara posits the

the Social Scientific Imagination:

centrality of

Hegel

for this debate in terms

the

of the relative advantage the Hegelian

Begriff has vis-a-vis the posterior developments found, for instance, in the hermeneutic tradition. See La

Concepcion del Conocimiento Historico en Hegel, pp.
one of the most important Anglo-American figures

xi-xvi; 595-601. Charles Taylor,

in these debates.
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among

others,

is

Hegel’s Eurocentrism, and the

have discerned

moment of domination

that feminists

in his philosophical system,
taint his notion

immanently undo and reopen

his philosophical system 63

and

critical theorists

of universal history and

So entangled has the idea of

.

universal history been with progressive
teleologies, or with historicism, that the
term

presented as intrinsically entangled with
Eurocentric domination, and

is

is

accordingly

emplotted in these narratives.

Although

his formulations are

marred by strong Eurocentric sentiments, as well

guided by a philosophical-redemptive narrative of sacrifice
centrality

of Christ

in

the

(this

could be traced to the

of the argument of the Phenomenology
),

structure

as

his

speculative attempt to expound the universal and the particular
in the singular need not be

somewhat

discarded. Stated

identity

differently,

it

is in

Hegel’s effort to speculatively cognize the

and lack of identity between universal and

comprehensively

that the epistemological import

particular, identity

of his comprehensive account of history

can be found. Hegel’s increasingly Eurocentric motifs marred
this

could be immanently criticized in order to transcend

concept of Freedom that

it

its

“World

limitations in the

Spirit

it

And

yet,

name of the

and Natural History”.

from the perspective of the present,

sought to acquire a higher historical knowledge. Yet there

The locus

conception.

Hegel, by positing the centrality of a comprehensive, and speculative,

understanding of the whole in order to apprehend

63

this

invokes. In important ways, that’s precisely Adorno’s task in

the often-neglected section of Negative Dialectics,

Still,

and difference,

classicus of this critique

is

found

in

is

a lot here of what Michael

Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. See also his Hegel: Three
by Adomo and the tradition of critical theory, see

Studies. For a feminist critique of Hegel informed
Patricia

J.

Mills’

“Hegel’s

Antigone”

in

Feminist

Interpretation

(Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1996). See also Patricia

(New Heaven: Yale

University Press, 1987).
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J.

of Hegel
Mills,

,

ed.

Patricia

J.

Mills

Woman, Nature, and Psyche

Andre Bernstein has

aptly called a logic of back-shadowing,
as the past

not only

and given a logical order from the perspective
of the outcomes of decisions

justified

individuals in that past could not have foreseen,
but

ambiguity and contingency

64
.

Moreover, perhaps

is also, in this

is

a redemptive

narrative that further despoils the particular of its
singularity
It is

this

redemptive narrative that

is at

one of the aspects of his thought

Minima Moralia, Adorno

instance,

in

embraced

this age, Hitler’s

that

way, despoiled of

work

in

moment

in this

65
.

Hegel’s conception of universal

Adorno most vehemently

writes:

its

attesting to the strong influence a

Christian version of eschatology bears in
Hegel, there

history,

is

criticized.

“Had Hegel’s philosophy of

robot-bombs would have found

For

history

their place besides the early

death of Alexander and similar images, as one of the selected
empirical facts by which
the state of world-spirit manifests itself directly in symbols.
spirit’,

stroke,

that

Hegel

s

philosophy of history .”

More

66

Adorno

importantly this redemptive narrative

takes

is

its

at the

what he perceives

same

as

the

strong totalizing bent, to task

predicated on the logic of sacrifice

pervades his system - sacrifices that are supposedly made for the emergence of a

higher form of consciousness.

64

have seen the world

not on horseback, but on wings and without a head, and that refutes,

pernicious combination of a redemptive narrative, with
here.

[...] ‘I

And

the totalizing tendencies of Hegel’s dialectical

See Michael Andre Bernstein, Forgone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History (Los Angeles and
The University of California Press, 1994).

Berkley:
65

Like Lowith before him, Hayden White has discerned the influence of Christian eschatology

nineteenth century philosophies of history. See Karl Lowith,

Columbia University

Press, 1964), 35ff. See also his

Meaning

From Hegel
in

to Nietzsche

in

(New York:

History and White’s Metahistory: The

Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1973), 127.
66

Adorno, Minima Moralia, 55.
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rendering of universal history are
criticized accordingly. For as
Adorno put

Benjamin said
needed

to

that history hitherto

had been written from the standpoint of the

be rewritten from that of the vanquished,

we

it,

“If

victor,

and

might add that knowledge indeed

presents the fatally rectilinear succession of
victory and defeat, but should also address
itself to

those things which were not embraced by
this dynamic, which

wayside—what might be
dialectic .”

67

And

it

is

fell

by the

called the waste products and blind spots that
have escaped the

precisely these blind spots that Adorno’s negative
dialectic, with

emphasis on non-identity, seeks
illuminated in what in the

first

its

to illuminate through constellations. Blind spots
that are

chapter of this study

I

formulated as the Other Scene the
:

space in which non-identity
part

is

illuminated, and

its

suffering

fleshed out concretely, as

is

of a comprehensive constellations of concepts. In terms of historiography,

illuminate these blind spots

by means of

to

constellational critique, a universal historical

narrative that renders these comprehensively and concretely

is

needed. In other words, a

constellational critique that seeks to break with the silencing of history but
one that

paradoxically

may

lend voice to the suffering of the nameless others by representing their

silence rather than pretending to either speak for

apprehending the “blind spots

comprehend history from

that

have escaped the

the perspective of non-identity.

the idea that there are continuities.

failure, actions

them or impose

As

a voice

dialectic,”

Even

so,

68
.

Indeed, by

Adorno seeks

he refuses

to give

to

up

the aforementioned passages suggest, victory and

and reactions, are entangled

in structural process that is nevertheless

contingent; namely, not part of a teleology.

67

68

Adomo, Minima Moralia,
Cf. Elizabeth

151.

Wyschogrod, An Ethics of Remembering:

(Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1998).
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History, Heterology,

and

the Nameless Others

Thus, as Adorno immanently criticizes
the concept of progress, he
preserves the
notion of universal history.
principle that

is

in his discussion

of progress, Adorno clings

constitutive of his philosophy: the need
to

of a concept

in

understanding of both

its

history

As

its

equivocations,

its

the

immanently analyze the

which often lead

utopian content and

to

to

a

more adequate

possible complicity with present-day

domination. “Like every philosophical term,
progress has

its

equivocations; and every

such term’s equivocations also register a commonality .” 69
From

this

Adorno proceeds

to

explore these equivocations in order to flesh out the
commonality in the equivocations of
the concept, and

how

in its equivocations,

Progress means: a coming out of the
is itself

nature,

to nature

true content emerges.

its

spell,

when human mankind becomes aware of

and halts the mastery which

by nature continues.
occurs where

it

even out of the

In this respect

it

it

spell

its

of progress which

own

exerts over nature through

indigenousness

which mastery

could be said that progress only properly

ends.

Then, progress would become transformed into resistance against the perpetual

danger of relapse

70
.

Adorno thus challenges
reflections

on capitalism

the

is

modem

idea of progress, an idea that in Marx’s critical

both significantly shattered and preserved; shattered, insofar

as capitalism has not brought about concrete emancipation, and preserved for similar

reasons as the condition of being part of the proletariat

is

securely superior vis-a-vis

mediaeval serfdom, and as orthodox Marxists have long sustained, capitalism

69

70

See Adorno, “Progress”

in

Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History

Adorno, “Progress,” 90-91, 101.
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,

84.

is

an

intrinsic stage in history’s path.

The

latter

view

secularized version of eschatological
narrative.

vehemently

while

rejects,

seeking

comprehensive understanding

to

is

It is

preserve

reinforced

by Marx’s

reliance

precisely this last view that
the

epistemological

it

a

Adorno

power of

history. In contrast, to other
Hegelian-Marxists,

reclaims the critical import universal history as

on

a

Adorno

allows for a comprehensive totality in

which the concrete intersection between universal
and

particular

elements can be

discerned (one cannot not think a historical totality
however contingent his historical

might

articulation

be). In the modernity, capitalism

be reckoned with, but
locations and social

market imperatives manifest

its

formations.

Adorno’s conception seeks

To

economy.

political

critical

is

It

to capture

in different

precisely this intersection,

I

ways

in specific

shall

argue, that

71

Adorno’s position represents

to look at the latter’s critique to the ahistorical nature

I

would

to

.

better see the point of departure that

Marx, one needs

emerges as a universalizing force

like to suggest that

vis-a-vis

of classical

what can be retrieved from Marx

is

the

historicism that emerges from his critique of the categories of the political

economy

—

its

other component, that pertaining to the transitions from one

mode of

production to another, has been pondered and problematize by Marxist such as Anderson,

Mayer, and Jameson.

more nuanced
With
in

It is,

indeed, in Jameson’s reformulation of these questions where a

position can be found.

the advent of the French revolution the concept of progress gained salience

Western social and

political thought

which the increasing changing

71

Cf. Osborne,

and thus provided the narrative structure through

in politics, culture,

The Politics of Time, especially chaps. 1-2
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and the

political

economy began

to

be

From Thomas Malthus

framed.

John Stuart Mill the

to

started to conjecture the possibility

of historical progress and

of social progress by means of education, or
impenahst-civihzational imperative

73
.

in the case

to

frame within

discourse

it

the idea

of Mill, also by means of an

In doing so, the categories

economy of Adam Smith and David Ricardo became

economy

political

of the new

reified, as these

political

were presented

as

universal laws, thus brushing aside their social
and historical nature. In Marx’s view, by
the

mid nineteenth-century both “Smith and Ricardo

still

stand with both feet on the

shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose
imaginations this eighteenth-

century individual

-

the product

on one

side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of

society,

on the other side of the new forms of production developed since

century

- appears

as an ideal,

whose

historic result but as history’s point

the sixteenth-

existence theory projects into the past. Not as a

of departure .”

74

Or

as

Marx

presented

it

later on,

although this time in terms of the larger canvas of human history: “World history
has not

always existed; history as world history

By means

[is]

a result .”

75

of his critique of capitalism, Marx consistently deployed a

“critical

historicism” to criticize the false universalization of complex, and by no means linear,

7

"

In relation to the questions of abundance and scarcity, Nicholas

Xenos writes: “Once the concept of
abundance took shape as an ideal negation of the present order, appearing
in this guise in David Hume’s reflections on justice. Eventually, the concept of progress provided a
narrative structure within which scarcity and abundance could be accommodated in a single linear frame.”
See Scarcity and Modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 35. See also chapter IV of this
scarcity took hold in modernity,

dissertation.
73

On

the civilizational imperative in Mills, along with his historicism, see

Empire (Chicago,
74

IL:

The University of Chicago

S.

Metha, Liberalism and

Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus
UK: Penguin Books, 1993), 83. cf. Marx’s discussion of the attempt of classic political

(London,

economists to naturalize their conception of production
75

Uday

Press, 1999).

in p.

Marx, Grundrisse, 109.
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87

particular-historical processes.

as a

way

about.

to avoid the erasure

Furthermore, this

intersection

different

of

modes of production

bnng under

and

how

critical historicism that

memory

as

that

the

Adorno would

that the reification

critical historicism

between capitalism,

imperatives

relations;

A

later

on endorse

of categories have brought

seeks to also comprehensively explore
the

newly prevalent mode of production, with

preceded

it.

Stated

how

differently,

capitalist

capitalism non-capitalist relations, as well
as pre-capitalist

these,

in

turn,

become

once constitutive of the process of

at

accumulation of capitalism as well as reconstituted
by

this

system of power and

its

imperatives.

Marx continued towards

the end of his

life

reconsidering

some of these

After 1871, while facing the situation in Russia, in the famous

Marx ended up
development

questions.

Vera Zasulich,

letter to

suggesting “the idea of a concrete multiplicity of paths to historical

and acknowledged

that his

well-known model of

transition

from different

modes of production was based on

the experience of Western Europe. But

fully articulated the implications

this shift, as

dated from 1881. Here

Marx

of

he only hinted

at

them

Marx never

in another letter

objects to the use of his “historical sketch of the genesis of

capitalism in Western Europe into a philosophical theory of general development...”

From

this

Etienne Balibar derives the following conclusion:

“Just

as

there

is

capitalism ‘in general’, but only a ‘historical capitalism’, comprising the encounter

76

In a letter to Benjamin,

on 29 February 1940, he

writes:

“For

all reification is

no

of-

a forgetting: objects

become purely thing-like the moment they are retained for us without the continued presence of their other
aspects: when something of them has been forgotten.” Benjamin and Adorno, The Complete
Correspondence 321.
,
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and conflict between - many capitalisms,
so there
historicities

is

no universal

history only singular

.” 77

Marx’s

formulation,

however,

hints

a

at

different

possibility:

one

that

speculatively reads the universal and the
particular always in reference to the
concrete. In
the

same

letter

quoted by Balibar, Marx adds: “Thus events
strikingly analogous, but

occurring in different historical milieu, led
to unique disparate results.

of these evolutions on
to the

its

phenomenon, but

own, and then comparing them, one

it

will never be arrived at

By

studying each

will easily discover the

by employing

key

the all-purpose formula

of a general historical-philosophical whose supreme
virtue consists

in

being supra-

historical.”

Yet,

Marx

s

formulations in Capital and in the Grundrisse are marred by his
share

of what Michael Andre-Bemstein
linearity to

teleological

of

and

linear conception

of history, comes

For instance,

in the

its

structure, thereby also allow insights into the structure

all

built itself up,

the vanished social formations out of

whose

anatomy contains a key

partly

still

78

to the

whose

and the relations of
ruins and elements

unconquered remnants are carried along with
explicit significance within

anatomy of the ape

See Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx,

110

and ultimately undermines

Grundrisse Marx wrote:

whose mere nuances have developed

77

to the fore

categories which express [bourgeois society’s] relations, the comprehension

production of

it

“back-shadowing” (retrospectively adding a

an otherwise process of structured contingencies) which, along
with a

his critical historicizing.

The

calls

trans. Chris

.

Marx, Grundrisse, 105.
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it,

etc.

it,

Human

78
.

Turner (London and

New

York: Verso, 1995),

Marx

thus tnes to extend his comprehensive
knowledge of bourgeois society to

antecedents.

work

As

the analogy with the ape suggests,
there

one

here,

critical

historicism notwithstanding,

Marx

of classical

of the moment of

from Hegel a teleological

critical

historicism found in his

economy. Indeed, the strong teleological bent of

political

philosophy of history oftentimes takes the best of his

at

equivalent in Marx.

its

inherited

conception of history that ultimately swallows
the
critique

an evolutionary assumption

that not only resonates with
Hegel’s invocation

recollection of Geist, but that also evidently
constitutes

His

is

its

critical historicism.

his

Despite his

trenchant critique of the bourgeois conception of
progress, the basic conceptual elements

of teleological history are
case,

unaltered in his analysis

left

as in Mill’s reflections,

is

-

based on three stages

revolution, and the emancipated society of true humanity

comprehensive

historical

79
.

thus expounded: history,

is

In addition to the

knowledge of both the universal and

Marx

historical capitalism,

a progression, that in Marx’s

also inherited

from Hegel, who

promise of

the particular aspects of

in turn inherited

from the

Scottish enlightenment, a conception of historical “development” that
informed both
thinkers’

Eurocentric

redemptive narrative

expounded

at

moments. Indeed,

work

in Considerations

developmental approach

Metha and

both

the

Marx and

nineteenth

Mill.

It is

century there

is

also

a

in the latter’s historicism, as

on Representative Government where a teleological and
,

to historicism is articulated,

others have shown,

differently, liberal historicism

79

in

in

is

one

was entangled with

that, as the

British

work of Uday

imperialism.

Or

stated

the one implicated in the justification of imperialism.

Xenos, Scarcity and Modernity, 48.
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S.

It is

against these formulations that
Adorno’s insistence on the double
character of

the notion of progress needs
to be understood. In both the
essay “Progress” and in his
joint authorship with

Horkheimer

in the Dialectic

of Enlightenment, he tnes

to critically

histoncize the idea of progress, along
with an immanent exploration of the
conceptual
tensions within

it.

A

critique

progress that, although

it

by means of which Adorno

resists

is

able to present a critique of

any abstract negation of the experiential and
utopian

connotations of the term, does not revert into
a teleological understanding of history
that

redeems past suffering

for a quasi-eschatological end.

renewed not only mastery but
history

is

woven from

the increase in

concept.”

also the prospect of

real suffering,

means of abolishing

which
it,

“Each advance

its

alleviation.

in civilization has

However, while

real

certainly does not diminish in proportion to

the fulfillment of that prospect depends on the

along similar lines that Adorno seeks to retrieve the notion
of universal

It is

history.

Adorno’s

retrieval

of universal history

is

found

in the

Hegelian model of Negative

Dialectics. But, contrary to the lengthy treatment that philosophy
of history receives in

Hegel’s system, and the emphasis the

latter

way of

of the

writing

it,

Adorno’s

retrieval

places on

critical

its

method, object, and even

import of universal history

is

from the perspective of theoretical philosophy. Thus he does not offer the Marxist
point of Hegel as an apologist of the Prussian
universal history.

As

state,

in the

done
entry-

nor Hegel’s specific formulations of

the opening quote of this chapter reads:

Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have

happened, and

80

Adomo

in

view of the catastrophes

and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment,32.
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to

come,

it

would be cynical

to

say that

a plan for a better world
that reason,

splintered

however,

is

is

manifested in history and unites

it.

Not

to

be denied

for

the unity that cements the
discontinuous, chaotically

moments and phases of history— the

progressing to rule over men’s inner nature

unity of the control of nature,

81
.

Both the cynicism surrounding abstract ideas
of progress and the subjugation of nature
by

humans

are part of the

moments

that

Adorno sees contained

vein, he seeks to retrieve the possibility

in this notion. In the

of a comprehensive narrative

in

same

which both

aspects can be critically discerned. Hence,
the insistence on the unity that cements the

discontinuous moments.

And humanity -

as a

whole -

is

what

depicted by means of

is

this concept.

Although

this assertion

has not received sufficient attention two accounts stand

out as offering probing readings of

it:

Gillian Rose’s and Fredric Jameson’s. In Rose’s

reading, universal history must be construed “in order to

and deformation” (namely,

capitalist relations

comprehend

social formation

of production and other socio-cultural

dynamics of continuity and/or domination) and denied, insofar

as

it

has historically been

presented either in terms of the Kantian guiding Providence, or the rational unfolding
of a

Hegelian World-Spirit.
instance of

8

"

Jameson, on the other hand, sees

Adorno arguing

dual-attributes, but also

for the

need

to

this

assertion as another

apprehend a concept not only by means of its

from the perspective of constellational thinking: the way

handle “the impossible yet indispensable concept.” Or, stated differently, handling

81

82

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 320.
Rose, “The Origins of Negative Dialectics,”! 30.
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to

this

concept from the comprehensive
perspective of “constellative critique .” 83
For Jameson,

“what

argued in effect

is

that is history ...” 84

It

is,

is

the ultimate objectivity of that
absent and invisible totality

after all, the

Adorno most vehemently presents

primacy of the object

in

his

negative

that is

dialectic.

perspective that this notion of universal history
maintains

its

one of the things

And

validity

is

-

and, as such,

reclaims Marx’s attempt to comprehensively
render the social process that
as

something ontologically posited, but as a social and

85

is

this

history, not

political process.

Thus, Adorno goes on to affirm, “History
discontinuity .”

from

it

is

the

unity of continuity and

But out of this assertion an important difference with Marx

the break with the teleological bent of his
conception, and

its

is

discerned:

retrospective recollection.

One need

not dispute Marx’s influence in Adorno to disagree with
Jameson’s contention

that this

model presents a “‘defense’ of

immanent

Marx

s

critique

insofar as

and

it

socially bounded, and

objectivity; but unlike Marx’s,

Marxian view of history .” 86 Adorno’s

of the notion of universal history might be similar

retrieval

is

the

it

is

to

thought-out from the perspective of

resists the progressivist

evolutionism that

is

sometimes

found in Marx’s formulations. Besides, as part of his immanent critique of universal
history,

Adorno draws on Marx’s

relationship

between nature and

contention,

history,

in

The German Ideology, about the

and approvingly quotes the following passage:

“History can be considered from two sides, divided into the history of nature and the
history of mankind. Yet there

83

84

85

86

is

no separating the two

Jameson, Late Marxism, 88.
Jameson, Late Marxism, 89.

Adomo, Negative

Dialectics, 320.

Jameson, Late Marxism, 88.
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sides; as long as

men

exist, natural

and human history will qualify each
” 87
other
Adorno draws on

this

account of the

mediation of nature and history, and argues
the impossibility of separating
these aspects,
or presenting nature as an ontological
base for society, or as a second nature.
In Adorno’s

view,

“Human

history, the history

of the progressing mastery of nature,
continues the

unconscious history of nature .” 88 But despite
his debt
conception of natural history, or perhaps because
of

histoncism from the perspective of the dynamics of
exchange. For Adorno, “Ideology

of society;

it

is

is

it,

Marx

to

in

articulating his

he transforms Marx’s

late capitalism,

critical

and the process of

not superimposed as a detachable layer on the being

inherent in that being.

It

rests

upon

abstraction,

which

is

the essence of the

exchange process .” 89
According

human

to

Adorno, “No universal history leads from the wild animal

being, but one indubitably leads from the slingshot to the
megaton

instead of simply opposing necessity with contingency,
in

to the

bomb .” 99 But

Adorno reformulates

the binary

terms of an aporetic stance in which both are rendered comprehensively. Indeed,
as

his account

of the interpenetration of culture and society, contingent

in

historical events can

inaugurate patterns of domination that structurally perpetuate their existence. Suffering

due
a

to the increasing

worthy object of

domination of non-identity

definition,

Under the all-subjugating

would have

to

is

an instance of

this,

“The world

spirit,

be defined as a permanent catastrophe.

identity principle, whatever eludes rational planning in the

realm of means, turns into frightening retribution for the calamity which identity brought
87

88

89

90

As quoted

in

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 358.

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 355.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 354.

1

have slightly amended the

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 320.
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translation.

on the

non-identical,*' a calamity that

suffering

...

the

One and

can take the form of “the

All that keeps rolling on to this day

...

of

totality

would

historic

teleologically be

the absolute of suffering.”

Universal history thus contains both moments:
the

moment of contingency

cuts

through notions of necessary progress or
evolution; the necessary allows for
sociohistoncal relations of domination (even if
from contingent origins) to be discerned in
their continuity.

Thus both moments

or even claim

to

are comprehensively rendered, but never
reconciled,

be comprehended

constellational critique at

its

best, thus

that allows for the non-identity

critical historicism that

in

all

their

determinations.

This

is

Adorno’s

opening the space for a comprehensive narrative

of the universal and the

particular,

one infused with a

seeks to historicize particular histories in their concrete local

manifestations without dispensing of the universal

comprehensive moment

cognitive experience of apprehending and representing these. Indeed,
if there
for universal history in

Adorno,

it

is

the continuation of

human

is

in

the

any basis

suffering, even if the

concrete manifestations have varied historically.
* * *

In

“Hegel and Haiti” Susan Buck-Morss provocatively writes:

on Hegel

and

continuance

—moreover,

Haiti

important?

“Why is

ending the silence

Given Hegel’s ultimate concession

to

slavery’s

given the fact that Hegel’s philosophy has provided for two

centuries a justification for the most complacent forms of Eurocentrism (Hegel

perhaps always a cultural racist
interest to retrieve

from oblivion

if not a biological

this

one)

—why

is

it

was

more than arcane

fragment of history, the truth of which has managed

297

to slip

away from us?

essay on

the

Thus Buck-Morss begins the

historical

relationship

last section

of her path-breaking

between the Haitian Revolution and
Hegel’s

master/slave dialectic; the latter being a key
paradigm in the account of the development

of human subjectivity, and of the emergence
of freedom
Hegelian system. For Buck-Morss,
also his best

world history, within the

this is a relationship that not

commentators share responsibility

the significance and

in

only Hegel silenced, but

for such silencing

ample coverage the Haitian Revolution had

92
.

After documenting

in the

newspapers and

journals of the time, especially the journal Minerva,
one that according to Buck-Morss

Hegel daily read, Buck-Morss
of

all

Hegel was the blindest

the blind philosophers of freedom in Enlightenment
Europe, surpassing Locke and

Rousseau by
front

articulates her contention, “Either

far in his ability to

of his nose

at

block out reality in front of his nose (the print right

the breakfast table); or Hegel

knew

—knew

in

about real slaves

successfully revolting against real masters, and he elaborated his dialectic
of lordship and

bondage deliberately within
In this vein,

this

contemporary context .” 93

Buck-Morss takes

issue not only with these silences she discerns in

Hegel and his commentators but also with the Eurocentric frame of reference
disavows an understanding of

this

historical

event.

As Michel-Rolph

that

Trouillot has

convincingly shown, in the western European imagination the Haitian revolution was a
non-event,

it

“was unthinkable

in

its

time,” “even as

it

happened,” insofar as

“it

challenged the very framework within which proponents and opponents had examined

91

92

93

Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 821-65.

Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 842-46.
Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 844.
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race,

colonialism, and slavery in the
Americas .” 94

revolution

whose outcome was

hemisphere -

work

best

95
.

But according

in Europe,

-

it

and

was ingrained

black

state,’

century—challenged

to the extent that

“Age of Revolutions”

still

of

even the

neglects

of the

its

racist

attitudinal racism

in the official discourse

to

Atlantic

black-nation-state in the

less so a reflection

Each and every one of the steps— leading up

and culminating

on

of the Imperial

in the

emergence

largely part of the unthinkable until the
twentieth

further the ontological order of the

West and

the global order of

96

colonialism .”

In light of slavery’s role as root

from Locke
relation to

first

first

to Trouillot this neglect is hardly
the offspring

of its contemporaries

modem

of a

represented the

one neglected by Western historiography,

the part of posterior histonans

West.

the establishment of the

that seeks to sympathetically
reconstruct the

significance

attitudes

albeit

It

to Hegel,

it,

seem

to

metaphor

in

modem

western political thought

ending the silences of the Haitian revolution, and of Hegel’s

be crucial for Buck-Morss not only for the sake of scholarly

soundness, but also politically

97
.

In her concluding remarks

Buck-Morss

links

her

concern with ending Hegel’s part in silencing the Haitian revolution, and with “ending
the silence

on Hegel and

Haiti,” with the question of Eurocentrism,

See Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 82, 73, 82-3. Buck-Morss’ account

is

and with the need

indebted to this

to

text.

As Trouillot points out, even in the work of Eric Hobsbawm, the foremost Marxist historian of the Age
of Revolution, the silencing is astonishing. See Silencing the Past, 99, 173n. The text in question is Eric

Hobsbawm’ s The Age of Revolutions, 1789-1843 (New York:

Vintage, 1994).

96

Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 89.
97

On

the Haitian revolution in the

fact that slavery is present

between a slave and
since

its

modem

even

a master. Thus, the

ancient Greek origins.
political

chapters IV and

European

thought

is

historical imagination, see Silencing the Past, 70-107.

in Plato’s Republic,

My point

and

It is

a

that Aristotle suggests the possibility of friendship

imagery of slavery has been present in western political thought
here, following Buck-Morss, is to suggest that its significance in

closely related to the Imperial adventures of Europeans. See

V of the present study.
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my

discussion in

theoretically

and

politically

history from the uses to

universal history that

is

undo

it

by means of “rescuing

which white domination has put
retrieved but in the

the idea of universal

it.”

same gesture

In

doing

so,

is

it

human

not only

the promise of freedom and

emancipation can be retrieved by offering a
narrative that by challenging these
silences
articulates the equivocations

of universalism and reason concretely. “If
the

about freedom can be ripped out of the
narratives told by

own

victors

and salvaged

for our

time, then the project of universal freedom
does not need to be discarded but, rather

redeemed and reconstituted on a
forcefully

“It

its

historical facts

when

different

basis .”

98

Buck-Morss makes

this

point

she challenges enlightenment, liberal narratives of
the ending of slavery:

took years of bloodshed before slavery - really-existing
slavery, not merely

its

metaphorical analogy - was abolished in the French colonies,
and even then the gains

were only temporary. Although abolition of slavery was
the only possible

outcome of the

ideal

of universal

freedom,

it

did

not

logical

come about through

revolutionary ideas or even the revolutionary actions of the French;

it

the

came about

through the actions of the slaves themselves .” 99 Slavery ended because
the universal
discourse allowed for soon-to-be free slaves to appropriate

its

universalism for their

freedom by means of their own actions, oftentimes by means of violent

owners did not concede too easily

Buck-Morss thereby

to the

calls for a retrieval

reworked conception of universal

own

actions, as slave-

demands of enlightenment.
of the ideal of universal freedom emplotted

history,

presumably one whose basis

in a

partially resides in

forging narratives that undo the silencing impulse in western historiography, and one that

98

99

See Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 864-65.

Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 833. Emphasis added.
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make room

Will also

essay,

Buck-Morss

for the silence

of the nameless other of

rhetorically asks,

“What

if

history. In concluding her

every time that the consciousness
of

individuals surpassed the confines of
present constellations of

power

in perceiving the

concrete meaning of freedom, this were
valued as a moment, however transitory,
of the
realization of absolute spirit?

undisciplined

stories

What

other silences

told ?”

would be

reconstituted idea of universal history

ways predominant and hegemonic

100

is

would need

Hence,

to

be broken? What

one of the challenges

facing

a

breaking with the silences of the past, with the

discourses, in order to reclaim concealed histories,

displaced individuals and their stories, and retrieving
“undisciplined stories” constituting
the utopian

universal

dream of freedom. And a

human

universal history

racist

from

history

on a

its

crucial step in this direction is “rescuing the idea of

complicity with white Eurocentrism: conceiving

different basis,” in non-teleological terms,

and Eurocentric bias

As Buck-Morss’ attempt

and breaking with the

that has historically participated in the production of history.

to

end the silence of Hegel and Haiti - within the context of

breaking the Eurocentric impulse in western political thought -

attests,

out of what could

be considered a plethora of unreflective criticisms, the strongest critique one can

level

against the Hegelian system and

least

its

from the camps of contemporary
and

how

dialectic

is,

ironically, the

political theory: the question

one

that is

posed the

of Hegel’s Eurocentrism,

this bears in his reflections.

* * *

Yet stem challenges

whose

100

to notions

reflections are informed

of universal and world history have come from thinkers

by the post-colonial

Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 865. Emphasis

critique

in the original.
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of Western historiography,

and

imperial ambitions. Here

its

portrayal of the

Young’s

West -

cannot go into the details of
the accuracy of the

I

there are different levels of
sophistication here, from Robert

rather superficial

White Mythologies to the more
sophisticated and nuanced

accounts of Chakrabarty, Guha, Spivak,
and, from a Latin American perspective,
Enrique

Dussel and Walter Mignolo. So to
I

will limit

illustrate

myself to comment on the

my point,

critiques put forth

In his proposal to provincialize Europe,

dominant metropolitan

without claiming to be exhaustive,

by Chakrabarty and Dussel.

one predicated on an alliance between

and post-colonial accounts of the former colonies,
thus

histories

thinking of Europe as a province rather than as
a universal entity, Chakrabarty affirms
that

concepts such as citizenship,

state, civil society, the individual,

public sphere,

etc.,

are concepts that are intrinsic to political modernity,
even though these are of a European

provenance

101
.

He

further

acknowledges

that

“Modem

social

critiques

of

caste,

oppressions of women, lack of rights for labor and subaltern classes
in India, and so on and, in fact, the very critique of colonialism itself
partially,

of

how

More

of the concrete manifestations of Western modernity

On

also informed

in that part

by a

of the world.

central categories of modernity

one hand, “Historicism enabled European domination of

the world in the nineteenth century .”

102

On

the other hand, Western constructions of the

Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Post Colonial Thought and Historical Difference

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4.
102

two

was

challenged by the spread of western modernity to the non- western world:

historicism and the political.

101

in the subcontinent.” Still, as

this appropriation

precisely, there are, according to Chakrabarty,

that are

are unthinkable except as a legacy,

Enlightenment Europe was appropriated

with the aforementioned example of slavery,
critique

—

Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe

,

6, 7.
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political,

according to Chakrabarty, are constituted
on the basis of

western subjects and that

it

contrasts with non-

its

considers “pre-political.” Here
Chakrabarty has in mind the

kind of histoncism that entails a conception
of history based on the progression from
one
“stage” to another that
the British tradition,

is

commonly

associated with Hegel but that in reality
resides in

from the Scottish enlightenment

In other words, as the preceding
discussion

to

John Stuart Mill.

of Marx intimated,

this is a rather one-

sided and simplified view of historicism.
Historicism can be understood in a variety of

ways: (1) as a set of conventions and norms by
means of which history
scientifically;

(2)

a

way of

knowledge - an approach

thinking that

that

may

is

opposed

to

is

approached

systematic, or structuralist

lead to the contextualization and relativization of

epistemological and moral claims, especially those that claim
trans-historical validity; (3)
or as the capacity to understand the historical dimension
of

Fredric

human phenomena. 103 Or

Jameson presents the question of historicism: “The dilemma of any

as

‘historicism’

can then be dramatized by the peculiar unavoidable, yet seemingly
unresolvable
alternating

between Identity and Difference.

that allows for

This dilemma also entails a periodization

both a sense of continuity and discontinuity

to

emerge, along with the

Spanish philosopher Manuel Cruz has formulated a concept of historicism that can be best understood in
between human and nature, and it is informed by an anthropological
understanding of human societies. And it is informed by the following precepts:
(1) human history is
relation to the epistemological split

change

;

(2)

individuality,

there are no trans-historical, or eternal, truths; (3) every historical process has its own
even though a comprehensive comparative framework is allowed to explore those (indeed, it

is a necessary aspect of it); (4) there is no such as thing as an unchanging human
essence; (5) humans as
social individuals are historical beings (recall Appadurai’s claim on the past as a scarce resource);
(6) social

and cultural objects are
as a unity with

historical,

and history

is

the

sum of human

existence; (7) each epoch

is

understood

own

antecedents; (8) and a historical account of the world substitutes theological and
philosophical conceptions. It is this formulation of historicism that Chakrabarty identifies with modernity
and the one that he resists the most. See Filosofia de la Historia (Barcelona: Paidos, 1995).
l04

its

Fredric Jameson,

“Marxism and

Historicism,” in The Ideologies of Theory, Vol. 2 (Minneapolis: The

University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 150. See also

some of Jameson’s formulations where he

A Singular Modernity

,

1-81.

reads a logic of necessity in history that

non-identitarian dialectics.
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Yet
is

I

take distance from

hardly tenable from a

cntical import discerned

by Mane’s

entwined with periodizations.

And

critique

of

economy. Histoncism

political

is

thus

both are not only consonant but
also indispensable for

a non-identitarian formulation of
universal history that seeks to break
the silencing of
history to respond responsibly in the
present.
Interestingly, a universal narrative of
capital underlines Chakrabarty’s
project,

even

And

if

one

this

that interrupts but is also interrupted

seems

in tune with

comprehend

processes, without seeking to

non-European. That
to

is,

narrative of

Adorno’s formulation. Moreover,

Europe, a global historical narrative
identity seeks to

by a

is

105
.

in order to provincialize

called for, one that from the perspective
of non-

the both the universal and the particular in these
historical

mend

them, or to impose identity between Europe and the

the task of critical theory

undo the displacement of particular

is

And

epistemological.

as such,

it

seeks

histories but also their reification for the sake of an

of representing the intersection between both moments

effort

human belonging

in

specific historical

configurations. In an important way, the agenda for a critical notion
of world history from
the perspective of non-identity follows the path of Eric

Wolfs Europe and

Without History and Michel-Rolph Troulliof s Silencing the Past. But
taken

by Chakrabarty.

Instead, he falls

back

of authenticity and unmediated experience
pitfalls

own

of Heidegger’s “philosophy of

into Heidegger,

that rehearses

origins;

this is not the path

and thus introduces an

some of

an stand that

the People

is

the

ideal

most dangerous

untenable in light of his

analysis of capitalism.

Enrique Dussel, on the other hand, represents perhaps the most ambitious project

coming from a Latin American perspective

105

Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 70.
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to

offer

a reconceived

conception of

universal-world

history

from

a

non-European

perspective

106

Dussel

.

does

by

so

reclaiming a narrative of world history,
from the perspective of “world-systems
theory”
in order to offer a

considering

capitalist

how

more comprehensive account of the emergence
of modernity, without

an account of universal history anchored
in systemic understanding of

development might reproduce the

he

partiality

For Dussel, European

criticizes.

accounts of modernity are partial and
provincial; hence, his concern with a
more

comprehensive

picture.

Thus

at

first

it

might seem

arguing for resonates with Dussel’s project, and
in

that the perspective

its critical spirit it

I

have been

might do

so. Yet,

there are important differences. Dussel, for
instance, invokes a world-systemic approach
to historical capitalism,

and so his reflections turn out

to

reproduce the systemic impulse

of Hegel’s without considering the epistemological critique
of Hegel from the perspective
of

theory and sharing the functionalism inherent to this
systemic approach. The

critical

first

point can be seen in Dussel’s infatuation with the Aztecs
and his dismissal of the

Caribbean

107
.

This contributes to

many silences of particular

constitutive of the total process of colonization.

on the long duree
be apprehended

to the detriment

in

The second aspect

Here

I

am

can only

to

a

that the

108
.

Boundary 2 20 (Autumn 1993): 65-76.

indebted to a conversation with a friend and colleague Gabriel de

Encomienda system argues on

the

latter

of modes of production and social formations - notions

See, for instance, “Eurocentrism and Modernity,”

were

seen by the primacy

of individual particular processes - the

world-systemic approach has often found expendable

107

is

both their particular and universal moments by reference

dialectical conception

106

historical instances that

la

Luz. His

own work on

the centrality of the Caribbean for any understanding of the conquest of

America.
108

At

this

this stage

an important question emerges, what

conception? The most productive

way

is

the understanding of Capitalism

to think about capitalism

is

in terms

more adequate

for

of the expansion of market

imperatives. This allows for a comprehensive understanding of capitalism, one in which both the universal
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* * *

The idea of universal

history that

which particular demands

in

which

in

for

Buek-Morss alludes

to, I shall

suggest, needs to be one

freedom are given an emplotment

their often subversive

and particular content, with

in a universal narrative

contradictoriness and

its

ambiguities, are rendered but never
reconciled or mended; a universal
history that
represents the particular and the universal,
the seemingly permanent and the
seemingly
contingent, both the deep

memory of a

expounds and presents the past
along with

its

moments of

witness and the distance of the archivist; one
that

in its brokenness, its contingency,

unity. Thus, an account

of the past

and fragmentariness

in

both

its

unity and

discontinuity could be comprehensively articulated,
albeit never reconciled or mended.

The realm of historical representation

away

the possibility of a comprehensive understanding
of our past with

and breaks, one needs rather
constitutive of

more
it

a contested one, and instead of throwing

is

to

it,

to

undo

its

silences,

hegemonic discourses, and

its

hidden

its

continuities

stories, the stories that are

are part of their cultural capital.

Still,

there

is

especially if one seeks to recast the idea of universal history in
order to deploy

as part of forging an ethico-political historical consciousness,
one responsive to the

suffering of naked

human

life.

Not only does a

reconstitution of the idea of universal

history need to break with the silencing of the past hegemonic powers, but
restore the silences constitutive of the past.

order to do so; on the contrary, as

dimension of
also

avoids

this

mode of production

is

much

It

need not regress

mythical notions

apprehended, without sacrificing one for the sake of the other.

functionalist narrative. There’s nothing teleological about this.

mercantilization model of capitalism by opening
it

also needs to

in

as breaking with the silencing tendency of

subsuming particular concrete manifestations of capitalism

sometimes systemic forms

to

it

room

takes.
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On

in

a

It

universalist-systemic-

the contrary, this approach avoids the

for the contingent

amidst the structural and

current historical narratives
basts,

it

is

is

crucial to rethink universal

human

history

on a

different

equally crucial to affirm the
discontinuities and the silences
that constitute

such a history. In terms of the experience
of the Auschwitz,

this translates into preserving

what Saul Friedlander has called the
“deep memory of the survivor” not
only as

a

disruptive force that fleshes out the
contingency and continuity of the historical
narratives

on the Judeocide, but also the constitution
of such memory and the silences often
partaking in

it.

These voices also

fulfill

a crucial role in any attempt to historicize
the

Judeocide from the perspective of world history
as they provide controls
could be represented.
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to the

ways

it

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING REMARKS
History

promises

possibility

no salvation and offers the
hope only to the concept whose

of

movement

follows

history’s

path

to

the

very

extreme.

Theodor W. Adorno
Shortly after

the

embarked

I

in the writing

World Trade Center took

of this dissertation, the attacks

At

place.

the time,

lessons of Auschwitz, for any critical theory worth
responsibility.

In

conceptualizing a

other

was focused only

its

presents.

underpinnings

the

dissertation

A

my

chosen

focus, and thus disregard

violence and

advances.

consisted

in

large part of the task entailed the elucidation of the

of such

and

theory,

then

examining

representation as a coda. But an event of such proportions forced

boundaries of

in pondering the

name, by means of the question of

main theme of

the

Pentagon and

theory of responsibility responsive to the challenges the
post-

critical

Auschwitz predicament
conceptual

words,

I

to the

topic. Still, rather than

all

the

work

I

making

had already done,

I

11

me

the

question

to digress

September 2001

tried to

of

from the
into

my

ponder the question of

representation from the perspective of critical theory this dissertation

its

One of

the things the aftermath of

1 1

September made abundantly clear was

the centrality of this question in the discussions, or sometimes lack thereof, of the

political

dimensions of this event.

I

was dismayed

perspectives on the events that were

replaced

1

by

nativist

Like historian

Amo
&

and

J.

still

at,

for instance, the

way

certain critical

unfolding were fiercely rejected, while being

self-satisfied narrative

emplotments.

1

So given the

initial

focus

Mayer’s remarks, originally only published by Le Monde. See “Untimely

Event 5 (2002) <http: www.ihu.edu7muse/theory & event >. Among other things,
Mayer wrote: “Until now, in modem times, acts of individual terror have been the weapon of the weak and
Meditations,” Theory

the poor, while acts

of state and economic

terror

have been the weapon of the strong.
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In both types

of terror

of the dissertation to theoretical
consider the representation of
vtolence did not seem too
far fetch.

actually added to

It

my

topic an important dimension
that otherwise

probably have not been addressed.
Writing these remarks retrospectively,
assert that

it

was

would

I

can further

the relative lack of a political
reflection on these events

- meaning

apprehending the events comprehensively
from the perspective of American
collective
identity, its

what

really

power, and

its

prompted me, not so much

another aspect of

my

-

historical uses

as well as the chain

to digress

guiding question. The

from

result:

undoubtedly found immense inhuman proportions

in

my

of events they ensued,

chosen focus, but to explore

a study in which the violence that

Auschwitz became the occasion

to

rethink the axioms of critical theory and
to ponder the centrality of violence
in any

account of political responsibility

in light

of the catastrophes of the previous century.

Thus, alongside the Judeocide, a political preoccupation
with our present emerged as yet
another guiding historical event.

An
and

It

its

is

representations, remained as the horizon to

that a discussion

which

this

of Auschwitz

that the discussion that indeed took center stage in these
pages

a future

Auschwitz

engagement with the

in the twentieth-

book of its own.

Still, in

itself,

study never fully achieved.

remained an unachieved horizon but a guiding horizon nonetheless. Yet,

do now,
to

implication of this shift of perspective

is

I felt

then, as

I

a precondition

specific debates surrounding the representation of

and twentieth-first centuries. This

what follows,

I

would

like to suggest

is

a topic perhaps worth a

some

lines

of inquiry into

of course, important

to distinguish between target and victim. This distinction is crystal-clear in the
on the World Trade Center: the target is a prominent symbol and hub of globalizing corporate
financial and economic power; the victim the hapless and partly subaltern work force. Such a distinction
it is,

fatal hit

does not apply to the strike on the Pentagon: it houses the supreme military command - the ultima ratio
regnum - of capitalist globalization, even is it entailed, the Pentagon’s own language, “collateral” damage
to

human

life.”
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1

this future project.

Then,

I

would

September 2001 predicament we

like to return to the question

all

here, admittedly spartanly,
formulated?

By

le 8 itimizin

S.

to

component

uses and abuses of power.

for the

concept of responsibility

the end of the twentieth-century,
the centrality

of the Judeoctde as a catastrophe
pertaining
a crucial

1

navigate.

Why is the representation of Auschwitz so central

The Judeocide had become

of its bearing in the post

It

humanity

at large

in the rhetoric

was hardly

disputed.

2

of condemning, as well as

had also become a central component

in the

public rhetoric denouncing genocide
everywhere, thus raising awareness about
genocidal
politics at a global scale. This

is

not necessarily a

new phenomenon. The

Judeocide, in

its

multiple representations and narrative plots,
has been deployed as part of strategies of
political contestation since

recognition

it

its

aftermath, even if

nowadays commands. These

different contexts

it

not always possessed the widespread

representations have been mediated by

and disparate agendas, as well as by the way

in

which

its

significance

is

represented in different national settings.

Even

so, the

range of experiences for which

it

is

invoked seems

to attest to

its

universal, or perhaps global, dimension. Subsequent
genocides are often measured up

against

it.

Meanwhile,

Israel s officials,

and Jewish

politicians, instrumentalize

it;

but

they are hardly alone as American liberals often deploy the Judeocide
as a universal trope
to

legitimize

“humanitarian interventions”; meanwhile,

instrumentalizations,

2

One

even

if

leftists

both condemn such

they often advanced them in a different disguise, or

naming the catastrophe of the extermination of European Jews, see James E. Young,
and Rewriting the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), especially chap. 5.
See also more recent discussions, which combine the question of naming of the holocaust with the debates
the question of

Writing

on how

to define genocide, in Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (London and
York: Verso, 2003), especially chap. 2; and Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and
Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

New
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sometimes, or worst
bias.

Better

their

still,

challenge the centrality of the
Judeocide for

still,

its

Occidentals

sometimes radically divergent overtones
notwithstanding, such

instrumentations by JeWS and non - Jews

allke ’

**

often deployed in

ways

that

disguise the reproduction of
practices that served as condition
of possibility for the

Judeocide

to

come about

3
.

The discourses around

the Judeocide have evolved into
the

establishment of an almost universally
recognized imperative, or global standard,
as
often deployed in order to help
avoiding
incarnation, of naked

human

its

life is at stake.

repetition, regardless

it is

of what instance, or

Namely, the avoidance of its

repetition in

any

other context, locality, as well as in
any configuration of victims, perpetrators,
and

bystanders has increasingly

The Judeocide, both
symbol

for genocide.

It

that requires a process

become

part

of the Western ethico-political consciousness.

in its universality

has also

and

particularity, has thus

become an emblem of

of working through, and

loss.

become

Like other losses

in the specific case

of

a global

it is

this catastrophe, a

process of mourning, however vicarious, conducive
to confronting and facing the

and

to render

it

comprehensively

emergence of an
happening again.

ethico-political

It

through are indeed

towards

3

is

my

critical

instilling a sense

in order to

learn

from

it,

one

and thus hope

loss;

for the

consciousness to prevent such catastrophes from

conviction that the lessons derivable from such working

and pertain

to all

of responsibility

to

of humanity insofar as these could lead

naked human

life,

in

whatever shape

it

See Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), iv-xvi. For other
accounts on the revival of the holocaust at the end of the twentieth century see Peter Novick’s The

critical

Holocaust in American Political Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999) and Norman G. Finkelsntein’s The
Holocaust Industry: Reflecting on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (London and New York: Verso,

2000 ).
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takes

4
.

However, sueh working through
presupposes, and

Auschwitz

in a counter-narrative that
critically captures the
interplay

and particular,
historical

in

memory

its

in

singular manifestations.

ways

A

that brings about both

its

particular to

is

brutality,

to

weave

between universal

narrative that renders our
present
universality and

thus avoids privileging one at
the expense of the other. Yet,

what

on the need

relies,

it is

its

one

particularity,

that

and

does justice

to

Auschwitz without silencing previous
instances of violence,

and genocide. Indeed, as

I

suggested in chapters four and

five, to

break with the

silencing of the brutality of
imperialism that, in a way, contributed
to the violent
constellation of practices associated with
Auschwitz, hardly banalizes this particular

catastrophe; such procedure rather increases
our awareness and historical comprehension

of the Judeocide, therefore allowing one

Following the discussion of Adorno

to assert those elements that are particular
to

in chapter

two of

this dissertation,

I

would

5
it

.

like to

argue that in order to derive ethical and political
lessons from the Judeocide, particularly
in

ways

that force

critical theory,

one

to rethink

hardly represents

its

even the most basic epistemological assumptions of
redemption or instrumentalizations. But

The process of ‘working through” I have in mind here is political
by means of society’s “collected” memories. A Collectivity,

deliberation

insofar as
as

James

it

E.

to

argue for

entails collective

Young

has rightly
suggested, does not share a brain cortex. I thus believe that any account
of collective memories and identity
is sociological not psychological.
usage of this metaphor cannot be taken as an endorsement of the
psychoanalytic language of trauma to refer to the Judeocide. See James E. Young,
The Texture of Memory:
Holocaust Memorials and Meanings (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1993), xi. For a critique of this
perspective on the grounds that it partakes in an “ideological individualism”
see Dominick La Capra,
History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault, French Studies (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2000),
63n. Needless to say, LaCapra’s criticism seems to me off mark.

My

One of the most important debates emerging from the German Historikerstreit was the debate between
Martin Broszat and Saul Friedlander on the possibility of historicizing the Judeocide. Unfortunately, I
cannot elaborate on it in these pages. Needless to say, I plan to do so in the future. For a discussion of this
debate that takes into account both the strengths and the shortcomings of different attempts to historicize
the Judeocide, see Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New
Press, 2003), 1-20.
,
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the ethical

and

critical

import of Auschwitz demands an
elucidation, however bnef,
of the

import of this approach in relation
to others.
In Israel, for example, the
logic

the

way

the Judeocide

of nation-state building has

represented. Israeli national identity

is

example of what Ernst Renan, writing

many

memory

is

things .”

6

Memory

is

almost a textbook

is

in the nineteenth-century,
referred to as “the

essence of a nation”: “all individuals
have
forgotten

significantly shaped

many

crucial

in

common

things in

but they have

nation building, especially because

a combination of remembering and
forgetting (if we

remember everything we

might be as immobile as Jorge Luis Borges’
Funes), and the constitution of a national
identity precisely requires the

forgetfulness. Still,

silencing.

same mechanism of

what Renan referred

One only

forgets things that

of Palestinian dispossession

James

E.

Young has

Israel in relation to the

shrill,

it

were already considered

to

is

It is

Ernst Renan,

“What

is

New York:

as well as

it

cannot be ever forgotten

Take, for instance, the suffering

a non-event.

memory

Judeocide in the following terms: “At times ambivalent,

remember and

memory

to forget,

a Nation?,” trans. Martin

Routledge, 1990),

Thom,

11.
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form of

suitable candidates for

described the official discourse on the work of

state-building task and the reasons such a state

(London and

silenced

in the first place.

in relation to Israel.

the official approach to Holocaust

simultaneous need

remembrance

to as forgetting oftentimes takes the

remembrance. But when a particular history
because no one bothered to remember

selective

in Israel has long

at

in

times

been tom between the

between the early founders’ enormous

was necessary, between

in

Nation and Narration ed.
,

the survivors’

Homi

K. Bhabha

memory of

victims and the fighter’s

remembering and

forgetting that

memory of

Young

alludes to

resistance.”

is

7

Yet the

dialectic

of

only in relation to what
stones are

going to be told in relation to
the Judeocide. In other words,
the tensions are confined
within the bounds of Jewish identity.
For the question

without allowing

concern of a Jew.

it

to constitute the center

It is

“How

The

memory and

central concern being

traditional self-image as victim”
with “Zionist ideals

Thus the Judeocide could be emplotted

remember

of one’s Jewish identity?”

precisely along these lines that the

referred to unfolded in Israel.

to

as the

how

the Holocaust

is

the nghtful

forgetting

Young

to reconcile “the Jews’

of strength and self-determination .” 8

end of Jewish

life in exile,

not solely in

reference to the extermination of the
European Jewry, and the establishment of Israel
as a

source of strength, security, and renewal.
sense of national identity.

Its

During world war two, and
and statelessness” but
that

proved

to

it

function resides in helping to forge a strong

lessons are accordingly confined

its

was

Its

immediate aftermath, a

link

by

this national imaginary.

was made “between Holocaust

the link “between rehabilitation and national
rebirth” the one

be the stronger of the two. Even

if

an argument can be made

that

statelessness tout de court, or being a vulnerable
minority within a foreign nation, has

been oftentimes a one of the

common

elements

in

the different genocides of the

twentieth-century (Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, Cambodians, Kurds, and
Tutsi), as well as

of Apartheid regimes such as South Africa, and pseudo apartheid colonial
Israel, the link

Jewish

identity.

between statelessness and genocide was emplotted solely

Only by

societies like

in reference to

casting the Judeocide in Zionist terms, a state can at once found

7

Young, The Texture of Memory, 211. For more on the role of the Judoecide in Israel, see
Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
8

Young, The Texture of Memory, 212-13.
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Tom

Segev, The

its

by reference

identity

with

its

histoncal experience

against ascribing too

To be

to the

much

Judeoctde and reproduce some
of the dynamics assoc, a, ed

5
.

Ye, there

is

a lo, of sense in Petty
Anderson’s warning

exceptionalism to the Zionist colon,
al venture and

sure, Israel colonial occupation

its

cadres.

of Palestine represents a unique
combination of

features associated with past
colonial enterprises: like the
imperialisms of old,
settler society,

but unlike those older powers there

Conversely, once compared
nation-state, Zionist cadres

the dialectic of

to

is

it

is a

no metropolis to respond

to.

other instances of the construction of
an ethnically defined

emerge as “ordinary cleansers .” 10 These are
the elements of

remembrance and forgetfulness

in Israel’s ambivalent relation to
the

Judeocide.

As

already suggested, Palestinian dispossession
does not figure in this dialectic,

even when the

sites

of memory,

les lieux

de memoire cannot entirely erase
,

somewhat

memory of

differently, the

although these hardly

fit

dispossession

is

it.

part of the sites of

within the tradition of holocaust remembrance in

Israel,

State

it

memory,
however

they do partake in the tradition of Palestinian national
identity. Pierre Nora reminds us
that

memory

qualities

It

bound with

can be discerned:

tradition.

Memory is

For

life,

remains a permanent evolution, open

unconscious

g

is

of

its

successive

it

is

within a national tradition that

borne by living societies founded

to the dialectic

deformations,

its

in its

main
name.

of remembering and forgetting,

vulnerable

to

manipulation

and

An

argument can be made on how the present divisions and partitions within the Palestinian zones
in
mostly the offspring of Olso, contributes to a new form of apartheid that frightfully resembles the
creation of Jewish ghettos under Nazi rule. See Edward Said, “Palestinians Under Siege,”
London Review
Israel,

of Books, 14 December 2000. Also see, by Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York:
Vintage, 2001). For an informative treatment of the complicity of architecture in the occupation and
colonization of Palestine, especially after 1967, see A Civilian Occupation: The Politics
of Israeli
Architecture ed. Raft Segal and Eyal
,

10

Weizman (London and New York:

Perry Anderson, “Scurrying Towards Bethlehem,”

New Left Review
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Verso, 2003).

10 (July/August 2001), 13.

appropriation, susceptible to being
long dormant and periodically
revived.
insofar as

is

it

affective and magical, only

Hence, some might argue,

two national

its

by

perspective of

Israel is a

taboo

There
has

its

identity.

victims

that,

is

become overly

of a

state in the

to

little

Moreover,

none space

Auschwitz within

once broken,

elicits

Amo

Mayer’s suggestion

ways

Segev,

Benny

memory, Mayer

sees

have lead not

that only recently a

new

Morris, Avi Shalim, and

Pierre Nora,

8

It

that

a

imaginary from the

the

memory

Between Memory and

lost

opposite.

it

criticize

12
.

from sight .” 13

Official

If

Nora

memonalizations of

of the Judeocide

in its

has further contributed to the myth-

generation of Israeli historians, such as

Gershom

Shafir,

have begun

to unveil

Israel that include the violence

rather than history

History: Les Lieux de

sees

is

static

and

Tom

by means

of Palestinian

acritical.

Or

Memoire ,” Representations 26 (Spring

as

I

1989),

.

See Edward

W.

Judith Butler, “No,
13

seems

it is

economic, and cultural

to a greater understanding

of sobering accounts of the foundation of
dispossession.

Yet

memory of Auschwitz

that “the

that “the social,

universal, singular, and particular aspects. Instead,

making process

territory.

bogus charges of anti-semitism

static, inflexible” in

Israel

11

for Palestinian suffering within

to criticize this national

mainsprings of the horrors of Auschwitz have
been
history devouring

same

an even more arduous exercise in the
US, where to

thus validity in

is

facts that suit it...”

the imperatives of nation-state
building, or the aspiration to

build one. Thus, there seems to
be

Jewish national

Memory,

malleability in each side of the divide:
Israel and Palestine,

identities seeking the establishment

malleability constrained

official

accommodates those

[...]

Amo

J.

New Left Review 6 (Nov/Dec 2000), 45-53. See
London Review of Books 21 August 2003.

Said, “America’s Last Taboo,”
it’s

not Anti-Semitic,”

Mayer, “Memory and History:

Radical History Review 56 (Spring 1993),

also

,

On

the Poverty of

7.
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Remembering and

Forgetting the Judeocide,”

suggested in the previous chapter,
the era of memorization

remembrance and
on the

historical ignorance.

critical faculties

terrific historians

is

Here one might be tempted

of history vis-a-vis the

perils

at

once the era of

to place

of memory. Yet

this

undue

faith

same group of

provides the best control case for
such an assertion. Their histories

include the violence of Palestinian
dispossession and fully display the
multifarious nature

of Israeli colonialism. Their positions
on the present, however, are much more
tamed and
chastened than their revisions of the past.
Their boldness
political

correlate

14
.

Yet the break with the silencing practices
of

transcends the political choices of
narrative, but

its

is

does not find a
Israeli

emissaries. History, like national stories,

one with specific constraints not available

as one’s narrative

in the archive

presented as a novel,

its

to literary narratives.

memory
is

also a

For as soon

author enjoys a creative freedom the

historian does not. Regardless of whether
or not modernist techniques of representation
are deployed

by means of what Terry Eagleton has

referred to as the irony of modernism

- the effort of representing and
pointing to the limits of your representation in the same

-

gestures

or

by means of Hayden White’s vindication of modernist “middle

voicedness,” there are limits to the representation of historical
events like the Judeocide
Historians are constrained by the available evidence and
comparative controls as

by

rules,

however contingent these

strategies.

14

The

This discussion

latter

is

are,

much

15
.

as

something that imposes constraints on narrative

can easily present constraints

to

what evidence

is

admitted, and what

indebted to Perry Anderson’s editorial, “Scurrying Towards Bethlehem,” especially

pp. 24-28.
15

Terry Eagleton, “Pork Chops and Pineapples,” London Review of Books 23 October 2003; and Hayden
White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” in Probing the Limits
of Representation:
Nazism and the Final Solution, ” ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 3753. For a subtle defense and elaboration of White’s position, see James E. Young, “Toward a Received
,

History of the Holocaust,” History and Theory 36 (December 1997), 21-43. I think that when
formulating White’s arguments he adds a nuance that is not always found in the original versions.
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Young

is

is

allowed to bear

thereof, to

in

it,

but such limits can be reversed

by

the narrative's ability, or
lack

comprehensively account for the phenomena
under study

However, the seclusion of the lessons of
Judeocide
unchallenged.

One of the most eloquent and

16
.

to Israeli borders has not

yet problematic expositions

considered the universal dimension
of the holocaust

the

is

gone

of what could be

one offered by Yehuda Bauer,

a prominent Jewish historian,
in a speech given on the
Holocaust Memorial

Day

to the

German House of Representatives,
The book of which

I

spoke

earlier contains the

should add three additional ones:
children

shall

Ten Commandments. Maybe we

‘You, your children, and your children’s

never become perpetrators’;

‘You,

your children,

children s children shall never, ever allow
yourselves to

your children, and your children’s children
onlookers to mass murder, genocide, or (may
like tragedy.

Bauer anchors
text

whose resonance

Here
essay

never,

be passive

never be repeated) a holocaust-

of non-repetition

in the Bible

-

resides in the Judeo-Christian tradition

avoidance of the holocaust

He

it

never,

victims’; ‘You,

17

his imperatives

Jewish tragedy.

shall

become

and your

is

a founding and canonical

- while

insisting that the

predicated from an understanding of the holocaust as a

then distinguishes between the genocidal practices against Gypsies

I am following Perry Anderson’s critique
of White’s
On Emplotment: Two Kinds of Ruins,” in Probing the

reflections

on

narrative

and

history.

See the

Limits of Representation, 54-65. For another

critique to the rejection

of “realism” by White and other proponents of the “linguistic turn” in history, see
and Theory 34 (February 1995), 84-89.
For accounts that do justice to the role of narrative and literary metaphors in historical writing while
reclaiming a notion of historical truth, see Michel de Certeau, The Writing
of History, trans. Tom Conly
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), especially chaps. 1-2; Roger Chartier^ On the Edge of the
Cliff: History, Language, and Practices, trans. Lydia G. Cochrone (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997); and Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text
in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 65 (January 1990), 59-86.
Berel Lang, “Is

17

it

Possible to Misrepresent the Holocaust?,” History

The speech appears

as an appendix to Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, pp. 261-273.
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8

and other groups, and the extreme
extermination of European Jewry
distinctions, he agues, are

particularity

universal

meant

to offer a balanced account

with

its particularities,

the expense of the other. Surely,
the
different groups are all instances

Bauer’s careful

of the universality and the

of the Judeocide. In so doing,
his argument seeks

moment of Auschwitz

18
.

to

reconfigure the

without privileging 0 priori one

mass murders perpetrated by the Nazis

of genocides of naked human

life,

at

against

either as stateless

individuals, or as designated “zones
of exception.” Insofar as Bauer suggests
that the

holocaust represents an extreme form of
genocide, Auschwitz has become to
symbolize

one the worst forms of suffering and extermination
we have thus
repercussions that both transcend

its

and also

specificity

far witnessed,

instill

one with

a strong sense of

its

situatedness.

Bauer

s

reflections illustrate a productive tension

between the particular and

universal attributes of the holocaust, one discemable
significantly in his depiction of this

extreme genocide

in a context-bounded, yet historicized perspective.

The Holocaust was

was a genocide,
estimation,

its

Kamchatka

to

it

According

to Bauer,

a genocide, but of a special and unprecedented type.”
Insofar as

demands comparison and

it

thus acquires certain universality. In Bauer’s

universal dimension of comparability should concern everyone,
from

Tasmania and from Patagonia

to the

unique genocide, with unprecedented— and, so

far,

Hudson Bay.” And

yet “it

is [still]

unrepeated—characteristics .” 19

a

In this

account, part of the context-bounded uniqueness of the Holocaust resides in the state-

centeredness of

1

On

its

implementation, and, following Saul Friedlander, in the extremeness

the genocidal policies against Gypsies see Gunter

Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
19

Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, x-xi, 39-48, 55, 66, 264-267
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the Gypsies

of the redemptive anti-Semitism
driving the Nazi desire
Jews.

Once

for a total extermination

of the

these aspects of the Judeocide. in
their particular h.storical
configuration, are

rendered comprehensively in a larger
historical narrative, the singularity
and uniqueness

of the Holocaust are discemable

20
.

than this, although “the holocaust

prone

to

make Holocausts

possible

be repeated, not to be sure
but by anyone towards

Even

so, for

Bauer would not compromise

was unprecedented,” he

when

representation and apprehension of

“human

civilization is

conditions are ripe”; namely, “the holocaust
can

in exactly the

anyone .”

adds,

for less

same way, not by Germans, not towards Jews,

21

Therefore,

its

the centrality Bauer ascribes

universality, along with

its

particularity,

to

and

the

how

both are intermingled within the singularity of
these events.
In this

way Bauer

seeks to avoid circumscribing the political and
ethical import of

a catastrophe like Auschwitz. This, in order
to render
illustrate its centrality

rest

of the globe,

to the

be emplotted exclusively

in terms

since the destruction of the

impossible to represent.

ways

that

On

first

afflicting

it

Jews ever

Temple, or presented as the unthinkable, and thus

the contrary, “the Holocaust

“all too

basis for the holocaust need not lead to

or consequence of modernity.

Elie Wiesel

as an unexplainable tragedy, nor can

of the archetypical catastrophes

happened because we are human, perhaps

One need

its

human.”

is

a

human

Sill, this

event,” and

it

affirmation of the

representation as the logical outcome,

not sacrifice

its

particular historical experiences

Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 50, 112-18. See also Saul Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews:
I, The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997).

Volume
21

in

whole of humanity. Contra

and others, the Judeocide can neither be rendered

20

comprehensively

not only for Jews, Europeans, and Westerners: the
lessons of the

Judeocide extend to the

human

it

Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 50.
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and concreteness, while presenting
universality,

reflections

if

in a narrative in

merely a contingent and

Bauer formulates the

latter

which one

political one.

over the world.

purely ideological.

who

This menace

is

It

is

might be repeated—certainly not

maybe even very
be the Jews and

will

—very

it

presented as a warning.

to

It

in the exact

the

who would

There

are,

reflections,

global,

same form, but

founded on the

specifically connected with the Jews.

It is

fact,

like to inflict the

been already copied, though not

same onto

The

the extreme character of the

be compared with other cases of genocide and
has in

of

the next time.

is

it

Should the warning be ignored? Should the Holocaust serve
others

his

we have no way

Germans

same time—because

and the universal cannot be separated.

Holocaust that allows

its

beginning to be understood

similar manner, and

who might be

universal and at the

experience of the Holocaust
specific

Towards the end of

A very special case of genocide took place here—total,

possibly in a similar,

determining

able to discern

is

point in the following severe terms:

the lack of a precedent for the
Holocaust that

It is

all

even

it

yet others ?

to

be

exactly.

as a precedent for

22

however, several problems with Bauer’s arguments.

First,

Bauer assumes the existence of a universal humanist discourse

through his

in

which

his

depiction of the universal ethical and political import of the holocaust can be rendered
intelligibly. Still, as

it

seems

that

we move away from

one moves

to a

more

its

abstract,

particular

and

and context-bounded emplotment,

less credible plane, especially given the

widespread suspicion the positing of a universal narrative

idiom

to

avoid

its

Can we,

non-identical repetition regardless of cultural context?

an emplotment of these
22

elicits.

new

three

commands,

Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 267-68.
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is

then, find an

Or by

offering

Bauer defeating the universality of the

holocaust insofar as these three

Chnstian tradition? In a world

in

commandments

which notions of universality

and are assumed largely discredited,
global narrative? Is

it

its

how can one emplot

are constantly under

the Holocaust in a universal,
or

possible to devise a histoncal narrative
that posits a

it

different configurations of particular
histories playing out within

the realm of singular events? In a
way, the previous chapter offers
to this question, but a

second

set

of problems remains

universal and particular dimensions of the
Judeocide:

Judeocide that should serve as a warning

What
Jews?
its

critical

naked human
s

life

tentative answers

in relation to the division

What

is

makes

its

its

universal lessons?

lessons the sole concern of

The commitment of responding

I

last part

both

of

critical

in the universal.

can only venture to offer very tentative answers

Their elucidation was the

in

to the suffering

cannot overshadow the responsibility of representation and

this point

of the

the universal aspect of the

humanity? What are

concern with non-subsuming the particular

At

my

conception of responsibility needs to address these questions

universal and the particular aspects.

theory

to

are the particular aspects of the Judeocide
that

Any

fire,

possible to devise such narrative in
non-Eurocentnc terms, as a

truly universal narrative? Is

universal history in

are anchored in the
western Judeo-

of the dissertation

that

to these questions.

remained undone.

Still,

one can

suggest that a vigilant attitude towards imperialism, old and new, race thinking,
and the

homogenizing imperatives of the
universal lesson to be derived.

triad nation-state-territory

Some of the

perhaps constitute the most

roots of the violence of the Judeocide can be

traced to the violence of imperialism and the race-thinking that informed
racialization

of

its

victims

is

dissimilar genocides like that of

something

that

this

even

if the

genocide shares with otherwise

Rwanda. The same could be

322

it,

said in relation to the drive

,

towards the creation of a homogenous
population; an

attribute also shared

by instances of

ethnic cleansing that could hardly
be called genocides of the scale
of Auschwitz or

Rwanda

23
.

Similarly both Auschwitz and

Rwanda pose

a crucial

dilemma

to historians

and observers. In both genocides,
massive mobilization and participation
were required,
although with significantly different
degrees of coordination
legitimate offspring of modernity:
Auschwitz

stemming from

was

imperialism in post-colonial Africa. Yet what
industrialization of death in the concentration
that

informed

25
it .

(Both make up for

Judeocide also suggests.) But the only

its

way

Rwanda

by means of
is

camps and

unique significance for Jews, as the temi
to

make

relation to both

core that remains incomprehensible, their
reflection not in order to

without colonizing

23

mend

the gap

Auschwitz was the

“the redemptive anti-semitism”

these analytical connections

by subjecting

histoncism defended in the previous chapter without reducing
Still, in

constituted one of

the legacy of European

distinctive about

historicizing the Judeocide from a global perspective
and

uniqueness be apprehended.

Also, these two are the

a child of the instrumental rationality

the dialectic of enlightenment within,
while

the legacies of this dialectic turned
outwards

24
.

it

to

it.

it

is

to the critical

Only then can

Auschwitz and Rwanda, there

moment of

by

its

is

a

non-identity that triggers further

between concept and

object, but to

comprehend

it

it.

For helpful discussions see Weitz, A Century of Genocide Enzo Traverso, The Origins
of Nazi Violence
Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 2003); Michael Mann’s forthcoming work The Darker Side
;

trans. Janet

°f Democracy, and Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
"4

Cf.

Mamdani, When

Victims

The best treatment of this

Become

last

point

the

Killers, 199.

is

found in Friedlander. Nazi Germany and the Jews, especially chap.

3.
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Politically,

Western

political

the significance of the language
that the Judeocide brought
into

and ethical consciousness seems

dimension. Perhaps

its

most

lasting global legacy

genocide, for “the crime without a

name

to

demand awareness

was

to force the

West

to its universal

to find a

” In the short
twentieth-century, the idiom of

genocide has been used to undo some of
the most painful silences of history

what could be considered genocidal

name,

practices,

even

if not

in relation to

genocide as such as

debatable to the extent that there was
an explicit intent to destroy

,

is

it

such as the

enslavement and eventual extermination of
indigenous populations during the conquest of

America. The term genocide, even though
the twentieth century, has served to

name

it

was coined out of the genocidal

these experiences of

human

politics

of

extermination and

suffering that traditional Western historiography
had silenced, but with the raise in

awareness,

other

instrumentalizations

came

the

to

fore.

In

addition

to

its

intrumentahzation for the sake of nation-building, nowadays,
the language of genocide

invoked

in relation to

what the western

liberal intelligentsia perceive as the

need

to

is

break

with the overwhelming inaction bordering in indifference on
the part of western powers,

mostly the USA.

advanced here

(i.e.

of indifference

spell

are

Even

if there is

some

in relation to the suffering

differences are as sharp, perhaps even

tried to

suffering of

'6

This

is

between

rights

more

of naked human

solely

so.

The

by

the position of

life that is

virtue

critical

defend throughout these pages needs

human

this call

and the perspective

the need for a notion of responsibility that entails breaking with the

presumably guaranteed human

have

similarity

to

life;

of

of human beings
their

that

humanity) the

theory of responsibility that

I

be responsive to not only the

perpetrated at the hands of genocidal politics, but also to

Samantha Power,

‘A

Problem from

York: Basic Books, 2002).
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Hell’:

America and

the

Age of Genocide (New

the suffering that

is

the

outcome of neoliberal market imperatives,
and discourses of

development. In an impassioned essay,
historian Vinay Lai reproached
discussions on

genocide for precisely leaving these
forms of violence nameless as long
as these are not
considered worth the label “genocide .” 27
Although

I

sympathize with Lai’s general claim

on behalf of breaking with the silencing
of neoliberal and developmentalist
violence,

as

well as with his call for a critical
epistemology that breaks with the silencing
of history
that

makes

certain events unthinkable, even

when

they unfold in front of our noses,

strongly disagree with the extension of
the term “genocide” to that form of
violence
this

its

form of violence there

is

no “intent

I

28

In

.

to destroy” a specific ethnic or national
group.

At

worst, one can accuse certain policies to have
genocidal implications, but even this

judgment needs
There

is

to

be

in relation to individual cases

no hierarchy of human

suffering.

unethical at worst. Although historically the

and based on concrete evidence.

To claim one

West has

insisted

is

tasteless at best

on some form of it,

it

and

need

not be invoked, or reinstated. Perhaps, the urgent task remains
to rethink the connections

between (national) development and genocide, or between
genocide and progress,
historically.

To do

so requires breaking with the silences of history, as well as with
the

contemporary silencing of certain forms of violence. This
account of responsibility and
with

that,

comes

a

its

is

constitutive of a critical

task in the important realm of representation. Alongside

newly found sense of responsibility

that requires reflection

"7

Vinay Lai, “Genocide, Barbaric Others, and the Violence of Categories:
American Historical Review 103 (October 1998), 1 187-1 190. Lai’s essay is

on the uses

A

Response to Omer Bartov,”
forum on an essay by
genocide historian Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,”
American Historical Review 103 (June 1998), 771-816. See Bartov’s reply in the same issue, pp. 1191part of a

1194.
28

The best account of a critical epistemology of history is Michel-Rolph
Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
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Trouillot, Silencing the Past:

and abuses of the actions done
collectivity. Instead

the liberal

in one’s

of rapidly embarking

camp demand, whose outcome

that is oftentimes the root

name, and with the power one
generates
in

“humanitarian interventions,” as some
within

has been to further reinstate the
imperial power

of the problem, or

to create

“solved,” what acting responsibly
might require

is

more problems than those

this

also requires that events such as

11

that are

turning the eye inwards, while

demanding stronger accountability and reclaiming
a democratic
yet,

as a

political identity.

And

September are historicized from the

perspective of their imperial background. Such
background not only partly explains them,
but

it

is

also crucial to understanding

how

the events themselves served as a catalyst
for

the strengthening of the imperial adventure. 29

not “our pluralism,” “our prosperity,” or “our

based on those assumptions

human

is

bound

loss within the imperatives

What was

attacked on 11 September was

way of life.” 30 Any memorial

to confine the

work of memory

that is solely

for this recent

of the imperialist nation-state, and thus perpetuate the

indifference of our imperial post-citizens, as well as their
unwitting complicity.

On how

September became such a catalyst for a larger agenda in East Asia and the Middle East, see
by Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, 84-85, 226ff. Still, Johnson suggestion that
the turning point from republic to empire took place after this date is historically inaccurate. See p. 4.
1 1

the discussion

30

These are some of the constitutive elements of the emplotment given by James Young to the attacks on
September in his proposal for a “living memorial” for its victims. See James E. Young, “Remember Life
with Life: The New World Trade Center as Living Memorial,” Presentation for Between Expedience and
Deliberation: A Symposium at the Steven L. Newman Real Estate Institute, Baruch College, 8 February
2002. 1 am grateful to James Young for generously providing me with a written copy of his presentation.
1 1
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